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Towards Multipath TCP Aware Security Technologies
Karlstads universitet, Fakulteten för hälsa, natur- och teknikvetenskap (from 2013), Institutionen för matematik och datavetenskap (from 2013). (PriSec)ORCID-id: 0000-0001-9886-6651
Karlstads universitet, Fakulteten för hälsa, natur- och teknikvetenskap (from 2013), Institutionen för matematik och datavetenskap (from 2013). (PriSec)ORCID-id: 0000-0003-0778-4736
Karlstads universitet, Fakulteten för ekonomi, kommunikation och IT, Centrum för HumanIT. Karlstads universitet, Fakulteten för hälsa, natur- och teknikvetenskap (from 2013), Institutionen för matematik och datavetenskap (from 2013). (DISCO)ORCID-id: 0000-0001-7311-9334
2016 (engelsk)Inngår i: 2016 8th IFIP International Conference onNew Technologies, Mobility and Security (NTMS), New York: IEEE, 2016, s. 1-8Konferansepaper, Publicerat paper (Fagfellevurdert)
Abstract [en]

Multipath TCP (MPTCP) is a proposed extension to TCP that enables a number of performance advantages that have not been offered before. While the protocol specification is close to being finalized, there still remain some unaddressed challenges regarding the deployment and security implications of the protocol. This work attempts to tackle some of these concerns by proposing and implementing MPTCP aware security services and deploying them inside a proof of concept MPTCP proxy. The aim is to enable hosts, even those without native MPTCP support, to securely benefit from the MPTCP performance advantages. Our evaluations show that the security services that are implemented enable proper intrusion detection and prevention to thwart potential attacks as well as threshold rules to prevent denial of service (DoS) attacks.

sted, utgiver, år, opplag, sider
New York: IEEE, 2016. s. 1-8
HSV kategori
Identifikatorer
URN: urn:nbn:se:kau:diva-47594DOI: 10.1109/NTMS.2016.7792485ISI: 000391578700063ISBN: 978-1-5090-2914-3 (tryckt)OAI: oai:DiVA.org:kau-47594DiVA, id: diva2:1062535
Konferanse
8th IFIP International Conference on New Technologies, Mobility and Security (NTMS), Larnaca, Cyprus 21-23 November 2016
Prosjekter
HITS, 4707
Forskningsfinansiär
Knowledge FoundationTilgjengelig fra: 2017-01-06 Laget: 2017-01-06 Sist oppdatert: 2020-01-14bibliografisk kontrollert
Inngår i avhandling
1. Towards Secure Multipath TCP Communication
Åpne denne publikasjonen i ny fane eller vindu >>Towards Secure Multipath TCP Communication
2017 (engelsk)Licentiatavhandling, med artikler (Annet vitenskapelig)
Abstract [en]

The evolution in networking coupled with an increasing demand to improve user experience has led to different proposals to extend the standard TCP. Multipath TCP (MPTCP) is one such extension that has the potential to overcome few inherent limitations in the standard TCP. While MPTCP's design and deployment progresses, most of the focus has been on its compatibility. The security aspect is confined to making sure that the MPTCP protocol itself offers the same security level as the standard TCP.

The topic of this thesis is to investigate the unexpected security implications raised by using MPTCP in the traditional networking environment. The Internet of today has security middle-boxes that perform traffic analysis to detect intrusions and attacks. Such middle-boxes make use of different assumptions about the traffic, e.g., traffic from a single connection always arrives along the same path. This along with many other assumptions may not be true anymore with the advent of MPTCP as traffic can be fragmented and sent over multiple paths simultaneously.

We investigate how practical it is to evade a security middle-box by fragmenting and sending traffic across multiple paths using MPTCP. Realistic attack traffic is used to evaluate such attacks against Snort IDS to show that these attacks are feasible. We then go on to propose possible solutions to detect such attacks and implement them in an MPTCP proxy. The proxy aims to extend the MPTCP performance advantages to servers that only support standard TCP, while ensuring that intrusions can be detected as before. Finally, we investigate the potential MPTCP scenario where security middle-boxes only have access to some of the traffic. We propose and implement an algorithm to perform intrusion detection in such situations and achieve a nearly 90% detection accuracy. Another contribution of this work is a tool, that converts IDS rules into equivalent attack traffic to automate the evaluation of a middle-box.

Abstract [en]

Multipath TCP (MPTCP) is an extension to standard TCP that is close to being standardized. The design of the protocol is progressing, but most of the focus has so far been on its compatibility. The security aspect is confined to making sure that the MPTCP protocol itself offers the same security level as standard TCP. The topic of this thesis is to investigate the unexpected security implications raised by using MPTCP in a traditional networking environment. Today, the security middleboxes make use of different assumptions that may not be true anymore with the advent of MPTCP.We investigate how practical it is to evade a security middlebox by fragmenting and sending traffic across multiple paths using MPTCP. Realistic attack traffic generated from a tool that is also presented in this thesis is used to show that these attacks are feasible. We then go on to propose possible solutions to detect such attacks and implement them in an MPTCP proxy. The proxy aims to extend secure MPTCP performance advantages. We also investigate the MPTCP scenario where security middleboxes can only observe some of the traffic. We propose and implement an algorithm to perform intrusion detection in such situations and achieve a high detection accuracy.

sted, utgiver, år, opplag, sider
Karlstad: Karlstads universitet, 2017. s. 91
Serie
Karlstad University Studies, ISSN 1403-8099 ; 2017:12
Emneord
network security, MPTCP, TCP, IDS, snort, edit-distance
HSV kategori
Forskningsprogram
Datavetenskap
Identifikatorer
urn:nbn:se:kau:diva-48172 (URN)978-91-7063-763-6 (ISBN)978-91-7063-764-3 (ISBN)
Presentation
2017-04-28, 1B364, Karlstad, 13:00 (engelsk)
Opponent
Veileder
Prosjekter
HITS
Tilgjengelig fra: 2017-04-10 Laget: 2017-03-17 Sist oppdatert: 2019-12-02bibliografisk kontrollert
2. Life of a Security Middlebox: Challenges with Emerging Protocols and Technologies
Åpne denne publikasjonen i ny fane eller vindu >>Life of a Security Middlebox: Challenges with Emerging Protocols and Technologies
2020 (engelsk)Doktoravhandling, med artikler (Annet vitenskapelig)
Abstract [en]

The Internet of today has intermediary devices known as middleboxes that perform more functions than the normal packet forwarding function of a router. Security middleboxes are a subset of these middleboxes and face an increasingly difficult task to perform their functions correctly. These middleboxes make many assumptions about the traffic that may not hold true any longer with the advent of new protocols such as MPTCP and technologies like end-to-end encryption.

The work in this thesis focuses on security middleboxes and the challenges they face. We develop methods and solutions to help these security middleboxes continue to function correctly. In particular, we investigate the case of using MPTCP over traditional security infrastructure as well as the case of end-to-end encryption. We study how practical it is to evade a security middlebox by fragmenting and sending traffic across multiple paths using MPTCP. We then go on to propose possible solutions to detect such attacks and implement them. The potential MPTCP scenario where security middleboxes only have access to part of the traffic is also investigated and addressed. Moreover, the thesis contributes a machine learning based approach to help security middleboxes detect malware in encrypted traffic without decryption.

Abstract [en]

The Internet of today has intermediary devices known as middleboxes thatperform more functions than the normal packet forwarding function of arouter. Security middleboxes are a subset of these middleboxes and face anincreasingly difficult task to perform their functions correctly in the wake ofemerging protocols and technologies on the Internet. Security middleboxesmake many assumptions about the traffic, e.g., they assume that traffic froma single connection always arrives over the same path and they often expectto observe plaintext data. These along with many other assumptions may nothold true any longer with the advent of new protocols such as MPTCP andtechnologies like end-to-end encryption.

The work in this thesis focuses on security middleboxes and the challengesthey face in performing their functions in an evolving Internet where newnetworking protocols and technologies are regularly introduced. We developmethods and solutions to help these security middleboxes continue to functioncorrectly. In particular, we investigate the case of using MPTCP overtraditional security infrastructure as well as the case of end-to-end encryption.

We study how practical it is to evade a security middlebox by fragmentingand sending traffic across multiple paths using MPTCP. Attack traffic that isgenerated from a self-developed tool is used to evaluate such attacks to showthat these attacks are feasible. We then go on to propose possible solutionsto detect such attacks and implement them. The potential MPTCP scenariowhere security middleboxes only have access to part of the traffic is also investigated.Furthermore, we propose and implement an algorithm to performintrusion detection in such situations. Moreover, the thesis contributes a machinelearning based approach to help security middleboxes detect malware inencrypted traffic without decryption.

sted, utgiver, år, opplag, sider
Karlstad: Karlstads universitet, 2020. s. 26
Serie
Karlstad University Studies, ISSN 1403-8099 ; 2020:10
Emneord
network security, TCP, MPTCP, IDS, Snort, edit-distance, encryption
HSV kategori
Forskningsprogram
Datavetenskap
Identifikatorer
urn:nbn:se:kau:diva-76291 (URN)978-91-7867-093-2 (ISBN)978-91-7867-103-8 (ISBN)
Disputas
2020-02-28, 21A342, Eva Erikssonsalen, Karlstad, 10:15 (engelsk)
Opponent
Veileder
Tilgjengelig fra: 2020-02-05 Laget: 2020-01-14 Sist oppdatert: 2020-02-05bibliografisk kontrollert

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Forlagets fullteksthttp://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/7792485/

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