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IDS rule management made easy
Karlstads universitet, Fakulteten för hälsa, natur- och teknikvetenskap (from 2013), Institutionen för matematik och datavetenskap (from 2013). (PriSec)ORCID-id: 0000-0001-9886-6651
Karlstads universitet, Fakulteten för hälsa, natur- och teknikvetenskap (from 2013), Institutionen för matematik och datavetenskap (from 2013). (PriSec)ORCID-id: 0000-0003-0778-4736
2016 (engelsk)Inngår i: Electronics, Computers and Artificial Intelligence (ECAI), 2016 8th International Conference on, IEEE, 2016Konferansepaper, Publicerat paper (Fagfellevurdert)
Abstract [en]

Signature-based intrusion detection systems (IDSs) are commonly utilized in enterprise networks to detect and possibly block a wide variety of attacks. Their application in industrial control systems (ICSs) is also growing rapidly as modem ICSs increasingly use open standard protocols instead of proprietary. Due to an ever changing threat landscape, the rulesets used by these IDSs have grown large and there is no way to verify their precision or accuracy. Such broad and non-optimized rulesets lead to false positives and an unnecessary burden on the IDS, resulting in possible degradation of the security. This work proposes a methodology consisting of a set of tools to help optimize the IDS rulesets and make rule management easier. The work also provides attack traffic data that is expected to benefit the task of IDS assessment.

sted, utgiver, år, opplag, sider
IEEE, 2016.
Serie
International Conference on Electronics Computers and Artificial Intelligence, ISSN 2378-7147
HSV kategori
Identifikatorer
URN: urn:nbn:se:kau:diva-48016DOI: 10.1109/ECAI.2016.7861119ISI: 000402541200055ISBN: 978-1-5090-2048-5 (tryckt)ISBN: 978-1-5090-2047-8 (digital)OAI: oai:DiVA.org:kau-48016DiVA, id: diva2:1076856
Konferanse
8th International Conference on Electronics, Computers and Artificial Intelligence (ECAI), 30 June-2 July 2016, Ploiesti, Romania
Prosjekter
HITS, 4707
Forskningsfinansiär
Knowledge FoundationTilgjengelig fra: 2017-02-24 Laget: 2017-02-24 Sist oppdatert: 2019-11-11bibliografisk kontrollert
Inngår i avhandling
1. Towards Secure Multipath TCP Communication
Åpne denne publikasjonen i ny fane eller vindu >>Towards Secure Multipath TCP Communication
2017 (engelsk)Licentiatavhandling, med artikler (Annet vitenskapelig)
Abstract [en]

The evolution in networking coupled with an increasing demand to improve user experience has led to different proposals to extend the standard TCP. Multipath TCP (MPTCP) is one such extension that has the potential to overcome few inherent limitations in the standard TCP. While MPTCP's design and deployment progresses, most of the focus has been on its compatibility. The security aspect is confined to making sure that the MPTCP protocol itself offers the same security level as the standard TCP.

The topic of this thesis is to investigate the unexpected security implications raised by using MPTCP in the traditional networking environment. The Internet of today has security middle-boxes that perform traffic analysis to detect intrusions and attacks. Such middle-boxes make use of different assumptions about the traffic, e.g., traffic from a single connection always arrives along the same path. This along with many other assumptions may not be true anymore with the advent of MPTCP as traffic can be fragmented and sent over multiple paths simultaneously.

We investigate how practical it is to evade a security middle-box by fragmenting and sending traffic across multiple paths using MPTCP. Realistic attack traffic is used to evaluate such attacks against Snort IDS to show that these attacks are feasible. We then go on to propose possible solutions to detect such attacks and implement them in an MPTCP proxy. The proxy aims to extend the MPTCP performance advantages to servers that only support standard TCP, while ensuring that intrusions can be detected as before. Finally, we investigate the potential MPTCP scenario where security middle-boxes only have access to some of the traffic. We propose and implement an algorithm to perform intrusion detection in such situations and achieve a nearly 90% detection accuracy. Another contribution of this work is a tool, that converts IDS rules into equivalent attack traffic to automate the evaluation of a middle-box.

Abstract [en]

Multipath TCP (MPTCP) is an extension to standard TCP that is close to being standardized. The design of the protocol is progressing, but most of the focus has so far been on its compatibility. The security aspect is confined to making sure that the MPTCP protocol itself offers the same security level as standard TCP. The topic of this thesis is to investigate the unexpected security implications raised by using MPTCP in a traditional networking environment. Today, the security middleboxes make use of different assumptions that may not be true anymore with the advent of MPTCP.We investigate how practical it is to evade a security middlebox by fragmenting and sending traffic across multiple paths using MPTCP. Realistic attack traffic generated from a tool that is also presented in this thesis is used to show that these attacks are feasible. We then go on to propose possible solutions to detect such attacks and implement them in an MPTCP proxy. The proxy aims to extend secure MPTCP performance advantages. We also investigate the MPTCP scenario where security middleboxes can only observe some of the traffic. We propose and implement an algorithm to perform intrusion detection in such situations and achieve a high detection accuracy.

sted, utgiver, år, opplag, sider
Karlstad: Karlstads universitet, 2017. s. 91
Serie
Karlstad University Studies, ISSN 1403-8099 ; 2017:12
Emneord
network security, MPTCP, TCP, IDS, snort, edit-distance
HSV kategori
Forskningsprogram
Datavetenskap
Identifikatorer
urn:nbn:se:kau:diva-48172 (URN)978-91-7063-763-6 (ISBN)978-91-7063-764-3 (ISBN)
Presentation
2017-04-28, 1B364, Karlstad, 13:00 (engelsk)
Opponent
Veileder
Prosjekter
HITS
Tilgjengelig fra: 2017-04-10 Laget: 2017-03-17 Sist oppdatert: 2019-12-02bibliografisk kontrollert

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