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Incentives for separation and incentives for public good provision
University of Bonn, Germany. (Nationalekonomi)ORCID iD: 0000-0003-3719-8594
2010 (English)In: Public Choice, ISSN 0048-5829, E-ISSN 1573-7101, Vol. 145, no 3, 531-546 p.Article in journal (Refereed) Published
Abstract [en]

In this paper, I examine how the incentives of regions to unite and to separate are related to the incentives to provide public goods. Separation allows for greater influence over the nature of political decision making while unification allows regions to exploit economies of scale in the provision of public goods. From a social welfare perspective, there are excessive incentives for separation and for the provision of public goods. When incentives for public good provision are not taken into account, however, these incentives can be misinterpreted as incentives for separation.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Dordrecht: Springer, 2010. Vol. 145, no 3, 531-546 p.
Keyword [en]
Unification; Separation; Public good provision; Voting
National Category
Economics
Research subject
Economics
Identifiers
URN: urn:nbn:se:kau:diva-45623DOI: 10.1007/s11127-009-9578-9ISI: 000284975900011OAI: oai:DiVA.org:kau-45623DiVA: diva2:957358
Available from: 2016-09-01 Created: 2016-09-01 Last updated: 2016-09-08Bibliographically approved

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Staal, Klaas
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