Change search
ReferencesLink to record
Permanent link

Direct link
Centralized and decentralized provision of public goods
University of Bonn, Germany.
University of Bonn, Germany. (Nationalekonomi)ORCID iD: 0000-0003-3719-8594
2012 (English)In: Economics of Governance, ISSN 1435-6104, E-ISSN 1435-8131, Vol. 13, no 1, 73-93 p.Article in journal (Refereed) Published
Abstract [en]

We model the trade-off between centralized and decentralized decision making on the provision of local public goods. Decisions are influenced by spillover effects and differences in jurisdictional size. Centralized decisions aremade in a legislature of locally elected representatives, and this creates a conflict of interest between citizens in different jurisdictions. The legislature can be self-interested or benevolent and this can result in either efficient, excessive, or misallocative provision of public goods. The form of centralized decision making has a significant influence on the incentives for centralizing decision making.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Springer, 2012. Vol. 13, no 1, 73-93 p.
Keyword [en]
Decentralization; Local public goods; Spillovers
National Category
Research subject
URN: urn:nbn:se:kau:diva-45626DOI: 10.1007/s10101-011-0104-4ISI: 000310001400004OAI: diva2:957372
Available from: 2016-09-01 Created: 2016-09-01 Last updated: 2016-10-10Bibliographically approved

Open Access in DiVA

No full text

Other links

Publisher's full text

Search in DiVA

By author/editor
Staal, Klaas
In the same journal
Economics of Governance

Search outside of DiVA

GoogleGoogle Scholar

Altmetric score

Total: 11 hits
ReferencesLink to record
Permanent link

Direct link