Centralized and decentralized provision of public goods
2012 (English)In: Economics of Governance, ISSN 1435-6104, E-ISSN 1435-8131, Vol. 13, no 1, 73-93 p.Article in journal (Refereed) Published
We model the trade-off between centralized and decentralized decision making on the provision of local public goods. Decisions are influenced by spillover effects and differences in jurisdictional size. Centralized decisions aremade in a legislature of locally elected representatives, and this creates a conflict of interest between citizens in different jurisdictions. The legislature can be self-interested or benevolent and this can result in either efficient, excessive, or misallocative provision of public goods. The form of centralized decision making has a significant influence on the incentives for centralizing decision making.
Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Springer, 2012. Vol. 13, no 1, 73-93 p.
Decentralization; Local public goods; Spillovers
Research subject Economics
IdentifiersURN: urn:nbn:se:kau:diva-45626DOI: 10.1007/s10101-011-0104-4ISI: 000310001400004OAI: oai:DiVA.org:kau-45626DiVA: diva2:957372