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Comparing Security in eBPF and WebAssembly
University of Namur, Belgium.ORCID iD: 0000-0002-4970-3730
Karlstad University, Faculty of Health, Science and Technology (starting 2013), Department of Mathematics and Computer Science (from 2013).ORCID iD: 0009-0005-3850-855X
Karlstad University, Faculty of Health, Science and Technology (starting 2013), Department of Mathematics and Computer Science (from 2013).ORCID iD: 0000-0001-6459-8409
University of Namur, Belgium.ORCID iD: 0000-0001-5275-9308
2023 (English)Conference paper, Published paper (Refereed)
Abstract [en]

This paper examines the security of eBPF and WebAssembly (Wasm), two technologies that have gained widespread adoption in recent years, despite being designed for very different use cases and environments. While eBPF is a technology primarily used within operating system kernels such as Linux, Wasm is a binary instruction format designed for a stack-based virtual machine with use cases extending beyond the web. Recognizing the growth and expanding ambitions of eBPF, Wasm may provide instructive insights, given its design around securely executing arbitrary untrusted programs in complex and hostile environments such as web browsers and clouds. We analyze the security goals, community evolution, memory models, and execution models of both technologies, and conduct a comparative security assessment, exploring memory safety, control flow integrity, API access, and side-channels. Our results show that eBPF has a history of focusing on performance first and security second, while Wasm puts more emphasis on security at the cost of some runtime overheads. Considering language-based restrictions for eBPF and a security model for API access are fruitful directions for future work. © 2023 Owner/Author(s).

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
New York, United States: ACM Publications, 2023. p. 35-41
Keywords [en]
Access control; Computer operating systems; API access; Complex environments; Control-flow integrities; EBPF; Memory safety; Operating system kernel; Security comparison; Side-channel; Threat modeling; Webassembly; Web browsers
National Category
Other Engineering and Technologies
Research subject
Computer Science; Computer Science
Identifiers
URN: urn:nbn:se:kau:diva-104200DOI: 10.1145/3609021.3609306ISI: 001302566100006Scopus ID: 2-s2.0-85169019212OAI: oai:DiVA.org:kau-104200DiVA, id: diva2:1956322
Conference
ACM SIGCOMM 2023
Available from: 2025-05-06 Created: 2025-05-06 Last updated: 2025-05-22Bibliographically approved

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Gbadamosi, BolajiPulls, Tobias

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Dejaeghere, JulesGbadamosi, BolajiPulls, TobiasRochet, Florentin
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Citation style
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