In an age often understood as globalized, questions of space and territory are pushed to the forefront of political rule. This thesis explores how contemporary regimes of governing are not only practices of 'state craft', but also 'space craft' as power operates in relation to perpetual and encompassing notions of global competition among states, regions and subjects.

In the thesis a conceptual grammar based on so called assemblage thinking and governmentality studies is put forward in order to investigate how globalization is articulated as a problem for governing regional development in Sweden. It is shown how this is nested in specific political rationalities and governmental technologies that emerge in attempts to produce competitiveness.

By approaching the governance of regional development as an assemblage, a vibrant junction of discourses, practices and subjects, the thesis shows how political analysis can rid it self from notions of methodological nationalism, or in other words, a reification of the nation-state as the most appropriate scale for the study of social relations. When doing so it also highlights how complex forms of neoliberal rule lies at the heart of regional development, posing challenges for democratic principles and practices throughout the world.
Space Craft
Globalization and Governmentality in Regional Development

Andreas Öjehag-Pettersson
Space Craft - Globalization and Governmentality in Regional Development

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For Simon

Born in the innovation society. Resist it. Escape it.
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Karlstad, April 2015
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I shall begin this thesis by briefly following two quite different paths. The first one is the main theme of Kurt Vonnegut’s modern classic novel *Slaughterhouse-Five* while the other considers some of the main interventions of the now vast body of literature that is sometimes referred to as *globalization studies*.

In *Slaughterhouse-Five* the protagonist Billy Pilgrim has become ‘unstuck’ in time. The reader follows his trials and tribulations through a series of interconnected moments that relates to a form of critical event, the atrocious bombings of Dresden during the end of the Second World War. To be unstuck in time, Billy claims, means that he is never in just one place; rather, he is a form of multiplicity. In the novel, this is revealed as strange forms of time travels where Billy can manifest himself at any given position along the space/time continuum, a technique he has learned from an alien race named the Tralfamadorians.

On the planet Tralfamadore the inhabitants experience reality in four dimensions. Time, in other words, is neither a separate, distinct quality from space, nor is it a sequential experience with a beginning and an end. This has the effect that Tralfamadorians, and Billy Pilgrim, who has been abducted by them, exist in a radical simultaneity where all events have already occurred and the multiverse is already doomed (indeed, they know that it ends as a consequence of one of their own experiments going wrong). Since Tralfamadorians believe that birth and death are just the limits for the multiplicity of events that constitutes a life, death is not a particularly sad moment. Beings who die will continue to exist within their spatio-temporal interval, constantly (re)appearing in different instances of space/time, and “so it goes”.

Written in the 1960s, the notions of space and time, articulated in this novel coincide with similar articulations in academic disciplines. For instance, in geography, the influence of Einstein’s theories of general and special relativity brought about the concept of *relative space* as opposed to the common understandings of space as an *absolute* concept (Jones, 2009). In philosophy, the
so called *four dimensionality* was coined by Putnam (1966) and Rietdijk (1967) as they formulated the Rietdijk-Putnam argument, based on special relativity, that an observer in space-time occupies a unique plane of simultaneity that is different from that of another observer. This is because special relativity stipulates that observers moving at different relative velocities will experience the world differently in the sense that objects and events will emerge as the observers’ particular experiences of a three dimensional universe. It follows, or so the Rietdijk-Putnam argument goes, that since a multiplicity of such three-dimensional universes are present at the same time, there should be one more dimension that binds them together. In short, this means that the world is actually four-dimensional where time and space are one inseparable unit – time/space.

Now, the present thesis is certainly not a study in philosophy or physics and the main focus is not the ‘nature’ of space. However, it is a thesis about the *politics* of space and spatiality. Furthermore, I would argue that it is a thesis about the production of space(s) (Lefebvre, 1991) and the topologies of power that emerge in contemporary governance. Hence, this will ultimately at some point entail an engagement with the ontology of space, how it functions and how it can be conceptually related to power and politics.

On a more concrete note, the topic of the thesis arose out of an interest in what is sometimes understood as territorial governance (Lidström, 2007) and how the world is often represented in terms of geographically fixed structures in which politics are situated. Since the breakthrough of globalization as an analytical concept during the early 1990s, territorial governance has been pushed to the forefront of modern social theory (Brenner *et al.*, 2003). Hence, discourses of globalization are now nested in more or less all social science disciplines and emerge as intertwined with the core questions of political science, economy, law, geography, sociology, anthropology, history and communications studies, to name a few.

So, for instance, globalization has been theorized as a process that will end the era of the nation state and give birth to a fundamentally new social order (Ohmae, 1993; 1996). Moreover, it has been articulated as a vast network of flows that produces new inside/outside binaries between people, regions and nations (Castells, 1996). It has been linked to new features of modernity as in the works of Anthony Giddens (1990; 2002), and highlighted as part of Ulrich Beck’s (1992) risk society. Globalization has also been studied extensively in relation to business, economics and the market system in general (cf. Krugeman & Venables, 1995; Levitt, 1993; Stiglitz, 2003). On this note, it has also been
articulated as a more or less ‘natural’ extension of modern capitalism and its neoliberal manifestation (Cox, 1997; Harvey, 2005; Wallerstein, 2004). Furthermore, globalization has been: linked to the concept of the *social imaginary* (Appadurai, 1996); articulated as a force that reconfigures territories and gives rise to world cities (Sassen, 2008); problematized in relation to gender and race inequalities (Hoogvelt, 2006; Massey, 1994); and, indeed, it has been heavily criticized as a ‘folly’ and pointed out as a more or less redundant concept for social science analysis (Ferguson, 2005; Hirst, Thompson & Bromley, 2009; Rosenberg, 2005).

Hence, by considering only some of the most prominent works such as those above, it is clear that globalization studies has been a multi-disciplinary endeavor with many sub-themes, topics and issues. Literally thousands of articles and books have been published each year since the middle of the 1990s and while some have pointed to a death of globalization both as a phenomenon and as a field for academic inquiry a few years into the new millennium (cf. Rosenberg, 2005), research continues to be produced at a staggering rate (Liu, Hong & Liu, 2012). In this thesis I have no intention to approach globalization as kind of grand narrative. However, I do pick up on a particular subset of issues and questions of globalization studies relating to what I call *territorial reconfiguration*.

More precisely, this thesis consists of three interrelated case studies focused on the governance of Swedish regional development and how this entanglement of practices, discourses and subjects come together to (re)produce globalization. In addition, each of the three studies also highlights how globalization can be said to influence Swedish regional development in a number of tangible ways.

By mobilizing so called *assemblage thinking* (Acuto & Curtis, 2014; Ong & Collier, 2005; Sassen, 2006) I approach, not a predefined, territorially bounded unity, but rather a vibrant, changing and mobile set of interconnected sites where the practices, discourses and subjects of Swedish regional development manifest. It is this alloy that I denote the assemblage of Swedish regional development governance, and I argue that by studying the (re)production of globalization nested in it, we may gain new insights into how power operates and functions in relation to *territorial reconfigurations*.

Importantly, while I do use the figure of an assemblage more as a tactic or tool for delimiting empirical research than as a fully-fledged theory (cf. DeLanda, 2000; 2006; Deleuze & Guattari, 2004; 2009), I recognize that it enables a form of study where *space* is not taken for granted as a residual
category, or stage, where social practices are played out (cf. Massey, 1994; 2005). On the contrary, by approaching the governance of Swedish regional development precisely as an assemblage, I intend not only to escape but also engage with, and possibly disable, what John Agnew (1994) has called the territorial trap of international relations and political science. This means that assemblage thinking, and the empirical focus on Swedish regional development, steers away from forms of methodological nationalism, which is a common denominator for the social sciences in general, and (surprisingly) also in studies of globalization as well as governmentality (Brenner, 2004; Larner & Walters, 2004; Scholte, 2005; Strandsbjerg, 2010).

So, if assemblage thinking represents my way of approaching this particular domain of social reality in which we may study globalization in the making, so called governmentality studies (cf. Dean, 2010; Foucault, 2007; 2008; Larner & Walters, 2004; Li, 2007; Miller & Rose, 2008) represents the main inspiration for how to analyze it in terms of power and politics. To be more precise, I spend the first part of the thesis fashioning a kind of conceptual grammar building on assemblage thinking and governmentality studies. This means that I understand the practice of governing any given aspect of ‘the real’ to entail a form of problematization of this aspect which in turn is intertwined with certain political rationalities that mark the domain in terms of what it ‘is’ and how it functions. Moreover, I also recognize that the practice of governing presupposes and produces specific subjects of rule (and rulers), and in addition, how instating a particular domain as a governable space also is a matter of ‘rendering this technical’ (Murray Li, 2007).

Thus, the first case study investigates the assemblage of regional development in Sweden in terms of how globalization is articulated as a problem for governing and how this in turn produces a range of political rationalities that, according to my analysis, form certain chains of rationale that function as ways of steering the assemblage towards globally competitive Swedish regions. The second case study then explores how these rationalities produce certain social actors that are articulated as particularly important in a perceived world of global competition. The third, and final, case study then turns towards the technological side of governing the assemblage as I consider two forms of governmental technologies. First, how Swedish regional policy has evolved into a practice which is often articulated in multimodal texts, or that is to say, in the form of, for instance, documents with lots of images, typography, graphic design, drawings, tables, figures and numbers, and second, how performance indices represent a salient feature in the assemblage as it strives towards
comparability, benchmarking and learning. In all of the three studies, I also pay explicit attention to how the assemblage can be said to produce *global forms* (Ong & Collier, 2005) and thus, in certain ways, show how the governance of Swedish regional development produces globalization. This is then elaborated on in broader terms in the final chapter of the thesis where I discuss, in some detail, how we may understand the spaces that form around the assemblage of regional governance as *spaces of exception* where a neoliberal form of regions prevail. I argue that this *neo-regional* space can be understood as a *postpolis* (Tesfahuney & Schough, 2009) and as such is marked by certain logics and modes of in/exclusions.

Broadly speaking then, it can be said that this thesis relates to questions of a (re)configuration of social relations as I study the production of globalization in certain governmental sites. When doing so, I consider the political aspects of such a production and I rest my case on an ontological position where *space* is neither absolute, nor relative but *relational*. In other words, I think of space as produced through social practice and conceptualize it as social relations stretched out in time-space as a multiplicity of trajectories (Massey, 2005). In short, in some respects I will try to think like Billy Pilgrim and the Tralfamadorians, albeit in a much less deterministic fashion.

### 1.1 Formulating a Research Problem

Empirically, this thesis is concerned with the production of globalization in the governance of Swedish regional development, but first lets paint with broader strokes. All societies must deal with the problem of *order* or rather the problem of *ordering*. How do we order our forms of rule, our economy, our education, our health (care), our work place, our lives, our deaths? John Law (1994:4) has stated that:

> Many of us have learned to cleave to an order. This is a modernists dream. In one way or another, we are attached to the idea that if our lives, our organizations, our social theories or our societies were ‘properly ordered’ then all would be well. And we take it that such ordering is possible, at least some of the time. So when we encounter complexity we tend to treat it as distraction. We treat it as the sign of the limits to order. Or we think of it as evidence of failure.

In various political systems, democracies as well as totalitarian polities, this question of handling the complexity of rule is central. Indeed, the modernist dream that Law speaks of has expanded, and transformed during the last centuries so that we now include more and more segments of ‘reality’ in our political ambitions of ordering. Hence, human societies now strive to order
everything from sub-atomic particles and genomes to the earth’s climate, showing remarkable faith in their capacities to govern and control any form of dis-order.

As Michel Foucault (cf. 2008) has shown, a significant shift occurred in this pursuit of order during the early modern period. At this point, political rule had been renegotiated in terms of some fundamental aspects of how it dealt with the ordering of its subjects, or what Foucault termed its biopolitics. This, he claimed, are ways for the system of rule to govern the people by producing rationalities and techniques that seek to order their behavior and relations towards each other and the system of rule. Specifically, through what he has called ‘the governmentalization of the state’ (Foucault, 2007:109), the practice of government has shifted to a more ‘productive’ reasoning rather than repressive and deductive. With the articulation, recognition and increasing implementation of liberal thought during the early modern period, the notion of the state, and the rule it imposes, shifted from being very connected to the sovereign ruler to the more abstract apparatus of government as separate from personal sovereignty. Whereas the sovereign ruler would in a sense ‘kill and let live’ (Dean, 2010:125) in order to rule society so that his desired ordering could be expressed, the emerging governments, inspired by liberal ideas, started to build a system of rule where the individual subjects were the means and end for this system of rule. Importantly, this new focus sought to administer the well being of entire populations through biopolitics:

Bio-politics is a politics concerning the administration of life, particularly as it appears at the level of populations. [...] It is concerned with matters of life and death, with birth and propagation, with health and illness, both physical and mental, and with the processes that sustain or retard the social, cultural, environmental, economic and geographic conditions under which humans live, procreate, become ill, maintain health or become healthy, and die. From this perspective bio-politics is concerned with the family, with housing, living and working conditions, with what we call ‘lifestyle’, with public health issues, patterns of migration, levels of economic growth and the standards of living. It is also concerned with the bio-sphere in which humans dwell.

This focus on biopolitics then, emerged in the early modern period and evolved over time into the expressions we find in today’s advanced liberal state.

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1 By the ‘early modern period’ I here mean the time span that follows on the late medieval times up until the industrial revolution. The time frame is not so important. However, the emergence of biopolitics is connected theoretically to the reformulated relationship between the sovereign ruler and the people that can be traced in the writings of Machiavelli to Grotius, to Hobbes, through Locke, and into the enlightenment of Rousseau. Gradually, as the social contract becomes important in liberal thought, the relationship between the ruler and the ruled shifts and starts to reflect some of the natural rights articulated by these writers. Now, I wish to stress again that I do not take this to be a linear process and the evolution of biopolitics as accounted for by Foucault (2008) certainly is a generalized description, that actually bears traces of eurocentrism as well reductionism.
formations (as well as authoritarian regimes of the present day). Naturally, this has not been a linear process in space-time or equally expressed in the present multiplicity of polities. In short, the mentalities of governing change over time. However, the point I wish to make here is that governing can still be characterized as an act that aims to bring order to the complex compositions of subjects, events and physical objects that together form social reality.

As a consequence of globalization, recent decades can be understood as a time when the foundations for biopolitics have been displaced and rearranged. In other words, if we believe that social relations now to some significant degree are more ‘stretched out’ (Massey, 1994: 2005), then we may ask what this means in terms of biopolitics. Indeed, as Wendy Larner and William Walters (2004) have argued, while many Foucauldian oriented studies are interested in the manifold modalities of biopolitics in modern times, these studies have also tended to (re)produce the nation state as the central object for their study:

A noticeable feature of governmentality research is its domestic orientation. Overwhelmingly, these studies have taken the nation-state as their analytical locale. A glance at the contents of the major collections in this area reveals but a handful of contributions which consider the government of processes beyond or across political borders […] (Larner & Walters, 2004:5).

In this way, governmentality studies in general can be said to be stuck in what John Agnew (1994) has called the territorial trap, or in other words the propensity of social scientists to reify the territorial state as a prerequisite for society and social relations. This has spurred both a methodological territorialism as well as a methodological nationalism (Brenner, 2004; Elden, 2010; Strandsbjerg, 2010). This means that as studies are carried out by social scientists in general, and political scientists in particular, they often assume that state territory is a container for all important social relations, and moreover, that this container is clearly defined and delineated along borders that produce units (nation states) which are a kind of natural starting point for social inquiry (Agnew, 1994; Elden, 2005; 2010).

Ever since globalization studies emerged during the 1990s, an important sub-theme that recurs in the literature has been what we may call territorial reconfigurations as a consequence of globalization. Importantly, related to this has been an ongoing and intense discussion concerning the ontology of space and the territorial trap (Agnew, 1994). To typecast this more complex strand of literature, recent years have seen two contrasting views clash in their theorization. The first one is often labeled the scalar position and the second is
usually conceived of as the relational position (cf. Amin, 2004; Allen, 2011a; Allen & Cochrane, 2007; Cox, 2013; Marston, Jones & Woodward, 2005). At the center of this debate lies questions about how space should be perceived in order to understand globalization and the possible territorial reconfigurations that follows from it. While there certainly are differences between the two positions, it is at this point more interesting to focus on the fact that they both articulate the salience of space in the age of globalization, and what is more, they generally also depart from the constructivist understandings that space is intertwined with social relations and that it is in this sense produced (Lefebvre, 1991).

Furthermore, these recent theoretical articulations have another interesting feature in as much as that they often use the spatial construct of the ‘region’ as their point of departure and theoretical laboratory. Lately, this construct seems to be of particular importance, not only in the debate on space, but also in what has risen to become a widely spread practice of fostering innovation systems, clusters and creative communities to promote significant and reliable growth throughout Europe and beyond (Florida, 2005; Porter, 1998; Sum, 2009).

In the particular strand of literature that deals with sub-national regions, this resurgence of their object of study has been noticed at least since the late 1990s and coincides with the development of globalization theory. So called New Regionalism (cf. Keating, 1998; 2003; Lagendijk, 2001) is used as a label for a theoretical perspective as well as a form of empirical observation concerning the general state of sub-national regions. In short, scholars involved with this strand have pointed to a number of important shifts in the ways that regions function today as compared with previous times (old regionalism). Most notably, in the new-regionalist discourse that has been prominent within European politics since the 1990s the regions must now, in a sense, ‘fend for themselves’, producing their own prosperity while ideally also function as nodes in a machinery of growth that serves the states within which they are situated (Mitander, Säll & Öjehag-Pettersson, 2013; Säll & Öjehag-Pettersson, 2013; Säll, 2012; 2014). In such articulations one of the most important drivers for the changes are usually understood to be globalization and (global) competition (Fitjar, 2010; Keating, 1998).

Growing out of the debates on space and regions, novel ways of interpreting and understanding spatial politics in the era of globalization have been suggested. To begin with, Massey (1994; 2005) and others that stress the relational qualities of space have drawn attention to how this process or phenomenon we call globalization, as well as the ‘global space’ that is associated
with it, must be produced somewhere. That is to say, since for Massey space is ‘social relations stretched out’ (1994:2) and since social practices arise in specific spatial sites (often localized and in a particular delimited physical terrain) ‘the global’ is not just some ‘out there’ space that imposes limits and regulations upon local spaces. Rather, the local and the global must be thought of together as relationally co-constitutive of each other, and indeed, produced through one another (cf. Lefebvre, 1991; Swyngedouw, 1992).

Building on such premises that space is relationally produced, Aihwa Ong and Stephen Collier (2005) conceptualized what they call global assemblages inspired by the theoretical articulations of Deleuze and Guattari (2004, 2009) and Actor-Network Theory (ANT) as developed by, among others, John Law (1994), Bruno Latour (2005) and Annemarie Mol (2002). Assemblages in this conception is a sort of coming together of a range of practices, objects and discourses that relate to a particular segment of the social world, such as, for instance, the governance of regional development. Ong and Collier (2005:11) argue that there are a number of such assemblages that take on ‘global forms’ so that while the governance of regional development involves a wide range of locally situated aspects, the assemblage of practices, objects and discourses also picks up distinct global qualities. ‘Global space’ therefore can be interpreted as produced through a number of such global assemblages that together combine in forming what the global is and how it relates to the local.

I argue that this series of interconnected articulations described above can be used as a basis for new ways of understanding globalization as well as some of its concrete effects on politics and power. More precisely, using the figure of assemblages coupled with a relational perspective on space, the theoretical building blocks are in place for fashioning detailed studies of practices that continuously contribute to the ongoing production of globalization. Since the construct of the region has been articulated as resurgent under conditions of globalization (cf. Cox, 2009; Lobao, Martín & Rodríguez-Pose, 2009; Keating, 1997; 2003; 2013; Keating, Cairney & Hepburn, 2009), the practices of regional development seem like an interesting instance of governing which has clear bearing on issues of globalization and the possible territorial reconfigurations that stems from it.

In Sweden, the question of how to govern sub-national regions has been debated and argued over since the 1960s at least (Johansson, 2013). Yet, this discussion has taken new turns and been intensified since the end of the 1990s with a number of new regional administrative units emerging. Thus, the Swedish case is one where there is a lively and ongoing discussion concerning
the function of regions under conditions of globalization, and the governance of how these regions should be developed and instated in the broader polity can serve as a nexus where globalization, territorial reconfiguration, biopolitics and questions of power are both visible and possible to study.

Now, I find it important to emphasize very clearly that in understanding the form of problem existing in the intersections of ‘the global’ and ‘the local’, I do not intend to think of it in reductionist terms. By reductionism I mean here a form of methodological aspiration to draw lines between different classes of phenomena, categorizing them as either independent variables or dependent variables. Indeed, such reductionism is legio in political science (as in the social sciences as a whole) and of course it has its benefits. For one thing it offers parsimonious explanations – the possibility to describe and account for something using only a few derived principles is a long-lived ambition in all sciences. However, as argued by John Law (1994), this form of methodological reductionism tends to become dualistic and reified simplifications that pay more attention to certain parts of explanations than to others, not only because they matter more, but also because the reductions offers convenience.

Therefore I would like to think of the concepts introduced so far as a set of problematized components that may be assembled together to form a sort of horizon against which one may formulate critical questions. So, without specifying variables or directions, the puzzle and problem I wish to study in this thesis can be stated in a compact format. I am interested in how we order our societies under the contemporary forms of globalization, and how globalization is produced in this ordering of space(s). Furthermore I am interested in what this means in terms of power, and (bio)politics, and suggest that in order to provide fruitful answers to such questions, we need to engage with the territorial trap and its associated methodological nationalism.

For these reasons the general aim of this thesis is twofold. I wish to both theoretically contribute to the debate on globalization and how it can be understood and analyzed in terms of assemblages, while also showcasing how the particular theoretical framework proposed here makes it possible to highlight the empirical effects of globalization. The particular effects I am interested in are what may broadly be identified as power effects and biopolitics, and before I state the purpose and specific research questions more formally, I wish to make a quick detour so as to illustrate the particular questions of power (and politics) I have in mind. For this reason the next section introduces the notion of governmentality in some more detail as I suggest that this framework is useful in analyzing the governance of regional development in Sweden.
In order to study the production of globalization in Swedish regional development, I use the Foucauldian concept of governmentality as a framework. The original concept introduced by Foucault in his lectures at Collège de France has been developed and furthered by, for instance, Miller & Rose (2008), Larner & Walters (2002; 2004) as well as Dean (2010). The applications and theories differ slightly, but there are enough common notions to speak of a fairly unified theme of governmentality studies.

Governmentality in general has been developed in relation to the concept of government, and etymologically it therefore also shares origin with the more recent articulations of governance. If we start by paying attention to the common element of all the terms, namely the verb ‘to govern’, the term clearly relates in some way to a form of control and regulation of a particular object or domain. The practice of government then can be understood as a set of rationalities, techniques, formulations, thoughts and actions with the purpose to steer, control and regulate the conduct of human beings or the functions of specific domains of reality. Thus the practice of government can be conceptualized as ‘the conduct of conduct’ (Dean, 2010:17). Studies of governmentality therefore seek to trace the specific rationalities, techniques and thoughts that frame and delimit the frontiers and horizons for the practice of government at any given time in a particular locale.

Furthermore, in governmentality studies, the domains where the practice of government is enacted are in turn conceptualized as assemblages of interrelated practices. The conceptualization of these domains has been termed variously by different scholars and in different traditions. Hence, a domain where governmentally in a sense is being enacted has been called a regime of practice, an apparatus, a Dispositive and indeed also ‘just’ an assemblage (cf. Dean, 2010; Deleuze, 1992; Foucault, 2007; 2008; Larner & Walters, 2004; Murray Li, 2007; Miller & Rose, 2008; Pløger, 2008; Valverde, 2007). Here I will use the term assemblage to refer to the multifaceted steering, control and regulation enmeshed in practices and discourses of any given social function as it is being made the object of governing. For instance, the complex acts of punishing or

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2 I will get back to this rather confusing way that terms and concepts have been used to study aspects of governmentality; however I want to make the point here that what I suggest is an explicit combination of assemblage studies (cf. Ong & Collier, 2005) with governmentality thinking (Dean, 2010; Miller & Rose, 2008). Now, this is not entirely uncontroversial since to ‘think assemblages’ does not at all necessitate a Foucauldian reasoning. However, I follow the call raised by some prominent such scholars (Collier, 2014) to actually fashion a more merged version of assemblage thinking with Foucault’s concepts and methodology. This is further elaborated in chapters two, three and four.
caring in a society are regulated and enacted through such assemblages of practices and therefore constitute particular surfaces where we can study governmentality in action (Dean, 2010). Thus, in a society there exists a large but finite number of such assemblages at any given time. They relate to each other in such ways that they can be thought of as intermeshing and relationally producing each other and elements can be transferred from one assemblage to another given the right circumstances (Dean, 2010).

So, in this thesis I will make the case that a fruitful way of furthering research based on assemblage thinking is to posit that the assemblages can be analysed using the concepts developed by Foucault (2007) and governmentality scholars (Dean, 2010; 2013; Miller & Rose, 2008). Hence, if thinking assemblages provides a frame for delimiting the empirical object, focusing on the governmentality of such an object of study allows for critical analysis of how an assemblage is steered, regulated and controlled.

Following Dean (2010), Miller and Rose (2008) as well as Foucault’s own lectures (2007; 2008) and the interventions of Ong and Collier (2005), we may understand assemblages to share some basic features that render them researchable and open to critical analysis. More precisely, they can be thought of as revolving around two related but separate concepts, namely political rationalities and governmental technologies. Together these analytical categories form a matrix of possibilities and restrictions that delimits and enables features of an assemblage.

The political rationalities can be viewed as the way the governing of an assemblage is made rational. Thus, as subjects operate within it, they do it according to certain logics that relate to collective knowledge and thoughts. These include, for instance, ideas on who the governors and the governed are, what the nature of the particular domain that we want to govern is, and by what means we should work on maintaining or improving the assemblage.

The political rationale of an assemblage, in other words, draws upon a number of sources of knowledge in relation to the practices, discourses and objects that constitute it. Expert knowledge is particularly important in modern societies as it helps legitimate the conduct of conduct within a particular domain that is being rendered the object of governing. To make this slightly less abstract, think of the assemblage that I have so far called the governance of regional development in Sweden. It constitutes a particular domain of governing where the political rationality to a large extent draws upon the expert knowledge produced in the academic disciplines of political science, geography, economics and business. Thus, the knowledge produced by political scientists
and geographers concerning regions helps constitute and legitimize dominant
types of how to govern Swedish regions. Likewise, the governing of Swedish
regions also draws heavily on private consultany firms as knowledge producers
and so, together with the academic expertise, they help constitute a field within
which the political rationalities of regional governance form and transform (cf.
Säll, 2014).

It is therefore important to note that a significant part of governmentality
studies tries to understand how thought and rationality operate within an
assemblage. Researchers seek to find the rationale that legitimates practices and
that gives rise to certain technologies through which the rationality is enacted.
Thus, such an analysis of government is in broad terms interested in what kinds
of ‘truths’ there are within a particular regime. While the assemblages draw
upon different bodies of knowledge in order to legitimate their political
rationality, they also produce truths. That is to say, in this Focauldian reasoning,
notions of knowledge are always linked to notions of power (Dean, 2010;
2013). The classic expression of Sir Francis Bacon that ‘knowledge is power’ is
therefore only part of the concern of governmentality studies. Rather, much of
the focus is on how power is knowledge producing.3

Important aspects of the truth productions within assemblages are related to
the governmental technologies (Dean, 2010; Foucault; 2007; 2008; Miller &
Rose, 2008). These are interlinked with the political rationality, but not
reducible to it. In broad terms, we can understand the governmental
technologies as instruments, techniques, procedures, mechanisms, machineries,
tools and equipment that are deployed within a given assemblage in order to
govern. Consider, for example, how academics and consultants in the regime of
regional governance in Sweden produce vast amounts of indices, measurement
instruments, ceremonies and disseminate conferences through which dominant
rationalities may be expressed (and indeed also produced and strengthened). It
may be a matter of ranking regions with respect to innovative capacities or
entrepreneurial spirit, conducting surveys that measure regional happiness and
satisfaction with life in general as well as the orchestrating of deliberative
dialogues with (and among) ‘the public’ at different events and the production
of specific documents, such as regional development strategies.

Often, the political rationalities and governmental technologies are not
reflected upon by active agents within the assemblage; rather they are treated as

3 The analysis in this thesis rests on what may broadly be defined as a Foucauldian perspective on
power (c.f Digeser 1992; Dean, 2013). I expand on this in the methodology chapter, so for now
suffice to say that Foucault referred to power and knowledge as a more or less united in one
composite concept - often written as power/knowledge.
'the way to do things’ or in other words taken for granted. A governmentality study of a given assemblage therefore:

[..] examines how such a regime gives rise to and depends upon particular forms of knowledge and how, as a consequence of this, it becomes the target of various programmes of reform and change. It considers how this regime has a technical or technological dimension and analyzes the characteristic techniques, instrumentalities and mechanisms through which such practices operate, by which they attempt to realize their goals, and through which they have a range of effects (Dean, 2010: 31).

Moreover, studies of governmentality give priority to how-questions, or, in other words, they ask how we govern or are governed within a particular assemblage. This is not to be understood as a simple description of ‘how things look’ at some kind of face value. On the contrary, to ask how-questions is to ask for the very foundation of political logics. It is to direct attention towards issues of what kind of problematizations are at all possible within the particular domain, and indeed also what kind of problem that must be in place for that domain to be thought of as the object for governing in the first place (Murray Li, 2007). Furthermore it is to ask how an assemblage produces and categorizes social actors4 and how this also gives rise to issues of domination and control (Dean, 2010).

Thus, a study of governmentality ‘stands in contrast to theories of government that ask ‘who rules?’, ‘what is the source of that rule?’ and ‘what is the basis of its legitimacy?”’ (Dean, 2010: 39). In fact, such a focus is considered of less importance since it departs from an understanding of power that does not resonate well with the view taken by most scholars of governmentality. This view of power:

[..] is not a zero-sum game played within an a priori structural distribution. It is rather the (mobile and open) resultant of the loose and changing assemblage of governmental techniques, practices and rationalities (Dean, 2010: 40).

Thus, in this understanding of power, how-questions also highlight the production and categorization of social actors within a given assemblage and the issues of domination and control that come with it. Therefore, it is crucial

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4 Throughout this thesis I use the concept ‘social actors’ more or less interchangeably with the concept of ‘subject position’. While the latter are more common in Post-Structuralist Discourse Theory (Laclau & Mouffe, 2001; Howarth, 2000) I opt for ‘social actors’ that may be more commonly used in Critical Discourse Analysis (cf. Wodak & Meyer, 2009). By doing so I do not intend to make an important statement and I do think that it is fair to say that the concepts in many ways refer to the same phenomenon. At the same time I cannot help to feel that the notion of ‘subject positions’ lies much closer to human subjects than ‘social actors’. To me, ‘social actors’ are produced through discourse, just as ‘subject positions’. However, I find it easier to speak of the way, for instance, companies, machines or regions are produced as ‘social actors’ rather than as subjects.
to this kind of analysis to investigate the capacities and liberties that are produced in terms of social actors within the domain.

To ask how-questions and to conduct studies of governmentality can broadly be related to four dimensions of such questions. In broad terms, they are all a matter of analyzing the political rationales and governmental technologies and they are intertwined with each other, although none is fully reducible to any of the others (Dean, 2010).

(i) **Characteristic forms of visibility.** Governmentality studies generally try to investigate how and by what visual means an assemblage represents its features and subjects. This can involve graphs or diagrams, but also in a more general sense, imagery, tables, drawings and films.

(ii) **Concerns for the technical aspects of government.** This corresponds to the importance of governmental technologies, as vital for steering an assemblage as stated above. Thus governmentality studies take an interest in analyzing the instruments, procedures and tools used to govern in the regime in question.

(iii) **Government as a thoughtful and rational activity.** This means that studies of governmentality explicitly try to make clear the rationalities that are (re)produced within the assemblage.

(iv) **Attention to formation of identities.** Governmentality studies, as mentioned, highlight forms of identity construction within assemblages and aim to make explicit the characteristics, attributes, capacities and liberties that are assumed and constructed for both rulers and the ruled.

In this thesis I study the assemblage of regional development in Sweden and the way it takes on global forms and thus produces globalization (Ong & Collier, 2005). When doing so, I have conceived *assemblage thinking* as a way of delimiting and framing a particular empirical sphere within which it is possible to critically study how power and politics operate through political rationalities and governmental technologies.

On the basis of the introduction above to globalization, regions and governmentality it is now possible to formally specify the purpose and research questions of this thesis.

**1.2.1. Researching What? - Purpose and Questions**

As stated earlier, the main purpose of this thesis is twofold. First, I have a *theoretical* purpose in that I seek to articulate a framework for studying the
production of ‘global space’ in terms of power and politics. This entails the fashioning of a conceptual grammar that combines assemblage thinking with governmentality analysis more explicitly than what is commonly the case.

Second, I have an empirical purpose that concerns the application of the theoretical framework. More specifically, by mobilizing assemblage thinking and governmentality analysis I aim to show how the governance of regional development in Sweden takes global forms and contributes to the production of globalization. At the same time, I aim to show how this production has a recursive character in that it also produces a global form that imposes itself upon the practices of regional development. Put simply, I will illustrate how the production of globalization in the governance of Swedish regional development also generates tangible effects of globalization within that assemblage.

In respect to the first purpose, I develop the framework in the first part of the thesis as I introduce theories of assemblage thinking and governmentality studies in chapter three. I present the theoretical positions in a sequential manner while still paying attention to issues of how concepts and terms can be articulated together. Therefore, the framework is not fully developed until chapter four where I assemble the different pieces into a form of research logic for studying assemblages in terms of governmentality. This logic is then put to work throughout the rest of the thesis as I present three case studies to illuminate the empirical purpose.

The first case study functions as a point of departure. A corpus of some 81 documents pertaining to the assemblage of regional development in Sweden is investigated. As I analyze these texts, I focus on the modes of political rationale that circulate within the assemblage in relation to the way that globalization is understood and articulated as well as how globalization figures as part of a problem worthy to be addressed by government initiatives. The second case study then investigates how social actors are produced within the assemblage as an effect of the dominant modes of rationale and the articulated understandings of globalization that circulate within it. In the third study, I then turn to two examples of governmental technologies as I analyze a sub-set of my corpus, namely the 21 so called Regional Development Strategies (RDS) of Swedish regions as well as an index produced by the Swedish regions in conjunction with private consultants. The empirical part of the thesis is therefore guided by the following set of research questions:
1) **Case Study 1.** How is globalization articulated in the assemblage and how are political rationalities formed in relation to such understandings of globalization?
   a. How is globalization articulated and rendered a problem for governing in the assemblage?
   b. How do political rationalities arise in relation to such notions of globalization and how do they contribute to the formations of truth and legitimization in the assemblage?
   c. How do they contribute to the global forms of the assemblage?

2) **Case Study 2.** How are social actors produced and defined in terms of limitations and capacities in the assemblage?
   a. Which social actors are represented as important in relation to the political rationalities and articulations of globalization?
   b. How can the representation of social actors be understood as producing global forms?

3) **Case Study 3.** How do governmental technologies such as multimodal policy articulations and the production of performance indices enhance or otherwise transform the political rationalities as well as the representations of social actors of the assemblage?
   a. More specifically, how does the use of images, typography, tables, diagrams and drawings in Regional Development Strategy (RDS) documents function as a governmental technology?
   b. Using an index called Innovationsindex as an example, how are such indices, rankings and numbers made to operate as governmental technologies in the assemblage?
   c. Taken together, how can we understand these technologies in relation to the global forms of the assemblage?

So far I have not addressed any issues of delimitations, empiric material and modes of analysis. I will do so in more detail in chapters three and four, however, some clarifying remarks are in order.

Concerning time frame, this thesis aims to showcase a contemporary assemblage, which means that I have chosen to collect empirical material between 2005 and 2014.\(^5\) The time elapsed since then is treated as a form of

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\(^5\) This timeframe is a function of my way of approaching the assemblage methodologically through three distinct sites of emergence. I describe this in more detail in chapter four. It is also worth noting
'stretched present’ that manifests itself in texts produced in relation to the assemblage. This means that while I do understand that ‘things have happened’ during the years that have passed since 2005, I am more interested in uncovering a contemporary simultaneity of practices and discourses than to describe an evolution.

Concerning material and modes of analysis I focus on texts. By ‘texts’ I do not only mean ‘written text’ but rather the much wider connotations used in various forms of Discourse Analysis (DA). Particularly the so-called Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) scholars understand text as the semiotic representation of events and practices. As such, written documents, images, numbers and films are all different modalities of text open to analysis. Therefore, in order to find and display the political rationalities and governmental technologies, I conduct a qualitative text analysis guided by my articulated framework of merged assemblage thinking and governmentality analysis. Again, this is presented in more detail in the chapter on methodology.

1.3 The Road Ahead – Thesis Outline

The body of this thesis can be thought of as comprising two parts. A theoretical and methodological part is unfolded in Chapters 2-4, and the empirical material is analyzed in Chapters 5-7. The thesis is concluded in the last chapter in which I consider the empirical and theoretical parts together and refer back to the thesis purpose and research questions.

Thus, Chapter 2, Space(s) – Globalization, Territory and Regions, functions as a kind of literature review on the vast globalization literature and other research of importance to this thesis. More precisely, first I engage with literature on space and theories of scales and relations that have emerged as important in the wake of globalization. This then leads into a discussion of territorial reconfiguration by focusing on literature that problematizes the notion of territory in political science in general and points to the fallacies of the territorial trap in particular. Finally, I approach the notion of resurgent regions that have gained some prominence in globalization literature, and certainly in regional studies. This means that I center on literature that theorizes and critiques so called new regionalism. For reasons of framing the empirical study, this sections ends with paying attention to recent studies of regional governance in Sweden.

here that only one document from 2005 was collected and most of them are from the last two or three years. Appendix A presents a list of all analyzed documents.
In Chapter 3, *Theoretical Framework – The Governmentality of Assemblages*, I pick up on some of the most central concepts that I have engaged with in the literature review of chapter two as I clarify so called *assemblage thinking* and governmentality studies. Thus, the main goal of the chapter is to highlight how thinking assemblages can be combined with so-called governmentality studies to produce a particular ‘analytics of power’. This means that I follow the calls of Stephen Collier (2014:37) as he has suggested that assemblage thinking should evolve in a direction that involves ‘more Foucault’ to realize its critical potential.

Therefore, the different sections of the chapter introduces, aligns and positions concepts of governmentality alongside assemblage thinking to produce what I call a *conceptual grammar* that can be used to fashion detailed empirical work. This is also supplemented with sections that more comprehensively spell out my take on power.

In Chapter 4, *Methods and Empirical Delimitations*, I present the theoretical themes that have been introduced in chapters two and three in a more condensed fashion. By this I mean that the chapter begins with articulating an empirical schematic based on the conceptual grammar developed so far in the thesis and thus it can also be said to showcase one of the ‘results’ of the thesis in as much as one part of the purpose was precisely to fashion a tool that could be used for empirical studies of globalization.

In addition, chapter four also represents a start of the empirical analysis since it explicitly accounts for steps taken in the empirical research process. How data have been collected, how I intend to analyze it, how the results can be assessed and how a reflexive approach may be understood are all themes considered here.

The empirical part of the thesis begins with the chapter titled *Production and Legitimization of Global Rationale*, providing a starting point and a platform for the following analytical chapters. A corpus of 81 documents pertaining to the assemblage of the governance of Swedish regional development is analyzed and specifically shows how political rationalities are formed in relation to dominant representations of globalization. Thus, this chapter primarily addresses the first set of empirical research questions (1, 1a, 1b and 1c).

The analysis is split into two broader segments where the first considers the ways that globalization is articulated as a problem for governing regional development, and the kind of discursive effects this has. The second segment then scrutinizes how this gives rise to certain *chains of rationale*, and this is followed by an analysis of how these articulations of globalization and the
subsequent chains of rationale are discursively legitimized. The chapter ends with a discussion on how the production of these rationales enables the (re)production of globalization through global forms.

In Chapter 6, *Who’s Your Global Region? – Representing Social Actors and Action*, I introduce an empirical analysis of the social actors that are represented as important in relation to the articulations of globalization and the chains of rationale found in chapter five. This builds primarily on the findings of chapter five as it surveys the corpus of what I call the production of social actors and action, and thus also considers how this production commences. Hence, in terms of research questions, the bedrock of this chapter is the second set (2, 2a and 2b).

Six saliently represented social actors are investigated as I show how the actors are being constructed as important to varying degrees in the assemblage: the women, the region, the corporation, the immigrants, the experts and the entrepreneur are all discursively represented as prominent parts of regional development in Sweden. Yet, the production of them as social actors is stratified and unequal. By probing how these representations are articulated and what effects they have, the chapter ends with a discussion on what this means in terms of global forms, and by extension globalization.

In Chapter 7, *Assemblage Technologies – The Images and Numbers of Global Competitiveness*, the focus is on the third set of research questions (3, 3a, 3b and 3c). In other words, this means, that I analyze two versions of governmental technologies internal to the assemblage of Swedish regional development. The first part of the chapter therefore turns to the so-called RDS documents and the way they articulate policy in multimodal texts. This governmental technology of producing policy as multimodal is analyzed by paying attention to how different forms of texts are assembled to convey particular messages. More specifically, by departing from the dominant rationalities of the assemblage this chapter investigates how these rationalities can be enhanced and modulated through multimodal expressions, such as photographs, drawings, diagrams and colorful typography.

In the second part of the chapter, I analyze what can broadly be understood as the politics of numbers in the assemblage. More specifically, this means that the governmental technology of producing rankings, indices and benchmarking is explored in terms of power and governmentality. The empirical focus is on a particular index called *Innovationsindex* produced by the Swedish regions through the organization Reglab. This index is designed to measure the innovative capacity of all Swedish regions and since its first publication in 2012 it has been
revised once in 2014. The analysis here considers how the index further modulates and enhances aspects of the dominant mode of rationale that I have called *creativity, innovation and entrepreneurship* in chapter five. After this analysis the chapter ends with a discussion on how the governmental technologies help produce global forms.

The thesis then ends with Chapter 8, *Dangerous Regions: Spaces of Exception and Neo-regional Global Forms*, in which the different parts and themes of the thesis are brought together in a concluding discussion. Specifically, this entails a longer review of how we may understand the tangible effects and the global forms of the different empirical analyses together and how this can help inform our understandings of contemporary regional development as sites for the production of globalization. It is argued that the (re)production of globalization here produces the phenomenon as naturalized, inevitable and detached from the power of politics to change its directions. For this reason, regions have been reconfigured into ‘exceptions’, or in other words spaces where neoliberal forms of governmentality reign supreme in order to facilitate competitiveness and growth. The thesis then ends by linking this discussion to the broader discourses of ordering society under global capitalism.
This chapter serves two main functions. First, it is a literary review in the sense that it presents research that connects to and has specific pertinence to the purpose and research questions of the thesis. Second, in the course of presenting relevant research, the chapter also helps to theoretically embed and further explain concepts that are relevant in order to follow the discussions of chapter three and four where more specific theoretical and methodological explorations are carried out.

As for the present chapter, the presentation follows a structure of introducing research in steps, each of which can be understood as a delineation of such works that are of particular importance to the purpose of the thesis. Hence, it begins with a survey of the vast globalization literature that has emerged since the late 1980s (cf. Held & McGrew, 2007a; Scholte, 2005), recognizes how this strand of research has helped reinvigorating discussions of space and scales (cf. Cox, 2013; Jones, 2009; Massey, 2005), follows specific works that, against a backdrop of globalization and space, investigates territorial reconfiguration (cf. Agnew, 1994; Brenner, 2004; Storey, 2012), and finally highlights a strand of literature that emphasizes the importance of regions as a spatial formation under conditions of globalization (cf. Keating, 1998; MacLeod, 2001; Paasi, 2009).

More specifically, the first step is a genealogy of globalization research that presents three main discourses within this strand in the present canonical literature. The genealogy is made possible by a sifting through the enormous output of globalization literature with the use of some bibliographic tools, which help to identify what is generally considered to be the most important works and authors. Furthermore, the genealogy also traces the evolution of globalization studies by evoking a wave analogy through which I represent different themes and issues as appearing at different (but overlapping) points in time, constituting the particular issues that globalization scholars direct their attention to.

While this obviously is a simplification, the genealogy is used here to justify two basic premises concerning globalization research that are of
importance to the next steps of the chapter. First, that one important aspect of globalization research can be understood as *territorial reconfiguration* and second, that theories concerning this aspect in turn must build on certain ontological and epistemological articulations of space.

For this reason, the second step directs attention to issues of space and spatiality. In broad terms I give an account of three different understandings of ‘what space is’, namely *absolute space*, *relative space* and *relational space*, and I align myself and this thesis with the last one. Hence, the presentation of spatial ontologies also helps to situate and define important points of departure for me, but the main purpose is to prepare for an account of a renewed and intensified discussion on *scales and relations*.

While I call this a ‘new’ discussion, I do, however, recognize that within geography such debates have been common for a long time (Amin, 2002; Cox, 2013; Jones, 2009; Marston, 2000; Marston, Jones & Woodward; 2005). Nevertheless, this dialogue has just recently started filtering into neighboring disciplines, such as political science, international relations and anthropology and therefore it makes sense to treat it as ‘new’ for the social sciences in general.

In the third step of the chapter, I turn to research that has debated the meaning and application of territory and territoriality in the social sciences since the breakthrough of globalization. I focus on the threads and links developed in relation to the seminal articulations made by John Agnew (1994) about the *territorial trap*, which has generated a strand of literature that understands the concept of territory as depended on spatial ontologies, thus allowing for reinterpretations of the important trope of *territorial reconfiguration* as an important part of globalization studies.

Finally, I focus on a sub-set of research in the globalization literature that converges with certain strands of urban and regional studies focusing on sub-national regions as new important spaces in the era of globalization and territorial reconfiguration.

During this exposé, I clarify my own position in ways that demonstrate that this thesis rests on a body of research that views space as relationally produced, where globalization is a process in the making, grounded in social practice in a range of different spaces. Furthermore, this thesis tries to escape the territorial trap and methodological nationalism that have been common in political science and international relations by focusing on the region as a spatial construct suitable for understanding the production of globalization. This enables critical investigations not only of such production, but also of the important trope of resurgent regions and
the new regionalist discourse that often directs regional development today.

2.1 A Genealogy of Globalization Research

Theories of globalization have been produced in such abundance since the breakthrough of the concept two decades ago that any representation of them by necessity must be quite incomplete and schematic. At this point in time, many recent influential books on the subject are actually theoretical overviews, compilations and reader companions that try to establish historical patterns, influential themes and competing positions in the field of globalization studies (cf. Bisley, 2007; Coleman & Sajed, 2013; Holton, 2005; Held & McGrew, 2003; 2007a; 2007b; Jones, 2010; Ritzer, 2007; Wunderlich & Warrier, 2007).

At the same time, in terms of articles and journals, some recent publications have focused on mapping the bibliography of the research field, tracing its emergence and evolution through quantitative citation analysis (X Liu, Hong & Y Liu, 2012).

Hence, while the research field is plentiful and more or less impossible to take into account in its totality, it is possible to present a form of genealogy that showcases important articulations and themes. In this chapter, the genealogy serves as a foundation on which the more specific segment of globalization research that deals with issues of space and spatial transformation can rest. My presentation is based on a reading of the material found in the bibliometric article by Liu, Hong & Liu (2012) and my own use of the software Publish or Perish (Harzing, 2007).

As such, the genealogy starts with a description of current discourses of globalization theory before moving on to what I consider are important representations and articulations that have contributed to the present disposition of theories. When doing so, I represent globalization theory as a series of interconnected articulations emerging through four distinct, albeit not discrete, waves where certain questions and answers regarding globalization are raised. I use the analogy of waves rather than phases or stages since it has connotations of a shared body or pool from which they all emerge and at the same time is less sequential. Waves are simultaneous expansions and contractions and they may exist in ways that make them absorb, reflect, refract, interfere with and diffract from each other, highlighting the nonlinear and non-chronological emergence of globalization discourses.
By first illustrating what I call the modernity wave, a set of initial, sometimes competing, articulations concerning the nature of globalization are highlighted as theoretically connected to the historical instance of (post)modernity (Giddens, 1990). Second, a consolidating wave is reproduced here as a set of discussions that furthers and expands the modernity wave while at the same time explicitly articulating globalization theory, bringing it into the center of academic debates (Dicken, 1992; Ohmae, 1993). Third, the critical wave can be understood as assertions of globalization theory that are both empirically and normatively critical of mainstream globalization research (Hirst, Thompson & Bromley, 2009; Hoogvelt, 1997). Finally, the fourth wave is labeled encapsulating, alluding to the many grand works of globalization theory that have emerged since the turn of the millennium, all striving to summarize and bring order to a fragmented debate (Held & McGrew, 2007a; Scholte, 2005).

In sum, the genealogy (based on first the bibliographic analysis and then subsequent readings of the most prominent works) showcases the most central claims within globalization theory and makes it possible to situate and expand on a particular segment of it – namely issues of space(-time) and possible reconfigurations of dominant modes of social ordering.

2.1.1. Two Decades of Globalization Research

As indicated, research on globalization has been conducted in a large number of disciplines and empirical fields and has exploded in quantitative terms during the last two decades. Social scientists have been studying the phenomenon and developed the concept in relation to economy, politics, culture, identity, development, democracy and more or less all major disciplinary concepts.

Naturally, accounting for such a vast research field will always be a matter of selection and simplification. However, one first step could be to investigate the research output from a ‘bird’s eye view’. Doing so makes it possible to show some overall tendencies in terms of what journals are most important, which disciplines are most proliferate and how globalization is theorized in relation to other important concepts.

The bibliometric analysis presented here is based on two sources, first the article, *A Bibliometric Analysis of 20 Years of Globalization Research: 1990-2009* (X Liu, Hong & Y Liu, 2012), and second, my own analysis performed by using the software Publish or Perish (Harzing, 2007). The second step provides some updated information not accounted for in the
article which allowed me to expand some searches into directions more suited for this thesis.\(^6\)

Drawing on the analysis of globalization research made by Liu, Hong and Liu (2012), we can interpret their results in relation to four aspects: the interdisciplinary character of the field, its relatively young age, its most prolific authors/works and the most important sub-topics of globalization studies. In their analysis, Liu, Hong and Liu (2012) use both articles and books to demonstrate the growth and spread of globalization research. As empirical sources, they primarily draw on Web of Knowledge\(^7\) data for analyzing articles and three large online catalogues, The US. Library of Congress, British Library and WorldCat, for books. Since the articles include keywords and other important meta data they constitute the bulk of the analysis. However, the books are an important complement, not least given the fact that the publishing culture is quite different in the social sciences.

First, concerning the research output, an initial interpretation is to acknowledge that globalization studies are to a high degree interdisciplinary and thus follow different paths. Published research during the years 1990-2009 was spread across some 219 disciplinary categories and 2,600 journals listed in the Social Science Citation Index. None of those accounted for more than ten percent of the total output, unlike the case in other areas of study. Usually there are a few disciplinary categories that dominate a field, while in the globalization research field economics, geography, political science, sociology, international relations, anthropology, business and other major disciplines share the research quite evenly in terms of published articles (X Liu, Hong & Y Liu, 2012).

Nevertheless, an interpretation of the analysis suggests that economics is the most common disciplinary category for articles published on globalization closely followed by geography and sociology. However, if political science and international relations are treated as one and the same (which is the case in Sweden), they would combine into being the most common category of globalization publications.

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\(^6\) More specifically, my own analysis using Publish or Perish (2007) allowed me also to investigate the years between 2009-2014. Together with the article by Liu, Hong and Liu (2012) this presented me with a set of authors, journals, articles and books that seemed to be of importance to other globalization scholars. This ‘list’ confirmed and expanded my reading of the globalization literature. In a second step I returned to Publish and Perish (2007) for additional searches using keywords suited for the following sub-sections of this chapter, e.g. state rescaling, territory, space, scale, regions, (new) regionalism and assemblage.

\(^7\) At the time when the article was published the database was still referred to as simply ISI-data. This dates back to its establishment in 1960 under the Institute for Scientific Information (ISI). Since Thomson Reuthers acquired ISI in 1992, it has gradually removed the ISI label, first by calling it Thomson ISI and now officially labeling it Thomson Reuters Web of Knowledge.
Another interesting interpretation is that, while the articles have been distributed quite equally among the disciplines, the reverse is true if one investigates the most important journals in terms of number of publications. The top twenty journals (less than one percent of the total number of journals) account for 13.9 percent of all articles published on globalization. The same journals also hold high rates of citations for articles published in them with some exceptions. In other words, it seems as if there is a set of journals where the most influential research on globalization is published. *Global Networks: A Journal of Transnational Affairs, Globalizations* and *Third World Quarterly* top this list.

Second, globalization research is relatively new. While some of the earliest records of scholarly publications date back to the 1960s, only 16 articles on globalization were published in the year 1990. This, of course, is quite different from the 1682 articles published in 2009. The real upsurge of globalization studies in terms of published articles seems to have come, as noted, in the middle of the 1990s and according to some seemed to peak in the early years of the new millennium before reaching a more stable number of output since then (X Liu, Hong & Y Liu, 2012).

The same tendencies can be highlighted for published books for which the numbers skyrocketed around 1995 after a small but steady growth between the late 1980s and the first years of the 1990s. Like the articles, it is possible to interpret the data as if books too reached a peak somewhere around 2003 when the numbers stabilized around 8 000 publications per year in WorldCat. In the same year, the Library of Congress had around 1 300 publications while the British Library had around 500. Published books on globalization before 1988 seem to be virtually non-existent according to the data in the surveyed catalogues.

Third, interpreting the articles in SCI and SSCI Liu, Hong and Liu (2012) were able to identify some of the most prolific authors on globalization in terms of output and number of citations. Manuel Castells, David Harvey, Anthony Giddens and Saskia Sassen, who all have more than one thousand citations for their work on globalization, top this list. Not far behind are names such as David Held, Arjun Appadurai, Ulrich Beck, Paul Hirst, Roland Robertson, Kenichi Ohmae, Michael E Porter, Paul Krugman, Pierre Bourdieu, Bob Jessop, Doreen Massey and Immanuel Wallerstein. Interestingly enough, it is worth noting that two of the most cited ‘authors’ in globalization studies are institutional organizations, namely the OECD and the World Bank.
These authors also produced the most cited books and articles in the field. So a list of the most cited works on globalization include, for instance *The Consequences of Modernity* (Giddens, 1990), *Global Transformations: Politics, Economics and Culture* (Held, Goldblatt, A McGrew, et al., 1999), *The Conditions of Postmodernity: An Enquiry into the Origins of Cultural Change* (Harvey, 1990), *The Rise of the Network Society* (Castells, 1996) and *Globalization in Question: The International Economy and the Possibilities of Governance* (Hirst, Thompson & Bromley, 2009).

Fourth, using the analysis made by Liu, Hong and Liu (2012) also makes it possible to discern how studies on globalization relate to other concepts and fields. Admittedly, this analysis is quite simplified as it uses the keywords supplied for all published articles. However, at the same time it should reflect the most popular topics addressed by scholars in connection to globalization. Furthermore, by splitting the data into three different time frames, Liu, Hong and Liu enabled interpretations of which topics are on the rise and which are declining in popularity (X Liu, Hong & Y Liu, 2012).

A first look at the keyword analysis thus suggests that the ten most common topics (keywords) in globalization articles are politics, state, trade, policy, growth, United States, governance, China, performance and migration. Topics on the rise include growth, governance, China, networks, countries, knowledge, Europe, power, integration, institutions and India. Topics declining in globalization research over the last fifteen years include United States, technology, identity, firms and cities.

All the four general areas of globalization research included in the analysis made by Liu, Hong and Liu (2012) were also quite prominent in my own search and delimitation of literature. Using the software Publish or Perish (Harzing, 2007), the enormous strand of globalization literature could be narrowed down and made more accessible. Here, this survey both served the purpose of finding and delimiting the most central works of globalization literature as well as functioned as a pathway into more specified aspects of it. Hence, extended searches beyond ‘general’ globalization theory, helped to single out what seemed to be the most important works connected to globalization and space, spatial transformation, globalization and regions as well associated assemblage thinking.

Taken together, I interpret the results of my own searches and accounts of globalization literature more or less along the same exact lines as Liu, Hong and Liu (2012). For example, the same multidisciplinary character of globalization research was apparent, as was the presence of a near identical
list of influential scholars. Furthermore, the search for articles and books within sub-topics of globalization research also produced quite a similar interpretation of the general relation of the topics. That is, some of them were more popular in terms of citations and published articles or books, while others were less popular. By and large, the relative popularity corresponds to that described by Liu, Hong and Liu (2012).

This exercise in bibliography, is first and foremost intended as a way of engaging with the literature on globalization and to provide a short genealogy of the studies that have evolved around the concept. As such, it functions as a way of sorting through a disparate and vast catalogue of articulations, theories and positions that produce discourses on what globalization is, when it began and how it evolves. In the next step I reproduce the most prominent themes of the globalization literature by focusing on what seems to be its most influential works and sub-topics.

2.1.2. Discourses of globalization

A genealogy stands in contrast to other forms of historical accounts in that its primary function is not the quest to uncover the true emergence or origins of a particular concept or event. Instead, it tries to account for the multiple ways in which truth, representations, discourses and identities are produced in different configurations in separate times. As such it is, in the words of Michel Foucault:

[...] a form of history which can account for the constitution of knowledges, discourses, domains of objects etc., without having to make reference to a subject which is either transcendental in relation to the field of events or runs in its empty sameness throughout the course of history (Foucault, 1980b: 117).

Therefore a genealogy is not so much about writing history from the point of the past, uncovering what essentially can be found in documents and artifacts, as it is a search for the making of the present through instances of the historical. A genealogy of a concept such as globalization seeks to interpret how this is made into an object of knowledge and how it is (re)produced over and over again. It takes as a starting point the discursive constructions of this concept in present times and then tries to highlight some critical points where the production of knowledge takes turns and incorporates new entities and/or discards others (Foucault, 1980a; Dean, 2010; Sembou, 2011).

Therefore I conduct my genealogy in two steps. First, I reproduce an often invoked classification of competing globalization theories where three different discourses clash (Held & McGrew, 2007a). Briefly, I follow
convention as I label these discourses the globalist discourse, the skeptic discourse and the transformationalist discourse (cf. Held & McGrew, 2003; 2007a; 2007b; Holton, 2005; Bisley, 2007). This is done based on a reading of the central works in globalization studies as they were drawn from the bibliographic analysis presented above as well as some of the most comprehensive overviews and reader companions. In essence, the first step is intended as a short introduction to the current ‘state of the art’ and discursive struggles of globalization studies.

The second step traces the emergence of globalization theory from the late 1980s through its peak years a decade later and into the ongoing debate yet another decade down the line. This is done by highlighting four different waves or phases of research where different aspects of globalization are theorized and articulated. Naturally, these waves are neither perfect illustrations, nor are they discrete categories. Rather they serve the function of a genealogy, as mentioned above, to illustrate the different claims for truths and discursive struggles that occur during the emergence and maintenance of concepts (Foucault, 1980b).

(1) Current globalization discourses

Theorizing globalization is often a matter of technology and deregulation of the global economy. Indeed, what I here call the globalist discourse is firmly rooted in such reasoning and it can be understood as a form of template upon which most representations of globalization rest. The bibliographic analysis performed by Liu, Hong and Liu (2012) indicated that economics is the field within which most works of globalization studies are situated, which most likely contributes to some of the basic assumptions.

The globalist discourse represents globalization as a phenomenon that first and foremost emerged as a consequence of technological evolution in communications and IT. The expansion of telecommunication, the birth of the Internet and the more or less instant system of economic transactions that emerged from it will have far-reaching consequences. Coupled with the liberalization of economic regulation, the technical development will produce a world where global capitalism and a vast, all embracing market system will reign supreme. Crucially, the current levels of interconnectedness, both in terms of information and mobility of people, are often described as unprecedented in human history by the globalist discourse. Indeed, as put by Kenichi Ohmae (1993; 1996; 2005), this will
make way for a world where states wither away and new forms of sovereignty must be established:

Putting regions at center stage demands some radical rethinking of the way we view the world. The global stage is borderless. This means that a lot of our nice cozy concepts about geography are going to have to be discarded. The most obsolete of those notions is the nation-state (Ohmae, 2005:82).

The market system and capitalist economy will inevitably spread to all parts of the globe and in globalist discourse this produces opportunities and challenges for states, firms and other forms of institutions. In particular, some of the most popular articulations of the globalist discourse represent globalization as a force that will bring with it a reconfiguration of the geopolitical landscape so that countries and regions that presently are considered ‘undeveloped’ may rise to prosperity. Within this discourse, texts about ‘a flat world’ (Friedman, 2007) and ‘globalization works’ (Wolf, 2004) enjoy prominent positions, although the discourse also contains critical understandings. For instance, many Marxists agree with some of the most neoliberal articulations when describing globalization as a force sprung from the evolution of technology and the capitalist system – however, they do not find this to be a development that ‘works’ (cf. Wallerstein, 2004).

As against the globalist discourse, a less prominent, however still academically important skeptic discourse articulates globalization as anything from a form of misconception to a folly and an over exaggerated claim. In short, the skeptic discourse questions first the assumption that globalization is something new under the sun. The unprecedented levels of interconnectedness are actually not at all unprecedented since this discourse represents the current situation as merely one in a series of expansions and contractions of how the world is tied together. A common argument here is to point to the so called belle époque in the late nineteenth century that displays at least as high levels of interconnectedness as today. Hence the fact that we are highly interconnected does not automatically entail the end of the nation-state, nor the coming of a new world order (Ferguson, 2005; Hirst, Thompson & Bromley, 2009; Weiss, 1998).

Second the skeptic discourse questions the ‘global’ aspect of globalization. In this discourse, globalization is repeatedly represented as a phenomenon or process that primarily takes place among nations in North America, Europe and South East Asia. Trade, migration and information flows all have distinct patterns and while some of them may display very high levels, they simply do not include the entire globe and therefore
articulations in the skeptic discourse are keen to point out that what is often labeled globalization is rather internationalization, or regionalization (Hirst, Thompson & Bromley, 2009).

Third, the skeptic discourse also poses questions concerning the analytical rigor in mainstream globalization studies. For instance, Rosenberg (2003; 2005) has called the entire project of globalization studies a ‘folly’ that continuously confuses cause and effect, *explanans* and *explanandum*. In short, the skeptic discourse articulations often ask whether we should understand globalization as emerging from the intensification of social processes such as migration and trade or if we should rather view globalization as something that causes such intensifications (Hay & March, 2000; Rosenau, 1996; Rosenberg, 2005). As articulated by James Rosenau (1996:249-50), globalization scholars need to consider in much greater details a number of questions concerning the nature of their main concept:

Does globalization refer to a condition, an end state or a process? Is it mostly a state of mind, or does it consist of objective circumstances? What are the arrangements from which globalization is a departure?

In connection to this, the skeptic discourse also articulates how this form of conceptual confusion makes globalization a form of discursive resource that nations and businesses may draw on for legitimizing their decisions in the face of the public (Hay, 2002; 2004; Hay & Rosamond, 2002).

Alongside these two poles the *transformationalist discourse* can be viewed as something of an intermediate position. While this is a rather stark reduction of complexity, it is still a common representation (Bisley, 2007; Held & McGrew, 2003; 2007a; 2007b; Jones, 2010). Articulations of the transformationalist discourse generally agree with much of the critique that is prominent in the skeptic discourse, although they do not subscribe in full. In particular, they do agree that globalization theory needs to formulate more precise concepts and methods, but do not see this as a reason to withdraw from the endeavor. Quite the opposite is the case. A range of contemporary aspects are represented by transformationalist discourse as highly relevant and historically unique in terms of interconnectedness:

Among these drivers are: the changing infrastructure of global communications linked to the IT revolution; the development of global markets in goods and services, connected to the world wide distribution of information; the new global division of labour driven by multinational corporations; the end of the cold war and the diffusion of democratic and consumer values across many of the world’s regions (alongside some marked reactions to this); and the growth of migration and movement of peoples, linked to shifts in patterns of economic demand,
demography and environmental degradation. These deeply structured processes generate dense patterns of global interconnectedness, real and virtual. As a result political communities can no longer be considered (if they ever could with any validity) as simply 'discrete worlds'; they are enmeshed in complex structures of overlapping forces, relations and networks. (Held and McGrew, 2007a:4)

Hence, the transformationalist discourse resembles the globalist in terms of what drivers are seen as causing the emergence of globalization in contemporary times, although the discourses differ in terms of what effects this will have. Importantly, the transformationalist discourse sees precisely a form of transformation of the social world as the result of globalization, rather than a stark break with previous orderings. Nation-states are likely to continue to be important. They will, however, be situated in new circumstances that call for new modes of analysis. This includes what Agnew (1994), Brenner (2004) and Scholte (2005) have called a step away from methodological nationalism as the basic premise for conducting social scientific inquiry.

In sum, the transformationalist discourse is disparate although still prominent. With the exception of economics, it is likely the most commonly articulated discourse and some of the scholars associated with it are also the most cited as shown in the analysis above. The transformationalist discourse often defines and articulates the notion of globalization as a complex process that involves a multitude of reconfigurations of social practices, often using the figure of the network to describe and conceptualize what is happening (cf. Castells, 1996; Giddens, 1990; 2002; Held & McGrew, 2007a; 2007b; Scholte, 2005). Hence, one of the most commonly reproduced definitions considers globalization to be:

a process (or set of processes) which embodies a transformation in the spatial organization of social relations and transactions, assessed in terms of their extensity, intensity, velocity, and impact – generating transcontinental or interregional flows and networks of activity, interaction and the exercise of power (Held et. al. 1999, s.16).

(2) Evolution of academic globalization discourse

Turning now to the evolution of globalization studies since the late 1980s, it is immediately clear that a large number of topics have been part of the unfolding of the discursive formations that constitute the present situation. It is possible, however, to highlight four moments of theoretical formulations where discourses relate to a limited number of prominent elements that structure the articulations made. Here, as mentioned, I
present those moments as four waves that emerge when articulations of similar types that structure globalization research around certain topics and themes are made. While I do count the waves (the first, the second and so on), this does not mean that they emerge in a linear chronological fashion. Except for the first wave, which in a sense can be understood as the start of globalization studies, the others overlap, intertwine and disappear, only to reappear at other moments in time. Hence, it is important to recognize that the four ‘waves’ that are displayed here are not discrete events. Rather, they continue to influence the theoretical articulations well into the present state of globalization theory and in some ways the waves also align well with the current discourses accounted for above. It is quite easy to recognize, for instance, that the third wave that I call the critical wave is the moment when much of the skeptic discourse starts to take form.

(I) As presented in the bibliographic overview the research on globalization starts in the late 1980s and early 1990s. An important part of this modernity wave was that scholars such as Anthony Giddens (1990; 2002), David Harvey (1989), Ulrich Beck (1992) and Kenichi Ohmae (1993) all started to theorize what they understood as a set of distinct features of the modern world. While there are works in I.R, Political Science, Geography, Businesses, Economics and other social science disciplines that relate to increasingly international orientation of the social system, it is important to recognize that these scholars introduce and relate to the concept of globalization. While the term dates back to the 1960s and Marshall McLuhans (2011) concept of ‘the global village’, it was not used as an analytical concept until this first wave (Scholte, 2005).

For Anthony Giddens (1990), the transition from ‘pre-modernity’ into modernity is highly connected to globalization. In fact, it is this shift that produces globalization, which in turn can be understood as an acceleration of the processes of modernity. Giddens (1990; 2002) highlights three such processes, the separation of time and space, the disembedding of social systems and the reflexive character of social practice. Put briefly, as societies become modern, Giddens argues, a particularly salient feature is the way that time becomes an abstract category that no longer is situated in space. The invention of mechanical clocks, the railway system and other forms of communication produce a need for time to be something quite different than a locally situated feature that is measured primarily through a village church bell, the coming of the seasons and the setting of the sun. The introduction of the Greenwich Meridian as the basis for a global time marks a point when time is globally related and coordinated through social
systems. The train leaving the west coast of the USA does not have to pass through a multitude of localized times as it travels to the east coast, instead the passengers and operators of the railway system all relate to the same ‘thing’ when they speak of time (Giddens, 1990).

Connected to this separation of time from space is the fact that social systems and social practices become disembedded from the local space in which they were previously firmly located. Increasingly, articulations of the modernity wave hold that under globalization social systems such as rules for driving a motor vehicle or higher education take similar forms all over the globe. This is possible through a form of symbolic order that is easily lifted from one context to another and traffic signs are a good example of such symbols. Money, Giddens (1990) argues is the most prominent of a number of such ‘global tokens’ that are very easily circulated and translated into a global scale.

Finally, for Giddens (1990), a striking feature of modernity is the way we increasingly view our social practices in the light of different forms of expert knowledge. That is, in modernity, what was previously a locally embedded social practice in a particular space will come to be recognized, both by its practitioners as well as those who sees it from the outside, as just that – a locally situated practice that can be questioned, transformed and abandoned. In short, under globalization, humans become more reflexive of their social practices while at the same time a cadre of experts will become more important in the shaping of social reality.

All these points are picked up by other authors and, for instance, Ulrich Beck (1992) builds on the way that Giddens formulates that globalization will produce a form of ‘risk society’. That is, as reflexivity becomes more prominent and the disembedding of social systems continues, we will increasingly deploy security systems for trying to handle what is now recognized as global risks. These risks cannot be contained within established nation-states and it is clear that systems of security will take new forms under modernity.

For David Harvey (1990), modernity (or rather post-modernity in his words) is a form of evolution of the capitalist system and in order to understand globalization one needs to start with the way capitalism regulates social life. Building on his previous works of relating Marxism to geography and theories of space, Harvey argues that the present condition is marked by a crisis as two different forms of power logics collide. The logic of capital and the logic of territory could coincide for a long time, although the logic of territory became subordinated by the logic of capital.
during the nineteenth century. That is to say, whereas capital operates in a form of unhindered space-time, politics operates within territorially bounded units, and the breakthrough of capitalism propelled the bourgeoisie into a dominant power factor in political life. Under globalization, and in particular its neoliberal form, the logic of territory has become more and more problematic as capitalism produces a form of space-time compression, making capital even more fluid and unrestricted. This compression of space-time and its linkage to the evolution of modern capitalism is fundamental for understanding globalization, Harvey (1990; 2005) argues.

(II) While the first wave conceptualized globalization as connected to modernity, the second one, here called the consolidating wave, elaborates the theoretical articulations and in many respects situates globalization theory at the center of social science institutions. Hence, the consolidating articulations follow general features of the modernity wave and in particular a great deal of focus becomes directed towards economy and capital (cf. Casson, 1992; Dicken, 1992; Reich, 1992). Indeed, it may be stated that it is in association to this wave that some of the most ‘globalist’ accounts of a future world without nation-states and a very prominent global system of economic actors emerges (Ohmae, 1993; 1996). For this reason, globalization also became very important in the field of international relations, which traditionally works with states as the most important actors. Therefore a range of scholars within I.R related this articulated shift explicitly to questions of sovereignty and order in the international system (Camilleri & Falk, 1992; McGrew & Lewis; 1992; Rosenau, 1990; 1996).

Hence, what was consolidating at this point was very much a discourse on globalization that corresponds well with the globalist representations accounted for above. However, this is not only what I have in mind when labeling this wave consolidating. Rather, what is consolidating is the way that globalization studies as such and as a field gains recognition around universities and other forms of institutions. Indeed, a great deal of important research at the time was firmly situated in questions that carried on the research where globalization was connected to modernity. In general, however, they shift focus towards more explicit globalization studies and introduce concepts and theories that continue, reinforce and expand earlier works. In general, some of the more seminal works of this wave are interested in what they found to be far reaching transformations of our entire social systems (cf. Albrow, 1996; Axford, 1995; Appadurai, 1996).
Some of the most influential articulations of this wave are connected to the thinking of Arjun Appadurai (1996) and his theorizing on mass media and culture in the light of modernity and globalization. In particular, he introduced the concept of global imaginaries that is an important feature of what he sometimes denotes a post-national world. In short, as globalization expands, we find large groups of people moving around (both as refugees and more voluntarily), creating diaspora populations who will have to find their identity through the shared imagined identity. Thus, he expands on Benedict Anderson’s (2006) work on nationalism as an imagined community by asking questions that link this imagination to a more fluid conception of the nation. To conceptualize this shift further, Appadurai (1996) introduces a suffix (scapes) that, in a sense, transforms established concepts into more fluid ones. So for instance, instead of speaking of ethnicity he claims that what we are witnessing under globalization are imaginations of this, or ethnoscapes. Similarly, we are witnessing mediascapes, financescapes, ideoscapes and technoscapes rather than media, finance, ideology and technology.

(III) The third wave of globalization research is here labeled *the critical wave*. As the second and consolidating wave emerged, a growing number of articulations of globalization theory stood primarily in stark contrast to those claims of globalization that represented it as a fundamentally new phase of human history. These articulations can be understood as critical in at least two ways. First of all, there are the skeptics that problematize and question grand claims of globalization as more or less empirically wrong or outright useless for understanding contemporary social changes (Ferguson, 2005; Hirst, Thompson & Bromley, 2009; Rosenberg, 2000; 2005).

Second, a number of articulations started to represent globalization and modernity more in terms of power, justice and neocolonialism (Hoogvelt, 1997; Massey, 1994; Hard & Negri, 2001; 2005 Roy, 2002; 2003; Shiva, 2000). Closely connected to these articulations are also a number of works, primarily situated within what may broadly be called Marxist understandings, which initially did not use the globalization concept in their theories. However, as the general discourse on globalization grew in importance, neo-marxist schools such as World-System Analysis (Amin, 1997; Arrighi; 2010; Wallerstein, 2000; 2004), and neo-gramscianism (Cox, 1981) still contributed to the debate and formulation of globalization theory through their understanding of modern capitalism.

Importantly, these critical articulations conceptualized what has come to be a prominent theme in globalization studies, namely the relation between
‘the west and the rest’. In more precise terms, much theory was developed that problematized structural injustices in the international political system, which through globalization actually became even more proliferated. Hence, in contrast to some of the more liberal economic praises of globalization theory that had been developed in other waves, in the critical wave scholars started to focus on parts of the world that were not connected to the main hubs of the network society that Castells (1996) had so meticulously traced. Anki Hoogvelt (1997), for instance, focused on how globalization also entailed a dirty backyard, sites needed for modern capitalism to function although never intended to be included in the global system. In her articulations the continent of Africa is essentially a space that functions as a ‘containment of anarchy’ (1997:162), an example of the peripheries of the global capitalist system where powers of the west have created systems of dominations, orchestrated through so called austerity measures and structural adjustment following lending of money from institutions such as the World Bank (WB) and the International Monetary Found (IMF).

Similarly, scholars positioned in those spaces that are not ‘the west’ have continuously contributed to the debate and theory of globalization and its consequences. So for instance, has Vananda Shiva (2000) shed light on the workings of the global food market and the way knowledge, technology and power emanating from ‘the west’ destroys and transforms agricultural production systems in what is sometimes called ‘the global south’.

Working in the same empirical context as Vananda Shiva, namely India, Arundhati Roy (2001; 2003) has made similar articulations focusing on how the free market system that underpins so called globalization colonizes language and inscribes new meanings into terms such as development, progress and freedom. According to these articulations, this has produced a situation where globalization is very much about the expansion of a brutal form of capitalism that is hard to resist, since who is supposed to be against freedom, against progress and against development?

Wallerstein (2004) and scholars broadly following his World-System Analysis (Amin, 1997; Arrighi, 2010) also focus on the workings of global capitalism. Articulations of World-System Analysis point out that the phenomenon that globalization theory is interested in explaining, describing and understanding can generally be interpreted as a rather obvious step in the evolution of the capitalist system of production as
such. For them the notion of the ‘world-system’ denotes exactly this fact that capitalism has never been contained within nation states. On the contrary, the capitalist system requires an advanced form of division of labor among countries so that there is a set of core nodes where the most advanced production and knowledge are clustered alongside a large set of nodes where basic production of much less knowledge-intensive goods and services is carried out. In between this structure of center-periphery exists a set of countries that Wallerstein (2004) and World-System Analysis denote ‘the semi-periphery’. These spaces serve important functions for handling the production of yesterday’s high-tech and knowledge intense goods. In general, World-System Analysis brings a distinct form of power critique into the study of globalization as it explicitly states that given the current system of production (global capitalism) what we interpret as globalization will always be riddled with structural injustices and stratifications of power and economy.

(IV) Finally, a wave of research that is here labeled the encapsulating wave has been articulated through a body of prominent globalization work that started to appear around the turn of the millennium. These were generally rather grand undertakings that tried to bring some order into the globalization debate(s), while bringing pronounced features to the field as their summaries of research also made new articulations in relation to existing theory.

Most prominent in this phase has been the works of David Held and Anthony McGrew (2003; 2007a: 2007b; Held et.al, 1999). Indeed, together they have summarized the field of globalization studies and initiated a distinct series of works that is more or less the backbone of the discourse I called transformationalist above (the term is actually coined by Held and McGrew). Other than representing globalization in line with the transformationalist discourse, Held and McGrew have also put forth what is arguably the most influential definition of globalization (reproduced at page 39 above) as well as provided readings of globalization that contributed to representations of the phenomenon that went well beyond economistic accounts.

For Held et.al (1999) globalization and the transformations it brings about are not at all confined to the economic or technological fields of our social systems. On the contrary, culture, media, art and war are all transformed in the era of globalization and the directions of the causal mechanisms are all but clear. However, they do suggest that globalization may be approached by asking questions along four dimensions, namely its
extensity, intensity, velocity and impact. Doing so allows researchers to classify globalization as, for instance, ‘thick’ and ‘thin’ as it is manifested non-uniformly across the globe. Along the same line, Held & McGrew (1999) argue that the outcome of the current globalizing process is not at all decided. While they hold for true that the current globalization transforms nation states, this does not necessarily mean that they weaken, nor does it follow that all states are affected equally.

Similarly, Jan Aart Scholte (2005) has been influential in providing a thorough overview of globalization as a phenomenon as well as the theory that tries to understand it. In doing so, he has furnished an understanding of globalization as an increase in transplanetary and supraterritorial connections. Such articulations highlight how present day communications increasingly are not easily mapped along territorial coordinates but rather emanate from different forms of ‘virtual’ spaces. For instance, it may be asked, in all seriousness, where ‘the global’ is located. Questions raised about economic transactions, Internet communications and the virtual worlds of large Internet games such as World of Warcraft must deal with issues of time-space in new ways.

In addition to Scholte (2005) and Held and McGrew (2003, 2007a; 2007b), a number of similar encapsulating works have been produced in recent years. For instance, Zolo (2007), Holton (2005) and Bisley (2007) have all provided different takes on globalization theories, controversies and debates. In particular, these articulations have strived to find ways of representing the globalization literature, opting in some cases for the same wave analogy as used here, in other cases the notion of phases are used and yet others focus on themes such as economy, politics and culture to organize the literature.

To sum up, three things may be highlighted in the genealogy conducted here. First, that discourses of globalization generally connect to notions of territorial reconfiguration, and whether this is in the form of a stark break with current orderings or through gradual transformations most theorists agree that to some extent globalization is recasting important aspects of our social systems. Second, in order to understand these proposed changes, new debates on space have spurred in geography as well as in the social sciences generally. In short, as stated before in this thesis, globalization is a matter of space(-time) as is evident in many of the most prominent works. These debates also reveal a third interesting finding, namely that a particular spatial construct has recently been articulated as an important
site for understanding many of the *territorial reconfigurations* that follow globalization, namely *the region*.

### 2.2 Debating Space

So far the concept of space, which is of outmost importance for understanding globalization, regions and territorial reconfigurations, has only been mentioned in brief terms. This section will therefore focus more specifically on what can be thought of as an internal globalization debate, namely that of space. Naturally, this does not mean that the theoretical development concerning space has been exclusively connected to globalization. On the contrary, within geography the concept lies at the core of the discipline and thus it has been constantly developed and reimagined (Jones, 2009). Likewise, within such disparate disciplines as mathematics, physics, political science, international relations, history, sociology and anthropology, to name a few, space is an intrinsic part of core theories, whether articulated as such or not. However, as the globalization debates developed over time, one of the most important focal points quickly became that of space, and therefore it is fair to say that the recent decades have spurred renewed interest in space and its importance for social relations. Or as Ash Amin (2002:386) puts it:

[...] I wish to highlight at this stage [...] that underlying the debate on the meaning and implications of globalization, are some fundamental questions about the spatial ontology of contemporary social organization.

Moreover, it is important to recognize that the renewed spatial interest is not just a matter of scholars that theorize *global space*. Rather, since discourses of globalization have become part of most aspects of social scientific theory, the discussion spurred among globalization scholars has had repercussions in neighboring fields and disciplines, particularly so in regional studies (Amin, 2004; Jonas, 2012; Jones, 2009; Keating, 1998; Loughlin, 2007).

#### 2.2.1. Theories of Scales and Relations

At least since the beginning of the 2000s, scholars have started to produce somewhat new articulations of a long-standing theme in spatial theory – that of scalar relations. Put briefly, the scalar representation of space has deep theoretical roots and was a prominent perspective throughout the 20th Century in different disciplines. As such it has been developed against the backdrop of two conflicting basic ontological views of space.
In the first, scholars thought of space as *absolute* and based their understandings on Euclidian geometry, or in other words, the idea that ‘space exists independently of any object(s) or relations: space is a discrete and autonomous *container*’ (Jones, 2009:489). In this view space becomes a background or indeed, as in Karl Popper’s interpretation of Immanuel Kant (1972:179), ‘a kind of framework for things and events: something like a system of pigeon holes, or a filling system for observations’.

As against this absolute position, space has also been articulated as *relative*. This meant that many scholars sought to explain it by breaking with Euclidian perspectives. Rather than space, they would theorize *space-time* as a concept where the three dimensions of space are merged with time so that points in space are instead conceived of as moments or events with positional quality somewhere along the space-time continuum. In this view the dispositions of any spatial totality have distances and relationships between objects and events that change over time and across space (Allen, 2011a; 2011b; Jones, 2009; Marston, Jones & Woodward, 2005).

It is in opposition to this older theoretical debate that the articulations of scalar as well as relational understandings of space have been formed. Scalar notions have a long history and often it seems as if a theoretically given position of space consisting of nested hierarchies (such as the local, the regional, the national and so forth) is a natural representation of ‘reality’. However, it is this representation that is being contested, both by new theories of scale and relational space perspectives.

Marston (2000) argues that what the theories of scalar space has in common since the beginning of the 1990s is their focus on the social construction of space and a move away from hierarchical orders as ontologically given. Translated into the old debate recited above, this would mean that previously scalar space was articulated in absolute terms where the different layers or levels were ontologically thought of as ‘units’ of reality. Often, the ‘Russian doll analogy’ has been used to illustrate the core assumption that space basically can be understood as a set of layers where the higher orders contain the lower orders.

With the development since the 1990s, scalar theory then became much more interested in how the scales seemed to be intertwined, mixed and possible to jump over or bypass (cf. Brenner, 2004). Moreover, and maybe most importantly, the new theories of scale highlighted how levels or layers could be thought of as socially produced. It is impossible to recapitulate all of the important interventions in this theoretical development. However, as Marston (2000) argues, they all owe a great deal to the seminal works of
Henri Lefebvre (1991) on the production of space. In addition, prominent writers within this new scalar understanding (cf. Agnew, 1994; Brenner et al., 2003; Smith, 1992; 1996; Swyngedouw, 1997; 2000) also initially drew on Peter Taylor’s (1982) work in translating Immanuel Wallerstein’s (1974) World-System Theory into geographical scales. Taylor’s work therefore signaled what is another important quality of the recent work on scalar space, namely its linkage to investigations of the capitalist system. Indeed, from this body of work has come what is now often articulated as ‘the political economy of scales’ (Jessop, 2002).

The advancements of scalar theory and its loosening of the hierarchical order has also been highly related to the development of the relational perspective on space. Engaging with much of the same questions that have driven the advancement of scalar thinking away from absolute conceptions of space, the relational scholars also drew initially on thinking of space as relative. However, it soon developed beyond this, rejecting and dissolving the boundaries between objects and space entirely (Jones, 2009).

One of many things contributing to the articulations of a relational space perspective was the influence of Actor-Network Theory (ANT) as it has been developed by for instance Law (1994), Mol and Law (1994) as well as Latour (1986; 2005). This body of work helped theorize new forms of understandings of the interlinkages between objects and events. Indeed, it shifted the focus away from objects and events that are possible to map in space-time towards the fabric (network) that positions and constitutes them.

Drawing on ANT, and some of the advancements of scalar theory, as well as the original mathematical works of Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz on non-Euclidian geometry and calculus, the proponents of relational space critiqued absolute and relative understandings for not paying enough attention to the motions within objects and the mobility of their relations. Thinking space relationally, as Jones (2009:491) put it, means that:

Space does not exist as an entity in and of itself, over and above material objects and their spatiotemporal relations and extensions. In short, objects are space, space is objects, and moreover objects can be understood only in relation to other objects - with all this being a perpetual becoming of heterogeneous networks and events that connect internal spatiotemporal relations […]

The relational perspective has grown in importance through the writings of, among others, Doreen Massey (1994; 2005), David Harvey (2006a) and Nigel Thrift (2004). As evident in the description provided by Jones above, to understand space relationally means literally holding that the realization
of any given object or event is dependent on, and indeed impossible without, its constitution in relation to other objects or events. In short, from a relational perspective it is not possible to understand an object in itself, as a form of Kantian *ding an sich*. Rather, objects and events are constantly being produced through social relations, and indeed, in Doreen Massey’s versions space is social relations ‘stretched out’ (Massey, 1994:2).

What is more, since social relations are constantly shifting and rearranging, Massey holds that we must understand space not only as socially produced, but also as a form of multiplicity of different trajectories. Importantly, this means that the active becoming that is space is not a neutral becoming. Power and politics are always present to form what she calls *power-geometries*:

> The view, then, is of space-time as a configuration of social relations within which the specifically spatial may be conceived of as an inherently dynamic simultaneity. Moreover, since social relations are inevitably and everywhere imbued with power and meaning and symbolism, this view of the spatial is as an ever-shifting social geometry of power and signification (Massey, 1994:3).

Hence, space is not a scalar system, but rather a multiplicity. A system of constantly rearranging and emerging sites in which different objects and relations manifest as ‘real’, but not independently from space. So, turning again to the debates on globalization and its implications for spatial organization, the new theories of scales (for instance Brenner *et. al*, 2003) often speak of globalization as a reconfiguration of the scales, or, as in Swyngedouw’s (1997) work on what he calls *glocalization*, an increased linkage between certain spatial totalities and a breakdown of traditional hierarchies such as the local and the global.

From a relational perspective, it is not possible to distinguish ‘local’ relations from ‘global’ relations in any meaningful way. Instead, in Massey’s (2005:83) words again:

> Globalization is not a single all-embracing movement (nor should it be imagined as some outward spread from the West and other centers of economic power across a passive surface of ‘space’). It is a making of space(s), an active reconfiguration and meeting-up through practices and relations of a multitude of trajectories, and it is there that lies the politics.

To elaborate somewhat further on this definition: to understand space as relational is also to push the spatial analysis to the forefront of power and politics. Any given space is produced through its relations with other

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8 The understanding of power and the political that Massey (1994; 2005) deploys can broadly be categorized as Foucauldian and in agreement with Mouffe (2005) on distinguishing politics
spaces. Hence, as is common within globalization studies, to theorize, for instance, the relationship between ‘the global’ and ‘the local’ must not become a matter of treating the global and the local as two binaries that struggle against each other. Indeed, it is common to understand the local as produced through the global (Swyngedouw, 1997) or to show how the local in a sense can be ‘defended’ in the age of globalization (Escobar, 2001). However, from a relational perspective it is also obvious that it is not only the local that is produced through the global; rather the global is also produced through its relation to the local. In more simple terms, globalization is ‘made’ in local practices.

A relational perspective therefore stresses an understanding of space that lets it become an important part of the social scientific analysis. Given that we understand space as a multiplicity of trajectories, to think of development or evolution of societies in unilinear forms, something which is common in contemporary times (Massey, 2005), becomes problematic. Such thinking masks or hides how different spaces occupy shifting positions in the power geometries that at any given moment are present. Indeed, it masks in particular, how these different spaces are vastly unequal in terms of influence and power and how supposedly equal and just systems of development that fail to recognize this will inevitably produce more injustice (Massey, 2005).

In this thesis I subscribe to Massey’s definition of globalization and in particular her argument that it is an intrinsically political becoming. It is not a neutral process, nor is it a natural process with a given history and future. Instead, in line with Massey (1994; 2005), I argue that we need to theorize from the political. Hence the perspective fits well with my take on governmentality and I will develop my view on ‘power’ in Chapter 3.

What I mean by this relates to what we understand space ‘to be’. As has been made clear, from this perspective spaces are social processes and events, not a stage where these manifest. So to treat space as a part of the analysis means to understand it as a form of vibrant plateau instead of a fixed canvas. Massey (2005) traces how this more static notion of space has evolved as a consequence of its conceptualization in relation to time throughout the social scientific history. This frozen concept of space can be traced back to, for instance, Henri Bergson (1911) who, in a sense, unintentionally helped produce it as a consequence of his ambitious attempts to reformulate how we understand time. Here space is articulated as a frozen instance of time, so that at any given moment we understand space as a form of residual category needed to explain movement as in the classic example of Zeno’s paradox. As we know, in the most famous paradox of Zeno, Achilles furiously tries to chase down a tortoise but is unable to do so simply because of their positions in space. For every movement Achilles makes, by definition, so much time must pass, and the tortoise will always also have moved, traversing some space as Achilles reaches the point where it used to be and hence Achilles will never catch it. Thus, in such examples, space comes out of time, as an instance marked by an absence of duration constituted as a particular configuration of objects. It is this understanding that the relational perspective critiques. While space and time are intimately tied together, the classic conceptualization reduces space and the potential for critical analysis that it holds.
globalization in terms of the social practices that produce it and moreover the always present political aspects of these practices.

To sum up, Massey (2005) offers what she calls three propositions for mobilizing space in the way that I have accounted for above. First, that we understand space as the product of interrelations (that is its relational quality), second that space is a sphere of multiplicity, a coevalness of existing trajectories (therefore it is a heterogeneous formation) and third, that this sphere is always in the making, never closed or finished; rather it is ‘a simultaneity of stories so far’ (Massey, 2005:9).

However, while I do subscribe to these definitions and propositions, I also feel that in order to produce empirical research, space(s) must be made researchable. That is to say, I need a way of grasping this relational construct that is neither too rigid, stale and fixed, nor so loose that empirical investigations are not possible to carry out. In this thesis I will pick up on the figure of the assemblage to produce an understanding of relational space that encapsulates its vibrant relationality in ways that make it empirically researchable. Before that, however, I will account for research closely interlinked with the debates on scales and relations, namely what I have so far called territorial reconfiguration.

2.3 Territorial Reconfiguration

One might argue that the reason for the centrality of questions concerning scales and relations in the literature on globalization is connected to what I call issues of territorial reconfiguration, or what some have referred to as rescaling of state governance (Brenner, 2004). More precisely some of the globalization literature has helped transform and advance a rather orthodox territorial thinking in political science by making it more explicitly connected to space and spatial ontologies. So, for instance, John Agnew (1994) spurred an ongoing discussion as he called the mainstream territorial thinking that underpins international relations and political relations a territorial trap.

2.3.1. Trapped in the territory

Territory is generally defined as a particular piece of space, mappable in terms of longitude, latitude and altitude, enclosed within a border that demarcates it in relation to other territories, each of which having a sovereign ruler (Delaney, 2005; Storey, 2012). Any modern political map of the world illustrates this well with its color-coded representations of states and their borders and perhaps also their internal sub-division into further
territorial units. This understanding dates back at least as far as Max Weber (1994:310-11), who made a by now classic formulation that ‘a state is that human community which (successfully) lays claim to the monopoly of legitimate violence within a certain territory, this “territory” being another of the defining characteristics of the state’.

However central the notion of territory is in theories of the state, it remains remarkably non-theoretical, and in particular, it is strangely detached from discussions concerning space and spatial ontologies (Strandsbjerg, 2010). Indeed, the concept has been used in the Weberian sense without further theoretical reflection in most social sciences, even in human geography where it seems reasonable that such discussions would be quite present. It is generally conceptualized without any explicit spatial understanding; yet the implicit assumption is to think of territory as a container for the social rather than as an outcome of social practice. In other words, this thinking is firmly based in an ontology of absolute space. While this has changed somewhat since the onset of globalization studies, territory still maintains a largely taken-for-granted-status especially in comparison with other key concepts in Weber’s famous definition, such as state, sovereignty and legitimacy\(^\text{10}\) (Brenner et.al, 2003; Delaney, 2005; Storey, 2012; Strandsbjerg, 2010). Indeed, as John Ruggie (1993) started to question the epistemological underpinnings that his colleagues in international relations mobilized when conducting their studies, he noted:

> It is truly astonishing that the concept of territoriality has been so little studied by students of international politics; its neglect is akin to never looking at the ground that one is walking on. […] What is more, I have tried to show that unbundled territoriality is a useful terrain for exploring the condition of postmodernity in international politics […] (Ruggie, 1993:174).

Around the same time, that is, in the early 1990s, the emerging globalization literature started to make a serious impact through what I have called the first and second wave of articulations. As scholars introduced questions pertaining to the rise of new forms of information technology and liberal politics in what they understood as modernity, or indeed post-modernity, they also started to question the social formation of the nation-state and its territorially bound sovereignty. Where Ruggie (1993) was amazed by the lack of theoretical attention that territory received, geographer John Agnew (1994) took one step further as

\(^{10}\)This is obviously a simplification, since there are a number of researchers who actually do theorize territory throughout different disciplines (cf. Cox, 2013; Sassen 2006; 2013), yet it is certainly no exaggeration to state that this is a rather undeveloped (and in my mind also important) aspect of many central issues in contemporary social science.
he spelled out some of the implications of the taken for granted aspects of territory in the social sciences. His argument has continued to be important to contemporary theoretical articulations and its basic idea points to how a particular configuration of assumptions concerning territory has allowed for a “territorial trap” to spring and produce a situation where the initial presumptions reinforce each other to, in a sense, put territory beyond critical investigation.

According to Agnew (1994), international relations and political science have formed a dominant understanding of the territorial state that runs through most of the major theoretical positions so that otherwise different works such as Kenneth Walz’ (1979) and Robert Keohene’s (1984) share a set of assumptions of how territory functions analytically. This is the result of a “preference for abstract and “closed system” thinking among advocates of a scientific (positivist) approach to international relations’ (Agnew, 1994:58). In such thinking a state is a logical unit, an ideal type representation rather than a contextualized space and it gains a form of essential territoriality so that state and territory become intertwined. In this way the concept of nation-state has, according to Agnew, been used almost as synonymously with territorial state in political science, which of course is not a big deal in many cases, and yet it has endowed the territorial state with a form of legitimacy in that it can be understood to be ‘expressing the “character” or “will” of the nation’ (Agnew, 1994:59). Furthermore the intellectual division of labor that manifested itself after the First World War as international relations and political science became two disciplines11 also helped discourage more dynamic theoretical articulations of territory, as international space was made separate from domestic space.12

Together, these contextual circumstances helped set the territorial trap that according to Agnew (1994) has plagued the social sciences. It consists of three parts:

But what are the geographical assumptions that have led to the privileging of a territorial conception of the state in the first place? First, state territories have been reified as set or fixed units of sovereign space. This has served to dehistoricize and decontextualize processes of state formation and disintegration. Classical realism and idealism have both relied heavily upon this assumption. But it can be regarded

11 In some countries, this distinction between disciplines is not as outspoken. In Sweden for instance, I.R and political science is usually the same department or institution, yet the theoretical distinction between international politics and domestic politics is equally pronounced.

12 While some scholars such as for instance Robert Putnam (1988) wrote influential articles that tried to bridge this divide between a ‘domestic’ space of politics and an ‘international’ one they generally scrutinized the concept of the state much more than they did territory. Indeed, this can actually be said about a great deal of the globalization literature of more recent date as well (Strandsbjerg, 2010).
as the ‘rock bottom’ geographical assumption that underwrites the others. Indeed, some commentators have restricted their attention entirely to this one (e.g. Weber, 1992; Walker, 1993). Second, the use of domestic/foreign and national/international polarities have served to obscure the interaction between processes operating at different scales; for example, the link between the contemporary globalization of certain manufacturing industries and the localization of economic development policies. This assumption has been particularly important in neo-realism’s fixation on the ‘national’ economy as the fundamental geographical entity in international political economy. Third, the territorial state has been viewed as existing prior to and as a container of society. As a consequence, society becomes a national phenomenon. This assumption is common to all types of international relations theory (Agnew, 1994:58).

For some, the challenges articulated by Agnew and Ruggie marked the start of a kind of spatial turn in the social sciences (Brenner, et.al, 2003; Brenner, 2004; Strandsbjerg, 2010) reinforced by the spurring globalization literature. However, as the discussions on territory gained momentum, it remained undertheorized and, importantly, still rather detached from discussions of space. Stuart Elden notes:

However central the notion of territory is to definitions of the state, it generally tends to be assumed as unproblematic. Theorists have largely neglected to define the term, taking it as obvious and not worthy of further investigation. One searches political dictionaries or introductory text books in vain for a conception of this notion: rather it is unhistorically accepted, conceptually assumed and philosophically unexamined. Its meaning is taken to be obvious and self-evident and can therefore be assumed in political analysis. Political science that does discuss this notion tends to concentrate on legal issues of secession or border disputes, or problems of refugees, nationalism and core–periphery relations rather than come to terms with the notion itself (Elden, 2005:10).

So while the onset of globalization studies and a spatial turn in the social sciences directed attention to territory, it still maintained a rather non-theoretical quality. Instead, the discussion was very much directed towards a form of complimentary concept to territory, namely the idea of territoriality. Along this line discussions have been ongoing along classic fault lines of nature versus nurture as biologically inspired thinking (cf. Dawkins, 2006; Morris, 1969) views territoriality as naturally occurring in all animal behavior whereas more sociological literature emphasizes the contextual factors as reasons for territorially inclined behavior (cf. Sacks, 1983; 1986).

In fact, there is a whole family of territory related concepts that have all been discussed in quite some detail such as territoriality, territorialize, territorialization, deterriotialization and reterritorialization. David Delaney (2005) has suggested that scholars and students actually need to establish a form of grammar that clarifies the different meanings of these concepts, and when doing so he points out that linguistic qualities are not innocent.
For instance, the fact that the basic term for the concept ‘territory’ is a noun gives it a specific quality of being ‘a thing’. Etymologically attention is often drawn towards how territory may stem from the latin word *territorium* which means something like ‘the land around a town’ as well as *terra* which means simply ‘land’ (Delaney, 2005; Elden, 2010). In these cases the ‘thingness’ of territory is clearly expressed. However, as William Connely has suggested, one may also trace the meaning of territory down a different path:

*Terra* means land, earth, nourishment, sustenance; it conveys the sense of a sustaining medium, solid, fading off into indefiniteness. But the form of the word, the [Oxford English Dictionary] says, suggests that it derives from *terrene*, meaning to frighten, to terrorize. And *territorium* is a “place from which people are warned.” Perhaps these two contending derivations continue to occupy territory today. To occupy a territory is to receive sustenance and to exercise violence (Connely, cited in Delaney, 2005:14).

While the first etymological path then contributes to inscribing territory with ‘thingness’, the second directs attention to how the concept of territory (as in *to frighten* and *to deter*) is something that is made, or enacted. Likewise, the different forms of territoriality and territorialization, while still being nouns, are formed from and linked to the process through the verb ‘to territorialize’, which signals a form of social practice and meaning making. This may seem a simple enough recognition that territory is something that is being socially produced, yet, as pointed out several times now, the more mainstream notion of territory is simply a bounded piece of (absolute) space that functions as a container for social life (Delaney, 2005; Storey, 2012). Therefore, it is important to underscore that ‘before we can discuss what a territory means, or how it is made meaningful, it needs to be emphasized that it means’ (Delaney, 2005:15).

Recognizing this socially constructed aspect of territory then, has been suggested as one meaningful way out of the territorial trap. Stuart Elden (2010) argues that one of the main problems of the territorial trap is that ever since Agnew (1994) drew its contours, scholars have tended to acknowledge it, yet decided on strategies that try to avoid it rather than disable it. This has allowed the trap still to be very much in effect in the social sciences, producing a situation where analysis of central facets of social life is limited in some significant respects.

According to Brenner (2004:40), the general marginalization of territory as a theoretically and historically recognized concept has paved way for what can be called a *state-centric* epistemology that underpins much of social analysis:
This unhistorical conception of spatiality can be usefully characterized as a state-centric epistemology because its widespread intellectual plausibility has been premised upon naturalization of the modern state’s specifically national/territorial form. [...] By the mid twentieth century, each of the conceptual building blocks of the modern social sciences – in particular, the notions of state, society, economy, culture, and community – had come to presuppose this simultaneous territorialization and nationalization of social relations within a parcelled, fixed and essentially timeless geographical space.

Furthermore Brenner (2004) suggests that we may understand the limitations inherent in the territorial trap thinking as falling in three broad categories. First, it produces a spatial fetishism where the concept of social space as absolute is asserted and made timeless and immune to historical change through the assumed and undertheorized notion of territory. Second, it inscribes a methodological territorialism in that territoriality is a necessary facet of human social life. Third, it also underpins a distinct methodological nationalism since the nation state through its territorial form promotes the national scale as a natural entry point for understanding not only national, but also international, supranational and sub-national politics. As Peter Taylor (2000:8) puts it:

Embedded statism contains the remarkable geographical assumption that all the important human social activities share exactly the same spaces. This spatial congruence can be stated simply: the ‘society’ which sociologists study, the ‘economy’ which economists study, and the ‘polity’ which political scientists study all share a common geographical boundary, that of the state. However abstract the social theory, it is national societies which are described; however quantitative the economic models, it is national economies which are depicted; and however behavioral the political science, it is national governance at issue.

Yet, there is a growing body of work in the intersection between globalization studies and regional studies that focuses on recognizing the multiplicity of space as a fundamental starting-point for discussions on territory. Consequently, the possible territorial reconfigurations that are important tropes in the globalization debates are explicitly present here. Engaging with this literature presents an opportunity not only to avoid the trap, but also to actively unbundle the assumptions and conditions that make it present in the first place. To understand the emergence of this literature, it is useful to follow the territorial debate one step further.

2.3.2. Global Territoriality and De/reterritorialization

As mentioned many times, globalization studies in general actually engage with the concept of territory. However, this is not to say that they engage with disabling the trap, nor do they necessarily succeed in escaping it
Indeed, it is possible to point to a range of influential works that often have the ambition of escaping the ‘nationalist’ character of social analysis that instead reproduces it at a global scale, often in terms of a ‘world society’ (cf. Holzer, Kastner & Werron, 2014; Meyer et al. 2007; Spybey, 1996). This reproduction takes many forms, but it functions, for instance, through the use of linguistic categories lifted from a traditionally territorial thinking and then transposed to the global scale in order to describe this ‘world society’. Thus, the same terms and concepts that have been used to describe and analyze state territory are used to describe ‘the global’. In a sense therefore, in these perspectives, the most important differences that conditions of globalization bring to social analysis is the magnitude of the society that must be described. The world society is, in simplistic terms, just another society – but larger.

In more complex ways, this can also be said about Immanuel Wallerstein’s work and the World-System theory that has been influential in the last decades. As Brenner (2004) points out, the capitalist world system described by Wallerstein (1974; 2004) is full of state-centered arguments, even as it explicitly claims that the world must be understood as one system, downplaying the role of the territorial state. However, in his efforts to describe the world-system’s internal division of labor, Wallerstein consistently pays attention to the differential position of states within the capitalist system, rather than, for instance, focusing on the circulation of capital in firms, industries or urban centers.

If this global territorialist view reproduces the trap at a larger scale, there is another influential strand of thinking in globalization research that also becomes problematic in relation to the trap, but in different ways. In terms of discourses and waves accounted for in the beginning of this chapter, a crude categorization would be to say that such articulations that fall into what I called a globalist discourse are often interested in processes of deterritorialization.

Recall how these approaches (cf. Friedman, 2007; Ohmae, 1996; Wolf, 2004) hold that in the age of globalization the (territorial) state will increasingly become less important. Put briefly, it is often stated that global capitalism produces a more footloose capital that forces states to act in accordance with the needs of this capital to the point where they will actually severely diminish their own importance. Thus, this leaves behind a world comprised of regional zones of governance that primarily function...
as regulators for the supraterritorial processes of informations technology and finance.13

While naturally diverse in empirical application as well as theoretical focus, Brenner (2004) has pointed to the fact that such approaches to globalization research share a tendency to bracket many forms of locally situated changes that occur simultaneously with the global transformations. Indeed, as described in the previous section of this chapter, the relational perspective on space that is the foundation of this thesis would rather argue that such processes do not only occur simultaneously, they are constituted by and produce each other.

Put in a more precise conceptual form, these ‘local’ anchors of social processes can be described as moments of reterritorialization (Brenner, 2004; Harvey, 2006a; 2006b) as opposed to the moment of deterritorialization that is commonly associated with globalization. According to Harvey (2006a; 2006b) and Brenner (2004) globalization and capitalism are intrinsically linked, and they are both intertwined with space in such ways that possible transformations must be understood by studying a kind of edifice that is the result of entangled space, state and capitalism (see also Brenner et.al, 2003). When doing so, they claim, it is indeed possible to notice how processes of globalization can be expressed in terms of a more footloose capital that flows in circuits at the speed of light. However, this is premised upon processes of reterritorialization:

From this perspective, processes of deterritorialization are not delinked from territoriality; indeed, their very existence presupposes the production and continual reproduction of fixed socio-territorial infrastructures - including, in particular, urban-regional agglomerations and state regulatory institutions - within, upon, and through which global flows circulate. Thus the apparent deterritorialization of social relations on a global scale hinges intrinsically upon their deterritorialization within relatively fixed and immobile sociospatial configurations at a variety of interlocking sub global scales (Brenner, 2004:56).

This is very much in line with the relational spatial ontology I adopt here, although Harvey (2006a; 2006b) and Brenner (2004) articulate a form of dialectics that binds separate, but interlinked, forms of space together as processes of deterritorialization and reterritorialization continuously operate. They maintain a scalar ontology and thus fall more into the ‘new

13 It is important to point out here that while this fits in general with what I have called the globalist discourse, scholars who investigate processes of deterritorialization are not exclusive to that particular discourse. Hence, Scholte (2005), Castells (1996) Hardt & Negri (2001) and Appadurai (1996) also represent typical globalization research that emphasizes the processes of deterritorialization.
theories of scales’ category in the ongoing academic debates on scales versus relations.

In sum, however, much of the articulations on de/reterritorialization made by Brenner in the quote above can most likely function as a reasonable description for many relational perspectives on space, and I find the most important part of the research on such processes to be the way they articulate the connected relations of ‘local’ and ‘global’ spaces. Whether or not these are best understood with the help of (socially produced) scales or through relations is important; yet the divide is not at all impossible to overcome.

In any event, Brenner (2004) sketches four particularly important methodological challenges for scholars who wish to understand the processes of globalization today. Regardless of spatial ontology, I take these points to be of importance for anyone wishing to recognize the territorial trap and problematize the absolute spatial ontologies that underpin it. In short Brenner urges us to pay attention to the historicity of space, or in other words, to understand spatial-social phenomena as processes in the making, processes that among other things produce territory (Lefebvre, 1991). Moreover scholars must also pay attention to the new political economy of scales as well as the polymorphic geographies that are at play in the remaking of state space.

In the next chapter, I will articulate my take on assemblage thinking (Ong & Collier, 2005) as a way of expressing both a spatial formation that is possible to understand as oscillating between the moments of deterritorialization and reterritorialization that Brenner (2004) and Harvey (2006a; 2006b) find important and as a way of delimiting empirical cases. I will try to heed the challenges of Brenner by mobilizing assemblage thinking and in particular I will focus on a specific space, namely the region. I take this to be an emergent spatial formation that allows dynamic analysis in line with Brenner’s challenge of polymorphic geographies in the remaking of space as he spells it out:

Under these circumstances the image of political-economic space as a complex, tangled mosaic of superimposed and interpenetrating nodes, levels, scales, and morphologies has become more appropriate than the traditional Cartesian model of homogenous, self-enclosed and contiguous blocks of territory that has long been used to describe the modern interstate system [...] New representations of sociospatial form are urgently needed in order to analyze these newly emergent polymorphic, polycentric, and multi scalar geographies of global social change. A crucial methodological challenge for contemporary sociospatial research is therefore to analyze newly emergent geographies in ways that transcend the conventional imperative to choose between purely territorialist and deterritorialist mappings of politico-economic space (Brenner, 2004:66).
For this task, I will use the figure of assemblage to delimit a form of empirical surface, which in this case can be understood as constituted by a range of sites that form a space around regional development in Sweden. Thus, before I move on to present my theoretical bases in more detail in the next chapter, I will end this chapter with a survey of the literature on resurgent regions and so called new regionalism.

2.4 Resurgent Regions

In the wake of the academic debates of globalization, space, scales and territorial reconfiguration ideas of the region as a particularly important spatial site for approaching and understanding the larger changes that is believed to occur have become more pronounced. This trope is rather simple in its basic building blocks and it basically expresses the idea that during conditions of globalization tremendous pressure is put on nation states. Therefore the central state is challenged by ‘new’ territorial formations, namely regions as the most important site for political and economic activity in the future (cf. Cox, 2009; Lobao, Martin & Rodríguez-Pose, 2009; Keating, 1998; 2003; 2013; Keating, Cairney & Hepburn, 2009).

Thus, there is a nexus of literatures where scholars call for a disabling of the territorial trap and its associated methodological nationalism, question scales and spaces, theorize territorial reconfigurations and study the function and formulation of regions as a spatial construct. At this nexus regions are often said to be resurgent both in terms of political and scholarly importance.

While this compound of articulations has been made from a range of different angles, in the early 1990s they were often linked to the concept of ‘regional worlds’ (Ohmae, 1996; Storper, 1997). Around this time, in Storper’s (1997:3) words, the scholarly conception of the region suddenly shifted from being thought of as ‘an outcome of deeper political-economic processes’ to something that ‘might be a fundamental basis of economic and social life’. Thus, while social scientists had been paying attention to regions well before the resurgence, they now shifted focus.

Summarizing the claim of regional worlds, Lagendijk (2001) states that much of the literature relates to a notion of changing ideas concerning economic competitiveness in a globalized world. Thus, in short, the regional worlds literature emphasizes economic factors as reason for resurgent regions and it is heavily nested in so called territorial innovation.
models (TIM). Through TIM’s, such as Porter’s (1990; 1998) cluster concept, the ideas of regional innovation systems (Cooke, 1992), flexible specialization (Asheim, 1992), learning regions (Asheim, 1996; Morgan, 2007) and creative cities (Florida, 2002; 2005), the regions emerged as arenas where policies seeking to achieve growth and competitiveness would come to be seen as best situated. Larger than the local context, yet flexible and smaller than nation states, the development of regions came to be a complex practice where nations and local authorities could come together to produce prosperity (Mitander, Säll & Öjehag-Pettersson, 2013).

Interlinked with the ideas of globalization and economic imperatives as reasons for regional resurgence, there are also more political or ideological movements, sometimes collected under the label new regionalism (cf. Agnew, 2013; Fawn, 2009; Jones & MacLeod, 1999; 2004; Keating, 1998; 2003; 2013; Lagendijk, 2001; MacLeod, 2001; MacLeod & Jones, 2001; 2007; Paasi, 2009). Here the regional world’s claim is advanced, transformed and mobilized in new ways, while still retaining its basic function of holding regional space as particularly important in an era of globalization.

2.4.1. New Regionalism: claims and critiques
While being well established, the term new regionalism is not without problems since it refers to both an empirical claim concerning a ‘new’ function of regions in the age of globalization as well as a form of ideological movement in the literature. Furthermore, while generally denoting sub-national regional processes, the term is also frequently applied to so called macro regions (Hettne, Inotai & Sunkel, 1999) denoting how global space increasingly takes the forms of larger regions of integrated economies such as the European Union (EU), the Mercado Común del Sur (MERCOSUR), the African Union (AU) and the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN).

In general, however, much of the literature developed since the late 1990s points to changes in sub-national regions as the prime examples of new regionalism. New regionalism in this sense is conceptualized as opposed to ‘old regionalism’ that occurred alongside the evolution of the welfare states after the second World War (Keating, 1998).

In the old regionalism, states tended to their regions in functional ways, using them to structure their territory through policies that corresponded to problems of un/employment, housing and migration. In many countries, this corresponded with the evolution of the welfare state and accordingly, the developing of regions in this context was often a matter of
evening out differences, or at least balancing different areas within states (Keating, 1998; Lagendijk, 2001; Lidström, 2007).

This kind of old regionalism is also sometimes described as regionalization emphasizing the top-down functional logic where central states steer and control the evolution and prosperity of regions (Lagendijk, 2001). However, there is another sense of ‘old regionalism’ present in the literature, in which Syssner (2006:13) describes the relationship of old-new as follows:

Many accounts of regionalism in western Europe revolve around narratives about old and new regionalism. Old regionalism is largely understood as a movement of the 1960s and 70s, described ‘principally in terms of ethno-nationalistic movements’, and located primarily on the periphery. Ethno-regional mobilization has partly been interpreted as a result of uneven economic development combined with cultural differences between the centre and the periphery. [...] Old regionalism, furthermore is said to have been distinguished by its social and cultural agenda and by its hostile attitude towards the central state.

This second conception of the old regionalism is important for understanding the usage of new regionalism in the wider field. As mentioned, it is often used to designate an empirical state in the sense that regions are something new under conditions of globalization, but also to denote a new kind of ideological movement, or normative position concerning the autonomy of regions (Cox, 2009; Harrison, 2008; Fernandez, 2000; Grundel, 2014; Keating, 1998; Loughlin, 2007; Mitander, 2015; Syssner, 2006; Säll, 2012). Thus, both these descriptions of old regionalism point to features of a possible new one, but in different ways. However, the way that Keating (1998; 2003) has summarized the ‘new’ functions of regions in three main points has gained widespread attention, and indeed it incorporates both these aspects.

First, and this is very salient in the literature, the function and governance of regions are changing due to globalization. In essence, this is the same argument as in the articulations of a ‘regional world’, or in other words that economic globalization forces states to reconfigure their governance and upgrade the importance of sub-national regions for producing competitiveness and growth. Second, the regionalism of the new millennium is politically not only a top-down regionalization, but also a bottom-up one. As Syssner (2006) remarks, the new regionalism is often understood to be driven by actors within the regions so that the pressure for change is not first and foremost deployed from national governments. At the same time the political pressure from below is not primarily a function of separatist ideologies or nationalist movements (even though
they still exist). Rather, there is a complex mix of regional actors becoming interlinked with each other as well as national governments and supranational entities such as the EU, which together help produce shifting functions for regional governance (Keating, 1998; 2003).

Indeed, the increasing European integration is the third common point often articulated by new regional scholars as they claim that (European) regions now increasingly operate in a Multi-Level Governance (MLG) system (cf. Bache & Flinders, 2004; Hooghe & Marks, 2001). While often clearly articulated with an implicit absolute spatial ontology, MLG theory understands the region to be a good example of how politics are changing with the ever more evolving governance system that is the EU. European regions now have direct representation in the form of the Assembly of European Regions (AER) and many of them have offices in Brussels in order to formulate and express their goals through the vast lobby apparatus that operates in EU politics. This means that regions can ‘bypass the state’ as they formulate demands and try to influence their own future. Importantly, new regionalist scholars claim that, while this may be most pronounced in EU, similar structures are increasingly being put in place around the world, and so indeed many regions now have well-developed international ties and in a sense conduct ‘para-diplomacy’ (Aldecoa & Keating, 1999; Bursens & Deforche, 2010) as they maintain offices and ties in strategically important locations around the world (Gren, 2002; Keating, 1998; 2003; 2013; Loughlin, 2007).

While these three aspects of new regionalism are often described as more or less ‘objective’ circumstances or developments, the new regionalism is a field of inquiry very close to regional policy, where scholars continuously provide policy input through research, and where so to speak, the theory is led by policy (Lovering, 1999). In other words, it is underpinned by a number of implicit, yet very prominent normative claims. Christian Fernández (2000) points out three such basic premises upon which new regionalist research and policy often rest.

First, implicit in most new regionalist research and policy is that the main goal for politics is to create conditions for growth and economic development. Second, there is also a generally positive attitude towards the European union and its internal market as a political project. Finally, new regionalism rests on ideas claiming that the unitary state is inefficient as a political system and that stronger regions are both a better solution for economic growth and a democratic ideal.
To be sure, there is no shortage of research that is critical of this mixing of policy and research. In particular, John Lovering launched fierce critique already in 1999 by when he claimed that ‘The New Regionalism is a set of stories about how parts of a regional economy might work, placed next to a set of policy ideas which might just be useful in some cases’ (Lovering, 1999:384; original emphasis). Indeed, his article, which used a case study of how new regionalist policy and research were made operational in Wales, became a sort of intervention, producing a range of new regionalist scholars to reconsider positions and defend their work (cf. Harrison, 2006; MacLeod, 2001).

While Lovering’s (1999) critique was directed at more or less all of the new regionlist projects, there are more specific investigations such as Gillian Bristow’s (2005) problematization of the competitiveness discourse that she finds to be hegemonic in regional research, policy and practice. She concludes:

The discourse of regional competitiveness has become ubiquitous in the deliberation and statements of policy actors and regional analysts. However, this paper has argued that it is a rather confused, chaotic discourse which seems to conflate serious theoretical work on regional economies, with national and international policy discourses on globalization and the knowledge economy. [...] The result is that regional economic development policy is ultimately very narrowly focused. Policy under the rubric of competitiveness is not necessarily about collective territorial performance at all – it is about a particular aspect of a particular subset of activities within that territory (Bristow, 2005:300).

Taken together, the new regionalist literature continues to be important, particularly in the way that it works through the TIM-family research that continuously produces models for how to be innovative, competitive and successful in global competition (Asheim, 1996; Cooke, 1992; Florida, 2002; 2005; Morgan, 2007; Porter, 1998). These kinds of growth-oriented regimes have been deployed throughout regions first as a response to a perceived global competition, and later as a means for handling the ongoing economic crisis which reinforced the discourse of competitiveness (Lovering, 2007; Peck, 2002; 2005). In this thesis, I use Swedish regions as empirical entry points\(^\footref{14}\) and for this reason I will briefly sketch the evolution of regional governance and the emergence of a new regionalist dynamic in Swedish regions in the final section of this chapter.

\(^{14}\) More precisely, I call these entry points sites of emergence referring to the way an assemblage may become visible and possible to study. I describe my methodology more thoroughly in chapter four.
2.4.2. Regional Governance in Sweden: Changing Contours

In general, the new regionalist discourse is strongly present in Swedish regional governance and in this regard the themes are similar to what was sketched in the previous section. That is to say, in Sweden, regions are also thought of as in need of change and indeed today they occupy different positions in the legal-institutional system as well as perform different activities compared to a few decades ago (Fernández, 2000; Grundel, 2014; Hudson & Rönnblom, 2007; Hörnström, 2010; Johansson, 2000; 2013; Mitander, 2015; Mitander, Säll & Öjehag-Pettersson, 2013; Rönnblom, 2008; Säll, 2012; 2014; Säll & Öjehag-Pettersson, 2013; Syssner, 2006).

Given the empirical focus of this thesis I will nevertheless take some time to briefly introduce the evolution of Swedish regional governance here. When doing so I also explain some context-specific concepts and themes that will be of help in understanding the empirical analysis of chapters five through seven.

Johansson (2013) has suggested that the evolution of Swedish regional governance has gone through different phases from the middle of the twentieth century and into present days. Thus, as in many European countries, the policy area was instituted as a separate one during the 1960s when distributive policies, primarily between urban and rural areas, became a prolific issue in Swedish politics. At this point, the main goal of Swedish regional policy was to create similar conditions and possibilities for a ‘good life’ throughout Sweden, irrespective of where people lived. As in many other countries, regional governance was at this time primarily a top-down affair where the central state ruled by, for instance, offering government funding support to business relocations and economic help to social programs in specific support regions.

In the late 1970s and early 1980s, this focus changed as much of the actual governance was decentralized in the sense that the states’ regional agencies became directly responsible for carrying out much of the affairs concerning the development of different regions. Over time this changed the content of regional policy towards what Johansson (2000; 2013) called interregional issues. The regional agencies provided grants for which interregional actors could apply and run development-oriented projects, which in the end meant a more disparate focus of Swedish regional policy in general.

After around 1995, and Sweden’s admission to the EU, the regional policy entered the last, and according to Johansson (2013) still ongoing phase, which very much resembles the general features of a new regionalist
paradigm. In other words, there has been an even more pronounced shift from the regional policy of the first phase, as regions now primarily should aim to be competitive and produce growth. In this system, social differences among regions are a function, not a problem that must be solved.

During this time, and particularly since the beginning of the 1990s there has been an ongoing issue concerning the institutional organization of Swedish regional governance (Johansson, 2000; 2013; Mitander, 2015; Säll, 2012). Traditionally, Sweden has been considered a unitary state with a relatively weak regional polity coupled with a strong central state and strong municipalities (Jernek, 2000). In the regions, the directly elected body was traditionally the so-called county councils. However, during the evolution of Swedish regional governance, this has changed somewhat. In addition to this, there are more ‘symbolic’ regional units called landscapes, which sometimes, but not always follow the administrative borders of the counties. While having no legal or administrative status, the landscapes maintain an important aspect of Swedish regional identity. Furthermore, the state maintains a presence in all regions through a range of government authorities and agencies, and most importantly through the county administrative boards, which often are described as the state’s direct presence in the regions (Johansson, 2013).

While the division of labor among the county councils and county administrative boards has fluctuated somewhat, the county councils have generally been focused on one primary function, namely to administer and run the Swedish health care system, while the county administrative boards have been in charge of regional development. Since the middle of the 1990s, the rather messy regional governance in Sweden has become even more so through the introduction of so-called regional co-operation councils, comprised of indirectly elected representatives of the municipalities of a county. These councils have, however, in a number of counties taken over the responsibilities of regional development from the county administrative boards, making them important for understanding regional governance in Sweden (Johansson, 2013; Mitander, 2015; Säll, 2012).

What is more, and this makes Sweden a particularly interesting case, since the beginning of the 1990s there has been, as mentioned, an ongoing discussion of territorial reconfiguration in Sweden. More precisely, a number of committees and reports have been issued for reformulating the regional system, often with the ambition to achieve more competitive regions
This evolution of regional development policy and politics during the 1990s and into the present day has been described by Line Säll (2014) as following different political rationalities over time. By studying reports issued by the parliamentary committees responsible for Swedish regional development, as well as debates in the same committees, she shows how themes such as democracy and gender equality used to be part of the debates, although they have presently faded in favor of questions of growth and competitiveness. All in all, her analysis shows how new regionalist ideas have gained a foothold in Swedish politics, and contributed to the ongoing questions of if, how and why Sweden should be territorially reconfigured (Säll, 2014).

Concerning this theme in particular, the so called Committee on Public Sector Responsibility (CPSR) started its work in 2003, and initiated its final report (SOU 2007:10) in 2007, concluding that Sweden should be restructured in a number of ways, including a more streamlined regional division among authorities and agencies as well as larger (and therefore fewer) regional governance units. The committee recommended that Sweden should have six to nine regions with a minimum of one million inhabitants, as compared to the 21 counties/regions with very varied populations that exist today.

As the result of another government report (SOU 1995:27), there was concurrently an ongoing experimental process in which four counties (Gotland, Kalmar, Västra Götaland och Skåne) had been given the official status of regions, merging responsibilities of health care and regional development under one political body with directly elected representatives. This try-out period was extended and CPSR suggested to carry out the regional reform they recommended based on this model (SOU 1999:103; SOU 2000:85; SOU 2007:10).

The proposed reform was not implemented, however, and instead the Swedish government opted to allow regional formations to, as it were, be formed bottom-up, making it possible for county councils and regional co-operation councils to merge, and requesting to be formal regions (Johansson, 2013; Mitander, 2015). As of January 1, 2015, Sweden now has ten such regions (that are also called regions rather than counties), responsible for both health care and regional development with directly elected representatives in ‘regional parliaments’. In addition there are still eleven county councils, five regional co-operational councils as well as the
twenty-one county administrative boards all taking part in the regional development in Sweden, making the situation somewhat messy.

In any case, regional development must follow some specific guidelines as issued by the Swedish government, regardless of body in control. One of the most important guidelines is to draw up so called Regional Development Strategies (RDS), which each region must develop in order to show how they contribute to Swedish growth policy. In all of the regions that are now also formally called regions, they are responsible for working with the RDS, and in particular to measure and control to what extent the goals that have been set are also being met. In the remaining eleven counties, this responsibility is sometimes carried out by the regional co-operation council and sometimes by the county administrative boards.

The RDS documents also show the influence of the EU in Swedish regional governance policy as they are formally produced to link up with the EU2020 agenda with its goals of growth that are expected to be economically, environmentally and socially sustainable (EC, 2010). This EU agenda has been introduced in a number of ways, but institutionally it is also the basis of the Swedish national strategy for regional growth and attraction, as well as the Swedish national innovation strategy. Since these two documents are important policy articulations, which all entities that conduct regional development must relate to, they can be viewed as indirect ways through with the EU2020 agenda is introduced to regions.

In sum, the Swedish regions constitute spaces that are crisscrossed by authorities, agencies and governments located at various spatial sites, although they all still exercise significant influence in the development of regions. When doing so, from my perspective, they are not only rescaling Swedish territory, they are actively producing Swedish space. But this is not all. The complex practice that is Swedish regional development also produces globalization, and thus, it is not only globalization that affects Swedish regions; they are also affecting globalization. In the next two chapters, I will articulate more precise theories and methods that enable a distinct conceptual grammar for understanding space, territorial reconfiguration and regions in terms of power and politics. When doing so I draw on assemblage thinking (cf. Acuto & Curtis, 2014; Ong & Collier, 2005) as I study the space that forms around regional development in Sweden.

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15 Swedish: En nationell strategi för regional tillväxt och attraktionskraft 2014-2020
16 Swedish: Den nationella innovationsstrategin
In this chapter I describe a theoretical figure, the assemblage, as a way of approaching the (re)production of globalization in Swedish regional development. Furthermore, by mobilizing what has been called assemblage thinking (Acuto & Curtis, 2014), I aim to not only to avoid the territorial trap and methodological nationalism, but rather to disable it (Agnew, 1994; Elden, 2010). In addition, the chapter constitutes a step in this thesis where I combine assemblage thinking with a mode of analysis that explicitly pays attention to how power operates as domains of social reality are made into objects of governing, namely governmentality studies (Dean, 2010; Larner & Walters, 2004; Miller & Rose, 2008).

In practice then, this is the theoretical chapter of the thesis in as much as it continues and further develops some of the concepts already introduced in the literature review. This means first and foremost that I continue the discussion on space and territory by introducing the figure of an assemblage as it has been articulated in the tradition of Deleuze and Guattari (2004; 2009). When doing so, I account for some of the rather complex terminology of a few central authors (Deleuze, 1992; Deleuze & Guattari, 2004; 2009; Foucault, 1980a; 2007; 2008) and the translational issues one encounters when dealing with terms in three languages (English, French and Swedish).

While I think that a short theoretical discussion concerning the origins and functions of the assemblage concept is in order, I soon turn to defining assemblage thinking rather than assemblage theory (Acuto & Curtis, 2014; Collier, 2014; Ong, 2014; Sassen, 2006; 2014). By this I mean to say that I use the figure of an assemblage here as a tactic, or a way of approaching an empirical phenomenon, which in this case is the governance of Swedish regional development and the ongoing (re)production of globalization that goes on there. At the same time I also recognize that thinking assemblages provides a means of visualizing the formation of any given relational space, and I discuss how the assemblage
of regional governance that I study takes territorial form through processes of reterritorialization (Brenner, 2004).

In the second section of the chapter, I explicitly turn to governmentality studies as a mode of analyzing power and dominance in contemporary societies. This means that I return to some of the themes sketched briefly in the introductory chapter and expand on those. Particularly I start by asking ‘where’ governmentality can be located and by doing so show how assemblage thinking and governmentality analysis can successfully complement each other. I then describe in some more detail what is meant by the concepts of political rationalities and governmental technologies before I move on to consider what can be called the subjects of governmentality (Dean, 2010; Larner & Walters, 2004; Miller & Rose, 2008).

In the third and final section, I articulate my understanding of power and spell out how my analysis of globalization (re)production in this particular assemblage can be thought of as an analytics of power (Dean, 2010). More specifically I account for the three traditional conceptions of power in political science (Lukes, 2004) and introduce some general assumptions of a Foucauldian perspective in order to show how it breaks with, and runs alongside the other, sometimes compatible and sometimes not. This is primarily done to highlight how power is a concept that is hard to theorize in a totalizing fashion, rather than to show ‘the right’ conceptualization of power. Instead, by showing a set of dualisms where different articulations of power stand in direct opposition to each other, I recognize that rather than searching for a complete theory of this concept, I will work with a particular signature of power (Agamben, 2009; Dean, 2013).

In this case the signature of power that I articulate revolves around three themes in Foucault’s thinking, namely power as an economy, as a power/knowledge relation and as governmentality. I present these as overlapping discussions that all feed into the particular analysis that will be conducted later on in chapters five, six and seven.

3.1 Assemblage Thinking

First, a basic statement: I will speak of assemblage thinking rather than of assemblage theory in this thesis. Instead of following a grand narrative I think there are clear benefits connected to using the figure of an assemblage as a tactic or a framing device for delineating research. This means that I sympathize with Aihwa Ong (2014:18) when she states that she ‘developed the concept of “global assemblage” as a space of enquiry, not as a theory, but as a way to “frame” our analysis, to put it rather simply’. So therefore:
It is not a theory: assemblage is a way of reframing our inquiry, to grasp perhaps critical interacting elements that would help us in analyzing what is happening. We are trying to capture things that are always in the midst of unfolding so the very value, for me, of a global established strategy of enquiry as a concept is that it takes into account contingency and uncertainty in a way perhaps that large theories do not because they have causal determinants in one way or another (Ong, 2014:19).

In addition, the way Ong and Collier (2005) articulate assemblage thinking not only functions as a tactic, but in my mind also as a good visualization of a relational space, formed around instances of social practice that does not (have to) originate in territorial thinking. However, to be able to articulate more clearly what I mean by assemblage thinking, I do think it is necessary to account for some of the origins of this figure.

### 3.1.1. Assemblage: Origins and Applications

The concept of assemblage, and much of the current use of it, stems from the work of Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari presented in their two-volume *Capitalism and Schizophrenia* (2004; 2009). At the same time it can also be traced to the development of ANT and the formation of Science and Technology Studies (STS) through for instance Bruno Latour (2005), Annemarie Mol and John Law (1994), to mention a few.17

A first problem with this concept arises, as is often the case, with its translation and extrapolation from a particular configuration of concepts in French writing into English (or other languages). In this case it is actually quite a significant shift of meaning that is introduced through the translation and therefore a brief account of this is probably in order (Philips, 2006).

Deleuze and Guattari (2004; 2009) never actually use the term assemblage with analytical ambitions in their own writings, even though it exists in French with more or less the similar connotations as the English term (a form of compound of certain parts that has been assembled together). In both languages the notion of an assemblage is often restricted to more technological matters so that we may speak of, for instance, an assemblage of electronic components and certain metallic alloys that together form a

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17This important development of ANT and STS will not be accounted for in any detail here, however a short comment is in order. Particularly within ANT, Latour (1987), Mol and Law (1994) and Michel Callon (1998) have all articulated the importance of the network for social theory. Briefly, the network they have in mind resembles the assemblage as it is presented here, or that is, a form of coming together of discourses, actors (or actants in their terminology) and material objects in certain formations. The network therefore consists of nodes that are not only made up of humans but rather they are specific arrangements of material objects where action and agency are not restricted to humans. Indeed, to properly account for social phenomena ANT stresses that researchers should pay careful attention to technological tools, machines, animals, nature and other forms of physical structures. Hence, to analyze social phenomena this way means to study them much like one would by invoking the figure of the assemblage, and indeed the concept is used by many ANT scholars.
particular machine. Hence, in this notion the concept of the assemblage is a bringing together of different entities so that it produces a form of combination, yet at the same time the everyday usage of the word restricts it to certain segments of the social field (the technological) while designating a fairly high degree of stability, of completeness, and this is not what Deleuze and Guattari (2004; 2009) had in mind.

Instead, in the French original texts the term that is used is that of agencement. As such agencement is connected to (and indeed articulated through) other parts of Deleuze and Guattari’s (2004; 2009) distinct conceptual register such as lines of flight, nomadology, smooth space and rhizomatics and while its general understanding is similar to that of the assemblage, it is nevertheless a different concept that is hard to translate. John Philips (2006:108) comments on the situation like this:

Agencement is a common French word with the senses of either ‘arrangement’, ‘fitting’ or ‘fixing’ and is used in French in as many contexts as those words are used in English: one would speak of the arrangements of parts of a body or machine, one might talk of fixing (fitting or affixing) two or more parts together; and one might use the term for both the act of fixing and the arrangement itself, as in the fixtures and fittings of a building or shop, or the parts of a machine. [...] if one accepts that a concept arises in philosophy as the connection between a state of affairs and the statement we can make about it. Agencement designates the priority of neither the state of affairs nor the statement but of their connection, which implies the production of a sense that exceeds them and of which, transformed, they now form parts.

Thus, it is important to recognize this more ‘in becoming’ connotation of agencement when speaking of assemblage in this particular context. In addition, as mentioned above, thinking assemblages can be used as a tactic for approaching social science issues, as a way of articulating sites of empirical studies. Therefore, I wish to emphasize instead what we can understand as a ‘liberating’ function of translating concepts between languages and from philosophical articulations into empirical tools and this is precisely the disconnection from the conceptual apparatus that usually comes with the package so to speak. In short, the new function and the loss of theoretical baggage may be more helpful than harmful (Guillaume, 2014; Legg, 2011; Philips; 2006).\textsuperscript{18}

Hence, I think the opportunities outrank the risks, something that has been demonstrated through the many recent publications where

\textsuperscript{18} The argument made here is by no means one that all would agree on, as some would argue that the concept loses some of its meaning in the extrapolation that I suggest here. Assemblage theory has been articulated by different scholars but maybe most explicitly by DeLanda (2000; 2006). Indeed, what he does is to build on the kind of theory of assemblages that is given by Deleuze and Guattari (2004; 2009) and I do recognize that my usage of the concept will make it lose some of its theoretical meaning.
assemblage thinking has been used as a point of entry for a broad range of empirical studies (cf. Acuto & Curtis, 2014; Larner & Walters, 2004; Ong & Collier, 2005). This is also the conclusion that Saskia Sassen (2014:18) draws:

For me, before method, assemblage is an analytical tactic to deal with the abstract and the unseen. […] The economy, the government, the family, the city – all these basic powerful categories are becoming less stable than they were during the Keynesian period […] As a research practice, assemblage allows me not to throw those powerful categories out the window but actively destabilize them. This is also basically what she does in the influential book *Territory Authority Rights: From Medieval to Global Assemblages* (2006). By approaching the territorial reconfigurations aspect of globalization using her own assemblage thinking, Sassen is able to provide an informative reading of how such prominent analytical categories as ‘state’ and ‘territory’ can be reimagined. And again, what is important with Sassen’s assemblage thinking is that she is quite explicit in how she uses it in her own way, not letting herself be tied down by existing theoretical articulations:

People think that I am a Deleuzian because I use the term assemblage. I am using it more like a ‘carpenter’ than as a Deleuzian. […] I am not a Deleuzian, I am not a Foucauldian and I am not a Marxist. I am doing my own stuff and I am having a lot of fun with it as a kind of ignorant carpenter (Sassen, 2014:19).

By thinking of assemblages as sites of problematization or empirical studies, the concept affords ways of bringing together discourses, material components and subjects (and explicitly the bodily vessels that are linked to subject formation) into a form of vibrant unity, stable enough to study, yet always in the making, moving and becoming. Think of, for instance, the trafficking of women that occurs around the world. What is trafficking? What components are parts of it? What discourses produces it? What policies are deployed to address it, and perhaps more important, how are the problems of trafficking formulated? By thinking of trafficking as an assemblage, Stephen Legg (2009; 2011:129) was able to analyze how ‘actual movements, policies novels, rumors, myths, desires, and places of disembarkation, slavery, purchase and policing’ all contributed to formulating ‘trafficking’ as a distinct (however, not fixed) arrangement of these intersecting lines of flight into a conjunction, open to further analysis.

Another example, more along the way the concept of assemblage has been articulated in STS and ANT, is Nick Srnicek’s (2014) suggestion of treating the production of knowledge and expertise in the international
system as ‘cognitive assemblages’. While this concept builds on the notion of ‘epistemic communities’ that has been around for sometime in constructivist I.R, thinking cognitive assemblages explicitly directs attention to how the epistemic communities are intertwined with technology. That is to say, to understand how policies, knowledge and expertise regarding, for instance, climate change are produced, mobilized and deployed in differing contexts around the world, it becomes important to study such material components as computers, the models that come to life inside them, the algorithms that underpin them and the evolving computing capacity of processors. Such technologies are integral to the cognitive assemblages that formulate our collective knowledge regarding climate change, and what is more, this knowledge arises precisely in the conjunctions between the scholars, the politicians, the scientific articles, the computer models and the measuring instruments.

On the theme of expertise, Eugene McCann and Kevin Ward (2012a; 2012b) also showcase the usefulness of thinking assemblage as they developed what they call policy mobility. McCann and Ward’s notion of policy mobility focuses on how policies can be understood as mobile constructs that spread around the world between different polities, while at the same time transforming, mutating and shifting as they do so. To understand this policy mobility McCann and Ward suggest that it is vital to recognize how local practitioners and policymakers are ‘extrospective’ (McCann, 2011a), or in simpler terms, they actively look out from their local sites to find policies that they can import. In such circumstances expertise and scholarship have become very important as local sites measure up against each other looking for ‘best practice’ regarding policies in all political fields. By invoking assemblage thinking, McCann (2008; 2011b) has successfully shed light on how the city of Vancouver, Canada, imported, transformed and deployed policies for handling a growing drug problem. This entailed a combination of ‘enforcement, treatment, prevention and a commitment to reducing the harms of illicit drug use, rather than eliminating their use’ (McCann, 2011a:143). The assemblage that formed around this drug policy combined discourses and policies with medical expertise, law enforcement and community activism, and importantly these were not at all ‘only’ local. Rather, it became important early on to import elements from other local sites of expertise, policy, enforcement and activism.

Summing up so far, assemblage thinking can be used as a way of approaching a problem and delimiting an empirical space. In short, to set
the perimeters for a given study, while still recognizing that such a
demarcation is always contingent. An often-used quote from Deleuze
reads:

What is an assemblage? It is a multiplicity which is made up of heterogeneous
terms... the assemblage’s only unity is that of co-functioning: it is a symbiosis, a
’sympathy’. It is never filiations that are important, but alliances, alloys (Deleuze &

Assemblage thinking therefore focuses on the intersections where the
multiplicities meet and form. In terms of empirical focus, as exemplified
above, the assemblage can be more of an orientation towards a particular
heterogeneity such as the issues of trafficking women, climate change
expertise or mobile policies. But it can also explicitly be a matter of space.
In fact, Ong and Collier (2005) articulate ‘the global’ through what they call
global assemblages. In this case they bring together a large number of authors
that all investigate forms of assemblages that operate in such ways that
they contribute to the understanding of what ‘the global’ is. In this sense,
Ong and Collier (2005:10) speak of global forms and ‘in doing so […] mean
to emphasize a peculiar characteristic of their foundations or conditions of
possibility’. Hence, for them, an important aspect of the abstract category
of ‘global space’ is the assemblages that take global forms:

Global forms are able to assimilate themselves to new environments, to code
heterogeneous contexts and objects in terms that are amenable to control and
valuation. At the same time, the conditions of possibility of this movement is
complex. Global forms are limited or delimited by specific technical
infrastructures, administrative apparatuses, or value regimes, not by the vagaries of
a social or cultural field (Ong & Collier, 2005:11).

As I have declared several times, I sympathize with the general idea of the
global as a form of space that is produced through the relational qualities
of different spaces and sites of emergence. By studying assemblages that
take on global forms, it is possible to shed light on (aspects of) how
globalization is produced. In this thesis I am particularly interested in what
we may understand as ‘the ordering and governance of regional
development’ and the space that forms around these practices. This means
that I intend to understand the governing of regional development in terms
of assemblage thinking. Hence, I do not start from the idea that the
practice of regional governance must be located in a particular ‘regional
space’, but rather think of it as multitude of instances that become tied to
each other through the very act of governing. This does not mean,
however, that it does not have material form or territorial impact.
3.1.2. Assemblage as Relational Space

Assemblage thinking as I have articulated it here revolves around a connection, a kind of seriality, between certain instances or sites. Not always, but often, such sites do have locality, or that is to say they can be understood as territorial points where the assemblage disembark. Thus the space that forms around the governance of Swedish regional development overlaps with regional territories in that country. However, it is also a space that includes far away geographical locations throughout the world as well as instances not directly mappable in terms of Cartesian coordinates.

Nevertheless, this can be understood as a (relational) space, and in terms of the debates accounted for in chapter two I do think the figure of an assemblage functions as an image of a relational spatial formation. To approach such a space, however, often requires what can be called a topological view rather than a topographical one (Allen & Cochrane, 2007; 2010; Harvey, 2006a; Massey, 2005). In topographical approaches distance and proximity are mappable using Euclidian geometry and Cartesian coordinates, while topological ones break with such notions. An example of state power may provide an idea of this break.

In traditional ways of understanding the relations between state power and space, topographical perspectives predominate. Briefly put, power is often thought of as a capacity that is either trickling down in a vertical hierarchy (compare the traditional scalar thinking) or radiating horizontally through networks of interconnected sites (compare modern scalar positions or some relational ones). Hence, state power has a form of reach that can be measured in miles or kilometers and refers to ways that the state may make itself present or active in spaces within (or outside) its borders.

In contrast, a topological view builds on a similar ontology as the one articulated in this thesis where spaces are actively produced through social practice and their relations to each other (Massey, 1994; 2005). Therefore, to speak of state power in such circumstances is more a matter of intensity than extension. The state powers may appear in many different spaces with varying intensity. Indeed, the state becomes one aspect out of many that constitutes the assemblage that produces any given space. John Allen and Allan Cochrane (2007) have conceptualized the spatial formation of a ‘region’ as an assemblage and illustrate the relation between central and regional powers using a topological approach:

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19 More precisely they rest on mathematical foundations of a kind of set-theory and geometry blend stretching back to Leibniz and the 17th century. For an overview of the influence of Leibniz in geographical thinking, see Elden (2013).
In this topological take on the politics of central/regional relations and the altered geography of state power that it illuminates, what comes to the fore turns out to be less a movement of power downwards and rather more of an interplay between parts of central, regional and local authority “lodged” at different sites within the region. [...] In each case, the powers of reach exercised are not a simple form of spatial extension where an authority’s powers pervade every square meter of a given territory. Rather, proximity and reach play across one another in a variety of intensive ways to bridge the gap erected by the physical barriers of distance (Allen & Cochrane, 2007:1075).

Thus, using a topological approach emphasizes the ‘connectedness’ of different spatial sites as they are linked through social practice and makes it possible to conceive of an assemblage in terms of a spatial formation. Importantly, this is a relational spatial formation, which means that however it is manifested and around what instances of social reality, it is the relations among these instances that give it a specific ‘identity’. Thus, as a space forms around the many practices involved in the governing of regional development in Sweden, this is a particular, and vibrant, unstable formation that connects a given set of sites for some finite amount of time, yet these sites may also stand in relation to other spatial forms, outside of this particular assemblage, effectively making it a construct that always help produce other spatial sites.

Metaphorically, we may say that the assemblages are constituted as a range of discourses, practices and subjects that reaches into it, but the assemblage also reaches out (Allen & Cochrane, 2007; 2010). This means that as the practices of governing regional development are linked up and enacted they also reach into other instances of the social. In particular, aspects of this assemblage may acquire global forms (Ong & Collier, 2005), which are particularly mobile and possible to merge into other forms of practice. Thus, we may think of such global forms as (re)production of globalization. This can also be illustrated using a more tangible example and perhaps that will help clarify what so far has been a rather abstract discussion.

In computer programming the actual program is, as we know, in fact a form of language or code. As the programmer produces this code it consists of variables, control structures, data structures, syntax and tools for making the program executable. Importantly, an established concept in computer programming is to speak of so-called global variables that resemble the kind of global forms I have in mind here (Ong & Collier, 2005). As the code gets larger it is not uncommon to structure the program into modules that are separate from each other and perform different tasks in the overall composition. The global variables, however, are such variables that can be
called upon by any module in the program and thus be inserted into different circumstances. Now, the important thing here is that even though the global variable is the same, the way it ‘behaves’ depends on the context (or rather module) in which it is made operational. So as the programmer produces modules and global variables, there is not necessarily an inherent or essential function in the global variable that determines its function, it is rather the interplay between its *global form* and the local module that calls for it. I suggest that we may think of the global forms in an assemblage in similar ways, as continuously (re)produced in a complex interplay between ‘the local’ and ‘the global’, and herein also lies the production of globalization (Ong & Collier, 2005).

The argument above can be reintroduced by thinking in terms of deterritorialization and reterritorialization as discussed by Brenner (2004) and Deleuze and Guattari (2004; 2009). The assemblage of regional governance can be understood as a contingent alloy, a bringing together of a multitude of objects and events all with disparate lines of flight. At the same time, using Ong and Collier’s (2005) ideas of global forms as a base, we may possibly group those lines of flight into two main categories, those that deterritorialize the assemblage and those that reterritorialize it. Hence, at any given moment the assemblage will have aspects and functions that pull it apart, lift it and scramble it, making it ready to dissolve. At the same time the assemblage is also striving towards fixation, stratification and sedimentation, thus turning it into a part of social reality where power flows, subjects form and discourses are produced (Legg, 2011). Again, I would like to propose that we think of the assemblage as producing these oscillating global forms where globalization is simultaneously an outcome and an impact, both produced and experienced.

To study this, I will use a conceptual grammar largely based on Foucault and the literature on governmentality. Before I turn explicitly to this in the next section, one remark on Foucauldian analysis may be made here in relation to *assemblage thinking*. It is clear, as Stephen Legg (2011) has shown, that Deleuze and Guattari’s (2004; 2009) concept of assemblage (*agencement*) resembles what Foucault (2007; 2008) calls apparatus and also *dispositif*. Indeed, Deleuze and Foucault worked closely together on different projects and according to Legg (2011) as Deleuze wrote *Foucault* (1986) and *What is a Dispositif?* (1992), he also made it clear how much of their respective theories and concepts that could be linked. In particular, Deleuze’s reading of Foucault’s analytical concepts *the dispositif* and *the apparatus* is very similar to his own *agencement*. Here I will not go into this
detailed history, but I think that this conceptual discussion is important, not for finding the ‘true’ meaning of concepts but for notions of clarity and simplification. Hence, I will develop this discussion a bit further in later sections.

In any case, to analyze the assemblage then, it can be productive to explicitly fashion a merger with a set of tools that builds on the Foucauldian notion of power. Indeed, to focus more explicitly on how power operates within and shapes assemblages has been articulated as a welcome approach and a task for future research. When asked about the challenges and future of assemblage thinking, Stephen Collier (2014:37) said:

I’m just not sure we need another sub-discipline to throw itself into expositions of Latour or Deleuze or whomever else. But we do need more work on what successful assemblage theory look like. This is one of the reasons for why I would like to keep Foucault in mind as an assemblage thinker. […] His methodological reflections are always motivated by his investigations of particular assemblages or apparatuses. We really look to Foucault for the extraordinary array of concepts and distinctions he introduces […] These concepts and distinctions make it possible to redescribe or reconstruct major elements of our contemporary reality and our history in a way that changes our understanding, allows us to think in a more discerning, and, in that sense, critical way. […] To put it a bit provocatively, we need more Foucault, less Latour.

Hence, the combination of Foucauldian governmentality and assemblage thinking is a motivated path for conducting empirical investigations. In the following sections, I turn to these issues more specifically as I suggest a particular molding of assemblage thinking and governmentality concepts into a functioning theoretical grammar suitable for studying the (re)production of globalization in the governing of Swedish regional development.

3.2 GOVERNMENTALITY REVISITED

It is possible to approach the concept of governmentality in different ways. First of all, the term is widely used in two separate, albeit interlinked, connotations. The first usage denotes what Foucault (2007) articulated as a specific feature in the development of state rule. As such it emerged in relation to the birth of the liberal states and the changing focus of

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20 It would be interesting to follow the history of ideas of Foucault and Deleuze as the latter many times has articulated his obvious indebtedness to the former (Legg, 2011). Indeed, Legg (2011:130) calls Deleuze’s interpretation of the Foucauldian apparatus ‘almost comically assemblage-like’. In particular, since Agamben (2009b) later made a different reading of the notion of apparatus/dispositive, I think it would be interesting to conduct a form of genealogy concerning this set of concepts.
government to become, first and foremost, a practice that deals with what has been called ‘biopolitics’ (Foucault, 2007; 2008).

In this sense governmentality is historically delimited and manifested as new articulations of central concepts for the practices of ruling and relates to the ways in which such practices can be understood as nested in mentalities, or ways of thinking of government. Dean (2010) lists four such features that emerged in states around the time when this historically delimited meaning of governmentality started to take form and he also locates its origin:

Governmentality emerges in Western European societies in the ‘early modern period’ when the art of government of the state becomes a distinct activity, and when the forms of knowledge and techniques of the human and social sciences become integral to it (Dean, 2010:28).

First (1), at this time in a fundamentally new way, the locus of rule became the population of any given such regime of government. Unlike in earlier times, to rule meant to cater to the entire population in an encompassing promise of health, welfare, happiness and prosperity for all citizens. The primary means of achieving such ambitions meant that the government at the same time had to become very much focused on the economy, both in the sense that it had to deliver economic prosperity but also through the fact that it had to become economical itself (Dean, 2010; Foucault, 2007; 2008).

Second (2), this shift also brought about new articulations of sovereignty and discipline since the new relation to the population meant that the subjects within a particular territory now could be understood as its most vital resources possible to utilize and optimize. Therefore, third (3), over time states increasingly started to enclose their subjects within vast security systems such as the police, the military, diplomatic forces, education systems, health systems and welfare systems to mention a few. Finally, fourth (4), this evolution then also led to a fortification of one central and highly dominant center of power within any given such regime – that of the central government itself (Dean, 2010).

Hence the first meaning of governmentality can be understood as this particular manifestation of government that rules its population primarily through its economic register and aims to foster its subjects (Dean, 2010). Along this line scholars have also continued to point to historical forms of governmentality and tried to trace its path from the emergence in the early modern period through modernity and into the present day. Miller and Rose (2008), for instance, highlight what they term ‘classic liberal
governmentality’, ‘social governmentality’ and ‘advanced liberal governmentality’ as different forms of rule that have been influential in the last century.

The second meaning of the term, however, is actually what is of most importance here. In this sense governmentality must be interpreted more generally than as one or many specific instances of historically situated forms of rule. Rather, governmentality here denotes how most elements of the social practice of governing can be understood as influenced by discursively produced mentalities, or forms of thinking and ways of representing the truth. We can begin to approach this meaning of governmentality by asking what it means to rule a particular domain of social reality (Dean, 2010).

A first central point then is to understand that governmentality analysis explicitly tries to form an understanding of the term ‘to govern’ as something that not at all must be associated with institutions and actors traditionally affiliated with the state, the region, the municipality or any other ‘official’ form of political body. Instead, following Foucault (2007), the notion of government can be understood as ‘the conduct of conduct’. As the wordplay indicates, government in this notion is a matter of steering, leading or guiding (conduct as a verb) the behavior (conduct as a noun) of a particular object or field. At the same time the word calls attention to the crucial fact that governing also can be conceived of as a self-reflexive activity in the sense that humans tend to ‘conduct themselves’ (Dean, 2010).

In relation to this reasoning therefore, government becomes a (more or less) calculated activity performed by numerous authorities, agencies and subjects that employ a multiplicity of techniques in order to shape the conduct of any given domain of social reality. Hence, governmentality scholars can be focused on vastly different terrains when conducting their analysis. The sick, the healthy, the ecology, the economy, the students, the teachers, the penal system, the region and the elderly are all examples of social fields that have become the object of government. This leads us to the crucial point of understanding not only government, but rather governmentality in this second meaning.

Studies of governmentality are interested in how certain domains of social reality may become the object of programmatic thought that renders them governable through mentalities of government. This means that they focus on how thinking is nested in, and constitutive of, our governmental practices, and furthermore how such thinking generally is taken for granted.
and embedded in language as well as other technical instruments (Dean, 2010:25).

Moreover, it also means that government is a form of rational, calculated activity as it draws on different bodies of expertise in relation to its goals. Hence, governmentality studies also highlight how power/knowledge complexes stand at the center of government in advanced liberal democracies – and how they become relay systems mediating between the apparatus of government and the subjects of government. In short, government is understood in governmentality studies as practices that produce ‘truth’ in relation to their objects. Therefore it becomes vital for the analysis to investigate how such truth claims are legitimized and upheld.

Following Dean (2010:30), we can label the studies carried out by governmentality scholars as ‘analytics of government’. When they undertake such studies, scholars depart from an understanding of governing as a form of collection of practices that clearly links to what I have so far called thinking assemblages (Acuto & Curtis, 2014; Allen & Cochrane, 2007; 2010; Ong & Collier, 2005). Here I follow general governmentality articulations when I argue that we can understand the assemblages as governed through two broad categories, governmental technologies and political rationalities and in turn how these produce and presuppose certain articulations of the subjects of government, or social actors, that are to be governed.

This means that thinking assemblages helps delimit an empirical space while the governmentality analysis provides tools for critically investigating it. That is, the assemblage thinking (Acuto & Curtis, 2014; Allen & Cochrane, 2007; 2010; Ong & Collier; 2005), for me, helps produce a grouping out of a number of related sites where certain domains of reality are actively being made the object of governing, a governing enacted through technologies and rationalities operating both at the level of the self as well as the level of political government.

The logical next step for the purposes of this chapter then is to further illustrate the analytical concepts I have mentioned so far in relation to governmentality. Before I turn to introducing political rationalities and governmental technologies, as well as what I mean by the fact that they presuppose and produce subjects of government, I wish to make my thinking on how the assemblage manifests itself as a surface where governmentality, in a sense, takes place, more explicit.
3.2.1. Locating governmentality

It seems crucial to include a passage on ‘where’ governmentality actually occurs in the discussion on governmentality and assemblage thinking. Indeed, this is my primary reason for evoking the figure of an assemblage – it constitutes this ‘where’ as I claim that the constellation of practices, discourses, objects and subjects ties together different sites of emergence as they are being made governable. However, in the Foucauldian literature (cf. Dean, 2010; Deleuze, 1992; Foucault, 2007; 2008; Larner & Walters, 2004; Murray Li, 2007; Miller & Rose, 2008; Pløger, 2008; Valverde, 2007), there are a number of concepts that are mobilized to describe and conceptualize the object of governing, or the surface where governmentality in a sense ‘takes place’. Among these are for instance regimes of practice, dispositif and apparatus. What they have in common is this function of expressing configurations of objects and subjects that are being addressed in ways that constitute the ‘conduct of conduct’ (Dean, 2010). For this reason I would like to address two points. First, I wish to showcase how assemblage thinking compares to these other concepts and second, I am interested in fleshing out in some more detail, how the assemblage can be thought of as a series of what I call sites of emergence. This second point then allows for a clearer picture of what to actually study empirically when investigating the governmentality of assemblages.

I have already touched upon the resemblance between Foucault’s use of apparatus and Deleuze’s conception of agencement. When doing so I sided with Legg (2011) as he suggested first that the translation of agencement into assemblage made the term more technical and less elastic than what the French meaning communicates. As for the Foucauldian apparatus, this term too, is often used in English translations to denote what in French is called a dispositif. Hence we are dealing with a set of problematic translations in as much that some of the meaning seems to become both confused as well as altered in the process. When Foucault answers the question that in English is translated into ‘What is the meaning or methodological function for you with this term apparatus (dispositif)?’ (Foucault, 1980b:194) the French term is given in the parenthetical translation. This convention is followed up in the answer, where Foucault, clearly does not think of the apparatus as ‘simply’ technical:

What I’m trying to pick out with this term is, firstly, a thoroughly heterogeneous ensemble consisting of discourses, institutions, architectural forms, regulatory decisions, laws, administrative measures, scientific statements, philosophical, moral and philanthropic propositions – in short, the said as much as the unsaid. Such are
the elements of the apparatus. The apparatus itself is the system of relations that can be established between these elements (Foucault, 1980:194).

So when Deleuze later writes his short essay What is a dispositif? the term is again translated into English as ‘social apparatus’ with the French term in brackets. For Deleuze then, the meaning of apparatus is very close to his own agencement:

Foucault’s philosophy is often presented as an analysis of concrete social apparatuses [dispositifs]. But what is a dispositif? In the first instance it is a tangle, a multilinear ensemble. It is composed of lines, each having a different nature. And the lines in the apparatus do not outline or surround systems which are each homogenous in their own right, object, subject, language and so on, but follow directions, trace balances which are always off balance, now drawing together and then distancing themselves from one another. Each line is broken and subject to changes in direction, bifurcating and forked, and subject to drifting (Deleuze, 1992:159).

Finally, when Mitchell Dean (2010) articulates his take on governmentality, he uses the concept regimes of practice to provide a description of the surface, or manifestation where governmentality can be ‘found’. When doing so he builds explicitly on Deleuze’s conception of the Foucauldian dispositif (or rather apparatus in the English translation) and suggests that studies of governmentality should pay attention to ‘how’ questions, or that is, questions that lead to ‘problems of the techniques and practices, rationalities and forms of knowledge, and identities and agencies by which governing operates’ (Dean, 2010:40). Indeed, when describing the regime of practice Dean (2010:40) also uses the term assemblage:

Practices of government cannot be understood as expressions of a particular principle, as reducible to a particular set of relations, or as referring to a single set of problems and functions. They do not form those types of totalities in which the parts are expressions or instances of the whole. Rather, they should be approached as composed of heterogeneous elements having diverse historical trajectories, as polymorphous in their internal and external relations, and as bearing upon a multiple and wide range of problems and issues. [...] The term ‘regime of practices’ refers to these historically constituted assemblages through which we do such things as cure, care, relieve poverty, punish, educate, train and counsel.

Thus, taken together, the terms apparatus, regimes of practices, assemblage, agencement and dispositif are all to some degree used to designate the same concept. This short excursion into questions for scholars interested in the more precise meanings of Foucault’s many ideas is not meant as a way to find the ‘true’ or most precise meaning, but rather intended as a clarification. I use the term of assemblage when I perform ‘assemblage thinking’ in order to produce the array of different surfaces where governing in relation to regional development is enacted. Thus,
when doing so, I use it to designate a concept of loosely entangled discourses, practices and objects that together form a certain unity.

This brings me to the second point that I wish to make, namely how in order to study an assemblage, we may think of it as manifested in *sites of emergence*. Think of the way that the governance of regional development is conducted through a large set of practices and installations. It is an assemblage formed around parliamentary debates, commission meetings, bureaucratic orders, public-private partnerships and deliberative hearings but also in closed business meetings, among freemasons, in other private networks of influence, at conferences and throughout academic journals. Hence, the assemblage emerges in different sites located in different spaces and it is through the ways it ties these sites together that it is constantly in becoming. In my mind there is no finished assemblage. Rather, it continuously links up (and disconnects) different sites of emergence and in this process it also becomes visible.

In particular, I would say, in line with many CDA scholars (Fairclough, 2010; Wodak & Krzyzanowski, 2008; Wodak & Meyer, 2009a), that the practices of governing emerging in such sites have a prominent feature in as much that they produce *text*, that is to say, text in a broader meaning than written letters of a particular alphabet. Indeed, in CDA, text is considered to be multimodal, or taking different forms so that photographies, films, art, typography, flow-charts and architecture can all be identified as texts with certain meaning(s) and even grammar (Kress & Van Leeuwen, 2001, 2006).

Therefore my idea is to think of these textual fragments as traces left by any given assemblage in particular sites of emergence and thus it would be meaningful to study the characteristics of an assemblage by analyzing the texts it produces. Furthermore, the literature on governmentality (Dean, 2010; Miller & Rose, 2008; Rose, O’Malley & Valverde, 2009) provides a vocabulary for understanding the sites of emergence and the fragments of texts that they leave as traces. More precisely, understanding the way that an assemblage is being made the object of governing means to pay attention to a two-dimensional matrix consisting on the one hand of *political rationalities* and on the other of *governmental technologies*.

Thus, to sum up, in this section I have illustrated how assemblage thinking may provide a form of location for governmentality in the sense that it is within assemblages that objects and subjects are being made governable. I have suggested that doing so is consistent with broader Foucauldian thought, even though there is a range of terms that may be
invoked to describe this. I have also articulated my idea of assemblages being possible to trace through the textual fragments that they leave behind as they manifest themselves in sites of emergence. Finally, I have suggested that the vocabulary present in the governmentality literature, in particular the concepts of political rationalities and governmental technologies, provides a schematic picture of understanding the way assemblages are being made into objects of governing. For this reason I turn now to presenting these concepts in some more detail.

3.2.2. Political Rationalities

We can think of the political rationalities of an assemblage as a series of interlocked discursively produced elements. First, the basis for governing any assemblage is an element of problematization in the sense that for a field to be conceived of as an object of governing, one needs to inscribe it with some degree of problem in relation to whatever it is that needs to be steered. This process of formulating problems in order to render a field possible to govern, and thus intervene in, is embedded in the aforementioned complexes of power/knowledge that lies at the heart of advanced liberal government (Miller & Rose, 2008).

When a field has been made the objective of any form of rule, governmentality scholars also point to the fact that such rule has a clear programmatic character:

Governmentality is programmatic not simply in that one can see the proliferation of more or less explicit programmes for reforming reality — government reports, White Papers, Green Papers, papers from business, trade unions, financiers, political parties, charities and academics proposing this or that scheme for dealing with this or that problem. It is also programmatic in that it is characterized by an eternal optimism that a domain or society could be administered better or more effectively, that reality is, in some way or other, programmable (Miller & Rose, 2008:29).

The governing programs for any given assemblage should not, however, be interpreted as identical with its political rationality. Rather, the programs are internal to the assemblage and thus must be examined in relation to other forms of knowledge invested in it. This means that to search for the political rationalities of an assemblage is to trace the underlying logic that orders it, inscribes meaning in it and interlinks its array of individual practices and sites of emergence (Dean, 2010; Miller and Rose, 2008).

Therefore, it can be stated that a governmentality analysis is interested in how we govern (and are governed) in relation to any given social field. It considers how thought operates and is being made logic through, for
instance, a certain language and vocabulary, characteristic ways of charting and graphically representing the field that is to be governed, how ‘truth’ is formed and legitimized and how specific regimes of practices produces actors/subjects (Dean, 2010). In short then, it is through such mechanisms that we may trace the political rationalities that are integral and crucial for the ‘conduct of conduct’ to function. However, the rationality must also be made practicable and this is, in quite simplified terms, the function of the so-called governmental technologies to which I turn next.

3.2.3. Governmental Technologies
To paraphrase longer questions asked by Foucault (1986) and Latour (1987), we may ask ourselves, how is government possible, and furthermore, how is it possible to realize a form of governing that operates at large distances between the ruler and the ruled? In governmentality studies scholars often turn to analyzing what can be labeled governmental technologies in order to answer such questions. This is not to say that government is exclusively a technological practice since, at the very least, these technologies are intertwined with the political rationalities of particular assemblages and often the rationality is the actual basis for a given technique. It is to say, however, that no matter how we phrase the questions of governing, we will sooner or later encounter government as technological (Dean, 2010; Miller & Rose, 2008).

If we continue to use Swedish regional governance as an example illustrating the concepts evoked here we can now elaborate this and conceptualize it as driven by a form of logic, or political rationale as well as constituted through a disposition of technologies. So, for instance, forestalling the analytical chapters of this thesis, the general logic or political rationale can be said to run along the lines of growth, competitiveness and global competition as almost ontological articulations of how the world is constituted. This is also intertwined with discourses of regions as vehicles for competitiveness in a way that makes them important for the nation.

In relation to this we may recognize a large number of governmental technologies that operate throughout the assemblage. For instance, since the deployment of the EU2020 policy, the European Commission (EC) uses a technology that it calls national reform programmes to produce insights into how the policy is implemented in the membership countries and in what ways they work on improving it. For this reason EU countries must now regularly produce specific documents (that are the actual national
reform programmes) that contain their descriptions on how the implementation of the EU2020 strategy is carried out.

Likewise, in Sweden the national government has deployed a system where each Swedish region must produce a so-called Regional Development Strategy (RDS) that includes a range of measurable goals linked to the central features of both the national strategy for regional development as well as the EU2020 strategy. These include a large focus on improving innovative capacities and the entrepreneurial ‘climate’ in order to produce higher, and more inclusive, growth.

This short example illustrates how certain documents become technical aspects of government as they are produced with the function to ‘govern at a distance’ (Miller & Rose, 2008). However, governmental technologies are not at all restricted to such documents. Rather, they include a number of practices, spectacular as well as mundane, which work in such ways that they contribute to both rendering a particular domain of social reality governable as well as providing the means for intervention and improvement.

Following up on the example above, it is likely that particular agencies, private firms and academic institutions within the assemblage count, measure and calculate the performance of individual regions and compare them with each other as well as the stipulated goals through the use of instant official statistics and surveys. We may quite easily interpret them in terms of technologies. In addition, recent years in regional governance have seen an upsurge of such activities as conferences, award ceremonies and breakfast meetings (Säll, 2014). Such practices can also be considered to be technologies for evoking distinct forms of conduct. Miller and Rose (2008:32) illustrate the thoughts on governmental technologies as follows:

To understand modern forms of rule, we suggest, requires an investigation not merely of grand political schemata, or economic ambitions […] but of apparently humble and mundane mechanisms which appear to make it possible to govern: techniques of notation, computation and calculation; procedures of examination and assessment; the invention of devices such as surveys and presentational forms such as tables; the standardization of systems for training and the inculcation of habits; the inauguration of professional specialisms and vocabularies; building design and architectural forms – the list is heterogeneous and is, in principle, unlimited.

Thus we may say that, in some crude form, the governmental technologies combine with the political rationalities of an assemblage to make it in a sense ‘tick’. We should not, however, draw conclusions that the technologies are only expressions of the rationale so that the latter is a somewhat more fundamental feature of the assemblage. On the contrary,
one of the most important functions of governmental technologies is that they also actively produce rationalities (Dean, 2010; Miller & Rose, 2008). That is to say, in a system that, for example, is very focused on assessing performance and facilitating benchmarking activities, such as regional development, it is likely that we will find a rationale that is highly dependent on the technologies themselves.

3.2.4. Subjects of Government

As a third focus of governmentality studies we may mention what Dean (2010:43) has called an ‘attention to the formation of identities’. This means that governmentality studies generally are interested in understanding how political rationalities and governmental technologies are complacent in the formulation of desired subjects, and indeed how they presuppose certain ideas of the subjects that are to be governed:

We might ask in relation to this final axis: what forms of person, self and identity are presupposed by different perspectives of government and what sorts of transformation do these practices seek? What statuses, capacities, attributes and orientations are assumed of those who exercise authority (from politicians and bureaucrats to professionals and therapists) and those who are to be governed (workers, consumers, pupils and social welfare recipients)? What forms of conduct are expected of them? (Dean, 2010:43)

Thus, approaching the assemblage of regional governance in Sweden in terms of governmentality means that I will pay attention to the formation of such identities, or subject positions, that are both an outcome of the rationalities and the technologies as well as a prerequisite for them. Importantly, this does not mean that I seek to demonstrate a ‘real’ subject that exists prior to governing, or a real subject that is the outcome of power relations:

The forms of identity promoted and presupposed by various practices and programmes of government should not be confused with a real subject, subjectivity or subject position, i.e. with a subject that is the end point or terminal of these practices and constituted through them (Dean, 2010:43).

Indeed, from a governmentality perspective (or more generally a Foucauldian perspective), the subject does not exist as an essential ‘thing’. That is to say, there is no assumption of a true, and inner self that exists beyond all regimes of power and language that operate in social reality. The free, autonomous individual that may seek its inner essence and fulfill interests and stand against operations of power is a figure developed in the tradition of the enlightenment and it is rejected here (Mansfield, 2000).
Instead, the subject is thought of, not as a starting point of power, but as a result of it. I will elaborate further on the conceptualization of power in relation to this in more detail in the next section. However, for now it is important to recognize that the subject is the vehicle of power rather than an independent bastion that can stand against it. As Foucault (1980b:98) puts it:

The individual is not conceived as a sort of elementary nucleus, a primitive atom, a multiple and inert material on which power comes to fasten or against which it happens to strike, and in so doing subdues or crushes individuals. In fact, it is already one of the prime effects of power that certain bodies, certain gestures, certain discourses, certain desires, come to be identified and constituted as individuals. The individual, that is, is not the vis-à-vis of power; it is, I believe, one of its prime effects. The individual is an effect of power, and at the same time, or precisely to the extent which it is that effect, it is the element of its articulation. The individual which power has constituted is at the same time its vehicle.

At the same time, to state that the subject does not exist as a rational actor, does not mean that it is unimportant in governmentality analysis, on the contrary, although not primarily as such a rational actor but exactly as an effect, and prerequisite for, the political rationalities and governmental technologies deployed to conduct a specific domain. So rather than asking ‘what kind of actions are taken by this actor?’ or ‘which actor is most powerful?’ I intend to investigate ‘who was conceived of as an actor?’ ‘in what circumstances?’ and ‘in what capacities?’ as I search, not for existing agents, but socially produced actors in the assemblage (Jäger & Meier, 2009).

Moreover, and this is why I prefer the term social actor, the subject does not have to be a human agent. Rather, what manifests as important social actors in any given assemblage that is being made the object of governing may just as well be corporations, regions, states, computers, or cars that are important for the production of conduct.

In this thesis an entire chapter is dedicated to understanding the formation of such social actors that are represented as objects of governing in Swedish regional development. As that chapter unfolds, it is then, an analytics of a particular form of power that produces specific subjects as prerequisite for, and effects of, governing this domain of reality. To be sure, governmentality studies in all forms are explicit analytics of power, whether that power is understood in relation to the production of social actors, or in the constituting of rationalities or technologies. For this reason, I will dedicate the last section of this chapter to positioning how power is understood here in relation to more traditional ways (Lukes, 2004).
3.3 Some Notes on Power

As a political scientist, I have been classically trained to look for power in three typical forms, or what often is identified as three faces of power (Lukes, 2004). I have already alluded to the fact that power is not understood in terms of those three ‘faces’ in this thesis, but rather in a Foucauldian sense that could be said to run alongside, under, above and intertwined with the traditional views sometimes compatible, sometimes incompatible. Therefore, I will start the discussion in this section precisely at this point, in the midst of the debates about the nature of power.

3.3.1. Debating As and Bs

I shall not dwell long on the classic notions. However, to illustrate a significant difference with the understanding of power adopted here I will recapitulate them briefly. The first face of power then, as understood by Dahl (1957), identifies power as a capacity of actors. Here power is exercised as one actor (A) gets another actor (B) to do something s/he would not otherwise have done. This conception was later challenged by Bachrach and Baratz (1962) when they suggested that while Dahl was on to something significant he also neglected what they understood to be the second face of power. Keeping with the often used formal abstractions of As and Bs we may understand this second face of power as a situation where A is not actively forcing B to do what s/he does not want to do, but rather preventing B from realizing particular goals. In essence, what this entails is to study power not only as decisions made in a given situation, but also to consider those not made.

Lukes (2004) then problematized these two faces of power one step further as he introduced what has come to be called a radical conception of power. This third face of power questioned the ability of both the other two faces to sufficiently account for the functions of power. It postulated that some of the most sinister forms of power are situations where B willingly does what A wants him or her to do. If A can control the desires and interests of B, then surely, according to the radical face of power, B is acting against the objective and real interests s/he holds, and therefore is being subjected to power. The classic example here is the ways that ideology in a Marxist sense could, for instance, distort the consciousness of the working class and mask their real interest, thus exercising power over them in a more subtle way than what is assumed in Dahl’s (1957) conceptualization.
Barbara Cruikshank (1999:29) has suggested that this debate between proponents of the different faces could be characterized as a fundamental quest for the ‘truth’ about the power concept, which in turn helped formulate ‘a positive science of politics for knowing and intervening in what had no prior existence’. This was because they actually articulated the same thing in different ways:

Their common object of analysis was to locate power by identifying instances in which A’s interests were served and B’s were not - or to prove that there were no such instances. The expectation behind the formulaic hypothesis of each “face” of power was the possibility of proving or disproving the truth about power [...] Each “face” assumed that power can be rationally and intentionally used by someone to affect (influence) other people (Cruikshank, 1999:32).

Now, the Foucauldian notion of power in some ways starts with different questions (and that is not to say that it is never interesting to ask questions more in line with the three classic conceptions). For starters, notice how all the classic conceptions take one thing for granted, the As and the Bs. From a Foucauldian point of view we would rather start by asking how are A and B constructed as social actors who are at all able to act and have interests? And what is more, what are the discursive conditions that must be in place to conceive of desires, abilities and interests as fundamental categories (Digeser, 1992)?

Thus, the way that Foucauldian notions of power would address the problems of the As and the Bs differs from the traditional ‘faces’. However, the nature of and conditions for the As and the Bs are not the only discussions that have taken place in relation to the concept of power. Rather power is a concept over which there are more general struggles going on that involve many more authors and debates than those mentioned briefly here. Importantly, this is not at all a discussion that can be reduced to ‘Foucauldian versus classic conceptions’ as it encompasses much more than so. Of course, power is in this sense one of those ‘essentially contested concepts’ and as social scientists try to define, use and mobilize it in analysis there seems to always be what Dean (2013:12) has called ‘an “excess” in the concept of power beyond what it might signify or mean, which marks it and forces this movement towards oppositions, their unification and further opposition’.

What Dean (2013) means with these movements and oppositions is the observation that, apart from the discussions concerning As and Bs, the history of debating power has also been of another nature. Indeed, if Cruikshank (1999) argued that all the three faces actually spoke about the same thing (power as capacity to influence), there are parallel debates in
which the concept as such is articulated in different ways. More precisely, as Dean (2013) argues, the historical (and current) debates on power can often be said to revolve around binary conceptions of the phenomena that first stand in opposition to each other, only to collapse into each other as a third conception appears, thus formulating a new binary position.

For instance, there is an ongoing discussion concerning the conceptual binary ‘power over’ - ‘power to’. In terms of the As and the Bs there is generally a notion of power as domination (power over) but also, in Lukes’ sense (2004), a tension between domination and power to act, or in a wider sense that power represents an ability to do something. Indeed, as argued by Cruikshank (1999), both these parts can be united in an understanding of power as capacity or in other words that both ‘power over’ and ‘power to’ signals some form of capacity to dominate or act. Yet, this does not exhaust questions of what power ‘is’. As Dean (2013) shows, as discussions concerning ‘power as right’ starts to appear we are faced with a new binary opposition (‘power as capacity - power as right’).

‘Power as right’ then is the vast debate concerning power as a legitimate or illegitimate source of rule for any given social system (Dean, 2013). By simply mentioning this we realize that such discussions overlap ‘power as capacity’ yet at the same time also stand in contrast to it. Indeed, returning again to Lukes (2004), his discussion concerning the radical view of power is, even though Cruikshank (1999) finds it identical to the other two faces, also very much a discussion concerning the legitimate use of power in society which then can be said to stand in contrast to both of the others, collectively understood in terms of ‘power as capacity’.

More such examples or dualisms, which continuously collapse and reform depending on angles and questions, are common in the social sciences today. Consider, for instance, the ongoing discussions concerning what we signify in the doublet ‘power as conflict’ - ‘power as consensus’. In this sense, a traditional view have placed power along a continuum so that violence and destruction are one extreme end of the spectrum (but they are nevertheless acts of power) while consensus decision making and democratic versions of institutionalized power are placed at the other end (Dean, 2013).

Hannah Arendt (1998), and others, breaks with such ideas when she posits that power relations cease to be power relations when they turn into violence and should preferably be denominated tyranny or dominance. This is a stream of thought that also Foucault (2001b) elaborated on (as I will describe below). Moreover, consider also the debate on ‘power as episodic’
versus ‘power as fluid’. In Dahl’s (1957) sense power seems to be enacted in sequences or steps, but in assemblage thinking, we often conceptualize it as a kind of flow, or indeed as Foucault often stated, ‘an economy’ in the word’s old, Greek meaning (Dean, 2013).

In sum then, it seems that the discussions on power are vast, overlapping and also incompatible. And of course, there are more such dualisms or binaries that have not been spelled out in detail here (for instance, Joseph Nye’s ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ power in the field of international relations). However, the point I wish to make is that currently there does not seem to exist a single unified theory of power that can account for all the instances where the concept is invoked in social scientific analysis. Moreover, I also wish to illustrate that since this is so, no unified Foucauldian theory of power exists either. Thus, rather than a unified perspective that constitutes a Foucauldian theory of power we may think of a heterogeneous range of articulations constituting a familiarity or filiation of this particular tradition.  

For this reason I will borrow Dean’s notion of a signature when I discuss relevant aspects of Foucauldian power below. This means that the way I utilize the signature of power here is a way of signaling what power is, although it is also a recognition that it is not a unified theory. My usage is similar to Dean’s (2013) in this sense when I simply state that rather than looking for a complete way of articulating the concept of power so that it addresses all those dualisms and struggles illustrated above, I will think of it as bearing a particular signature. That is to say, what power is, how it functions and operates is not nailed down completely here, but in this thesis I wish to regard it as three intertwined thematic Foucauldian articulations.

3.3.2. A Signature of Power

The particular signature of power that I address here therefore does not constitute a theory or a complete and internally coherent system of thought. It is rather three overlapping discussions that have a bearing on the kind of power effects and relations that I think we can study as we invoke the figure of the assemblage. I will discuss how power can be understood as an economy, as a power/knowledge complex and also as

21 Indeed, this was, according to Foucault, never his point. Rather, he claims that his project was always about understanding the construction of subjects, which lead him into discussions of power on various occasions. That being said, while rejecting a ‘theory of power’ he claimed to offer ‘an analytics of power’ (cf. Foucault, 2001b).
22 Dean in turn borrows this idea from Agamben (2009a) where the notion of a signature is discussed in more detail.
governmentality. Thus, as should be clear, I have already introduced the third feature of this signature. Still, I would like to expand on it slightly further since it can also serve as a useful way to end this chapter in a kind of concluding way.

(1) Beginning with power as an economy, I mean to denote the fact that in this thesis I follow Foucault (2001a; 2007; 2008) in understanding power as a system of relations that is not a zero sum game. Hence, this view contrasts with all of the traditional ways (the three faces) in two steps. First, in as much that I here mean to signify a flow that is inherent in the social fabric and that arises in (as well as shapes) relations among social actors, and second, it is not understood as executed in the sequential manner as suggested by for instance Dahl (1957). Rather, this idea of power as an economy is sometimes also articulated in terms of power as productive. Foucault (1980b:98) states:

Power must be analyzed as something which circulates, or rather as something which only functions in the form of a chain. It is never localized here or there, never in anybody's hands, never appropriated as commodity or piece of wealth. Power is employed and exercised through a net-like organization.

In this economy of power, it follows that all social systems and relations are imbued with power. There is no possibility of placing oneself outside of this system and, for instance, try to behave in relation to others in ways that would be neutral in terms of power effects. Furthermore, it must be emphasized that while power flows in this circuit system and while it is not appropriated as a wealth, this is not the same as saying that we are dealing with some form of democratic distribution of power. The point here is methodological: power is productive in everything from mundane social practice to grand political projects aimed at transforming entire social bodies. However, to investigate power should not be a deductive exercise starting at some imagined center:

One must rather conduct an ascending analysis of power, starting that is, from its infinitesimal mechanisms, which each have their own history, their own trajectory, their own techniques and tactics, and then see how these mechanisms of power have been – and continues to be – invested, colonised, utilised, involuted, transformed, displaced, extended, etc., by ever more general mechanisms and by forms of global domination (Foucault, 1980b:99).

(2) Turning to the famous conception of power/knowledge, Foucault (1980a) made the apparently simple, yet very illuminating, claim that there is a backside to the classic expression of sir Francis Bacon that ‘knowledge is power’. While this may be so, as power operates through discourses to
inscribe particular meanings in ‘the real’, it also defines this real and in continuation therefore defines knowledge. Thus, power determines truth and knowledge in quite a literal sense.

This does not mean that power and knowledge are the same thing, but it does mean that there can be no power relations without knowledge and that there can be no such thing as a pure knowledge positioned outside of power relations. This can be understood better if we consider that power is conceptualized as a social relation and more precisely, Foucault (2001b:340) articulated this relation as ‘an action upon an action, on possible actual or future actions’. Basically therefore, for power to be present (in a social relation) it requires, at the very least, rudimentary knowledge about the possible actions of other people.

One of the more prominent ways that this feature of power becomes visible is in the production of truth. According to Foucault (1980), the production of truth regimes is vital for any given field of society such as the education system, the health care system, the penal system and, indeed, the system of regional development. Here knowledge works to instate a fabric upon which power can be made operational. One of Foucault’s most famous examples is the one on the evolution of the prison as an institution in the western world, and how this presupposed, as well as (re)produced, a collective body of knowledge concerning ‘the criminal’. In short, the criminal must be marked, determined and defined in terms of knowledge in order to produce a system that can punish, and indeed, cure him in the best suitable way. This knowledge then, will be manifested not only in academic disciplines such as criminology or psychology, but also be imprinted in architecture, popular media and the legal-institutional system that is put in place to govern the particular field.

(3) The third feature of the signature of power that I articulate here can be understood as governmental power. Thus, I have already introduced some of the history of this Foucauldian thought as I described how advanced liberal states have developed into systems where biopolitics and the management of entire populations have become imperative. The following, therefore, expands somewhat on what has been said so far on this topic and possibly adds some more clarification. We may start, then, with following the reasoning set out above by recognizing power as ‘actions upon actions’.

Importantly, this idea also means that power is not, as is often the case, understood as opposed to freedom. Rather, to be able to speak of power from this point of view means that it is a relation that arises between social
actors that have at least a minimal amount of freedom (Dean, 2010; Foucault, 2001b):

Power is exercised only over free subjects, and only insofar as they are “free”. By this we mean individual or collective subjects who are faced with a field of possibilities in which several kinds of conduct, several ways of reacting and modes of behavior are available. Where the determining factors are exhaustive, there is no relationship of power: slavery is not a power relationship when a man is in chains, only when he has some possible mobility, even a chance of escape (Foucault, 2001b:342).

Thus power as this kind of social relationship denotes an aspect where in a sense there exists actions to act upon. If not, we speak of domination or control in such situations that may arise in terms of the traditional conceptions and thus, this kind of analytics of power is not at all unaware of such modes of dominance in society, on the contrary. Yet, it recognizes that such conditions of dominance are seldom the goal of advanced liberal societies, and what is more, it also recognizes that power operates as internal to the fabric of the social, as a non-episodic, productive flow related to power/knowledge complexes that instates truths about specific domains. One of the prevailing workings of power during the last centuries have, according to Foucault (1980a; 2001b; 2007; 2008), been the gradual transformation of societies into ones focused on biopolitics. This change can be said to rely upon the existence of a free individual as a basis for social relations.

An important feature in this transformation was a kind of extension of what has been called pastoral power from the institutions of the church to other parts of society. With Christianity a specific form of power was developed alongside that of the sovereign ruler or king, namely that of the pastorate. For the pastor, the ultimate goal was to lead his flock of individuals to salvation in the next world. To do so, this kind of power had to establish a relationship between the pastor and a subject where a notion of complete trust was inscribed. The pastor had to know and guide the soul of the subject, and importantly this was not just a matter of command from the pastor, but also a sacrifice. In short, in the extreme situation the pastor had to be ready to sacrifice himself for the benefit of the flock (Foucault, 2001b).

Notice how this is a kind of individualizing power that helps produce the subjects as individuals in relation to God and the pastor. In that shift from sovereign power to biopower, the spread of pastoral power played a significant role (Dean, 2010; Foucault, 2001b). Now the pastorate changed form and it came also in the name of health, wellbeing and security.
Furthermore, salvation was no longer thought to be realized in the life after this, but rather very explicitly in this life, and in the context of society. This also meant that the officials of the pastorate multiplied so that they came in the shape of state bureaucrats as well as private interests:

And this implies that the power of a pastoral type, which over centuries - for more than a millennium - had been linked to a defined religious institution, suddenly spread out into the whole social body. It found support in a multitude of institutions. And instead of pastoral power and a political power, more or less linked to each other, more or less in rivalry, there was an individualizing “tactic” that characterized a series of powers: those of the family, medicine, psychiatry, education, and employers (Foucault, 2001b:335).

So, using this illustration of the spread of pastoral power, we can relate back to the notion of power as an action upon an action. Obviously, in this spread we are talking of vast arrays of actions performed over a long time; yet they also signal something of the importance concerning ‘governing’ as a rational form of conducting such actions. Indeed, in this sense we return to what has been said in the sections of governmentality before:

Perhaps the equivocal nature of the term “conduct” is one of the best aids for coming to terms with the specificity of power relations. To “conduct” is at the same time to “lead” others (according to mechanisms of coercion that are, to varying degrees, strict) and a way of behaving within a more or less open field of possibilities. Basically, power is less a confrontation between two adversaries or their mutual engagement than a question of “government.” […] To govern in this sense is to structure the possible field of action of others (Foucault, 2001b:341).

Summing up, in this thesis I suggest, not a theory of power, not even a completely coherent set of conceptions of power, but rather a particular signature of power (Agamben, 2009a; Dean, 2013). By this I mean to capture a phenomenon that oscillates between and around a number of poles, and more precisely I have chosen to articulate it as a set of three Foucauldian claims. Power is in this thesis understood as relationally produced among social actors, and what is more, this also entails the actual construction of those social actors. By extension, to exercise power also requires a field of knowledge of a particular domain and to impose actions upon actions, or in other words to ‘conduct conduct’. Hence, to study power relations, we may start in the assemblages that structure certain domains and by focusing on the ways they order everyday social practices and produces social actors through modes of political rationale and governmental technologies. Importantly, this is not only a tactic for studying how power operates; it is also very explicitly a way of studying how power relations are the effects and outcomes of such assemblages. And while I have spoken of power as
always present in social relations, this of course also includes the production of subordination and stratification.
This chapter serves two functions. First I use it to sum up the theoretical articulations, positions and claims that I have made so far in order to produce a more compact grammar of what has been said. This then represents a kind of result in relation to the theoretical purpose of this thesis to fashion a framework that unites assemblage thinking and governmentality analysis in a way that makes it suitable for studying the (re)production of globalization. At the same time, this schema can also be understood as the starting point for the more tangible side of this thesis, namely the empirical investigations that I undertake in the following chapters.

Thus, starting with articulating this more compact format of the theoretical claims, I then follow this up by beginning to develop some further aspects that need to be in place before the analysis can start. This means, in other words, that I use this chapter as a platform for clarifying aspects of methods, such as my data collection, the practical parts of working with the resulting corpus of documents and the forms of text/discourse analysis I will perform.

Towards the end of the chapter I also introduce a section on standards of research and some thoughts on my position as a researcher in relation to the process of gathering and interpreting the empirical material. Before the chapter ends and the first analysis starts, I present a schematic overview of how this analysis unfolds over the three chapters, and how the different cases can be thought of as relating to each other methodologically.

4.1 SPECIFYING AN EMPIRICAL SCHEMATIC

So far, the theoretical chapters have shown a series of steps and procedures. First, that we may approach globalization as relationally produced in social practice. Second, that one way of conceiving such processes is to ‘think assemblages’ and therefore not approaching any absolute spatial construct but rather a composition in the making. Third, this is also a form of approach that allows me to avoid a kind of
methodological and territorial nationalism, particularly by focusing on the sub-national region that has been suggested as important in the recent articulations of spatial reconfiguration. Therefore, fourth, by thinking assemblages we may approach the governance of Swedish regional development as a composite of discourses, practices and subjects that emerges in ways that allow for studies of globalization in the making. Fifth, and finally, I have suggested that it is possible to apply the Foucauldian framework of governmentality to the assemblage in order to investigate how power operates within it.

When I have introduced these steps, a number of concepts and terms have been invoked. I have spoken of assemblages, global forms, sites of emergence, texts, political rationalities, governmental technologies and the discursive character of governmentality. In this section I lay out what I think of as a schematic for empirical analysis based on these concepts and this entails a more hands on approach to what has been theoretically articulated so far. In addition, presenting this summary also enables a more distinct discussion concerning methodological issues such as selection, delimitation and criteria for the evaluation of empirical studies using such an approach as suggested here. So, therefore, the following is both a theoretical ‘result’ and a map usable for empirical departures:

i. I have said that I understand and approach space as relational (Massey, 1994; 2005) and produced through social practice (Lefebvre, 1991). By this I mean that global space should not be understood as some mystic realm outside of human societies. Rather, it is produced through social practice in concrete sites in a myriad of spaces and thus gains its qualities not from an inner essence of ‘the global’ but is rather the outcome of multiple and intersecting trajectories of social practice. Indeed, we may understand the process of globalization as those trajectories where social practices are ‘stretched out’ and thus produce and form a global space while at the same time affecting other local spaces (Massey, 2005). It follows then, that one way of conducting empirical investigation of this is to approach particular local sites and investigate how social practices ‘reach out’. What is more, I have also said that I wish to avoid or disable the territorial trap (Agnew, 1994) and since current globalization research focusing on territorial reconfiguration points to the region as a specific spatial formation that becomes important, it makes sense to focus on this.
Furthermore, in Sweden, the debate on territorial reconfiguration is ongoing and the system is in the midst of a change concerning its internal composition of territorial units. For this reason I have chosen to study Swedish regional development, and I approach it in a specific way.

ii. By thinking assemblages (Acuto & Curtis, 2014; Deleuze & Guattari, 2004; 2009; Ong & Collier, 2005) I have said that we may conceptualize both an empirical surface as well as a particular spatial formation. An assemblage in this conception represents a conjunction of discourses, practices and objects that form a vibrating, rather unstable, amalgamation that together constitutes a particular entity. So, in this thesis I approach the practice of Swedish regional development as an assemblage and thus aim to study the space that forms around this, a kind of regional assemblage (Allen & Cochrane; 2007; 2010).

iii. In particular, I intend to study this assemblage in terms of how it (re)produces and inserts global forms (Ong & Collier, 2005), or in other words, how it revolves around practices that reaches out of the assemblage to relationally form global space as well as practices that enmesh global forms into local sites. Crucially, I then understand the (re)production of global forms as processes of globalization in line with the relational approach in (i) above. And this, in turn, is a process that involves both the production of global space, as well as the production of other spaces. In this case I highlight one example, namely the space that forms around the governance of Swedish regional development. Hence, by studying the production of global forms within the assemblage, I am able to speak of globalization effects in that regional space, as well as globalization (re)production in the social practices and discourses that constitute the assemblage.

iv. The global forms that are produced in the assemblage and the discourses and practices that both structure it and are shaped within it are understood as expressions of power (Dean, 2010; 2013; Foucault, 1980a; 1994). Particularly, I have said that, as an assemblage is being made the object of governing, such as in the case of regional development, it makes sense to study it using the conceptual register present in the Foucauldian approach of governmentality (Dean, 2010; Miller & Rose, 2008). Doing so enables a study of assemblages in terms of power, and in this case then, the
(re)production of globalization in social practice as an expression of power. Governmentality studies highlight three broad categories for understanding how government becomes operational:

- **Political rationalities** are inherent in the governmental process as a thoughtful and rational practice. In other words they express the ways we think of governing a particular domain or aspect of reality. As such they produce particular truths and legitimacy for the ways that government is enacted, and indeed also for the way government is enabled at all, since they also help problematizing a particular segment of the social as an object of governing in the first place.

- **Governmental technologies** are means of making the political rationalities operational. They may be thought of as instruments, procedures, techniques and measures that delimit and enact the governing of a particular assemblage. Importantly, the technologies are not ‘just’ expressions of rationales, but may also contribute to the (re)production of them.

- **The production of governable subjects** is both a prerequisite for, and an effect of, the political rationalities and governmental technologies. That is to say, the power that enables the governing of any given segment of social reality operates to a large extent at the level of the self and through attributing roles, capacities and limitations to certain social actors.

v. The assemblage then, is treated as the surfaces where governmentality is enacted as it is being made the object of governing. Furthermore, I have said that while the assemblage is a vibrant amalgamation, it is possible to think of it as becoming visible through what I have called *sites of emergence*. In these sites we may therefore study the remnants of the assemblage as these have emerged at a particular moment. In this case, the assemblage of regional development in Sweden is enacted in a wide range of such sites. So, for instance, this assemblage become visible in business meetings, political debates, government agencies, informal breakfast meetings and at dinner tables.

vi. As the assemblage becomes visible in sites of emergence, I have stated that it can be traced, and by this I mean that it produces *text*. Written documents, discussions, concrete material formations and symbolic gestures are all texts of different modality and hence, they
can be analyzed. In this case I have chosen more stable texts such as written documents and images. While in principle an assemblage may be studied with more totalizing ambitions, I think that delimitations of this kind are necessary.

vii. Therefore, when a corpus of texts (of any kind) has been collected the empirical analysis may commence through a form of text/discourse analysis that lays bare the political rationalities, scrutinizes governmental technologies and pays attention to how the practices of governing produce social actors in terms of capabilities and possibilities. In this case such an analysis also shows the (re)production of global forms and how globalization is articulated as part of the rationalities that form Swedish regional development.

In terms of this list, the rest of the chapter at hand focuses on the practical issues of selecting documents for analyzing the assemblage. Moreover, it also describes the more hands-on methods that I deploy in analyzing the texts. In short, these are forms of qualitative text analyses focused on interpreting the modes of rationale and specific technologies that are present in the texts.

4.2 Material Selection and the Practical Parts of Analysis

As I stated before, while in principle it would be possible to approach an assemblage with more totalizing ambitions, in practice there will generally have to be delimitations. Indeed, the way I have conceptualized my idea of sites of emergence the number of possible such sites are, if not infinite, at least a myriad. Therefore I have chosen to select what I take to be a number of sites that theoretically should be important in terms of the visibility of the assemblage as well as for the traces it leaves behind. These initial sites of emergence could of course have been different, and this naturally would also have yielded a different result in some ways. For instance, had my entry points been family relations, dinner conversations or breakfast meetings and in general the more informal side of regional development I expect that the story told here would have been different (for an interesting study of this cf. Forsberg & Lindgren, 2010). However, I think my selection of initial sites of emergence are justified. In the following, therefore, I will make a kind of reflexive (Finlay & Gough, 2003) description of my selection procedure and how the collection of texts was carried out.
My approach in some ways resembles snowball sampling (Biernacki & Waldorf, 1981; Browne, 2005; Morgan, 2008), which is a non-probabilistic approach to sampling often used in interview studies or in cases where the population is hard to delimit and/or access. The principle is simple. At the outset, the researcher prepares a draft of probable candidates to interview or approach, persons who might have access to the particular research area and its issues. On meeting one such person or more, the researcher lets the respondents guide the next step by letting them suggest additional people that, given the topic and theme, would be suitable to approach. This cycle then continues until the researcher feels that there is a form of theoretical saturation (Charmaz, 2006), or that is, additional respondents do not seem to expand the types of answers and data that have been collected so far. Thus, the theoretical saturation arises when the information starts to converge on a certain set of topics, themes or narratives and then the researcher concludes that s/he now has enough to start analyzing the material.

Now, I am not doing interviews and I am not doing grounded theory (which is a field where snowball sampling and ideas of theoretical saturation is commonly used). However, I find the general logic appealing. Therefore I approached the assemblage of regional development and its sites of emergence in a similar manner. More precisely, I started with three such sites which then represent the initial ‘probable respondents’ in terms of interview studies, although, since my focus was on collecting documents, these were three internet websites:

- The website hosted by the Swedish national government on Regional Growth\(^{23}\) (http://www.regeringen.se/sb/d/2498). This is a form of portal that lists initiatives, provides information and links to what the government considers central actors and themes in Swedish regional development.
- The website hosted by the European Commission (EC) on its regional policy called Infрегio This site also contains links, information as well as instructional films on EU-regional policy.\(^{24}\)
- A website hosted by the Swedish Association of Local Authorities and Regions (SALAR) simply called Regional Responsibility and Division.\(^{25}\) This site also contains links, information and thematic

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23 In Swedish: Regional tillväxt
24 Full site address: http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/index_en.cfm
25 In Swedish: Regioners ansvar och indelning
presentations of how SALAR views and works with the issue of regional development in Sweden (www.skl.se).²⁶

Using these sites as entry points of the assemblage, the collected material quickly expanded. All of the websites provided links to what they considered important documents concerning regional development and in my first step I decided to collect all of those. This yielded some 200 documents, although a quick survey reduced the number significantly down to about 50. In this process I excluded a range of very short information briefs, documents that were more in the form of budgets or very detailed quantitative reports on a particular subject and texts that I simply considered peripheral in relation to my central questions.

All in all, I set up some criteria for including documents in my sample that both functioned as a direction towards the particular questions I was interested in, as well as a delimitation in the sense defined above (the assemblage is nearly unlimited so delimitations had to be made). These criteria were:

a) Concerning content length: As mentioned above I selected documents of at least ‘a few pages’ that did not only consist of budgets or projections in terms of numbers. I also excluded short memos and brief information ‘flyers’ that, for instance, could include such things as upcoming dates for meetings or seminars.

b) Concerning content focus: I preferred documents that clearly dealt with regional development. That is to say, I did exclude some documents that had a regional dimension, but did not concern development (e.g. documents describing specific aspect of a law or regulation). What is more, I was of course interested in all documents that explicitly dealt with globalization and regional development. These where all kept, even if they violated criteria a) and c).

c) Concerning time frame. I have said that what I wish to investigate is a kind of stretched present or in other words recent and contemporary regional development. Thus, I included documents from 2012-2014, although, I also had a category of documents from circa 2005-2011, which were clearly addressing globalization and regional development. As mentioned in b) I decided to include all of these.

²⁶ Full site address: http://www.skl.se/demokratiledningstyrning/politiskstyrning/regionfragan/regionersansvarochindelning.733.html
Concerning sites: I wanted to have a certain width in terms of in the sites in which the texts I collected had been produced and for this reason I made sure to include a variation of expert reports, from both private consultancy firms and public bodies such as the OECD and ESPON, as well as official government documents from different governing bodies such as the EU, regions and Swedish national government.

These criteria narrowed down the 200 documents to about 50 and this was when I did my first readings and interpretations of the documents. This then expanded the list from the initial set, much like the snowball sampling of respondents for interview studies expand. In my readings I paid attention to sources that were cited often and/or in salient ways that were not included in my sample and if I could find them I added them to my growing corpus. The reading process in a way started anew with every new document that informed me further in the same way. This means that if an additional document added to my perception of important sources cited, it was included and the corpus expanded.

In the end this made me achieve something like the theoretical saturation that grounded theory scholars strive for (Charmaz, 2006). At this point I had 81 documents in my corpus in total and this was to be my empirical base (all documents are listed in Appendix 1). Since the three case studies are different in scope and aim, some parts of the corpus was included/excluded depending on the case. This sounds more complex than it is. There are simply two differences.

First, since the second case concerns governmental technologies of the assemblage, I centered on two kinds of texts, the RDS documents and two reports containing the documentation of a particular performance index (see below). Second, since the two reports concerning the performance index are very specifically directed towards the index, they were not included in the corpus for the first and third case study.27

In sum, for the collection of a corpus of documents I thought of the assemblage as manifesting in sites of emergence and I initially approached three such sites. These provided me with links to a range of new sites from which it was possible to collect texts that I treat as remnants of the manifested assemblage. Eventually, through a form of expansive reading where I picked up new documents along the way I arrived at my specific

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27 These two reports were actually added to the corpus for the specific purpose of analyzing the particular index at hand as a technology. Thus, they were not really collected as a part of the snowball sampling approach I have described above.
set of documents. I called this section of the chapter ‘Material Selection’ and I want to expand on one more topic, namely what kind of technologies I selected for further investigation and for what reasons. Therefore, I discuss this briefly below before moving on to the analytical methods.

4.2.1. On the Selection of Technologies
For the second case study I chose to focus on two forms of what I consider important governmental technologies. First, the so-called RDS documents are requirements for all Swedish regions to complete and submit to the national government. The documents must specify, in a particular format, how the regions intend to work towards the overarching goals stipulated by the government and, in continuation, the EU and the so-called EU2020 program.

Hence, I take those documents to have a clear technical character and what is more, they are also representative of the texts that I have collected in another way. In the assemblage it is striking how so many of the documents, from expert reports to official government pieces are highly multimodal and in particular uses a lot of images, typography and graphic design to convey their message. Therefore, I became particularly interested in this kind of technology – an extensive use of photographs, drawings and more or less advertising features that seem to be embedded in Swedish regional policy documents today. Therefore, I decided that one particular governmental technology could be identified as just that, the use of multimodal expressions within policy documents and since the RDS also represents a clear technical mode in itself, they seemed like a good place to start. In the end I decided to make the delimitation of ‘only’ considering the multimodal expressions of the RDS documents instead of the entire corpus. There is more than enough in those documents to analyze the technology with respect to how it functions and what effects it may produce. In addition this also delimited the study to a particular set of documents that are very technological in nature (i.e. they are requirements).

Second, it was also a recurring phenomenon in the corpus at large to find references to different types of rankings, indices and benchmarking tools, particularly concerning innovation performance. This guided me towards my second choice of technology to analyze in more detail, namely the so-called Innovationsindex, created by the organization Reglab in Sweden. Reglab is a cooperation arena for Swedish regions and government agencies and they describe their activities as follows:
At Reglab regions, national state authorities and researchers meet and can add to their competence on issues of development and growth.

Innovation and regeneration are key words when regions meet the challenge to create sustainable regional growth. The prerequisites differ, but the need for new knowledge and market intelligence is the same. Developing each region on its own merit calls for both analysis, entrepreneurial creativity and leadership.

Reglab is a meeting place where we learn from others and each other. Reglab initiates joint ventures, seminars and networking – always based on the needs of its members.

Today Reglab has 24 members: 21 regions, The Swedish Agency for Economic and Regional Growth, The Swedish Governmental Agency for Innovation Systems and SALAR, Swedish Association of Local Authorities and Regions. All organizations wishing to create sustainable regional development are welcome to join (http://www.reglab.se/om-reglab/english, accessed 20140907).

Thus, Reglab is an important site of assemblage manifestation and the so called Innovationsindex represents a joint effort between Reglab and the private consultant firm Kontigo. As such it is designed to measure the innovative capacity of all Swedish regions and so far it has been published twice, in 2012 and 2014 slightly revised with certain measures changed and the index scores and rankings adjusted accordingly.

In connection with the index, Reglab also created an interactive website at which it is possible to produce graphs, maps and rankings by adjusting a wide range of parameters. This reflects the outspoken ambition of the index to be a tool for learning so that representatives of the regions, or whoever might be interested, can access the data and compare the performance with other regions as well as follow the progression over time. In this way the impact of the index seems to have been quite significant as it is referred to (sometimes very extensively) in a number of RDS documents. Indeed, additional Google searches also reveal a wide range of workshops, seminars and meetings where the results of the index seem to have been important.

At the same time, the technologies chosen here have not been selected because of their high impact on regional development policy; rather my reasons for studying them are the ways they are articulated in the corpus as a whole. Put simply, they represent salient technologies, visual communication and the production of measuring devices, in contemporary regional governance. Moreover, the specific constructs of the RDS documents are underlined as important in a number of other documents and are understood to be valuable tools for achieving prosperous regions (cf. OECD, 2010; 2012) and the multimodal expressions are very prominent in them. Likewise, performance indices as a broader category are also a tool that has become important in governing many facets of
social reality, not least regional development (cf. Arndt, 2008; Bandura, 2008; Löwenheim, 2008). Therefore, while it would have been perfectly plausible to choose another as an empirical example, I think what is important with the Reglab index is that it represents the category of technologies as such, irrespective of its specific nature. At the same time, I think it also has some interesting qualities in that it is so explicitly produced in a network of regions as a learning tool and intended as a means for all regions to improve their performance.

All in all, the governmental technologies that I investigate are indicative of salient features of the assemblage and also of politics more broadly. Hence, when I present my analysis of these techniques in chapter seven, I do it well aware of the fact that I could have chosen differently. Still, the technologies chosen are easy to relate to in a broad sense, which is a further justification for choosing them.

4.2.2. Practical Aspects of Analyzing the Data

So far I have described how I have collected, selected and reasoned when I wanted to delimit my empirical corpus as well as introduced my reasons for choosing the two forms of technologies that I study in chapter six. Before I move on to my approach to the analysis of text that I have used in the different chapters, I also want to specify some more mundane parts of the research for the sake of reflexivity and intersubjectivity.

The collected documents formed, as I said, a corpus containing 81 documents of varying length. However, in sum it amounted to more than 3000 ‘pages’, which of course is a sort of clumsy quantification, but yet indicative of the size of the corpus. Analyzing these documents then has been a matter of a retroductive process where themes and codes have been extracted from the documents as well as applied based on the theoretical perspectives I use and the kind of questions I have asked.

In practical terms, the analysis was performed with the assistance of computer software (Nvivo). This, of course, does not enhance or produce analysis, but it gives a certain mobility to the analysis and in particular, it provided me with a first way into the material.

Since the corpus was so large I started analyzing it by doing different kinds of searches in Nvivo so that, for instance, I could begin analyzing how globalization was represented by first focusing on those parts of the material where it was most often mentioned. Although I did not conduct a quantitative-oriented analysis, this provided a starting point for a number
of basic categories that could help me build an initial understanding of the corpus.

As the analysis progressed, I expanded my list of categories and themes as I turned to reading the documents more thoroughly. However, I also returned to search functions in Nvivo on several occasions during the analytical process when I wanted to expand or refine selected categories or investigate a new theme.

In the end, the analysis resulted in a set of categories under which I grouped a significantly scaled down portion of the corpus in the form of longer quotes. These quotes, or stretches of texts, was the working material that I used as I then started to write the analysis and adding theoretical elements to it.28

4.3 ANALYZING TEXT

This thesis builds on particular forms of text analysis, although with a slightly different take in the respective cases. Indeed, I will describe the approaches of each case, and the differences between them, in more detail below. However, before that I wish to elaborate more generally on what I mean by calling this a text analysis.

First of all, in line with many schools of discourse analysis (cf. Fairclough, 2010; Glynos & Howarth, 2007; Howarth, 2000; Kress & van Leeuwen, 2001; 2006; van Leeuwen, 2008; Torfing, 1999; Winter-Jørgensen & Philips, 2002; Wodak & Krzyzanowski, 2008; Wodak & Meyer, 2009b), I make the assumption that language and ‘the real’ are intimately connected.

Simply put, here language is not considered a neutral tool that can be used to describe and fully represent a pre-existing and independent reality. Rather, all interaction with ‘the real’ is mediated through a form of language system that not only interprets reality, but also produces it. All forms of meaning that we attribute to any aspect of the world are intimately connected to our language and the way we use it (cf. Fairclough, 2010; Howarth, 2000; 2013; Glynos & Howarth, 2007; Kress & van Leeuwen, 2006; Wodak & Meyer, 2009).

I assume that there is an inseparable relationship between reality and language in as much as social actors will always interpret and relate to ‘the real’ through language. By language I mean any system of symbolic signification and I hold that this system bestows meaning upon its

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28 This Nvivo file with the resulting codes and the entire corpus is available for anyone who wishes to view it in closer detail. See appendix B for further details.
elements through their *relational configuration*. By this I mean to emphasize that in this view (Saussure, 1983) no linguistic signs hold a kind of innate meaning, but rather, each sign acquires a contingent meaning depending on its relation to other signs. Furthermore, while this relational system determines a given range of meaning for any element that can be very narrow and more or less fixed, the system in itself is *always* open to change (Howarth, 2000; Torfing, 1999).

If this is the underlying assumption for all my analysis, another cornerstone is of course also the notion of *text*. By using this category, I do not denote ‘only’ a system of written symbols, but rather, in line with my understanding of language. I take a *text* to be a semiotic remnant of *social events* (cf. Fairclough, 2009). That is to say, I understand any given social practice as comprised of a range of interconnected events. Each of these events typically communicate a semiotic quality beyond their material manifestation so that, to use a convenient example, when somebody puts a ring on the finger of someone else, this communicates a wide range of meaning(s) depending on the surrounding practice(s).

Thus, a text may be realized through different modalities, in which written letters is one such modality. Indeed, *text* etymologically dates back to ancient Greek and Latin, communicating the meaning of a *weave*. My intention then, is to analyze such text as the assemblage becoming visible in *sites of emergence* and through the texts it then leaves behind.

So far, I realize that it may seem as if I ‘only’ analyze semiotic meaning when I approach the texts. This is, however, not my position. Texts are always part of the social events from which they emanate, and thus shape these while also being shaped by them. In particular, just as a range of social events combine into more or less distinct social practices, the texts that these produce together form *discourses*. I understand discourses then to be inseparable from the social practices and events from which they emanate, and to stress this out again, they do not only emanate from, but also shape and produce those practices (cf. Fairclough, 2009; 2010; Wodak & Meyer, 2009b; Jäger & Meier, 2009). Thus, I hold that all social reality can be characterized as *discursive*, and I understand the *discursive* to be an ontological quality of ‘the real’, not an epistemological assumption about how to study its manifestation as humans experience it. Instead, the discourses structure the discursive social world into stable, but contingent, sediments of the real. As argued by Jäger and Maier (2009:36f):

[... ] discourses not only shape but even enable (social) reality. Without discourses, there would be no (social) reality. Discourses can thus be understood as material
reality *sui generis*. They are not a second class material reality, not ‘less material’ than ‘real’ reality, not passive media into which reality is imprinted. [...] discourses form individual and mass consciousness and thereby constitute individual and collective subjects. [...] Since consciousness determines action, discourses determine action. This human action creates materializations. Discourses thus guide the individual and collective creation of reality.

As mentioned before, in this thesis I focus on documents, that is, a form of multimodal composition of written letters, typography, images, figures, colors and saturations as I trace the political rationalities, scrutinize the governmental technologies and investigate the production of social actors that occur in such texts. I understand this analysis then, to be very much a materialist one, where the effects found are not ‘just’ expressions in texts, but rather remnants of a lived and material reality’s discourse.

Therefore, as I perform a qualitative text analysis of my corpus of documents, I draw on certain articulations of Critical Discourse Analysis (Kress & van Leeuwen, 2001; 2006; van Leeuwen, 2008) to invoke analytical categories suitable for the kind of analyses I have in mind. Since the different cases here are focused on varying aspects of how power operates in the assemblage, I mobilize assorted analytical concepts in each one, although they generally fall under the umbrella of Foucauldian based discourse analysis.

The works of Kress & van Leeuwen (2001; 2006) are highly useful since attention is paid to the ways discourses are realized in modalities other than standard, written texts. I have chosen to use aspects of this approach since I am looking to do precisely such types of analysis in chapter seven when investigating the RDS documents and the way they contain images, graphic design and typography to convey their message. That being said, this approach emanates from linguistics and is originally more comprehensive and coherently spelled out than in my use of it here. Rather than applying it as a template for analysis, I have been inspired by it and drawn out certain sets of analytical categories useful for analyzing political rationalities, governmental technologies and the production of social actors within the assemblage. To make my different types of analyses more clear, I will articulate how I perform them in each of the three empirical chapters and when doing so, I will also be more precise about the analytical categories I borrow from van Leeuwen (2008; 2009) and Kress & van Leeuwen (2001; 2006).

So, in all of the descriptions below a general principle is the way I have stated that language is not a neutral tool that can be used to completely signify an external reality. Rather, as I study texts and analyze them in terms of political rationalities and governmental technologies I see this as
expressions of power working in the texts, trying to fixate meaning in particular ways. In addition to this I use a number of concepts to describe how the texts discursively produce these meanings.

Lastly, I also think that making this kind of analysis presents a particular problem in terms of how academic texts are often structured. I am not at all sure that it benefits the analysis if I specify my analytical categories in this methods chapter, and leave out further explanations from the later chapters. For this reason I have opted for a sort of middle ground. I describe the general approach and most important categories that I use in my analysis here, but I will also continue to highlight them throughout the actual analysis, and explain them further if I think it is necessary, or if I invoke more nuanced categories than those defined in the next sections.

4.3.1. Approaching Political Rationalities Analytically
In the first analytical chapter I analyze my corpus of documents looking for the most salient political rationalities that structure the assemblage. As such it is a kind of conventional text analysis, however, it is based on the notions of language, power and text that I have explained before. Therefore the general strategy is to showcase certain articulations from the corpus to ground my claims in the empiric material. In this sense, there is nothing special about my qualitative analysis and it follows a general structure around quotes and running commentary of the relevant parts of the corpus. This is particularly true of the first part of the analysis where I am interested in the way that globalization is articulated and understood in the assemblage as a form of problem that must be governed through the political rationalities. However, at a different level of analysis, I had to find a way of approaching those rationalities and structure the material in a meaningful way.

After a first reading of the corpus it was clear to me that there was a number of rationales associated with regional development such as knowledge, attraction, leadership, innovation and entrepreneurship. After a second reading I had listed 14 such individual rationalities and I struggled for a way to comprehend the way that they operated together and I wanted to find larger categories. At the same time I really felt that the 14 I had found were distinct modes of rationale that often were articulated as important in and by themselves.

However, as I was starting to move on, trying to understand how the different modes of rationale were legitimized or how they produced certain forms of truths in relation to the assemblage of regional development, I
also noticed how one of the main forms of legitimization was the way they supported each other. That is to say, the *modes of rationale* were often articulated in chunks or groups that all gave reinforced meaning to each of the others. For this reason I came up with the notion of *chains of rationale* as a way of understanding these configurations, and hence my analysis now pursues this idea.

So, the terminology I use in this chapter is that there are *modes of rationale* that are being produced within the assemblage that can be interpreted as single ‘units’, although, more often these modes become *elements* in larger *chains of rationale*. As a mode becomes an element, it partly takes on new functions as it is positioned in clear relation to other elements and produces a reinforced legitimacy for the kind of ‘truths’ that are being articulated. As an example, the modes of knowledge, adaptability, competitiveness and creativity, innovation and entrepreneurship are saliently articulated together, forming a sort of logic where regional development must produce competitiveness, something that is best realized by being creative, innovative and entrepreneurial. However, this is not a simple relationship. There are rather different ways between those modes, and one of them is represented as *to be adaptive*, something that in turn is better achieved if resources are directed towards certain forms of knowledge. Therefore, in my terminology, I call that a *chain of rationale*.

By this I do not intend to portray a very stable composition of rationales, but rather that different modes are often tied to other modes outside of the chains that I suggest. As I use the concepts of modes and chains in my analysis it is mostly a way of structuring the material, even if I also make the qualitative assessment that the chains that I find also represent particularly salient ways of creating connections between certain modes.

During the analysis I will present these concepts again and expand on them further, using the fact that I think they are better understood as they are ‘put to work’ so to speak. However, as mentioned, I am also interested in prominent forms of legitimization and in this regard I draw on the schemas provided by van Leeuwen (2008). When I say ‘draw on’, I mean that I have used a select few of a larger set of analytical categories. The categories that I have chosen then work as ways of illuminating how political rationalities (conceptualized as chains) are legitimized and how this in turn contributes to global forms and globalization effects.

One such category that I use is *rationalization* and by this I mean how certain modes (or chains) can be represented so that they seem to be the
best rational answer to the problem of governing regional development under conditions of globalization. This may seem almost tautological since I investigate modes of rationale. However, leaning on van Leeuwen (2008), I specify this kind of rationalization in two sub-categories, namely theoretical rationalization and instrumental rationalization. The first kind then is a salient form that is invoked when for instance the understandings of globalization are articulated. So by presenting definitions, explanations and predictions, the representations of globalization is inscribed with certain legitimacy. On the other hand, when speaking of the chains, the kind of re-enforcing legitimization that arises from the fact that the different modes become elements that support each other in chains I call instrumental rationalization. In this case there does not have to be definitions and explanations, rather the chains appear as if they are legitimate representations of how to produce competitive regional development because of their internal composition.

In addition to this I also consider a form of legitimization that van Leeuwen (2008) calls mythopoesis, which denotes a form of storytelling. That is to say, prominent parts of my corpus were written in a specific fashion so that what we encounter are like moral tales that are filled with protagonists and antagonists, hazards and rewards. Therefore, I consider how this also produces moral evaluations of the represented social practices and social actors in the corpus that work to legitimize them.

4.3.2. On the Construction of Social Actors and Action
In the second analytical chapter I engage in the study of how social actors are constructed in the assemblage. To do this, I use two pairs of dichotomous categories for understanding how social actors (and action) are represented throughout the corpus. These categories are lifted from van Leeuwen’s (2008) more comprehensive schema for how social actors and action can be represented in texts using linguistic resources of a great variety.

I am interested in how social action is represented because I view this as expressions of how the particular actors represented in the material are endowed with a form of capacity that is important in relation to globalization and global forms. Naturally, there are many other things that are important in the construction of social actors than how they are represented in terms of action and I will pay attention to a range of different variations. But, the analysis can generally be said to be structured
around representations of social actors and action since this helps me to better understand how the social actors are constructed.

The first pair of categories that I deploy in this chapter is therefore inclusion and exclusion (van Leeuwen, 2008), which very simply provide a start of the analysis as it poses the question of what social actors are included or not in the material. By this inclusion/exclusion binary I do not at all mean to measure and calculate some kinds of frequency or proportion. Rather, this is, like all analysis here, a basic qualitative analysis that aims to show salient representations of inclusion and exclusion in the corpus.

This is then combined with my second pair of categories to better understand how the social actors are constructed in terms of agentilization and deagentilization (van Leeuwen, 2008), or in other words their capacity for social action. When doing so I consider if the social actors are represented as either active, re-active or passive in the material.

As for the exclusion of social actors I also use a set of categories to describe a degree of exclusion since, as I said, this is not a matter of counting the number of exclusions in the sense of ‘a social actor is not explicitly mentioned in this or that text’. So, to achieve some more nuance, I will speak of backgrounding in cases when social actors are represented and maybe spoken about in some detail, but constructed as not related to a specific theme or process. Similarly, I will also speak of suppression when there is an even greater degree of exclusion, and by this I mean, for instance, cases when a social actor is never referred to, or mentioned, yet logically the actor must be assumed to exist somewhere in relation to what is being articulated.

Apart from these two categories of inclusion/exclusion and agentilization/deagentilization I have also used one more category to describe the representations of a particular social actor, namely the entrepreneur. In my mind, the entrepreneur, more than any of the other important social actors, are represented in ways that make him or her overdetermined (van Leeuwen, 2008). By this I mean that some representations of social actors make them appear as simultaneously very important for more than one social practice. Indeed, while this could be applied to more social actors than entrepreneurs, they are in this sense very overdetermined and I feel that this analytical category could help describe how they are being produced.

As mentioned in relation to the other analyses, the kind of categories used here are parts of a larger qualitative analysis and used more as guiding lights and ways of underlining particular constructions in some more detail.
The bulk of the analysis though, centers on more classic text analysis (although with the particular understanding of text that has been defined earlier).

4.3.3. Analyzing Indices and Multimodal Texts as Governmental Technologies

The chapter on governmental technologies is a little different from the other in terms of analytical strategies. First of all, I analyze two different technologies and thus use different concepts for interpreting them in terms of power. In addition, these are quite specific ‘things’ that I analyze, namely multimodal text articulations (such as diagrams and photos) and the construction and maintenance of a performance index. Some of the analytical categories that I use for analyzing the multimodal texts, I also use to highlight some multimodal features of how the performance index is executed and disseminated, although, with the exception that these are two forms of analyses in the same chapter.

In both of these analyses I have chosen also to continuously explain and highlight the analytical categories that I use in the course of the analysis. As mentioned, I think this is better than to give a very detailed account of them now, and then just move on to apply what has been said here at a later stage. This means then, that the following is a compressed exposition of the kind of tools I use for analyzing the governmental technologies and may serve as indications of what to come, and to be explained again when used in context. Indeed, I think that the context is important for understanding them.

I start by considering the multimodal expressions of the so called RDS documents and when doing so I use a number of the categories suggested by Kress and van Leeuwen (2001; 2006). Basically, I understand all multimodal texts as producing two kinds of participants, namely represented participants and interactive participants and this is therefore a form of entry point for understanding the multimodal RDS documents as governmental technologies. By represented participants I mean all the elements that are in a photo, for instance, and these are not restricted to humans. So a photo of say, an office space, may include tables, coffee mugs, men, women, computers and papers that all can be considered represented participants, although this does not mean that they have to be participants. Often a composition revolves around a few salient participants where the other ‘objects’ become more of attributes of those participants than ‘actual’ participants themselves (Kress & van Leeuwen, 2006).
The interactive participants then, are the viewers of the image that are also produced as a function of the image. Indeed, underlying this analysis is the assumption that photos, diagrams and typography are texts that articulate meaning and thus cannot be seen as passive, correct and neutral representations of ‘reality’. Rather, they also produce reality, just like written texts do. So, when as viewers take part of a multimodal representation, such as a photo, they are being produced as interactive participants in this composition. To be sure, the way they are being produced cannot be reduced to some kind of natural law to predict how they perceive the image, yet this does not, on the other hand, mean that their participation is random. What I mean by this is that I approach each multimodal composition on the understanding that they all produce a relationship among the represented participants, as well as between the represented and interactive participants (Kress & van Leeuwen, 2006).

When trying to understand these relationships, I also mobilize a set of additional analytical categories. For instance, I use the notion of vectors to understand how action is communicated in images. Since this kind of text cannot use verbs as in written or spoken language and yet often displays things happening to certain participants, maybe as a consequence of something another participant does, we need a way to speak of such representations. Vectors in this sense are strong impressions of direction and action, such as a hand pointing in a drawing or an arrow connecting two boxes in a diagram (Kress & van Leeuwen, 2006).

Moreover, I also use the category of distance to analyze how certain represented participants are produced. Again, while this is not a determined condition, if someone is depicted in the photo as very far away, I generally interpret this as meaning something different than if someone else is depicted in a close up. In this respect, I also consider the angle that such representations depict. Again, if a participant is depicted from the side, from below, from the front or from above can in certain compositions produce differentiated representations and interactions (Kress & van Leeuwen, 2006).

Finally, I also consider the way that multimodal texts are composed. By this I mean that, unlike written texts, multimodal ones produce a kind of non-linear experience in as much as certain things can be represented at different points in the text and not automatically represent a beginning, a middle or an end of that particular text. Instead, I use other ways of understanding compositions by considering what kind of objects are represented to the left, to the right, at the top and at the bottom. In general
it has been shown (Kress & van Leeuwen, 2006) that in western countries what is to the left in photos or larger compositions represents ‘the known’ information, or that which we take for granted and which is fairly institutionalized. In contrast, on the right hand side we often encounter information that is ‘new’ or ‘contested’ in relation to the social system we inhabit. Similarly, the top section of an image has, at least since the Middle Ages, often been used for presenting the ‘ideal’, while the bottom part has been the ‘real’. In my analysis I take such things into consideration when interpreting multimodal text, but of course not in a deterministic fashion.

As for the second kind of technology that I investigate, this is even more presented as intertwined with analytical categories drawn from the theoretical literature on what broadly may be called the politics of numbers (cf. Fougner, 2008; Hacking, 1991; Krause Hansen, 2012; Krause Hansen & Mühlen-Schulte, 2012; Löwenheim, 2008; Porter T, 2012; Rose, 1991).

That being said, there are primarily three categories that I use to understand how the production of performance indices can be understood and these have been suggested by Krause Hansen (2012). Not until then do I consider how Reglab’s Innovationsindex works as a technology of distance as it enables measuring and ruling distant sites from centers of calculation. Second, I consider how it is also a technology of communication, which signals the fact that it is not only considered as a measurement tool, but rather is explicitly articulated as a tool for learning. In this regard the communicative ability of the index is clearly visible through its multimodal representations, website and dissemination networks. Third, I interpret the index as a technology of surveillance as it produces a form of constant monitoring of Swedish regions’ innovative capacity. Importantly, I claim that this is not only a form of external surveillance since the regions also comply with this and indeed have been complicit in the production of the index.

4.3.4. Reflexivity and Standards of Research

While I have now spent the main part of this chapter to render my approach in the following chapters intelligible, I wish to add a few more points on the kind of analyses I have conducted and what challenges it has posed. First, I do not think that any form of analysis based on assemblage thinking should be placed under a strict methodological schema to constitute what such an analysis ‘is’ or ‘should be’. Rather, following Aihwa Ong (2014), we may understand the performance of researching an assemblage as creating a bricolage. Or in other words it is:
‘artisanal’ in nature that you actually grab the tools that are at hand. You do not go for an externally imposed formula and try to reproduce it in some way, but rather you are grabbing tools at hand to study what’s before you. So it is a form of ‘collage’ that is emerging. The very things that you assemble to solve a problem to configure this space of intervention are going to give it a distinctive character, even though there is a very global element involved in it. That, for me, is very important because it helps us to understand the variability of globalized situations around the world (Ong, 2014:20).

So, if the outcome here is a bricolage, this makes me a bricoleur, that tries do bring in tools and objects at my disposal for analyzing the assemblage at hand. However, while the ideas portrayed by Ahiwa Ong in my mind are akin to quite an inductive mode of reasoning I would classify my approach to this analysis as neither inductive nor deductive. Rather, I would say that what I do, and what this chapter and the following articulate is a kind of retroduction (Peirce, 1955).

This mode of reasoning emphasizes a sort of back and forth motion between the analyzed material and the analytical categories extrapolated from theory and methodology. This means that the framework I deploy serves as a guiding light when analyzing the material, and yet in practical terms, this actual analysis also made me reconfigure the framework, adding and subtracting elements from it as the analysis progressed. What is presented here is the final product (what ever that is) of this longer process of molding categories and material.

In any case, retroduction (or indeed the bricoleur activity I have in mind) does not mean a lesser standard for coming up with findings and theoretical arguments supporting the kind of conclusions that are drawn compared with inductive or deductive modes of reasoning, for instance. In particular I hold that one of the things that sets a scholarly work apart

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29 In his work, mathematician, logician and philosopher Charles Sanders Peirce (1955) identified three major modes for drawing scientifically valid conclusions, *induction*, *deduction* and *retroduction*. This last mode is also sometimes known as *abduction* and it seems as if Peirce used the terms interchangeably. Yet, the jury is still out on whether or not retroduction should be seen as a class within abduction (or the other way around), or if the terms simply denote the same concept (Chiasson, 2005). In this thesis I use the term *retroduction* for the simple reason that it is the one that I have encountered most in the works that I refer to.

30 As an example, suppose you wake up one morning and find that the streets surrounding your house are all wet with pools of water. Given this knowledge you may use the data you have in combination with previous knowledge and categories of what might have caused such an effect around your house. There might have been a fire in a nearby house causing firefighters to spray the neighborhood with water in attempts to put the fire out, or it may have rained during the night. Again, confronting some more of your knowledge and categories given this first information and the following possible explanations, you may also notice that the sky is still dark and cloudy while at the same time recalling that you did not hear any alarming sounds during the night. Therefore you draw the logical conclusion that ‘it rained last night as a function of a movement back and forth between empirical observations and your previous knowledge and analytical categories. This is retroductive logic, a logic that ‘leads’ back from the data to previous knowledge, as it starts with a single empirical observation of a wet street and then moves back and forth between the data and predicated conceptions.
from other forms of knowledge is the striving for open and reflexive reasoning.

At the same time, the research literature using this approach is rather undeveloped in terms of how to actually do it, and I really think that the *bricolage* image is fitting. While this may be so, I am also well aware that this means that I have not built my case on established rules and reasons for selecting material and making delimitations. In broad terms, however, I have leaned towards what I think can be understood as a more general qualitative research logic, and in particular one that fits into a kind of post-structuralist frame of mind.

Nevertheless, I still think it’s possible to consider the contributions of this kind of research even though it must necessarily be a discussion that does not converge on notions such as validity, reliability or variable control. It is to be noted that I do not regard such criteria as unimportant, but there is an ongoing discussion on how to assess research in general and whether or not it is possible to apply one particular model to all kinds of research (Brady, Collier & Seawright, 2010; Charmaz, 2006; Hjerm, Lindgren & Nilsson, 2014). For this reason I want to articulate both what I think can be used as a discussion for criteria of evaluation in this case, and also continue with a discussion on reflexivity and my role as a researcher.

Kathy Charmaz (2006) has suggested four broad categories for evaluating different types of qualitative research in comparison with the more traditional claims of validity, reliability and generalization. Similarly, Jennifer Mason (2002) provides an informed discussion on how to refashion or relate to such concepts in qualitative research and in the following I will build on these sources for a short discussion on the contributions of the design and approach of this thesis to the study of power and politics.

First, concerning the concept of *validity* I do not think that it is a problem to speak of this study in terms of whether or not it is a valid approach to the questions I have raised, or in relation to the theories and data I have generated and interpreted. At the same time, it also seems clear that if validity includes operationalization of concepts into indicators and variables, for instance, then the situation is more problematic. In the same way I claim that the interpretations I make are *reliable*, but not in the sense of being the result of objective observation where I as a researcher is positioned outside of the discourses that structure the field of study. As I have shown, my selection of data and the steps I have taken to analyze them have included a great many *choices*. And, as pointed out, should such
choices and steps be changed, it is likely that the results would be different too.

So, rather than speaking of validity and reliability I think it may be possible to formulate questions of *credibility* (Charmaz, 2006:182). Then what is credibility in terms of research, and even more, in terms of research results? Well, to me it would be a concept involving issues such as ‘are there logical links between the data collected and the arguments provided in the analysis’; ‘are the data extensive and substantial to the degree that you can make the claims you are making’; ‘are there systematic comparisons and classifications in terms of codes, categories and themes’ (Charmaz, 2006:182). In sum, providing answers to such questions probably makes the research more credible.

Furthermore, instead of speaking of generalizations and explanatory power of the findings, we may use Charmaz’s categories of *Originality*, *Resonance* and *Usefulness*. Beginning with the first we would then ask questions such as: ‘are the analytical categories of your studies new and creative, do they provide new insights or angles’; ‘does the analysis enable new concepts and ways of approaching the empirical phenomenon’; ‘what kind of social and theoretical significance does the research provide’; ‘to what extent does the research contribute to challenging, extending or refining established concepts and ideas within the field’.

By *Resonance* then, Charmaz (2006:183) suggests questions along lines of: ‘do the themes and categories used portray the material as a whole in a reasonable way’; ‘has the research rendered such understandings that are taken for granted in the material visible’; ‘is the analysis done in such ways that it provides links between larger collectives, discourses or institutions and individual lives’; ‘does the analysis provide people who relate to the circumstances of the study with new insights about their situations and positions’.

Finally, when speaking of *Usefulness*, we may ask questions such as; ‘what meaningful knowledge does the study provide’; ‘do the analyses provide interpretations that people can use for changing their everyday reality’; ‘do the analyses make visible social processes and discourses that have not been seen before’; ‘can this analysis contribute to further research in this or other areas’ (Charmaz, 2006:183).31

31 Charmaz (2006:182-3) provides a detailed list with questions. Here I have used them more or less in the same way that she does, but I have rephrased them to be more generally applicable. In her original statements they are often explicitly linked to her (constructivist) version of grounded theory. Indeed, my presentation therefore also resembles the way that Hjerm, Lindgren & Nilson (2014) have restated Charmaz’ questions in Swedish, and with the similar ambition to make them more general than directed towards grounded theory.
My point here is rather to articulate a set of questions and dimensions for assessing the contributions of this thesis than to make a general critique of more standard ways of considering the quality of research. And for similar reasons I have also written this chapter in what I hope is an ‘inviting’ and accessible way. I want to portray my position as a researcher as reflexive and while this can mean a great many things, to me it primarily means to recognize the choices I make and the ‘situatedness’ of my position as a researcher (Finlay & Gough, 2003).

4.4 **WHAT NEXT?**

By now it should be clear that the empirical (or analytical) part of this thesis is comprised out of three separate, but interrelated studies. As stated, I use the same corpus (with minor exceptions) with a different focus in all three chapters, and yet there is also a sort of common structure that I wish to mention.

First, I take the analysis of chapter five, on rationalities, to serve as a kind of foundation for the other two so that the results that are produced there, in a sense, carries over into the other ones. In many ways of course, all chapters provide insights into each other and this has particularly been the case during the actual analytical process. Yet, they must also be presented in a format that is suitable for reading. Therefore, I would like to see the first study as primary and foundational and the other two as branches of the first. However, there is also a relationship in the sense that in the third study I show how rationalities and the production of social actors operate in the form of technologies both as outcome and as prerequisites.

All of the chapters are laid out differently depending on the fact that they analyze different things and ask different questions to the material; yet there are some common elements. In particular, I have chosen to end all of them with a (short) section on how I understand the results in terms of global forms. In this way then, we may understand the analyses and the results they convey as both globalization effects (i.e. certain political rationalities arise as a function of specific discursive constructions of globalization) and at the same as globalization (re)production (i.e. the global forms).

This helps putting a certain focus on the parts that I then will return to in the last chapter where I discuss the contribution of the different studies in relation to the purpose of the thesis and the research questions. Specifically then, this means that in the last chapter I focus on showing how the different studies together contribute to an understanding of how
the assemblage of Swedish regional government takes on global forms and (re)produces globalization as it does so. Therefore, what may seem as rather short discussions in the three chapters will be discussed together at a later point, and then also in relation to the concept of power.
This is the first in a series of three analytical chapters or case studies and as such it functions as a basis for the following ones. The main focus here is a qualitative analysis of a set of 81 documents that can be understood as texts produced in relation to the assemblage of regional development governance in Sweden. In essence, this study concerns the formation and articulations of globalization and prominent modes of rationale that arise in relation to it in the documents. Hence, this chapter is structured in a way that provides answers to the first empirical research questions as formulated in chapter one.

In other words, I am concerned not only with representations of globalization and modes of rationale, but also forms of legitimization that are interlinked with those. Recall that the political rationales were ways of problematization, instances of delimitation and the general forms of thinking and theorizing that become internal to an assemblage that is being explicitly governed. Hence, in the governance of Swedish regional development, it is likely to find varying modes of such a rationale that all are actively shaping and maintaining the assemblage. In short, in this chapter I will highlight these and also present an interpretation of how we may understand them as linked together in certain *chains of rationale* that give the individual modes a form of instrumental purpose as they feed into each other to produce notions of competitiveness. In addition to this, I will also investigate how they contribute to legitimization and the production of truth in terms of what ‘the problem’ of globalization is and how it can (must!) be handled in the regions.

The chapter is divided into four sections. In the first I showcase general articulations of globalization in the material. I show how the phenomenon (or process) is defined, how its causes and effects are articulated and how its future projection is produced. In the second section, I turn to the political rationalities that arise in relation to those articulations as I illustrate what I call *chains of rationale*, or, in other words, how certain
elements interlink and make up logical constructions for how to govern the assemblage under the perceived conditions of globalization.

In the third section I show how these chains are made operational through different modes of discursive legitimation. In relation to this I deploy some of the analytical categories provided by van Leeuwen (2008) as discussed in the previous chapter. This enables an analysis of how the chains of rationale are constructed, how certain truths of globalization are established, and by extension, how the political rationalities of the assemblage are upheld.

This then leads to the fourth section where I summarize the analysis and the general interpretations that I have made along the way. In particular, I present a discussion on the naturalization of globalization and some overt class dimensions that arise as intrinsic to the chains of rationale. In conclusion, I turn to discussing the global forms of the assemblage and thus how it is not only affected by globalization but also actively produces it.

5.1 REGIO NAL DEVELOPMENT UNDER CONDITIONS OF GLOBALIZATION

Articulations of globalization are common in the analyzed material and in particular they take a narrative position as ‘background’ or ‘pre-requisites’ in many of the texts. In other words, governing regional development is produced as a practice that is very much dependent on globalization and indeed a practice that is in a sense delimited by the frontiers of globalization. As mentioned, in this analysis, I first wish to lay bare so to speak ‘what’ globalization is understood ‘to be’ in the assemblage. This means that I am interested in how it is conceptualized and what causes are understood to produce it, as well as what effects are articulated as an outcome of these. Together, the causes and effects can be understood as the way that globalization is rendered as a problem that must be handled in the governance of Swedish regional development.

Often, in the texts, the articulations are unclear about what globalization ‘is’ in more precise terms. Rather, it is more common to find definitions or background accounts that simply state that globalization is a phenomenon with a set of effects, and then goes on to list those effects, often mixed with some causes. This means that in order to elicit what globalization is understood ‘to be’ in the texts most of the time I have considered such entangled articulations rather than straightforward definitions. It is of course not so surprising that explicit explanations and definitions of globalization are scarce, given that the bulk of the texts are government
reports rather than, for instance, scholarly work on the phenomenon. However, I also take this to be a rather interesting finding in itself; namely that one of the most prominent features in the entire corpus is the importance of globalization and how this force is something that brings about a large number of changes for the practice of governing, and yet it is a force that is not needed to define, theorize or motivate.

While the expressions of the causes and effects of globalization are entangled in the texts, I still found it useful to separate them in the analysis. Therefore, below I consider first how conceptualizations and definitions of globalization are articulated in conjunction with the causes of the phenomenon (or process) before I turn to the principal representations of globalization effects and projections.

5.1.1. Articulations of Globalization

In the corpus of texts that I have analyzed, the understandings of what globalization 'is' and how it came to be are generally articulated along the lines of (communications) technology and trade. Broadly speaking, in more or less all of the documents, the underlying assumption is that governing regional development is a practice that must be understood against a backdrop of increased connectivity made possible primarily by advancements in communications technology and increased trade. In short, this is articulated as producing a new order with reconfigurations of central elements that poses new challenges for regional development and indeed, governance in general. As it happens, in the texts this novelty is seldom measured up against any perceived previous order(s) to showcase what exactly it is that is new about it, although it is often explained and exemplified through metaphors of flows. People, capital, culture and information are represented as flowing over increasingly borderless spaces. Consider, for instance, a description in the document *En nationell strategi för regional tillväxt och attraktionskraft 2014-2020* [A national strategy for regional growth and attraction 2014-2020] (Ministry of Industry, Employment and Communication [MIEC],32 2014a:6):

(Q5:1) Globalisation is a process which makes national borders less significant as communication, trade and access to other countries increase and job markets and economies become more and more integrated. This process entails both opportunities and challenges for regions, businesses and individuals. The workforce is increasingly mobile, not least in the Nordic region and between the EU countries where the job market is free. As a result, there is an influx of foreign labor to the Swedish job market, at the same time as many Swedish people choose to work abroad. Global financial competition increases the pressure to reorganise

32 Swedish: Näringsdepartementet
the economy. At the same time, there is an increase not only in capital flow and investments, but also in trade, travel and migration. Moreover, we see an intensified exchange of information and technology.\textsuperscript{33} \textsuperscript{39}\textsuperscript{34}

In this quote, which is very typical of the corpus as a whole, globalization is conceptualized as a process\textsuperscript{35} where the world is becoming more and more intertwined. Evidently, this is primarily because communications technology and trade increase the accessibility to markets in other countries while at the same time labor is becoming more mobile and willing to work where the market currently gives the best pay-off, so to speak.

So, globalization is about interconnectedness caused by communication and trade, and while Q5:1 does list a range of challenges and opportunities that arise as a consequence of this, it also signals a form of natural evolution since there are no mentioning of, for instance, governments or interest groups that make this possible. This is not always the case in the texts, and yet, when it is not, the representation of consequences are often similar. As an example, even when globalization is defined and understood as a form of interconnectivity that concerns more than ‘just’ technology and trade, these elements still tend to be quite dominant, as in the final report from the secretariat of the Swedish Globalization Council (Braunerhielm, von Grief & Svaleryd, 2009:15):

(Q5:2) Generally speaking, globalisation involves trade, investments across borders, migration and capital flow, as well as the exchange of information and technology between countries. Aspects such as culture, the environment, attitudes and faith can also be included in the concept. Globalisation has been made possible primarily by decreases in the cost of communication and transactions following technological progress and policy decisions. It is not a new phenomenon, but the substantial decrease in transport and communication costs over the past few decades has resulted in a dramatic increase in global transactions and an increasing number of countries also partake in the global economy. In other words, globalisation has intensified, and this intensification is generally what is signified by the concept. [29]

\textsuperscript{33} Many of the quotes in this chapter are translations from Swedish. The original formulations can be accessed via a compiled document stored at the online repository of the DIVA portal. Please refer to appendix B for more information.

\textsuperscript{34} I have assigned two types of numbers to all empirical quotes. First the actual numbering (QX:XX) and then this bracketed number [XX] which corresponds to the empirical document from which the quote is lifted as listed in appendix B. This serves the function to more precisely designate the empirical source since it sometimes may be confusing given Swedish and English titles etc.

\textsuperscript{35} This is actually less common in the material. That is to say, it is not common with explicit recognitions of globalization as a process; rather it is often articulated as a state or phenomenon. This may seem to be a subtle difference but in some instances I think it has quite a significant meaning. For one thing a process signals something that is more ‘in the making’ and open-ended whereas a phenomenon or a state of condition seems more fixated and ‘just there’ like the air we breathe or the snow storm that just hit.
Again, different flows are at the center of globalization and again, it is primarily driven by communications technology and trade. Throughout the corpus, articulations such as the one in Q5:2 are strongly present. In these, the primacy of technology and trade are established, while still widening the understanding of globalization somewhat with recognitions of culture, environment and religion as important elements. Furthermore, there is also an active mentioning of political decisions as contributing to the onset of current globalization. However, taken together the primary meaning in articulations such as Q5:2 above does not significantly alter the understanding of how globalization is represented compared to the example in Q5:1. In fact, we may instead recognize a form of backgrounding of other aspects (culture, environment and so on) so that the mentioning of them actually reinforces the prominence of technology and trade as the most central elements of globalization.

In Q5:2 a less prominent feature of the corpus is also articulated. By this I mean the way it explicitly refers to, and tries to explain, what the novelty of current forces of globalization actually is. Again, while this is not something that is conspicuous in the texts as a whole, whenever it is articulated as such, it generally follows the understanding displayed here, namely that it is in fact not a new process, although it is now so intensified (as a consequence of technology) that it has reached unprecedented levels of interconnectedness.

The ideas of interconnectedness and different flows across waning borders are, as mentioned, some of the most salient features of globalization as it is articulated and implicitly defined throughout the texts and they are well illustrated in Q5:1 as well as Q5:2. Yet, there are more facets to the conceptualizations of globalization in the texts. Consider the

Articulations within the documents produced by The Swedish Globalisation Council can in some ways be said to be more detailed compared to the rest of the corpus since they actively address issues of what globalization is and how it functions as part of their main agenda. Yet, it is striking how these also fall very close to these more ‘narrow’ understandings in Q1. Another example from the final report of the council, Beyond the Crisis: How Sweden Can Succeed in the New Global Economy (2009:10) illustrates this:

“The term globalisation first appeared in the mid-1990s and quickly became popular in analyses of international developments, reflecting the insight that the world was undergoing a profound change. Crucially, national borders were declining in importance in many key respects. There were both political and technological reasons for this. Among the former were China’s decision to pursue a market economy, the collapse of the Soviet Union, EU enlargement and the deepening of European integration, plus the fact that many countries had phased out their currency regulations. The technological causes included the emergence of the Internet, advances in mobile telephony and falling transport costs. With the lowering of obstacles to trade, investment, migration and information exchange, new opportunities arose, not least in the production sphere. In just a short space of time, prosperity in the world increased at an unprecedented pace. Almost 500 million people were lifted – or rather lifted themselves – above the UN poverty line between 1990 and 2005.”
articulations of Q5:3, quoted from the Regional Development Strategy (RDS) of Region Jönköping:

(Q5:3) In general, we see a development of the world towards more integration (globalisation), a greater emphasis on knowledge and networking (a knowledge society), and the democratisation and dissemination of technology. This development makes countries with a rapidly expanding economy more and more influential, allows innovation to be more important alongside effective production, and turns people, because our living standards have improved, increasingly selective. It is also obvious that there is a strong tendency towards urbanisation as people and businesses move to larger, stronger regions of growth (RDS Jönköping, 2013:10). [60]

In Q5:3, the understanding of globalization as a very inclusive process is prominent. It is not only so that the world is increasingly intertwined, but this also seems to have very positive effects. Technology is made more accessible, more democratic and knowledge will become more important in a world where ‘we as people’ will enjoy higher standards of living. What is not mentioned here, and is practically absent in the corpus, are understandings of globalization as nested in relations of power where ‘humans’ are not a universal category that will experience globalization in the same way.

Consider how in both Q5:1 and Q5:2, but primarily in Q5:3, a form of sameness and affinity between groups of people is established. For instance, it is not some particular segments of Swedes that may decide to go work abroad, there is no mentioning of possible differences between the groups that come to Sweden to work, and likewise, innovative knowledge seems to be a resource equally accessible to all people. Throughout the corpus, this is saliently represented. Whether the articulations relate to nations, regions, municipalities or macro-formations, such as the EU, it is striking how groups of people are articulated at very high levels of abstraction such as Europeans, Swedes or citizens of a particular region. Through such representations it is as if they all stand to lose or benefit from globalization on equal terms, without recognition of, for instance, class or ethnic background. Thus, in this way, globalization is produced as a phenomenon that in itself is not a matter of power relations, so that while there are recognitions of possible inequities, particularly in terms of gender, or in such ways that some regions or countries may not develop as fast as others, these are effects that stem more from how globalization is handled, not from what it is.

A final prominent ingredient of the way globalization is conceptualized and represented in the analyzed material concerns the central function of firms and businesses. They are often articulated as drivers and causes of
increasing globalization as well as recognized as some of the most important assets in a globalized world for any country or region. In the final report of the ESPON project *Territorial Impact of Globalization for Europe and its Regions* (TIGER) this function of firms is clearly stated:

(Q5:4) Second, what are the major processes driving globalization? The shrinking of distance through the diminishing costs of transportation for goods and people has been critical to processes of globalization. These processes remain deeply integrated in large infrastructures located in cities, notably in major gateways, which concentrate hub functions in maritime and air networks. Although this has been a continuous trend since the industrial revolution, it has been a specific condition for the increasing volumes of flows of different kinds across the world in recent decades. The so-called information and communication technologies have also been considered central in the current era of globalization (Castells, 1996; Veltz, 1996). For many authors, their development has contributed to financial globalization and the emergence of more horizontal corporate management structures supporting more transnational and cooperative business networks. Firms and global financial actors have therefore been playing a major role in globalization processes. Since WWII, transnational firms have become major economic players and more international in their strategies, initiating processes of chain production across the globe. This process accelerated after 1990 resulting in increasing FDI as a share of world GDP (figure 1). Major firms act on a global scale through the integration of global production networks. This means that the production of goods and services is controlled by major economic actors that have global strategies for the location of functions within integrated value chains. It has resulted in a large increase in intra-sector trade at a higher rate than inter-sector trade (CEPII, 2006). Hence, a growing part of world trade is made within the same filière or value chain. Transnational companies have been the main driving force in this process, with intra-firm trade accounting for about one third of total world trade. In consequence, firms shape territorial relations through their location choices and offshoring strategies have important impacts on the development process at a regional level (ESPON, 2013d:4-5). [09]

In the example portrayed in Q5:4 the involvement of firms and businesses in globalization is very explicit and moreover, also theorized in a way that is not a pronounced feature of my corpus. Usually, corporations are simply recognized as central to the increasing connectivity among regions, nations and people and often, which is also true for Q5:4, there are no explicit mentions of power and politics in relation to this.

So, to summarize, articulations of globalization are abundant in the material and when it is conceptualized or theorized it is more or less always as a phenomenon that relates to increased levels of interconnection between regions, states, humans and, maybe above all, corporations. As such it lies very close to what I called a *globalist discourse* in chapter two, in particular through its articulations of technology and trade as the main drivers of the phenomenon. In addition to this, salient features also seem

37 Of course there are exceptions to this, and in fact the TIGER project report produced by ESPON where Q4 is taken from, is the one document that I have analyzed that comes closest to being a critical articulation. It clearly recognizes power effects and stresses how globalization has losers, not only winners.
to be that globalization is often implicitly defined as a neutral process that
in itself is not a matter of power and politics; rather it is more a state or
condition that simply is there to deal with. While there are articulations
that recognize both a wider understanding of globalization as well as its
political character, these also tend to tone down such features in
comparison with markets, trade and technology.

5.1.2. What's the Problem?

If the conceptualizations and causes of globalization could be classified as
having three or four main features, the effects of globalization are
articulated as being more scattered. However, while a wide range of
practices within the governing of regional development are said to be
affected by globalization, it is also very clear that all these effects somehow
relate to what I here point to as two primary consequences of increased
connectivity. I consider these consequences as the basic problematization
of globalization in the governance of regional development, or in other
words, something that the assemblage must, in a way, solve. First, and
most clearly articulated in the corpus, globalization produces *(global)*
competition and second, it has the effect that *regions become global* and
considered more important in the global economy.\footnote{Alongside these
two most primary consequences of globalization, there is at least one more
important challenge for the governing of regional development in the close future as displayed
in the documents. The nexus of global warming, climate change and sustainable development
is frequently articulated as intertwined with globalization and in such circumstances seen as
both a part of its definition and its consequences. At the same time it is also common to treat
this complex as a site of its own, not linked to globalization, which is also true of the practices
of migration. Again, rather contradictory, migration is often articulated as part of a definition or
conceptualization of globalization as well as an effect of it or, indeed, as a separate challenge
for regional development to handle. While I do recognize the importance of these themes in the
texts that I have analyzed, for the reasons described above I have chosen neither to include
them as definitions and conceptualizations of globalization, nor as effects of it. Hence, for now,
I will focus on *(global)* competition and *(global)* regions as the two main consequences of
globalization as they are articulated in the material. I will, however, return to the issues of
sustainability and immigration at various points throughout the analytical chapters.}

In more or less all areas covered in the documents that I analyze,
references are made to the sometimes sparkling, sometimes glooming state
of competition. So everything, from farmers in the countryside, businesses
in the big cities, to companies, schools, research institutions, cities and
regions, is in a state of competition. They compete for all forms of
resources to produce *growth* which in the material takes a form that closely
resembles an ontological necessity. Growth is simply the prerequisite for
every form of development and it is prominently nested in the chains of
rationale that I identify in the next part of the chapter. For now, suffice to
say that when the documents articulate global competition, this is mostly
done through a lens where, in order to produce growth, a city, a region, a school or a company must compete (globally) for the required resources. This mode of competition is illustrated, for instance, in the final report of the ESPON project *Spatial Indicators for a Europe 2020 Strategy Territorial Analysis - SIESTA* (ESPON, 2013b:21):

(Q5:5) Transnational firms operate in more than one country at a time and are considered as some of the most powerful economic and political entities in the globalized world economy. The economic success of cities in conditions of growing competition depends on their capability to attract and retain investment capital of transnational corporations, which allow urban areas to be included in the network of global connections. That explains why there is a strong competition between individual cities, manifested in creating remarkable conditions in order to attract the headquarters of transnational companies in each one of them. [07]

In Q5:5 the articulation concerns cities, but similar arguments are made over and over again in the material as a whole related also to other entities. For instance, consider the articulations such as those in the European Commission’s (EC) background document for its Territorial Cohesion policy *The Territorial State and Perspectives of the European Union* (EC, 2011:18):

(Q5:6) The integration of EU regions in the global economic competition and, at the same time, the increasing dependencies of states and regions in the world are accelerating. Globalisation changes functional profiles of regions and cities, linking places that were once treated as remote and hardly dependent of each other. For instance, fresh flowers and vegetables nowadays can be easily imported from Africa instead of being grown in the vicinity of metropolitan regions. Development of the IT sector in Ireland has resulted in out migration from middle-size cities in Poland. The US financial crisis has affected the Baltic States via liquidity problems of Scandinavian banks. This means that even small changes in one part of Europe might cause rather large effects in other parts of the continent. [18]

In a more hands-on fashion than in Q5:5, the articulation of Q5:6 illustrates how competition under states of globalization means that no single locality is excluded. Rather, all sites are potentially in competition with each other as a result of the interconnections and mobile character of information, companies and people. Furthermore, this articulation also illustrates a common form of thinking, namely how small or even insignificant effects in one particular site may produce large and overwhelming effects in others, indicating that globalization introduces a state of competition that demands constant monitoring and flexibility from those who wish to be competitive.

The global competition is thus an effect that is of outmost importance for the governing of regional development in any circumstance. It is articulated as inevitable and as such has repercussions that cut through many different policy areas and it produces a situation where embracing
the competition is the only way to prosper. In this way the most common articulations of competition is at the same time a threat and a good thing. Competition as such is articulated as a primary function of the (global) market economy necessary for the production of growth.

Moreover, the embracing of competition and the quest for competitiveness is not only of interest for individual regions; it is the foundation for maintaining a society that functions properly. This aspect of global competition is clearly visible throughout the corpus and can be exemplified with articulations from the RDS of Region Uppsala:

(Q5:7) Competition is hardening between countries, regions, and businesses. The extreme development of technology results in increased specialisation. Products and services are developed in global networks of suppliers and value chains. The competitive struggle of offering the best price, the greatest knowledge and the latest environmentally-friendly technology has intensified. It is impossible to live on old merits. In the workplace, the demand for skills is increasing and unqualified jobs are becoming scarce. Many new jobs are created in relatively new, knowledge-based service businesses in major urban regions. For the sake of welfare, it is crucial that the Swedish business sector in general, and that of Uppland in particular, can strengthen its position globally and identify market segments which meet the demands of the outside world. Only then will resources be generated which can finance pensions, schools, health care and everything else included in the welfare system (RDS Uppsala, 2013:7). [69]

When articulating the new forms of competition that become reality under conditions of globalization, the texts also frequently relate this to what may be called emerging powers. Most of the time these new powers actually turn out to mean one power – namely China. However, it is also possible to find references to a broader spectrum of emerging powers such as the BRICS countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa). In the articulations the same two-faced quality of threat and possibility also marks these countries. On the one hand, they are seen as possible growth markets for Swedish businesses and at the same time they are recognized as spaces where a great deal of production may be moved since the global interconnectedness allows for the easy relocations of transnational corporations. A typical articulation of China’s rising importance and part of the new global competition can be found in the document *Global Pressure - Nordic Solutions: Nordic Globalization Barometer 2010*, produced by The Nordic Council of Ministers39 (NCM):

(Q5:8) China has witnessed a dramatic increase in its research and innovative capacities in the past decade, with far-reaching implications for the global knowledge and innovation geography. The Nordic countries are principally well positioned both to compete and cooperate with China, particularly in the field of

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39 Swedish: Nordiska ministerrådet
climate and energy. However clearer strategies and better models for cooperation are required, particularly at national and university level, to allow the Nordic countries to realize this potential (NCM, 2010:7).

Q5:8 is also a good example of the duality of competition and prosperity that the rise of China brings with it. In particular it is stressed how Nordic countries have good opportunities for cooperation with China and this is also a prominent aspect when this particular facet of global competition is articulated in the material. On this note, articulations such as Q5:9, drawn from the RDS of Region Jämtland, are conspicuous:

(Q5:9) International cooperation is continually expanding its scope. A close partnership with a European region is as natural as an alliance with a neighbouring county has been in the past. What used to be Tröndelag can tomorrow be a region in France or the expansive province of Chengdu in China. Cooperation should be sought with those who can offer the most intelligent, competitive and effective responses to the challenges in question in each case (RDS Jämtland, 2014:45).

Turning now to the global regions, the second prominent theme concerning effects of globalization in the analyzed texts. This can be understood as a form of sub-category of competition, but given the nature of the corpus (it concerns regional development), the salience of global regions, regionalization and regional resurgence is clearly a theme of its own. In particular, it is stressed in the material that there is a clear link between globalization and regions in such ways that increased connectivity alters the landscape and makes regions an important space in the global age. As expressed in the final report by the Swedish Committee on Public Sector Responsibility 40(CPSR):

(Q5:10) Why, then, has globalisation above all increased the significance of regions? Of course, towns and nations compete with each other too. The reason is that the region has become more important as an arena where good conditions for growth and development are created. As mobility has increased and the job market has turned ever more differentiated, commuting distances have grown too. Local job and service markets have expanded far beyond municipality and county boundaries. This is what we usually call regional enlargement. It demands a far wider geographical perspective than the individual municipality both for planning infrastructure and public transport and for general community planning. It is particularly obvious in major urban centres – in the case of Stockholm, the local job market covers four counties and includes 2 million people (SOU 2007:13:188).

Hence, regions are important in the global economy (and in globalization) because they are suitable spaces for developing the kind of competitiveness that is needed for nations to prosper. This is a form of logic that underpins

40 Swedish: Ansvarskommittén
most of the analyzed material and it is explicitly spelled out in broad visions, such as the *Europe 2020 Strategy* (EC, 2010) as well as in RDS documents of Swedish regions. An example of the latter is expressed in Q5:11 where the RDS of Region Örebro states:

(Q5:11) Increasing globalisation means greater pressure on regions from the outside world. It is now regions, rather than nations, that carry competitive advantages and therefore also compete on global markets. The future of a region resides in its ability to attract businesses, inhabitants, and visitors. Dynamic regions which succeed in these areas are characterised among other things by a strong regional leadership (RDS Örebro, 2010:14). [63]

So individual regions thus experience globalization as a means for the state to be more competitive, while at the same time they are also the spaces that will be winners or losers in the competition. They have to accept that they must produce their own prosperity and contribute to Sweden’s growth, and at the same time this means that the governance of regional development in Sweden becomes a practice that must foster so-called growth poles and recognize that there will be spaces that fall behind. In the report *Du sköna nya globaliserade värld* [Brave new globalized world] (Forslid, 2008), produced as background material for the Swedish Globalization Council, this is clearly spelled out:

(Q5:12) Sweden has had a relatively active regional politics aimed at levelling regional differences. One of the main points of this report is the fact that globalisation changes the conditions for this kind of politics radically. Spillover effects between high technology businesses and between individuals constitute one of the key conditions for growth in a service-based economy. A politics which counteracts agglomeration in Sweden can have highly negative consequences in a globalised world (Forslid, 2008:40). [28]

So to sum up some of the ground covered thus far, we can see that in tracing the conceptualizations of globalization as increased connectivity through trade and information technology, two main effects emerge. First, there is the increasing importance of competition and that it takes on new forms. It is now global, constant and encompassing in regard to regions, cities, companies and more or less all social actors and practices. Second, the region and regional development is articulated as especially important because of its position as a good space for fostering the kind of practices that are needed to be competitive.

Taken together, the articulated conceptualizations, causes, effects and projections of globalization can be understood as a starting point that

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41 The Globalization Council issued over 30 such background reports (or in literal translation: foundational reports) concerning different aspects of globalization.
political rationalities of governing regional development must relate to. They are, as mentioned, rendered as a problem that must be solved in the governing of Swedish regional development, and therefore they structure other forms of articulations. Next, I will analyze this function further as I lay bare the political rationalities that become dominant in the governance of regional development, given this problematizing element of global competition and (not enough) global regions.

5.2 Chains of Rationale

From the articulations of what globalization is and how it functions emerges what we may use as a rough schematic for understanding the modes of political rationalities that circulate within the assemblage. To recapitulate, as illustrated in Figure 1, the representations of globalization as a phenomenon primarily related to communications technology and trade results in two predominant effects, a state marked by global competition and reconfigured (global) regions. This state then produces a set of political rationalities, generated in relation to the articulations of trade, technology, competition, growth and regions that are the principal elements of globalization as represented in the corpus.

*Figure 5.1 – Articulations of Globalization*

Comment: The Figure visually represents how articulations of globalization in the assemblage produces two main effects, and in turn how these effects and articulations becomes a foundation for political rationalities (outcome). Note the circularity in the representation that is meant to show that this is not a simple causal relationship in one direction, but rather a recursive one.
In my analysis of the texts I have identified what may be called 14 different modes of rationale. Individually, these modes are scattered throughout the corpus and may of course be analyzed as separate units as they relate to the articulations of globalization. However, in my reading, their primary function and predominant expressions are the ways in which they link up with each other to become elements in chains of rationale. In these chains the elements support, reinforce and further shape one another into fairly coherent circuits where the political rationalities of the assemblage operate.

In the following I will illustrate how I have identified four such chains and show how the separate modes of rationale become elements of the chains. Furthermore, I stress how these chains must be viewed as relatively unstable constructs, in which the elements of the different chains clearly also resonate with others, making the chains also feed into each other to produce a circuit system that functions as underpinnings and augmentations for the separate chains.

Table 5.1 provides a list of the 14 modes of rationale and relates them to the four identified chains: the adaptability chain, the attraction chain, the environment and sustainability chain and the leadership chain. The table can be used as a starting point and a quick introduction in terms of the rationalities circulating within the assemblage before we start to engage with the description of the chains themselves. When describing the chains, I will also take the time to explain the individual elements more thoroughly.\textsuperscript{42}

As expressed in Table 5.1 all four chains have two elements in common, namely the competitiveness element and the creativity, innovation and entrepreneurship element. The remaining twelve elements are listed with reference to the chain in which they primarily ‘belong’.

\textsuperscript{42} To repeat what was said in chapter four, the terminology here then is that I speak of modes of rationale that link up to chains of rationale. When these are a part of such chains, I speak of the modes as elements in that particular chain.
Table 5.1 – Political rationales of the assemblage (Modes and Chains)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mode of Rationale</th>
<th>Element of Chain</th>
<th>Short Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(1) Competitiveness</td>
<td>All*</td>
<td>This very prominent rationale articulates the general need for being competitive in a world of (global) competition. It is central to all chains.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2) Adaptability</td>
<td>Adaptability Chain</td>
<td>One way of being competitive is to be highly flexible and adaptive. This mode articulates such reasoning.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(3) Knowledge and Education</td>
<td>Adaptability Chain</td>
<td>For regions to be adaptable and to realize their competitiveness they must focus on knowledge and education. Particularly such knowledge and education that contributes to innovation and entrepreneurship.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(4) Attraction</td>
<td>Attraction Chain</td>
<td>In a world of (global) competition this mode of rationale articulates the importance of being attractive for investments, people and businesses.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(5) Image and Branding</td>
<td>Attraction Chain</td>
<td>One way of making a region attractive is by steering building up its image as successful and competitive. In short to work with the regional ‘brand’.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(6) Living Environment</td>
<td>Attraction Chain</td>
<td>This mode of rationale stresses the importance of the living environment for being attractive. It should be open, tolerant and suitable for business leaders, researchers and creative young people.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(7) Immigration</td>
<td>Attraction Chain</td>
<td>There is a clear mode of rationale revolving around immigration, both as a threat and an opportunity. The governance of regions must make sure to spur immigration of certain people, while at the same time also integrating immigrants. Particularly by encouraging and harvesting their entrepreneurial spirit.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(8) Inclusiveness</td>
<td>Attraction Chain</td>
<td>Regions must strive to be an inclusive and tolerant environment if they wish to be competitive.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(9) Environment and Sustainability</td>
<td>Environment and</td>
<td>Issues of global warming, green house exhaustions and other forms of environmental challenges are articulated as central to the governance of regional development. Furthermore this mode also incorporates a broader understanding of sustainability (i.e economic and social).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sustainability Chain</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(10) Leadership</td>
<td>Leadership Chain</td>
<td>Throughout the assemblage there are articulations of a firm regional leadership that is needed for steering regions in the right direction and managing the forms of cooperation that are seen as important.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(11) Cooperation</td>
<td>Leadership Chain</td>
<td>An important mode of rationale is articulated through calls for cooperation - between regions, with international regions, between the private and the public and in other forms.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(12) Expertise, Evaluation and</td>
<td>Leadership Chain</td>
<td>By mobilizing external and internal expertise and relying on evaluations and benchmarking the ongoing performance of regional development can be improved.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benchmarking</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(13) Clusters</td>
<td>Leadership Chain</td>
<td>A particularly salient mode of rationale when it comes to cooperation of regions is the focus on so called clusters (and cluster initiatives). These need to be monitored, evaluated and managed and are expected to lead to increased innovation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(14) Creativity, Innovation and</td>
<td>All*</td>
<td>This mode is articulated as the, by far, most important when it comes to being competitive. It ties in to all chains.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Entrepreneurship</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Comment: The table lists 14 different modes of rationale for conducting regional governance and how these link up to form four chains of rationale. * = these modes have a more central position and are clearly linked to all chains.
Briefly put, the different chains can be interpreted as follows. Given the dominant articulations of global competition described in the previous section of this chapter, it comes as no surprise that a prominent mode of rationale is that of competitiveness. Competitiveness is (obviously) needed to be prosperous in the global competition so therefore it is the starting point for all the four chains. In the same way, the analyzed texts clearly signal the composite of creativity, innovation and entrepreneurship\(^{43}\) as the paramount way to becoming competitive, and in this way it can be seen as a goal or end point. However, speaking of starting points and end points is misleading in this case. Rather, a better metaphor may be that of the circuit, introduced above. The rationales flow through the circuits where the elements all link up and produce the circuit system.

Figure 5.2 is intended as a visual illustration of Table 5.1 and therefore also functions as guide to the following pages. Together, Table 5.1 and Figure 5.2 form an image and summary of my main findings when analyzing the corpus of documents with respect to political rationalities and globalization. As such, they are in some ways a crude reduction of a vast and complex material. Yet, while we may argue about the composition of separate chains, I find the material to be remarkably coherent in terms of the individual modes of rationale. These are consistently articulated as important to the governance of regional development under conditions of globalization in more or less all texts.

\(^{43}\) While these three could be understood as three separate elements, they are articulated almost interchangeably in the documents.
The figure is intended as a kind of visual map of how the modes of rationale (see table 5.1) link up and form chains of rationale in the assemblage. As such it is not intended to measure distance. Rather I would like to think of it as more topological than topographical, and hence the main idea is to convey four main ‘groupings’ of rationale. It is also intentionally circular so that all elements in a sense stands in relation to each other.
5.2.1. The Adaptability Chain

One of the most visible rationales in the corpus is what I here call adaptability. That is to say, given the articulated state of globalization that primarily takes the form of global competition, regions will have to find ways to be flexible and good at adapting to the constantly shifting scenery if they are to have any chance at all of being competitive. In the material, adaptability is articulated over and over again as a foundation for regional development, meaning that regions must foster environments and people that are flexible in terms of jobs, settlements and education. Adaptability, it is argued, concerns more or less all aspects of social life. People, businesses, public institutions, cities, regions and nations must all be flexible and ready to adapt:

(Q5:13) Global competition and new technical opportunities have transformed the demands for knowledge and skills. Both organisations and individuals have to be prepared to change – change jobs, learn new things, and know more things. It is becoming ever more difficult to pursue a career and make do with schooling acquired in the past. The ability to change has in itself turned into a crucial skill, both for individuals and for organisations/businesses (RDS Norrbotten, 2012:55).

The articulation Q5:13 from the RDS of Region Norrbotten could have been taken from more or less all of the documents in the corpus. There are striking similarities showing the prevalence of adaptability as a political rationale for governing regional development. Therefore, the logical question that follows from this is something like ‘what does it mean to be adaptable, and how is it achieved’?

This is the beginning of what I here call the adaptability chain as it links the element of adaptability to education and knowledge and then creativity, innovation and entrepreneurship. In this manner a general logic is applied throughout the analyzed texts that, in simplified terms, claims that the best way to tackle the need for adaptability is through innovation. Therefore, regions must foster environments that reward innovative reasoning, and moreover, the overarching goal is a form of innovation that is possible to turn into commodities or services through creative entrepreneurship. In this sense, Q5:14 from the RDS of Region Värmland is striking in its articulations:

(Q5:14) At a time when change happens quickly, innovations provide the key to success. New products, processes, and business concepts involve demands on successful regional environments for innovation. In Värmland, Karlstad University plays an extremely important role in that domain (RDS Värmland, 2014:17). [70]
To foster such an environment (and people), it is important to deploy a system of education that is focused precisely on innovation and entrepreneurship. In a more general sense, knowledge is articulated as one of the most important pieces of the competitiveness puzzle and it is important for regions to both produce knowledge as well as to learn from it. The education system is one of the most important aspects of producing the kind of knowledge that is needed in the global competition and this is a form of life-long learning. Therefore the education system should focus more on innovation and entrepreneurship from early ages throughout higher education and doctoral studies. This is, for instance, articulated in the RDS of Region Stockholm:

(Q5:15) The inhabitants in the Stockholm region are generally positive to business and entrepreneurial efforts. New businesses are also much more numerous in this region compared to the rest of the country. What is partly lacking in the region is an emphasis on entrepreneurship as one of the basic skills in the future economy of the region. Knowledge about and practical experience of entrepreneurship and creativity should therefore characterise the educational system as a whole and be a foregrounded and integrated part of teaching. The focus should be on developing the potential, initiative and independence of individuals, in order to counteract the disinclination to take risks which has traditionally hampered entrepreneurship and creativity. From school year 6-9 and onwards, knowledge about starting, running and developing a company should be considered a basic skill, especially for those study programmes where the long-term prospects for permanent employment are considered limited (RDS Stockholm, 2010:65). [68]

At the same time the school system must also provide opportunities for workers who need to acquire complementary skills as they will face times of being between jobs and laid-off:

(Q5:16) Demands for qualifications change continually and become particularly obvious in relation to structural reorganisations, globalisation, and rapid technical developments. New jobs, especially in the service sector, come with new knowledge requirements, existing jobs add new challenges, and some jobs disappear which means a need to use skills in alternative ways. There is a new emphasis on life-long learning (RDS Västernorrland, 2011:12). [72]

In the end though, while both Q5:15 and Q5:16 speak of the importance of education in compulsory schools and forms of adult learning, the most important aspect of education and knowledge for the regions to cater to is higher education. Universities and university colleges are singled out as particularly important because of their potential to contribute to innovation through the education they provide and for the research they conduct. However, while lots of hope is invested in the institutions of higher education, a prominent theme throughout the documents that I have analyzed is a call for universities to become better at turning their
knowledge into innovations that can be commercialized. In other words, there should be a more distinct focus on the entrepreneurial aspects of research. Even in regions where the oldest, richest and most prestigious universities are located, this is an issue of great concern. As in the RDS or Region Uppsala:

(Q5:17) The basis for regional competitiveness is often the extensive research and expertise that can be found in the business sector as well as universities and the public sector, interaction with Stockholm and the participation in global networks. In order to respond to the complexity and changeability that characterises the global digital society, the business sector must take advantage of the cultural and creative domains, the critical and imaginative approach of the artist and an understanding of mankind derived from the human sciences. Despite the advantageous conditions and all the resources used for research and education, the Uppsala region creates relatively little value in terms of salaries and growth. The capability of the system to create use value from innovations must therefore be strengthened. The results of the massive measures taken should be highlighted more. Efforts in cutting-edge industries must be combined with entrepreneurship and production in a broad sense, for all lines of business. There is a great potential here for new companies and more jobs (RDS Uppsala, 2013:11). [69]

So, to sum up the adaptability chain, it is seen to connect and link the general element of competitiveness with the ability of regions to be adaptive and flexible. It furthermore links up to the rationale of education and knowledge, which is very prominent in the analyzed material, as a means of producing flexibility and, most of all, innovation as well as an entrepreneurial environment. The last rationale is seen as the best way for any region to be adaptive, and thus competitive in the age of global competition. Hence a prominent political rationality of this assemblage can be stated to be the one expressed through this adaptability chain.

5.2.2. The Attraction Chain

The Attraction chain ties together different elements around the notion of (global) attraction. In short, attraction is declared as one of the most basic needs for being competitive under conditions of globalization.

Attraction in this sense means that regions must be able to attract people, investment capital and businesses in order to produce growth. Therefore, they need to become spaces where people want to live, business wants to operate and finance wishes to invest. In other words, being attractive is not something that can be reduced to one or two fundamental features, rather there is a strong sense in the corpus that because of the levels of mobility today, regions must work broadly and in many different areas to become attractive. The importance of being attractive is
underscored by the Nordic Council of Ministers (NCM) in the document *Global Pressure - Nordic Solutions: Nordic Globalization Barometer 2010*:

(Q5:18) In the global economy, no economy can compete based on its own inherent resources and capabilities alone. It also needs to attract investment capital, human capital, and ideas. And it has to retain its own companies and people as far as they can choose where to invest or live and work. Attracting global interest is both an indicator and enabler of global competitiveness, just like the ability to see internationally: Only competitive locations are able to attract foreign interest. And the inflow of foreign capital and skills makes a location more competitive (NCM, 2010:37) [30]

The same primacy of being attractive is articulated by the Swedish government in the document *En nationell strategi för regional tillväxt och attraktionskraft* (MIEC, 2014:18):

(Q5:19) The ability to attract, keep, and develop skills, businesses and capital is crucial for the creation of attractive and competitive regions and municipalities. People contribute skills, run companies and invest capital. They are looking for a living environment which offers good housing opportunities as well as work, service, healthcare and spare time activities. This means that municipalities must collaborate in a systematic way with regional and national agents to develop attractive environments where both women and men want to live, reside, visit, and run businesses. Such efforts should start out from the specific local and regional conditions, and be carried out in close cooperation with the business sector, as well as take into consideration the possibilities for engaging civil society. [39]

In both Q5:18 and Q5:19 the importance of being attractive is clearly articulated as well as the broad endeavor required for a region to become so. This is also the starting point for the more complex chain of attraction rather than the isolated mode of rationale. While attraction generally is articulated as the broad practice visible in Q5:18 and Q5:19 and therefore links up to many different elements (not only in this chain), it is most clearly situated in relation to such elements as *image and branding, immigration, living environment and inclusiveness*. In short, all of these individual modes of rationale become elements in this chain since they are generally used for boosting attractiveness while being related to *creativity, innovation and entrepreneurship*. Again, this last set of elements functions as a central one, according to a logic that in rough terms states that there is a homologous relationship between attractiveness and creativity, innovation and entrepreneurship. Together they reinforce each other so that creative, innovative and entrepreneurial regions are by default attractive, although to become creative, innovative and entrepreneurial the region must attract people, investments and businesses.

In particular, it is stressed in the corpus that regions need to be attractive in terms of immigration. People should want to relocate to the
particular region or at least want to visit and stay for a while. Specifically, it is important to attract researchers, engineers, business leaders and other people that are identified as creative and innovative. This is not to say that the element of immigration is solely about such issues throughout the material. Rather, immigration is articulated as a form of double-edged sword in the sense that there may be a problem with integrating the immigrants into the Swedish community (and this is already present in many regions).

Therefore regions are tasked with both attracting people and combating segregation and poor integration. When doing so, entrepreneurship is often articulated as being central. In its territorial review of region Skåne, OECD used successful ‘bottom-up’ projects as a means of illustrating how entrepreneurship could help integration:

(Q5:20) The Young Urban Movement Project represents a bottom-up programme to foster the growth of young entrepreneurs in deprived areas of large cities (YUMP, Box 3.15). Created by the Swedish founder of the Metro newspaper, this initiative initially targeted young second-generation immigrants living around Malmö and Gothenburg. With funding coming from various governmental sources, economics and business courses were offered. A one-day convention called “The Street Is Smart” involved 50 participants, 15 of which were selected for participation in start-ups. The project helped to translate their ideas into businesses. Five companies were set up, with three people in each company. After a contest was organised, the first prize winner received a grant of SEK 50 000. This promising example suggests that initially small-scale initiatives can be a powerful way to re-engage youth “left behind” by targeting without stigmatising and by triggering positive creativity. Information on the positive outcomes of such initiatives could be disseminated more widely and opportunities for similar projects could be exploited in other municipalities (OECD, 2012:211). [34]

The example in Q5:20 articulates a salient trait in the corpus where the problems of segregation are re-inscribed with possibilities and opportunities by the means of entrepreneurial spirit and attention towards innovation. With the right focus the immigrants could be turned into profit, while at the same time the region stands to gain:

(Q5:21) Breeding new entrepreneurs should be a priority as they are a very scarce resource in Skåne. Untapped potential for entrepreneurs exists in certain population categories, such as immigrants, youth, and women. Mobilising this dormant pool could have a double impact: increasing the number of new companies and bringing more diversity, which is a breeding ground for innovation (OECD, 2012:149). [34]

It is also clear, as mentioned, that there is a particular segment of immigrants that are most important to attract. Sticking with the example of region Skåne, the region must become better at making the world-class
scientists and entrepreneurs to stay. To do so they should be catered to with special housings and schools, among other things:

(Q5:22) Large industrial groups located in Skåne, such as AstraZeneca, have tried to expand their pool of international staff for decades but results have remained disappointing, partly also because of the lack of regional support. Due to the shortage of adequate housing and education support for foreign families in Skåne, many international high-skilled workers choose to commute from Copenhagen to Skåne and send their children to the Copenhagen International School. This may soon change, however, as the upcoming opening of ESS and MAX IV facilities is expected to attract large numbers of knowledge workers and their families to the region. Getting them to stay in Skåne and embedding the benefits of their presence in the regional economy will require serving this new group through an adequate package of facilities. Examples of such facilities include housing, international schools, networking events, cultural activities, and assistance on next career steps (OECD, 2012:216). [34]

In this way the chain of attraction also links to inclusiveness and the lived environment. A theme in the documents is that for regions to attract high skilled, creative professionals, they need inclusive environments with a large supply of amenities. Such professionals, as well as potential future entrepreneurs in the form of young innovative students, like regions that can provide a certain ‘creative climate’, in which tolerance towards homosexuals, women and immigrant are important ingredients. In this context the urban centers are described as precisely such environments where the best potential lies for attracting highly skilled professionals. In the RDS of Region Jönköping, this is summed up as follows:

(Q5:23) The challenge also involves offering a sufficiently global living environment which includes among other things cultural events, coffee shops, restaurants, and a diverse population. This must be combined with the advantages of smaller towns and municipalities in terms of closeness to nature, services, small-scale structures and social networks. We must also guarantee good opportunities for education and demands and expectations related to the innovations and entrepreneurship of young people. In order to attract new inhabitants and qualified jobs as well as keep people and businesses already in place, we work together to increase the attractiveness of the region. It is important for us to improve even more in the area of promoting the strengths of the region through systematic long-term profiling efforts and coordinated marketing. (RDS Jönköping, 2013:29). [60]

Notice how the end statement of Q5:23 directly mentions the marketing and profiling of the region. This is in fact also an element that I interpret as linking to the attractiveness chain. In many of the documents, particularly the RDS from the regions in Sweden, spells out a tactic for actively working on their image, and indeed their ‘brand’. In an age marked by intense global competition, it simply is important to have an image that is associated with the kind of values that makes you competitive.
For this reason, working on the image is a rationale of its own, while of course, clearly relating to the other elements. In their policy recommendations, most of the regions, as well as experts such as OECD, endorse active efforts to strengthen the regional brand and to improve, or even alter the image that the region portrays. In the case of Region Stockholm, the ambition is to expand the brand ‘Capital of Scandinavia’ and when doing so recognize that this means to communicate it just as much to the local population as to the people outside of the region:

(Q5:24) The brand Capital of Scandinavia should be extended in terms of content and continue to be communicated strongly both internally in the region and to the outside world. The brand is meant to contribute to a stronger sense of unity and promote an attractive image of the region to the outside world, as well as highlight the financial, social, and cultural value of the region. A successful brand makes an impression and signifies both what a place is and what it aims to be. However, in order to fulfill this function a brand must be known and acknowledged by the inhabitants of the region. No marketing campaigns can match the impact of citizens functioning as ambassadors for their region and its brand (RDS Stockholm, 2010:117). [68]

While Stockholm is looking to expand and build on its already established position, in many of the Swedish regions the branding and image building is directed at changing the way people think and feel about their particular region. This is clearly (or should I say enthusiastically) expressed in the RDS of Region Halland:

(Q5:25) It is time to change the image of Halland. This is true both for the view of Halland held by others and our own understanding of the region where we live. We can do this by consistently spreading positive information about Halland in our own organisation, in the media, and on the Internet. We will make Halland known as THE BEST PLACE TO LIVE! (RDS Halland, 2005:30). [58]

On these grounds then, we may sum up the attraction chain. It first and foremost articulates a political rationality that must cater to the fact that 'being attractive' is a central element in regional development. Hence, the governance of regions needs to be conducted in such ways that they will become attractive, and in particular, this means being attractive to the ‘right’ people. Attracting the business leaders, the excellent researchers and the trendy youths means to construct living environments that correspond to their global life-styles that include tolerance and inclusiveness in broad terms. Finally, regions must also work actively with their image and ‘brand’ if they wish to be attractive, and if they succeed, this may greatly contribute to raising the awareness and interest of potential future inhabitants. Taken together this is all part of a chain of rationale where these elements of
attraction help foster innovation and entrepreneurship by bringing in capital, businesses and creative people.

5.2.3. The Environment and Sustainability Chain

The environment and sustainability are also embedded firmly in the core reasoning of the assemblage as a mode of rationale. Climate change, global warming and pollution are recognized as pressing issues that must be handled by regions because of their problematic relationship with continuous growth. Hence, the mode of rationale often enters documents as a threat and a challenge along the lines of ‘how are we going to be able to produce growth and at the same time being sustainable’?

The answer to this is, most of the time, defined as being innovative and by fostering new forms of entrepreneurial and creative solutions to our problems. Thus, the regions that can achieve this may actually not only be sustainable but in fact even more competitive since they will breed the innovative spirit. This is also the way that the mode of environment and sustainability becomes an element in a short chain of rationale where it functions as a link between competitiveness and creativity, innovation and entrepreneurship.

So, the threat of climate change is found throughout the texts, often in relation to the Europe 2020 strategy, which identifies the challenge as follows:

(Q5:26) Climate and resource challenges require drastic action. Strong dependence on fossil fuels such as oil and inefficient use of raw materials expose our consumers and businesses to harmful and costly price shocks, threatening our economic security and contributing to climate change. The expansion of the world population from 6 to 9 billion will intensify global competition for natural resources, and put pressure on the environment. The EU must continue its outreach to other parts of the world in pursuit of a worldwide solution to the problems of climate change at the same time as we implement our agreed climate and energy strategy across the territory of the Union (EC, 2010:6). [13]

The pressing tone of Q5:26 is quite pronounced as statements on the seriousness of climate change are also vital in the analyzed corpus. Indeed, often climate change, or environmental issues more broadly, are identified as the most important challenge of all in present times. In the Swedish National Reform Programme from 2011 (Swedish Government, 2011:44) it is stated:

(Q5:27) The Government is of the opinion that climate change and global warming are one of the greatest challenges of our time. Given its global dimensions, international cooperation is essential. Swedish energy policy aims to reconcile ecological sustainability, competitiveness and the security of energy
In the Government's opinion, meeting high climate and energy policy ambitions requires increased use of effective economic instruments and a restructuring to a more climate friendly production and consumption, where the presumption is that the polluter pays. [47]

In both Q5:26 and Q5:27 the focus is on the environment and climate change. However, as this complex of issues are articulated in the different documents it is important to recognize that they are actively being produced as part of the broader concept of sustainability (and sustainable growth). This means that the challenges of sustainability do not only concern the relationship between growth and the environment, but rather relates to social and economic sustainability. Hence, the governance of regional development does express recognition of power relations since growth should not come at the expense of (to much) social unrest, for example.

In this regard, one aspect is emphasized more often and with more recognition than others, namely the issue of gender equality. While the issues of integrating foreign immigrants into the community are also part of this general theme, the issue of gender equality seems to be of most concern. The Swedish government brings up both issues as being of great importance in the document En nationell strategi för regional tillväxt och attraktionskraft (MIEC, 2014):

(Q5:28) The attractiveness, growth potential and work prospects of Sweden as a whole must be harnessed in a way that contributes to sustainable development in financial, social and environmental terms. This is a key principle for regional growth efforts. It means among other things that the environment, equality, and integration should be considered when planning and implementing strategies, programmes, and efforts. A Sweden where power and resources are evenly distributed among women and men, where everybody’s skills are valued regardless of background and age, and where the environment is protected, is a Sweden where all of us together are capable of creating sustainable regional growth (MIEC, 2014:2). [39]

So, the environment, gender equality and integration of migrants are all identified throughout the corpus as important challenges and issues of the governance of regional development as a whole. Hence the mode of rationale, that is, the environment and sustainability, is clearly visible, although this mode becomes an element in a chain where the recognized challenges and issues are linked to creativity, innovation and entrepreneurship as the solutions.

Concerning the environmental issues, they are conspicuously tied to innovation and entrepreneurship as possibilities for more growth as an effect of creative people and already innovative companies starting to
address, for instance, climate change. In the analyzed documents formulations such as those made by Region Kalmar in their RDS are striking:

(Q5:29) We not only need to decrease emissions but also adapt our society to changes that we know are pending. We should also see this restructuring as an opportunity. We can lower costs and strengthen our competitive edge. This work contributes to new business opportunities and jobs as new products, ideas, and solutions are created. In the county of Kalmar, we are good at environmental technology and energy issues. In these areas, many companies have export potential. We can sustain a good breeding ground for strong, growing, and profitable businesses here. It can be done by creating environments that promote innovations and entrepreneurship (RDS Kalmar, 2012:34).

Thus, the issues of climate change are not only made possible to handle, but are actually a form of growth possibility that emerges out of what may first be understood as a threat. The prevailing status of creativity, innovation and entrepreneurship becomes, through such operation, even more reified. It is striking how environmental issues are articulated in the material and how this means that we need to reduce, for instance, our carbon gas emissions and how this must happen fast, and yet, by invoking the element of creativity, innovation and entrepreneurship there does not seem to be any dire need for far reaching life-style changes. Indeed, the life-style changes we need are not to produce fewer things and become more environmentally aware, but to produce more (innovative) things and to become more entrepreneurial and innovative.

The logic is slightly different when gender equality is linked to innovation and entrepreneurship. In this case, the fact that women and men are recognized as having different opportunities is primarily not made into a problem in itself, but is rather a problem because the regions are losing out on innovative and creative capacity.44 An example of this is the articulations of Q5:30, taken from the RDS of Region Dalarna:

(Q5:30) Women’s and men’s equal contributions to and influence over innovation work and the job market is becoming an ever more critical growth factor. A greater degree of equality supports the successful matching of skills for business needs, improves the conditions for entrepreneurship and innovative edge in Dalarna, and also contributes to make Dalarna more attractive. In Dalarna, as in other

44 I wish to invoke a caveat here. While this discursive production of gender equality is dominant in the corpus, this is an issue where the corpus as such is rather split. In some documents, particularly some of the RDS and the new regional growth strategy for Sweden, there are many active articulations of gender equality as a pressing issue in itself. In particular I find it rather striking how men and women in those documents consequently are being articulated as separate groups, emphasizing the differences that exist in terms of influence and power. Yet, this is, even in such documents, often embedded in the more prevailing rationale of creativity, innovation and entrepreneurship, and of course competitiveness and growth. I discuss this further in chapter six where I address the production of the social actor women.
Therefore, in conclusion, we may understand the environment and sustainability chain as one that primarily transforms the critical concerns for the environment, gender equality and other forms of sustainability into possibilities for growth and innovation. While this obviously is not always the case, it is a more prominent feature in the mode of environment and sustainability as an element in this chain then actively operationalized on its own.

5.2.4. The Leadership Chain

A crude classification of the previous three chains could be that they bring together modes of rationale that are important for the governance of regional development in terms of focus. That is to say, they point in certain directions as to what is important (i.e. attraction, knowledge, adaption, branding) and articulate certain questions or challenges (i.e. environment, gender equality, immigration). When it comes to the leadership chain, it is instead linked to certain rationales concerning the actual governance. It produces a rationale for the framework of governing regions as it links the modes of leadership, cooperation, clusters and expertise, evaluation and benchmarking and turns them into elements where they reinforce each other and the other chains, while still connecting to the elements of competitiveness and creativity, innovation and entrepreneurship.

One way of approaching this chain is through the way that regional leadership is articulated in the corpus. It is often implicitly understood that if cooperation is to work, there must be a specific form of leadership. This leadership, however, is not explicitly specified in terms of what it is that the leader should do, although the importance of it is pronounced in the corpus.

(Q5:31) Regional development and growth efforts are so complex that nobody can manage on their own. It is necessary to cooperate and collaborate, both across political domains and between the regional and local levels. Many agents in different roles take part. Leadership on different levels is required in order to create and develop alliances between key partners in order to implement the Dalarna strategy. Regional development is in a sense the sum total of local developments. In other words, regional development cannot happen unless the local level is involved. Municipal and local leadership capabilities are therefore especially crucial for the objectives of the Dalarna strategy to be realised. Leadership is a prerequisite and a key factor for success when it comes to the potential results of regional strategies. Consequently, it is important that the regional leadership can run development efforts in such a way that the necessary focus on a few strategically important challenges is maintained. Tactical games in
In Q5:31 from the RDS of Region Dalarna, it is clear that leadership is not only important, but that it also entails bringing order to what may be a situation of disagreement. It is mentioned that leadership should contribute to selecting a few specific areas where the region should focus its resources and at the same time make sure that there is no squabbling, no clashing or no strategic and tactical maneuvering amongst the involved actors in ways that position them as opposed. In short, regional leadership works best without too much politics involved.

While leadership should have certain qualities as those mentioned in Q5:31, it is also commonly referred to as a ‘thing’ through metaphors of an engine, motor or driver. This emphasizes the central role that leadership must take in the governance of regional development. It must be in place to facilitate and enable the momentum that regions can gain from, for instance, innovation and entrepreneurship. This ‘thing’ also has a physical manifestation in that it is supposed to include certain entities in coalitions, such as universities, political institutions and businesses that should cooperate in steering regional development.

Hence, the leadership element is closely tied to the element of cooperation and the illustration above of what leadership is articulated as also hints at various forms of cooperation that are deemed important in regional development. In their territorial review of Sweden from 2010, the OECD stresses how regional development may actually be a great space for stimulating so-called Public-Private-Partnerships (PPP). Thus, cooperation in this context means between different regions, between regions and other political units, but also between public institutions and private companies (OECD, 2010). A specific problem pertaining to this situation, according to the OECD, is that while private businesses are important in forming the partnerships, they are not sufficiently included in forming strategies and policies. Therefore, if they were to be included more in regional leadership, regional cooperation would be strengthened and in turn innovative capacities would benefit:

(Q5:32) While private actors are clearly involved in the financing of regional policy, their role in designing regional strategies appears more limited, although progress has been made with the implementation of the regional growth policy. Former NUTEK, now Tillväxtverket [The Swedish Agency for Economic and Regional Growth] has played a role in stimulating co-operation with private actors in the design of regional development and growth programmes (RUPs and RTPs), which encourage counties to establish regional partnerships that include private stakeholders. However, the participation of private companies in the design of
programmes remains limited (Tillväxtverket, 2008). This is partly due to lack of time and resources and the fact that they do not see the benefits for themselves of participating. Regional leaders have a critical role in ensuring enhanced public-private co-operation on the design of a regional strategy/vision for regional growth (current RUPs), based on regional comparative advantages (OECD, 2010:231). [36]

So, in this way, articulations of leadership and cooperation are intertwined and again, the primary function for this is to produce a regional system that functions in a world marked by global competition and uncertainty. A good example of how all these elements often are articulated together in the corpus can be found in Q5:33, taken from the RDS of Södra Småland, Kronoberg:

(Q5:33) A cross-border regional leadership capable of mobilising agents, prioritising, and implementing long-term efforts is crucially important for the future development of the region. Regional agents like political organisations, the business sector, universities, the county administrative board and interest groups must work together and cooperate to realise a common agenda. The region needs to claim a space on both national and international arenas, and a united front will facilitate that effort. Cooperation on local, national and European levels is simplified if there is a clear regional leadership capable of handling uncertainty about the future and balancing the many agents that together promote regional development. In a world which changes quickly and where we do not know what is going to happen or what will be required in the future, we need a strong leadership that can harness and augment the regional potential of the county (RDS Södra Småland, Kronoberg, 2009:9). [66]

Moving on in the leadership chain, a specific form of cooperation where both the private and the public can (and should) work closely together is articulated as the mode of rationale called clusters. Throughout the corpus the clusters are seen as fundamental building blocks for enhancing regional competitiveness and boosting innovation. While the cluster concept as such is quite lucid (cf. Jagtfelt, 2012; Säll, 2012; 2014), in these contexts a cluster is often defined as an agglomeration of companies within the same sector or branch that are important for regional economy. So, one region may have a cluster for forest industry, one for medical technology and another may have one for information and communications technology. The important thing in the corpus is how clusters are produced as sites where the public institutions, business leaders and researchers may fruitfully meet and interact, which is a prime example of how cooperation may foster innovation and entrepreneurship. For this reason, the governance of regional development should focus on producing policies for a cluster friendly environment, as articulated in the Swedish Globalization council’s expert report Clusters, Cluster Policy and Swedish Competitiveness in the Global Economy.
If cluster policy is about using clusters as a process tool to improve competitiveness more effectively, what are its central elements? First, government can support the creation of platforms for joint action to overcome coordination problems and tackle externalities. In a static perspective, such platforms allow cluster participants to better exploit potential linkages among existing capabilities, increasing the level of positive externalities in the cluster. In a dynamic perspective, they allow cluster participants to make better decisions about investing into new capabilities, taking into account the externalities of such actions across the cluster [...] Second, government can target specific policies, for example innovation support or FDI attraction, at regional clusters, whether or not an organized platform for collaboration exists. Such policies can overcome the collective action and informational problems by providing planning security and complimentary investments for private companies in the cluster. In the absence of a platform for collaboration, however, such targeting is made without the necessary knowledge to ensure that the government policies target the most relevant competitiveness barriers. More effective is therefore an approach where functional programs are made available for cluster initiatives that have decided that a specific program meets their unique needs. (Ketels, 2009:26f).

A final element of the leadership chain is here called expertise, evaluation and benchmarking, indicating what is often highlighted as important tools for improving leadership and cooperation (particularly clusters and cluster policy). In short, the articulations of this element links it to the other by describing how deploying so-called external expertise, such as consultant firms and research centers, could improve the governance of regions and their policy making. In such contexts, certain institutions, for example, ESPON, NORDREGIO and OECD are held in high regard and are frequently referred to as sources of evidence and legitimacy. The EU has worked extensively to facilitate such platforms of expertise upon which regional and territorial policy should build, and in Sweden the RDS documents must be designed with goals and policies that are possible to evaluate and measure. By providing what is often called ‘sound’ and ‘evidence-based’ information, the experts will help policy making by providing neutral insights. Thus, the experts become very important:

Involving territorial experts when a sector policy is being formulated could enhance territorial cohesion by the integration of territorial information into sector activities. An even deeper involvement is recommended in the case of regional and territorial policies. It is important to use the EU network of territorial experts, and to keep the European Commission informed about the availability of territorial experts. ESPON can already be a good starting point for setting up a European expert database and knowledge network and for making recommendations on territorial competences for educational and similar institutions (EC, 2011:88).

Summing up, we may conceptualize the chain of leadership as one that brings together modes of rationale that by themselves are focused on different aspects of steering, controlling and managing the regional development process. In the chain they become elements that provide a rather coherent rationale that stresses the need for cooperation, particularly
through clusters to further the involvement of private actors. This cooperation must, however, be connected to a strong regional leadership that is capable of making the different social actors involved pull in the same direction. By deploying different forms of expertise both the governance and the performance of cooperating entities, such as clusters, can be enhanced and further developed. All in all, these are articulated as vital steps in providing a regional development policy that produces innovation, entrepreneurship and competitiveness.

5.3 **Forms of Legitimization**

In this section I address questions of legitimization. As recalled, studies of governmentality aim to contribute to the understanding of how political rationalities are nested in forms of legitimization and claims of truth (see chapter three). This is a way of revealing how power operates as a productive force that conflates such claims of truth with the construction of social actors and categories of purpose, meaning and morale in social orders.

The chains of rationale that have been described in the previous section can in themselves be understood also as forms of legitimization as they link up different elements and position them together, providing a context into which they fit. In this section I shall investigate these chains in terms of *instrumental legitimization* as they are discursively produced as means to achieve particular effects. Before doing so, however, I will investigate how the discursive production of globalization can be understood as *naturalized*, as it is articulated in ways that turn it into a form of natural phenomenon.

I hold that this naturalization is an important discursive quality for understanding the way that regional development is articulated through the chains of rationale, since it becomes nested with these and continues to produce what seem to be 'natural' answers to a 'natural' process. Indeed, it bestows upon the rationales a certain purpose that not only acts as legitimization for the governance of regional development but also for the effects that it produces in terms of power and politics.

Here, I show this link between the articulations of globalization and the chains of rationale by focusing specifically on the legitimization of creativity, innovation and entrepreneurship as it is articulated as the prime way of producing competitiveness in the global order of competition.

Therefore, the analysis of the discursive production of legitimization is made in two steps. First I investigate how the articulations of globalization are legitimized in ways that naturalize the process and then I turn to how
the chains of rationale, and in particular the element of creativity, innovation and entrepreneurship, are articulated in ways that extend the naturalization to include the ‘responses’ to globalization.

5.3.1. Naturalized globalization...
We have already encountered the ways in which globalization is articulated in the corpus and we may recall that the primary aspects of its conceptualization were those of technological development and increased trade. Furthermore, these brought about effects such as new forms of global competition and global regions. So far, however, I have not provided more than illustrations of these discursive constructions, and now I turn to analyzing them in some more detail. In particular, I am interested in understanding questions along the lines of ‘how is this understanding of globalization legitimized and argued for?’

Consider first the articulations made by CPSR in their final report (SOU 2007:13:187) in Q5:36 below. Its conceptualization of globalization is very similar to that of Q5:1, Q5:2, Q5:3 as well as Q5:4 and it represents a typical example for the corpus as a whole:

(Q5:36) The most fundamental explanation for regionalisation is probably financial globalization. New technology and reduced trade regulations have allowed goods, capital, and information to move across national borders ever more quickly and easily. As a result, companies and business transactions have become more independent of national borders and national regulations. Capital and production can quickly and easily be moved from one continent to another, away from the reach of national governments and with a speed that they find it hard to handle. At the same time, however, companies have become more dependent on the environment in which they operate. A more and more differentiated job market and increasing demands on communication and logistics as well as living conditions for qualified staff members entail growing demands on infrastructure and educational opportunities, but also on accommodation, services offered and recreation possibilities. As a consequence, different regions in the same country do not only compete against each other, but also increasingly against regions in other countries. This in turn has led to regions with similar interests beginning to establish contact and cooperating across national borders. [01]

One of the main forms of discursive production of legitimacy according to van Leeuwen (2008) tends to be rationalization. Here I shall focus on how rationalization is articulated to produce the dominant political rationales of ‘global competition’ and ‘global regions’.

Consider how the text above first invokes a statement in the first sentence: ‘The most fundamental explanation for regionalisation is probably financial globalization’. This statement is then followed with a form of definition of globalization as something that has to do with new technology and reduced trade barriers. This is a typical form of
The rationalization that van Leeuwen (2008) labels **theoretic**. Theoretical rationalization works through introducing **definitions**, **explanations** and **predictions** in the discursive representations of objects, events and practices. In the text above definitions and explanations predominate. Globalization is explained and implicitly defined in terms of technology and the mobility of capital and production. Moreover, the form of theoretical rationalization present in the text above also conveys yet another aspect that may be labeled **scientific**. Scientific rationalization means that the representation draws on available ‘expertise’ in order to **naturalize** certain knowledge claims in relation to a represented social practice. In this case, the jargon is clearly ridden with economic reasoning (goods, capital, production, trade barriers and so on) which help legitimize its representation through theoretic (scientific) rationalization.

We can specify this further by drawing attention to the way the scientific rationalization naturalizes the process of globalization in the text segment above. It is represented as a process without any cause outside of those stated in the segment. There are no human actors or subjects present and the function of globalization is explained through a series of law-like connections between sequences of social practice. Therefore, the discursive rationality of global competition that underpins the reasoning is legitimized through a discourse of globalization that represents the phenomenon in a specific, naturalizing fashion.

What is more, consider also how it is claimed that one of the best explanations for recent regionalization is this form of globalization. This legitimizes the changes in regional development that have occurred in the last decades by placing the causes ‘out there’ without connection to active political struggles or articulations. The global competition is a natural effect of this almost natural state of globalization, and emerging global regions are also a logical step in relation to this discourse. While these global regions also cooperate, they do so because they seem to have the same interest in the broader state of competition. To put it bluntly, cooperation is not a question of solidarity.

Taken together Q5:36 is a good illustration of the kind or theoretical rationalization that is used to legitimize the modes of rationale that are present in the corpus. In this case, it particularly has the effect that globalization is represented as almost a natural phenomenon, like an earthquake or a tsunami. The political measures and possibilities then automatically become displaced and may at best be directed towards the
effects (competition and global regions) rather than the causes (globalization).

While these forms of legitimization probably are the most salient in the corpus, there are others. References to forms of authority and moral evaluation, for example, serve to enhance and facilitate naturalized articulations of globalization. However, I wish to call attention to another prominent feature of the corpus, namely the way that many articulations appear almost as story telling. This enables a particular form of legitimization that van Leeuwen (2008) has labeled mythopoesis. Consider the articulations of Q5:37 below:

(Q5:37) Climate change, international finance crisis, but also being able to communicate freely with the entire world 24 hours a day, constitute tangible proof that we are all part of the global community. The world and Sweden are turning ever more internationalised with a more and more integrated politics and trade. Pandemic illnesses and the global economy illustrate clearly how quickly a local crisis can spread to the rest of the world. At the same time, perhaps as a reaction to globalisation, there is another trend which foregrounds local and traditional aspects. Global and local levels merge in ever more overpowering information flows. News and new innovations reach the entire world at the speed of electrons. What we do in the Örebro region contributes to global development. We are all part of what is sometimes called the global village (RDS Örebro, 2010:12). [63]

Here, the text literally provides a story of globalization where the articulations are quite different from those in for instance Q5:36. While still holding elements of theoretical rationalization, this story presents globalization as a process with protagonists and threats. It is a form of moral tale where the prosperous region is international, innovative and aware of its local situations as well as the hazardous threats that may exist as it strives towards prosperity. The use of metaphors such as ‘the global village’, and the use of analogies such as those evoking images of global pandemics or economic crisis endow the text with this tale-like shimmer. In particular, the moral lesson of this tale is quite explicit, as it represents globalization as the surrounding turmoil in which the protagonist (Region Örebro) finds it self in the middle of. The world is changing and the only way out is to become part of the global village, and its hazardous, but predominantly promising prospects.

Crucially, this kind of moral tale works in a legitimizing fashion by describing actions and processes as rewarding or punishing. In this corpus, as is evident in Q5:37, there are both explicit and implicit rewards for accepting and preparing for global competition and global challenges, while not doing so are part of the punishing elements of the tale. The
moral tale then, also illustrates how globalization becomes a natural phenomenon that regions should embrace or pay the price.

To sum up, the articulations of globalization are made in such ways that they naturalize phenomena and inscribe qualities that legitimize the claims of effects. Most saliently, there is a theoretical rationalization going on where arguments are presented as in Q5:36. Such claims are also tied explicitly to expert authority such as OECD or prominent researchers. Finally, it is also quite common that articulations of globalization and its effect are presented as moral tales that further contribute to the naturalization of a phenomenon.

5.3.2. ... and its Natural Response
While the articulations of globalization and its effects where legitimized primarily through theoretical rationalization and mythopoesis, the chains of rationale that follow from them are represented more along what can be called instrumental rationalization. Indeed, the chains themselves are expressions of legitimization as the individual modes become elements in a larger set, thus producing a sense of meaning and purpose for itself. Indeed, it is this form of instrumental rationalization that is the most prominent one in the articulated rationales. The different modes form chains that together strive in certain directions, and have an effect orientation. The goal is, as I have shown, to produce competitiveness primarily through the means of innovation and entrepreneurship.

Therefore it seems plausible to start out with this central element in becoming competitive in the age of globalization. Two things are immediately striking as one analyzes the corpus and the articulations of creativity, innovation and entrepreneurship. The first is that the concept is rarely defined or theoretically motivated and the second is that it is nearly omnipresent.

Combined, I think this corresponds to van Leeuwen’s (2008) category of moral evaluation as a form of legitimization in discourse. In my corpus, the moral presentation of creativity, innovation and entrepreneurship is that the mode of rationale is a kind of abstract common good. Consider Q5:38 from the RDS of Region Västerbotten:

(Q5:38) Innovativeness will be a key factor for the long-term development of the region. Strong innovativeness is crucial for being able to respond to rapid societal changes and increasing the global competitive edge. An innovation can be defined as a new way of doing something, a new product or service, or new business models. It can be a new product introduced to the market, research turned into social value, or a more effective way to carry out community services. Västerbotten has a strong innovative profile and is highlighted as a leading innovative region in
European comparative contexts. However, the potential for partaking in those systems and environments that promote innovation is more limited in sparsely populated areas and smaller municipalities, which means that efforts must be directed at developing methods and tools for strengthening innovativeness in the entire county (RDS Västerbotten, 2013:12). [71]

The way that innovation is articulated here is prominent throughout the corpus. Innovation is not only a matter of certain technical developments. Rather, it concerns more or less the entire social body. Indeed, by being represented in such abstract ways, it becomes a moral good for any society to strive for it. To have a good innovative capacity, like Västerbotten claims to have through these forms of abstractions, actually means having a good society. Importantly, notice also how innovation is the means that must be used to achieve equality, as the last statement identifies that there are some problematic areas of the region that must be enhanced. Rather than stating that these are municipalities or areas that are problematic in terms of population decline, unemployment and education, they are represented as areas that have problems with their innovative capacity.

The types of abstraction permeating Q5:38 make the rationale of creativity, innovation and entrepreneurship (often articulated as one entity) present in all of society as a good example of development. Being innovative means being effective, it means being productive and it means being successful in broad terms. In Q5:39 from the MIEC document *Den Nationella Innovationsstrategin* the same things as in Q5:38 are expressed, although in a more explicit way:

(Q5:39) Social innovation and social entrepreneurship attract more and more attention, both in Sweden and in other countries. This is to a great extent about people’s motives, to start out from the needs of one’s own reality in order to identify and take advantage of possibilities for creating a positive social development at local, regional, national, or global levels. The objective is to respond to environmental or social needs. Those needs can be fulfilled by companies, civil society organisations, or in cooperation between the private sector, the public sector, and civil society. There are many different forms for it, from sophisticated private or non-profit organisations to simple grassroot-level initiatives. This type of initiative can be particularly valuable in rural areas and in small villages for developing service and infrastructure solutions (MIEC, 2014b:40). [44]

Here, innovation and entrepreneurship are identified as a human urge, sprung from the environment in which we reside, to create a positive social development. This use of terms is also fairly typical, further adding to the naturalizing representation of the rationale as a means of tackling issues of competitiveness. Yet another feature of this naturalizing representation of creativity, innovation and entrepreneurship as a way of enhancing competitiveness is the way that it is often located inside human beings. This
primacy of the individual’s innovative capacity is implicit in, for instance, Q5:39, but more explicitly articulated elsewhere in the corpus, as in Q5:40:

(Q5:40) Entrepreneurship originates in individuals and can look different, but the individuals themselves constitute the driving force which allows entrepreneurship to exist. The potential for motivation, initiative, reflection, knowledge-seeking, innovation, and commitment is crucial for the will and ability to absorb formal education and turn knowledge into achievement. Entrepreneurship, when understood this way, is a prerequisite for life-long learning (RDS Gävleborg, 2013:24). [56]

In sum, therefore, focusing on creativity, innovation and entrepreneurship is legitimized because their representation is based on the rationale that they are natural and good qualities in all humans. For this reason it should also spread to all segments of society:

(Q5:41) In the same way that entrepreneurship has been introduced in schools to impact attitudes towards business endeavours it is possible to introduce entrepreneurship in municipalities, county councils, and various authorities. This could entail skills development in relation to the conditions for entrepreneurs. It can also encourage and facilitate the running of part-time businesses among employees (RDS Västmanland, 2007:22). [73]

Now, clearly this form of moral evaluation is not the only marker of legitimization present concerning creativity, innovation and entrepreneurship. However it becomes important as it mixes with the form of instrumental rationalization that underpins all chains of rationale. As mentioned, one of the primary legitimizing functions is to articulate the separate modes of rationale in relation to others, making them elements of chains and thus giving them a sense of purpose or effect orientation. Many of these functions can be found in the articulations already presented in quotes that illustrate the chains. However, to emphasize some aspects a little bit further, consider Q5:42 below:

(Q5:42) The innovation climate is crucially important for the capacity for regional development. The ability to attract, keep, and develop skills, capital, companies, and other activities is essential for responding to increasing international competition.

As companies become more and more internationalised and dependent upon the development of markets in other countries, demands increase for strategic efforts at the regional level to create conditions for strong innovation environments. The opportunities for companies to cooperate with other companies and public sector agents such as universities in the same geographical area, in order to strengthen their innovative powers and long-term competitive edge, are becoming more crucial as criteria for decisions concerning investments in and localisations of businesses and entrepreneurs. It is therefore desirable that strategies for regional growth and development efforts are explicit about among other things strengths and internationally unique competitive advantages including the potential for
In Q5:42 one of the primary goals of the new Swedish innovation strategy are spelled out and when it is the elements from the adaptability chain as well as some aspects of the attraction chain and the leadership chain are clearly articulated. Notice then, how different modes of rationale are linked up as elements in the chains (for instance, how the ability to be attractive is linked to being competitive as a function of a good innovation climate) where they are represented as having effects that, in the end produce an innovative and competitive capacity for the regions.

5.4 POWER, CHAINS OF RATIONALE AND GLOBAL FORMS

This chapter has illustrated how a number of related, but separate, modes of rationale emerge as ways for the now globally oriented regions to be competitive in the circumstances of global competition. All in all, I have identified fourteen of them (see table 5.1) although I have also stated that it is not as individual modes of rationale that they primarily are made to operate. Rather, in the articulations the modes of rationale are turned into elements of larger chains in which they reinforce each other and thus are given more precise functions in relation to global competition.

When instead conceptualizing the modes as elements, I interpreted them as making up four more or less distinct chains. Importantly, in doing so I never intended to convey something like very rigid and stable formations, but rather looser entanglements that often intertwine with one another. Therefore, in the visual illustration of Figure 5.2, I represented them almost as the electronic elements of a circuit board. Like electricity flows through inductors, resistors, capacitors and switches, so too do the rationales flow through different elements like knowledge, leadership, attraction, competitiveness and innovation. In this interpretation the chains of rationale all stand in relation to one another and the elements from one chain may ‘call’ for elements in another one, yet for most of the time specific formations of flows are more saliently articulated in the corpus.

Finally, I also investigated how the chains of rationale were legitimized as responses to globalization and how they were represented as means of making the region competitive. When doing so I said that the most prominent way in which they were legitimized was the kind of instrumental positioning that the modes attained, as they became elements in the chains. In addition, a number of other discursive constructions of legitimacy were also deployed such as in the form of what van Leeuwen (2008) has called
mythopoesis, or in other words through representations of the region and its social actors in moral tales.

Taken together then, the analysis made in this chapter has primarily laid bare four different chains of rationale that are produced as important for the ongoing construction of the assemblage. It should also be clear that these representations are not neutral ways of understanding the practice of regional development. On the contrary, in a number of ways the articulations made here can be understood as operations of power that produce effects in terms of who or what the desired region should be and what kind of social actors are understood as important for its development. I will develop some of those questions in some more detail later on but I think it is important to call attention to some prominent effects of power already at this point.

First then, recall that I have said that I refer to a particular signature of power where the concept is understood as productive or in terms of an economy. This means that what we are witnessing in quotes and articulations are expressions of this power at work. It instates, molds, forms, cuts off, adds and expands social events, social practices and social actors in relation to the governance of regional development in specific ways. More precisely, it produces the chains of rationale as the dominant forms of rendering the assemblage a governable space, and when doing so conditions and determines the reach of, access to and intensity of government in this domain.

So, for example, what I have called the adaptability chain ties together articulations of adaptability with knowledge and education as ways of producing competitiveness. This can be understood as an instance of the ongoing transformations of schools and systems of higher education in Sweden (Dahlstedt & Tesfahuney, 2010; Dahlstedt & Hertzberg, 2011; Fejes, 2006; 2008; Fejes & Nicoll, 2008) but also connects to the larger complex of so called knowledge based economy (Jessop, Fairclough & Wodak, 2008).

Importantly, critical research has pointed out how this transformation of education systems and the shift to understanding knowledge as primarily important in terms of growth is connected to larger metamorphoses throughout the social fabric. In governmentality studies, this is often recognized as neoliberal regimes of governing, which entail the production of a state that is both receding, as well as highly present at the same time (cf. Fejes & Dahlstedt, 2013; Larner, 2000; Larner & Walters, 2002; Peck & Tickel, 2002; Ong, 2006). Such a neoliberal regime transforms knowledge
and education in line with what Dahlstedt and Tesfahuney (2010) have called *speculative pedagogies*. Since regions in general terms, as well as inhabitants in the same regions, must be flexible and adaptable if they are to be prosperous they must learn how to manage risks in a context of very uncertain conditions. Therefore, speculative pedagogies aim to ‘(re)mold individuals into calculating, risk-taking and maximizing subjects – gamblers – or docile and risk-taking subjects that live and act in accordance with the rules of the game’ (Dahlstedt & Tesfahuney, 2010:251).

In terms of *the attraction chain* I stated that it links elements of branding, immigration, inclusiveness and the living environment together to form a rationale that emphasizes the importance of turning the region into a space that is attractive for certain people, businesses and investments. I have already mentioned how this is very similar to assumptions underpinning the so-called creative class thesis (Florida, 2005; 2012). However, it is worth expanding somewhat on these issues. In Florida’s (2012) theory it is assumed that global competition is going to force cities and regions to pay attention to the needs of a particular, and highly mobile, set of people. This *creative class* is constituted by the doctors, the engineers, the finance and business leaders, the star researchers, the web designers or creative industry artists and the media elite. They are understood to be the pinnacle of competitiveness and the concentration of this class in any particular city or regions will determine its future prosperity (Florida, 2005; 2012). Therefore, regions must shift focus from maintaining a *business climate* to providing a *people climate* since it is not people who primarily follow businesses in the new global competition, but rather businesses that emerge and prosper as a consequence of the creative class being present in a specific place.

It is striking how explicitly embedded Florida’s theories seem to be in the governance of regional development in Sweden. Particularly in the RDS documents it is clear that regions are striving to be the best place for the creative class to relocate (cf. Q5:22 and Q5:23) and how they intend to deploy plans for promoting their image as such a great place to live (cf. Q5:24 and Q5:25). Indeed, previous research has shown that an increasingly important practice for regions and cities is to engage in *branding* in order to attract what they understand to be a very mobile and selective set of people that may help them to foster competitiveness and growth (cf. Grundel, 2013; 2014; Syssner, 2010).

The prominence of the creative class theory throughout the corpus underlines what I understand to be one of the most striking power effects
so far, namely the highly excluding discourse that underpins such reasoning. Brenda Parker (2008) has shown that the supposedly tolerant and including theory of the creative class is intrinsically imbued with selective and hierarchical notions of what (and who) is needed in the global competition. Indeed, for the creative class to function properly, it needs a cadre of service people who work in 24/7 stores, wait in restaurants, clean houses, wash clothes, mow lawns and take care of kids. The relationship between the creative class and the service class is not only hierarchic, it is also gendered and racialized (Parker, 2008; Peck, 2005).

The third chain that I generated from my material I labeled the environment and sustainability chain since it articulates the mode of environment and sustainability in conspicuous ways. First, I said that issues of the environment such as global warming and environmental decline in general were salient in the material and that it generally was recognized as one of the most important threats of modern times. At the same time, this chain of rationale produced representations of this threat where it was turned into moments of possibilities (cf. Q5:29). Through creativity, innovation and entrepreneurship, environmental challenges can be solved and at the same time made beneficial through the creation of new products and services that are creative responses to the kind of problems human societies face. Thus, the sustainability logic is often subsumed under the more prevailing notions of competitiveness in an era marked by (global) competition.

I also highlighted how the leadership chain branched out through the corpus, linking up elements of leadership, cooperation, clusters and expertise, evaluation and benchmarking. The prominent leader and his practice of leadership is a quality that regions seek to find, since it is articulated throughout the corpus that a strong hand is needed to steer regional development in the desired directions. The leader can manage cooperation and help facilitate clusters and innovation systems (Säll, 2012, 2014) and hammer out differences between parties to produce consensus and a clear direction for policy.

Importantly, a wealth of research has shown that regions under such conditions become spaces of depoliticization, where relations of power are concealed (Rönnblom, 2008), informal networks spur (Forsberg & Lindgren, 2010) and consensus becomes a prerequisite for politics rather than an effect of it (Säll, 2012:107).

In my analysis, all the chains rest upon specific assumptions of what globalization is, how it functions and what it forces regions to ‘do’. Here,
the signature of power that I refer to is visible in terms of how it produces truths and is discursively legitimized. Therefore, in this chapter I have spent some time analyzing the articulations of globalization and also how the representation of the process is legitimized. One of the most salient features regarding this is a certain naturalization of globalization. By this I mean how the process is represented as detached from our local space and as something inevitable, almost like natural disasters are inevitable features of the world. In this naturalization I illustrated how businesses and economic relations become primary functions that seem to operate ‘out there’ disconnected from the practices, discourses and objects that make up the social world that we encounter in everyday life.

I think that these representations of globalization are very important for understanding the way that the assemblage of regional development operates and evolves. Since the process is more or less equated with a ‘natural’ phenomenon it shifts the political rationale away from globalization as such towards what can be understood as responses to it. To illustrate this, think of the way a hurricane is generally understood in terms of a political rationale. While there are modes of political rationale that would be likely to relate the presence of hurricanes to environmental effects caused by human practice, most of the time the focus would not be on how to change hurricanes or how to make them disappear. More likely, the modes of rationale concerning hurricanes would articulate ways of handling their impact on social functions. The way that globalization is represented in the material produces similar outcomes. Prominent modes of rationale arise, not in relation to the conceptualizations of globalization as a process, but rather in relation to the very specific representation of it as global competitiveness. Indeed, the corpus is full of references to SWAT-analyses and workshops that take the analogy of a natural phenomenon one step further. The global competitiveness is not challenged since it arises as a kind of logical function given the naturalized understanding of what globalization is and how it functions. Crucially, this also means that since globalization is represented in this way, it is not understood as connected to power struggles or acts of politics. Rather, the natural phenomenon is also a neutral one that is potentially very good for all people, almost by default.

What I have showed so far, then, is a range of prominent modes of rationale that link up and form chains that structure the governance of regional development. In the following chapters I will focus on how these produce, and require, certain social actors and governmental technologies
to become operational. However, first I will illustrate how we may also think of these results in terms of global forms.

5.4.1. Relational Space and Global Forms
Recall how I earlier compared the concept of global form with global variables in a computer program code. I said that they could be thought of as shaped in ways that make them easy to insert into local spaces, producing outcomes that draw on those forms, but yet are easily mutable to fit in specific settings.

In this sense, I think there are some features of the way that the assemblage is manifested that are important to consider a bit further. My intention is to illustrate some of these here, and then to pick up this thread again in chapter eight together with the results of all three analytical chapters to discuss more broadly how the assemblage takes on global forms and (re)produces globalization.

First, while it may seem almost tautological, in my interpretation, it is important to recognize that the naturalized representations of globalization produce two intertwined and very salient effects, namely global regions and global competition. In this sense, the mere fact that regional development is so explicitly oriented towards ‘the global’ in policy is a production of global forms. Moreover, this representation of a global region, in a perpetual and all-embracing competition, will steer, direct and focus its global orientation towards certain rationales. Hence, as the rendering of ‘the region’ in itself becomes assertions of ‘a global region’, it is produced in specific directions that, while they may vary, must align with this global feature and the associated inscriptions of competition.

Therefore, the four main chains of rationale that I have suggested here can be indicative of the particular ways that the regions take global forms. Regions must not only be global, they must be global in order to compete and they can do this in certain ways. The script applied in this particular assemblage is highly mobile in terms of rationales and can be lifted from this setting and inserted into a great variety of political projects.

Indeed, Googling terms such as ‘the global region’ or ‘the creative region’ yields hundreds of thousands of results. There are networks for creative cities, creative regions, innovative cities and entrepreneurial regions that formally host websites with members from all around the world. Thus, the Swedish regional development assemblage applies a version of development that revolves around some globally present scripts for how to achieve prosperity in the perpetual competition. However,
when (re)producing these global forms there will be variations that will mutate it, apply it, and then re-apply it as small insertions into ‘global space’.

So, in the case of this assemblage, it is possible that the salient way that gender equality is represented as important for competitiveness, for instance, is a local variation of the script if compared to other assemblages. However, gender equality as a rationale has no place here unless it is positioned in relation to, and indeed subsumed under the category of competitiveness, illustrating how the script retains its global forms, and indeed produces sub-ordination of other rationalities (cf. Rönnblom, 2005).

Importantly, the way that global forms are (re)produced in this assemblage should not be interpreted as restricted to issues of regional development. Rather, the global forms are just that, *forms* that can be inserted into other assemblages so that different social fields may also apply them. Consider for instance how a related field of aid and development is not likely to remain unaffected by the way that governments all around the world deploy programs for developing their own regions.

In situations where regions are produced as important for maintaining prosperity and growth by competing globally, they are also transformed into being responsible for their own development, encouraged not to rely on anyone else for their future. It seems natural therefore, that the models of entrepreneurship, innovation and creativity (achievable for instance through the four chains that I reconstructed here) are features that will also be related to how aid and global governance in a more general sense function.

In this context, I think it is also important to note what is not included in the global forms that are (re)produced in the assemblage that I have studied. For instance, while there are recognitions of gender and immigration (even though they produce women and immigrants in specific and subordinated ways), I think it is striking, but not surprising, how so little of the material I have studied even mentions such notions as class and solidarity. In my mind, this is one of the most important features of the assemblage as it takes on global forms and contributes to globalization. Since everyone, in theory, can become more innovative or realize their inner entrepreneurial capacity, class differences within regions, or more generally, the vast inequalities that exist among regions around the world can only be understood as more or less natural outcomes in the race for
competitiveness. Some regions have simply not realized their innovative capacity enough yet. However, if they follow the script they have every chance of doing so. Class has nothing to do with it. As long as it is not creative.
This analytical chapter is concerned with the second set of research questions as spelled out in the beginning of the thesis. In other words it scrutinizes how social actors are produced in the assemblage as an effect of, and prerequisite for, the political rationalities that were highlighted in chapter five. Crucially, as mentioned several times now, in governmentality studies the production of the subjects of rule can be understood as intrinsic to the moment of problematization that must occur for any domain to be instated as an object of governing. As such, the social actors are both the vehicles of power as well as the outcome of power relations, and to study such a production enables a vantage point for analyzing the way power operates in the assemblage (Dean, 2010; Larner & Walters, 2002; Miller & Rose, 2008).

In this chapter I therefore trace the discursive representation of social actors within the assemblage as I illustrate some prominent ways that these actors are constructed throughout the texts that I analyze. I highlight how this productive power inscribes into the assemblage actors that are needed for its political rationalities to become operational, and how this in turn has a range of effects. For instance, the social actors that are being represented in the texts are endowed with capacities, attributes and potentials in ways that are not at all equal or ‘the same’ for all. Rather, quite different actors emerge as more or less important for the dominant rationales of regional development in Sweden and they are certainly not ascribed equal roles to play in the race for competitiveness through innovation.

The main goal of this chapter is therefore to illustrate how, given the salient rationales of global competition and competitiveness, certain categories of social actors are produced in the texts. As I do so, I again bring in analytical categories from the works of van Leeuwen (2008) that help me sort out and critically engage with the representations of not only who the social actors are, but also how they are being constructed.
Furthermore, since part of the representation of social actors concerns what I above called their capacities, attributes and potentials I also pay attention to the way that social action is being represented in relation to the actors. In particular, I find it important to ask questions that concern the way that forms of social action is being produced as de-agentilized in relation to global competition and competitiveness. I argue that some of these representations contribute to what I have earlier called a naturalization of globalization and the rationales that relate to the process.

The chapter is laid out in a sequential manner. First, I start out with some general articulations of globalization, competitiveness and innovation to showcase which social actors are explicitly included in relation to the rationales. At the same time this also sets up a discussion for different forms of exclusions in the corpus. Second, I turn to a description of those social actors that I have found to be of great importance throughout the texts. Third, I end the chapter with a summary of the main findings and a discussion on global forms.

6.1 INCLUSION AND EXCLUSION

We may begin this analysis in a basic fashion by asking what social actors are actually included and explicitly articulated in the corpus. Now, the presentation below does not claim to exhaustively describe all the representations of social actors in all of the texts that I have analysed. My ambition is rather to start out with some general articulations of some of the most important rationales and from these draw out representations of actors and action. Based on this it is then possible to expand the analysis in terms of how certain social actors are represented as included while others are excluded from the texts.

Consider the articulations of Q6:1 that in essence resemble many of the general quotes and articulations used in the beginning of Chapter 5 (such as Q5:1 through Q5:12). Taken from the Swedish Globalization Council’s report *Du sköna nya globaliserade värld*, it portrays ideas of global competition as a prominent feature of globalization, and in doing so also includes representations of social actors:

(Q6:1) Globalisation and especially the extensive economic integration in Europe make it less and less important for companies to locate their activities to a certain market or a certain country. Instead, it is becoming ever more valuable to place activities in an attractive cluster. The competition among European countries for attractive companies will therefore turn more and more into a competition between major European urban centres. This is an opportunity for Sweden, a country which is otherwise disadvantaged by a small market. The conclusion of this report is that it is crucial for Sweden’s future growth potential that the major
metropolitan regions can continue developing as successful service-industrial clusters, and that Sweden succeeds in attracting and retaining a critical mass of human capital and individuals with top-level competence. This means several challenges in the domain of financial politics (Forslid, 2008:53). [28]

To begin with the articulations of Q6:1 nominate one social actor as particularly important for the coming years, namely the metropolitan region. This kind of region, it is said, is the one that will have the capacity for competing in the fierce global competition that is already in effect. Furthermore, the metropolitan region is represented as dynamic, attractive and as a place people are drawn to. These qualities are also articulated as tied to a set of social actors that the metropolitan regions now compete for – the individuals with top-level competence.

In Q6:1 the metropolitan regions are represented as critically important for Swedish competitiveness in the future, but notice how in fact the metropolitan region is in a sort of passive relationship not only to the so-called ‘individuals with top-level competence’, but also the corporations. I think that this is an important representation that is salient for the corpus in large. That is to say, often regions, and particularly metropolitan regions, are nominated as important for competitiveness in the global economy and at the same time they are more re-active than active in relation to both corporations and the elite, the mobile class of actors that they wish to attract.

However, the metropolitan regions, and regions in general, are still more active than the fourth major social actor in Q6.1, the countries, and in particular Sweden. Countries appear as passive actors that will not be able to compete as a unitary state in the global competition, since the corporations and the competent individuals do not really care what country they live in or are located in so long as they have access to metropolitan qualities.

Hence, we can speak of four social actors as particularly important in Q6:1 and we may identify them as the metropolitan regions, the individuals with top-level competence, the corporations and the nations. The corporations and the competent individuals are ascribed very active roles. They can re-locate, choose where they want to be and are, in a sense, to be catered to by the nations and metropolitan regions. As mentioned, the representations of the metropolitan regions are not really passive, but still not really active either, as they are rather re-active, since they must be able to adapt and evolve in ways that can attract people and businesses. The

[28] Many of the quotes in this chapter are translations from Swedish. See appendix B for more information on the original formulations.
nations (including Sweden) are articulated as rather passive in the wake of global competition.

Taken together Q6:1 includes representations of social actors that I interpret as prominent in my corpus, but they are not the only ones. First of all, it is not only metropolitan regions that are included as important actors in the global competition; it is rather the regions as a whole. This is of course in line with the nature of the corpus (the documents are related to regions). Yet I think the expressions of Q6:1 explicitly state what is often more implicit, namely that all regions are not equally important for producing competitiveness.

Before I move on, I wish to make one more point regarding Q6:1 and the individuals with top-level competence. While Q6:1 designates a social actor, I would add that it also blurs exactly who and what these individuals are. Although this is a typical grouping of this category of social actors, they also appear regularly as broken down into more diverse types such as entrepreneurs, researchers, business leaders, excellent students and political leaders. In Q6:2 below, from the Swedish government’s national innovation strategy, these social actors emerge somewhat more clearly:

(Q6:2) The innovation climate is crucially important for the capacity for regional development. The ability to attract, keep, and develop skills, capital, companies, and other activities is essential for responding to increasing international competition. As companies become more and more internationalised and dependent upon the development of markets in other countries, demands increase for strategic efforts at the regional level to create conditions for strong innovation environments. The opportunities for companies to cooperate with other companies and public sector agents such as universities in the same geographical area, in order to strengthen their innovative powers and long-term competitive edge, are becoming more crucial as criteria for decisions concerning investments in and localisations of businesses and entrepreneurs. (MIEC, 2014b:46). [44]

Still, the region is represented as a rather re-active social actor that mostly must work on managing itself in ways that will make it attractive to corporations while the corporations, on the other hand, are represented as active, mobile and very important. The entrepreneur also emerges as a social actor that, presumably, can fit into the wider category used in Q6:1 about top-level competent individuals. The entrepreneur is also represented as a social actor that is active and capable of being mobile, placing demands and influencing his/her own future. Furthermore, universities and university colleges are depicted as two forms of public actors that are very important in fostering an innovative environment.

If we continue this more general inquiry of showcasing what kinds of social actors are represented as important in relation to globalization,
competition and competitiveness, Q6:3 from the RDS of region Norrbotten illustrates further aspects:

(Q6:3) Changes are required in other contexts as well; in the business sector, in politics, and in organisations. Entrepreneurship should be considered as natural a choice as employment. Women's and men's potential for entrepreneurship and business ventures will be harnessed through creating better conditions for starting and running companies. Since fewer women than men start and run companies, special efforts are needed to promote women's business ventures. Business ventures and entrepreneurship in the area of health and care will be encouraged and facilitated. Women are on sick leave more often than men and experience their health as less robust. Therefore, it is important to investigate the connections between health, work, and work conditions. Women are also to a greater extent than men victims of violence and threats of violence at work. Women and men should have the same opportunities and conditions for salaried labour. In this way, gender equality is promoted at the same time as exclusionary effects decrease. (RDS Norrbotten, 2012:9).

In Q6:3 the general message concerns women, and their problematic situation in relation to regional development as well as work, health and life in general. The social actor women is often explicitly represented throughout the material and statements of gender equality are eye-catching features, particularly in the RDS documents of the regions. Notice also how men are designated as social actors along side the representation of women. In some of the documents (particularly some of the later published RDS), this seems to be a strategy for underlining the category of gender by showcasing that individuals are gendered and that this matters in certain situations. I will get back to this when I describe how women are represented as social actors in more detail in the next section. However, I still think it is worth pointing out already at this point that, even if men and women are articulated as having different capabilities in certain circumstances, the practice of designating both men and women seems more to serve the function of highlighting women’s disadvantaged position than showing the privileged position of men. We could ask questions like: who threatens and commits violent acts against women, what power relations must be in place for producing a situation where women are more often sick and feel more unhealthy than men, and why do women and men have different opportunities to employment? In short, representations of men as social actors are backgrounded in relation to the forms of social action that are also articulated in the quote (for instance, regarding violence). Since this is so, it also contributes to the representation of women as in need of improvement and help because they are women rather than because of social injustice.
One more quote may be useful in illustrating two additional social actors that I see as important throughout the material. The articulations in Q6:4 are from OECD’s Territorial Review of Skåne.

(Q6:4) Opportunities to deepen the region’s labour markets are twofold. In the first place, Skåne should aim to capitalise on its strong innovative environment, expanding its entrepreneurial base. Substantial regional investment in the promotion of entrepreneurialism has rendered Skåne one of the most dynamic Swedish regions in terms of the proportion of newly created enterprises in total enterprises, but the region has the smallest proportion of firms created by those holding no more than compulsory education. Policies to promote innovation among a more extensive base of potential entrepreneurs, through training and enhanced access to capital for migrants, women and youth, would help to deepen regional labour markets, providing more employment opportunities for the region’s expanding population. A second opportunity to deepen local labour markets lies in the region’s ability to attract skilled international workers, providing an attractive environment to encourage them, and their families, to locate in the region (OECD, 2012:19). [34]

Again, the purpose here is to showcase what social actors are represented in relation to the dominant political rationalities of the assemblage so the theme of Q6:4 is recognizable by now. However, even if this is not new, it is important to show how representations of immigrants as social actors follow a specific trope in the corpus. Note how the construction of the category immigrant in this quote is being detached or disassociated from the category of the highly skilled international workers. For some reason, a difference is produced here in which one social actor (the immigrants) is represented as in need of help before they can become an asset to the region (they need education, training and access to capital). The other actor, the international highly skilled workers are again represented as active, selective and rather fastidious in a way that the region must accommodate. So, while immigrants are often designated as social actors in the texts I have analyzed, they are at the same time often split into two categories, where only one category retains the term immigrant. I will get back to this construction in the next section. However, before doing so I also wish to point to how the internationally skilled workers are also often represented in relation to students, as in the articulations of the Nordic Council of Ministers:

(Q6:5) While developing the local supply of skills is important it will not be enough. The attraction of foreign skills needs to be significantly enhanced. The educational institutes in the Nordic countries already get an inflow of foreign students that could be further development [SIC]. Much more is then needed to make it possible and attractive for these students to stay once they have finished their degrees. For experienced foreign staff, the complex issue of taxation has been on the agenda on and off in some Nordic countries. It will not go away (NCM, 2010:58). [30]
Clearly, the foreign students are also seen as a specific form of immigrants, or rather they are not labeled immigrants. Instead, they too are represented as potential parts of that larger group of experienced, internationally skilled workers that in Q6:1 were called individuals with top-level competence. So, the international students are also represented as important and potentially beneficial, and this is true of students in general, regardless of their place of origin. Students as social actors are generally represented as potentially contributing to growth through their education and creativity. Indeed, as part of the larger group of highly skilled individuals they are so important that in many cases the regions must take specific measures to attract them.

This section of the chapter is headlined inclusion and exclusion, and thus I wish to end it with expanding somewhat on what I mean by that second term. While there obviously are a number of social actors designated in the texts, we can also think of those that are not there, but in a sense leave traces or markers in the explicit articulations. Think for instance of how the expressions in Q6:1 through Q6:5 are remarkably free from social actors like politicians or government officials. It is as if many of the processes and actions related to globalization, competition and competitiveness are not embedded in discussions, debates and decisions made by political representatives of certain legislations. In the corpus as a whole such social actors generally are not represented explicitly, but are instead backgrounded or suppressed. Even, when the important rationale of regional leadership is invoked, leadership remains rather oblique and the voice of ‘politics’ remains unarticulated:

(Q6:6) The OECD study Territorial Reviews Småland-Blekinge, which was commissioned by the regions of Småland and Blekinge, includes an overview of the preconditions of the regions. It shows that the regional political leadership is crucial for development and growth, but it also shows that the regional development policy is characterised by uncertainty about the division of responsibility and resources among the public organisations involved. The regional development strategy is dependent on a centre of power, which has the mandate, legitimacy, and resources to promote development. Both in the evaluation of the previous regional development programme (RUP) and in the dialogue that frames the present project, the absence of such a centre of power has been highlighted as a weakness and an impediment to development. A regional rallying of forces and leadership is required (RDS Jönköping, 2013:12). [60]

Indeed, instead of representing social actors who enact and perform regional leadership, leadership is made into a noun, a ‘thing’ that through these forms of representations gain a more determined quality. There exists a ‘thing’ called political leadership that must be powerful and enhanced if the region is to be competitive, as if political leadership is not politics,
implemented with different visions and ideas not only about what is good for the regions, but also about what leadership is. Furthermore, this form of exclusion of the social actor ‘politician’ (or ‘leader’) also makes the processes of globalization and the rationale of global competition seem more inevitable. Indeed, it contributes to what I have so far called the naturalization of globalization and the practices that are being fostered in response to the dominant rationales related to the process. The backgrounding of the political leaders also backgrounds politics that neither seem to have any capacity to work in terms of the kind of globalization being produced, nor is represented to have anything to do with the way that current global regimes form.

All in all, these forms of exclusions naturally vary so that in any given quote we may find representations that background or suppress certain social actors while others are explicitly designated and foregrounded. As I am moving on into the next section, I have asked myself which social actors are the most salient in the material, and when doing so I have considered both inclusions and exclusions to come up with reasonable answers. This does not mean that I will present a list based on quantitative readings of who is mentioned the most or how many times a certain social actor is excluded. Rather my goal is to present a schema, the contours of which have been sketched here, presenting a more thorough understanding of the representations of social actors that are indicative of how power operates in the assemblage.

6.2 Important Social Actors

As mentioned several times so far, an important aspect of governmentality studies is to pay attention to how social actors are produced in relation to certain domains of governing. As representations of these emerge in textual fragments of assemblage remnants, so too can we view the production, not only of representations but of the actual subjects of governing. Rendering an assemblage governable is to a large extent a matter of defining, understanding and, crucially, problematizing the domain so that it can be intervened and steered towards a set of goals (cf. Dean, 2010; Miller & Rose, 2008). Hence, the way social actors are produced in texts are not coincidences or flukes, but rather an expression of the power/knowledge complexes that stand at the center of the assemblage that is being made the object of governing. For this reason, the remainder of this chapter turns to a more detailed analysis of six different categories of social actors that emerge as important in the corpus analysed.
When I present my analysis of how the women, the region, the corporation, the immigrants, the experts and the entrepreneurs are produced in the texts, I focus on how they are being made the object of rule by illustrating the capacities and qualities inscribed in them as well as how they are rendered intelligible in terms of social action. I present each of the categories in separate sections although, these sections are not organized according to the same set of analytical categories or structures. Instead, I use the categories and tools needed for describing the production of each social actor in what I take to be the best way. In other words, the answer to how one social actor is produced may require different analytical categories than required for describing the representations of another social actor. In general though, I follow the lines drawn up in the previous section where I presented an overview of social actors articulated in relation to the dominant modes of rationale in the assemblage. In other words, for each category of social actors, we may ask how they are included or excluded in the text, as well as how they are represented in terms of action.

6.2.1. The Women
First of all, when analyzing the way that women are produced in the material it is important to recognize that notions of gender equality and the position of women in regional development are frequent occurrences. Through the notions of inclusive growth in the EU2020 program and the so-called gender main streaming\(^46\) policies that emanate from it, to the way that gender equality has been made an explicit goal in national as well as regional documents (such as the national innovation plan and the RDS), the theme is present throughout the corpus. Therefore, a quick reading of almost any included document will at first give the impression that political measures are being taken within the assemblage to empower women as a group, in recognition of facets of gender inequality in society at large.

In the light of this I would say that the production of the social actor women runs along two main strands of representations. The first strand concerns notions of gender equality in general. Representations of gender equality (what it means, how it can be achieved and so on) are plentiful in the texts and through them women are produced in terms of capacities and qualities that together inform the production of them as a category of social actors within the assemblage. Second, as a subcategory of the first

\(^{46}\) Gender main streaming is a way of working with issues of gender equality by implementing them as part of the entire policy process, rather than viewing them as a separate goal alongside side others. For a critical investigation of this policy implementation in Sweden (and Norway), see Rönnblom (2005).
strand, women are often represented in relation to innovation and entrepreneurship in ways that primarily represent them as assets in the quest for competitiveness. Below, I will deal with both these strands of articulations in conjunction and make my interpretations of them clearer.

If we begin with the representations of gender equality, I would say that there is a great deal of articulation of just that - gender equality. For instance, striking features of the texts are how important gender equality is in order to produce more competitiveness and how crucial it is for the regions to work towards it. At the same time there is very little talk of gender inequality and I think this is significant. What I mean is that since there is so little time spent in the documents on what gender inequality is (how it is produced and why it exists in the first place), the notions of gender equality emerge as a good thing that everyone wants but it is still unclear why we do not yet enjoy it. The most clearly visible aspect of this is the lack of problematization concerning the relation between women and men as social categories. There are very few articulations in the corpus where this is understood as a power relation that contributes to the production of inequality. Q6:7 from the RDS of region Västerbotten is an exception that can be used to further illustrate my point:

(Q6:7) Equality contributes to regional development through granting everyone the same opportunity to contribute to social development. Studies have shown that women as a group have less power and influence than men in relation to social development today. Among other things, men are more prevalent in leading positions in the business sector, while women earn less doing the same jobs and assume more responsibility for the domestic sphere. Västerbotten starts out from the Swedish objective for equality politics, the idea that women and men should occupy the same position of power in terms of being able to shape both society and their own lives (RDS Västerbotten, 2013:6). [71]

In this quote the relationship between women and men is explicitly articulated in relation to notions of power. Although it is expressed in quite general terms, it is possible to construct an understanding of gender inequality (and therefore gender equality) where inequality is not just something that ‘happens’ to affect women. Therefore, representing the social actors men and women in this way, does not automatically mean that women are in need of help or empowering. Based on the articulations of Q6:7, it is at least possible to think of gender equality as something that can be achieved by recognizing men as a group and possibly pay attention in equality efforts to them. This could be done by, for instance, problematizing the current power relations that benefit one group at the expense of the other.
However, not even this quote is particularly explicit in this respect. While designating men and women as social actors and speaking of them in terms of power, it basically states that the current situation is one of inequality and that this needs to be addressed. There is very little direct attention given to the causes of inequality, and this is a salient feature of the corpus as a whole. Consider, for instance, how women are produced in Q6:8 from the OECDs Territorial Review of Skåne below:

(Q6:8) Enhancing women’s entrepreneurship benefits from renewed international impetus, including the ongoing OECD Gender Initiative (Box 3.16). More specifically, experience in some OECD countries has suggested that mentoring programmes from women to women have higher potential to foster female entrepreneurship effectively. Such programmes aim to offer a useful bridge towards role models that are able to transfer successful experiences to potential entrepreneurs and to increase the latter’s self-confidence. At the European level, the European Network of Mentors for Women Entrepreneurs was inaugurated in Warsaw, Poland in November 2011. This network complements the actions that started with the creation of the European Network of Female Entrepreneurship Ambassadors (ENFEA) in 2009. It will provide advice and support to women entrepreneurs on the start-up, running and growth of their enterprises in the early phase of their life (from the second to the fourth year of existence of a new woman-run and owned enterprise). The Women Entrepreneurship Portal also offers a list of national and international organisations that provide advice, support, information and contacts regarding existing support measures for female entrepreneurs. In Sweden, ALMI Företagspartner AB will receive SEK 30 million per year to strengthen women entrepreneurship through a variety of mentoring programmes, training and funding instruments. Special efforts will be made to reach women in green industries, the services sector, creative and cultural industries, health and social care, and education (OECD, 2012:214). [34]

Sifting through some of the more technical references to certain initiatives and internal textual references, we are left with articulations of how a number of suggested efforts could be made to enhance the entrepreneurial qualities of women. At the same time, as an effect of not articulating the causes of inequality, we are also left with representations of women as a group of social actors that in a sense ‘lacks’ what is needed. Therefore specific programs should be deployed, for instance, to increase their self-confidence. In other words, problems of inequality are here produced as intrinsic to women. If only they could be taught how to be more entrepreneurial and more self-confident, problems of inequality would be alleviated.

So, the benefits of gender equality are clearly articulated in the corpus, but since references to the causes of inequality are scarce, the result is that women themselves are represented as the root of the problem. Hence, empowering women becomes a matter of, as in Q6:8, increasing qualities that they as women have not developed enough. It is the lack of such
qualities that makes them, for instance, start fewer businesses, produce fewer innovations and hold fewer positions of power in society.

Turning then to the second important strand of representing women as social actors, the theme of Q6:8 is hardly a coincidence. Indeed, representing women as a potentially untapped resource for competitiveness and in the end growth is highly conspicuous throughout the material. In a way, therefore, this form of construction of women as social actors also contributes to the features of the first strand since the construction is generally along the lines of Q6:8 that women ‘lack’ some qualities. However, I also think that it does something else – gender equality is conditioned upon the notions of competitiveness and growth. To illustrate, we may consider again the articulations of Q5:30 from the RDS of Region Dalarna.

In this quote women and men are nominated\textsuperscript{47} as critically important social actors for the region’s continued efforts to increase growth. We are told that in region Dalarna, as in many other regions, the labor market is highly segregated in terms of gender and that this is problematic. Then the quote ends with what seems to be the primary benefit of breaking such a pattern, namely that it would help producing more growth. This illustrates the conditioned production of women as social actors equal to men since we may of course ask what would happen to this relationship if, for a number of plausible reasons, efforts towards increasing equality should not contribute to growth, but even slow it down. Furthermore, in a more concrete situation it is easy to imagine how practices that aim to foster growth and practices that aim to produce gender equality would be at odds with each other, and we may then ask, given this conditioned representation of women as social actors, if such equality is not important anymore.

In short, the representations of women as potential innovators and entrepreneurs are so conspicuous in the corpus that other possible representations are suppressed. Indeed, this is not only in relation to the social actor women. However, in this case it contributes to producing them as not equal for equality’s own sake, to put it bluntly. Indeed, even when there are articulations in the material with other considerations of gender equality, these are often in the next step transformed into an argument for growth or competitiveness. A good example is to be found in the Swedish

\textsuperscript{47} I use the category of “nomination” as it is generally understood in CDA (cf. Wodak & Krzyzanowski, 2008; Wodak & Meyer, 2009, van Leeuwen, 2008), or in other words, to specify when certain social actors are being named and spelled out in text.
Governments action plan for a gender equal regional growth where four general reasons for focusing on gender equality are declared (Swedish Government, 2012). Three of them follow the general rationale of the assemblage as I described it in chapter five (gender equality increases entrepreneurship, gender equality increases attraction and gender equality increases innovation), although one of them concerns how gender equality increases democracy (SIC!). While this would seem to be a tautological expression, what is interesting is how this articulation also represents the equal social actors (men and women) as good for democracy but in the end mostly good for innovation and entrepreneurship:

(Q6:9) The other connection involves the link between equality and democracy and the fact that greater equality contributes to a stronger democracy, which in turn supports the creation of conditions for increased growth. A society which does not exclude people from access to capital, networks, institutions, and so on, contributes to greater diversity, more trust, and a feeling of being a part of the community. Growing trust and diversity in social contacts also increase the chances for cooperation among businesses and public organisations which in turn supports the potential for innovation in society as a whole. An important aspect of democracy is to boost women’s and men’s ability to make their own choices as well as realise and commercialise their ideas (Swedish Government, 2012:3). [42]

So, to sum up, the representation of the social actor women as I have interpreted it is that we may understand them as ‘needy’, because they seem to lack certain qualities that, if realized, would make them very valuable. For this reason they need to become the target of specific programs and measures to improve such qualities. Hence, in terms of social action, I interpret the representation of women as quite de-agentilized, meaning that they are articulated in ways that they seem to depend on others for realizing themselves. At the same time, however, they are also inscribed with qualities that (while in need of improvement) can make them important and indeed part of producing the specific vision of the region that center on creativity, innovation and entrepreneurship. Moreover, this feeds into the political rationale that I have earlier referred to as subsuming critical questions concerning, for instance, gender and the environment under the logic of competitiveness (cf. Q5:28 and Q5:30). Indeed, while the production of the social actor women is an outcome of such a rationale, it is also its vehicle and the node from which it operates.

48 In Swedish this document is titled, Handlingsplan för en jämställd regional tillväxt 2012-2014.
6.2.2. The Region

Rather unsurprisingly, one of the most saliently represented actors in the material is the region. In chapter five I touched upon how global regions become an important rationale in the assemblage and I interpreted this as a response or result of the way that globalization and increased (global) competition were also produced as prominent rationales in the texts. In addition, I have also briefly illustrated, in the first section of this chapter, how the region is often represented as an actor in relation to the dominant rationales of competitiveness through innovation and entrepreneurship. Here I turn to those representations of the region in some more detail as I wish to further and expand my interpretation of it as re-active rather than active or passive. When doing so I will focus on three forms of representations as I interpret articulations concerning first, the region as important, then the region as re-active and finally the region as differentiated. They all tie into each other to produce the region as a social actor with certain qualities and possibilities, so my separation of them into distinct forms is more a question of presentation than analytical importance.

Starting off with the importance of regions in a globalized world, we may consider the articulations of Q6:10 from the final report of the Swedish Committee on Public Sector Responsibility:

(Q6:10) Economic globalisation has made companies less dependent on national borders and governments, at the same time as increasing competition and specialisation create higher demands on competence provision, logistics, and an attractive living environment to attract qualified coworkers. Many of these needs are filled most effectively on a geographical scale in between local and national levels, and therefore require regional areas of contact for the public sector and society at large (SOU 2007:13:195). [01]

Here, the region is actually represented as very passive, indeed more as a site than as a social actor, yet the articulations portray what stands out in the material, namely the importance of regions in this regard. And, while the importance of regions in Q6:10 embeds it in a rather passive position, the representation also points in the direction of some activity as the increased competition demands certain actions that, given the reasoning, must be performed by regions as they strive towards being attractive.

Indeed, I interpret this transformation, or rather tension between representations, from a site to an actor as an important theme in the corpus. The region is both represented as a site and as a social actor, and importantly, it becomes a social actor in the wake of the rationales that are needed to foster competitiveness. This can be exemplified by how the Swedish Association of Local Authorities and Regions (SALAR) expresses
their view on the region in Q6:11 drawn from the document Bilda slagkraftiga regioner: Sverige behöver fler starka tillväxtregioner - Argument och resultat.49

(Q6:11) At a time when regions compete in the area of attracting people and businesses, the need increases for an internationally competitive regional institution with an explicit growth commission. Sweden needs more strong regions capable of operating across borders (SALAR, 2011:3). [75]

While the region is represented as important in the global competition and its capacity to act is emphasized as important in Q6:11, it also stands in clear relation to certain modes of rationale that push it in specific directions. Therefore, we may understand the representation of regions as re-active in the sense that they need to act in such ways that are determined by the needs of, for instance, companies and skilled professionals that are understood to be of outmost importance for producing competitiveness.

In my view, this can be interpreted as another example of how politics disappear from practices that are formed in relation to globalization, or at least become confined within very narrow boundaries. The region is not represented as a political unit that may pursue different goals and interests, but rather it is endowed with forms of actions (re-actions) that are understood to be structured by forces emanating from some unidentified outside. In short, the region must be competitive, and it must react to the fluctuations in its surroundings, and it cannot shape or dictate what those surroundings are supposed to look like.

As mentioned, these representations of important (but re-active) regions also tie into articulations of differentiated regions. By this I mean two things. First, regions are often represented as more or less suitable for competing in the global competition. More precisely, there is a clear urban-rural divide in the sense that representations of the metropolitan region emerge as positive and particularly pertinent for fostering innovation and entrepreneurship. Hence, some of the passive representations are modified when the image of the urban metropolis is invoked, yet it is still re-active.

Importantly, there is also an interesting tension in the material that relates to regional size, and the size of cities. That is, regions are often represented as too small to compete, and therefore a specific logic that ties in to my second meaning of differentiation is invoked. By this I mean that since cities and regions are competing, the representations of them are made in line with a form of acceptance of more or less prosperous areas.

49 This roughly translates into: Form competitive regions: Sweden needs more strong growth regions - arguments and results
In short, in the assemblage the Scandinavian capitals Stockholm, Copenhagen and Oslo are articulated as ‘special’. They become the central actors in a network encircling them, and indeed, they too are merely small or medium sized outposts in a larger European network:

(Q6:12) Globally connected cities will continue to attract human capital and cluster higher added-value activities. Europe, while hosting few large metropolises, above 10 million people, has a balanced distribution of small and medium-sized cities all over the territory. Considering the challenges that global cities may have in terms of overconcentration, which could hamper sustainable growth, the polycentric structure of the European territory and the already large fixed social capital investments allocated in many cities, has the potential to facilitate a more balanced growth. European small and medium sized cities will have to increase their European and global connectivity without losing their social inclusiveness and cultural heritage (ESPON, 2014:21). [10]

Therefore, the representations of regions as social actors assign different roles to them in the network. Small and medium sized cities must continuously strive to be connected to the more important nodes that produce differentiation in terms of roles and actions. In short, the smaller regions have to accept that they will be worse off than capitals and big cities, and the best chance they have is to try to become connected to them. For some, this leaves problems, as articulated in the RDS of Region Örebro:

(Q6:13) The location of Örebro 200 kilometres from Stockholm and ever further from Gothenburg and Oslo makes it unlikely that we will turn into an integrated, functional part of either of these regions. The functional region of Stockholm will probably comprise most of the counties of Västmanland, Sömland, and Uppland, but only in certain specific cases include parts of the county of Örebro. At the same time, our region is probably too small for us to be able to create solid growth on our own. We are a region with a city which is slightly smaller than the definition of a big city. We cannot, unlike Stockholm, Malmö, Gothenburg – and possibly in the long term Norrköping-Linköping – expect the size of the region in itself to guarantee sustainable growth and welfare (Region Örebro, 2010:14). [63]

Therefore, in sum, I interpret the representations of the region as a social actor as important, re-active and differentiated. This means that while the regions are assigned qualities that make them important actors in the race for competitiveness, they are not equally important. When representing the actions of regions, I interpret the texts as portraying them as more or less conditioned upon other social actors. The larger ones have to compete and cooperate in a complex network for the grace of the mobile class of highly skilled workers and while this applies also to small regions, they must at the same time re-act much more in relation to the larger ones. Thus, the representations of the social actor the region can be understood as particularly related to the chain of rationale that I called the attraction chain in
the last chapter. Consider, for instance, how re-action is a prerequisite for being attractive, even when working with images and brands that in a way can seem pro-active (cf. Q5:23 through Q5:25) they are basically ways for the regions to cater to a mobile and selective creative class.

6.2.3. The Corporation

In my interpretation of how the corporation is represented as a social actor it takes a central position in relation to the rationale of global competition. Indeed, the corporation is represented as both the object of competition as well as a solution to competitiveness, or in other words, regions must strive to attract businesses, while having prominent businesses in place in a region also make them more attractive.

Thus, as a social actor, the corporation is bestowed with powerful and mostly positive qualities. In particular, as I have already illustrated, it is represented as highly mobile, ready to search for spaces that for the moment are best suited. Hence, it is a represented as very active in a way that forces the regions, and indeed countries, to focus on producing an environment that is considered ‘good’ for the corporations. The articulations of Q6:14 from the Swedish Government’s national strategy for regional growth and attraction are by now, a recognizable theme:

(Q6:14) A policy for promoting entrepreneurship and growing businesses includes framework conditions, incentives, and targeted measures. Sweden needs a business climate where many people, regardless of age, gender, and background, can identify opportunities and be willing to take risks, but also have access to the resources and support systems that they may need at critical stages of development. For instance, the ability to facilitate things for companies, to attract, keep, and develop skills, create access to capital, and take advantage of international contacts, is also greatly significant for the regional development potential. The public sector should contribute to these functions as part of its areas of responsibility (MIEC, 2014:13).

As argued, one of the most important features of the corporations in the age of globalization is their high degree of mobility. Indeed, this is often a mobility that is represented as still accelerating so that we must expect corporations to be even more mobile in the future. Such representations are made, for instance, in the report *Sverige som kunskapsnation - Klarar sig Sverige utan storföretagen?* [Sweden as a knowledge nation: Can Sweden manage without big corporations?] issued by the private think tank Globalization Forum:50

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50 This think tank is a part of the larger lobbying group, Swedish Entrepreneurship Forum, led by Professor Pontus Braunerhielm, who also chaired the Swedish Globalization Council. After the council’s work was finished in 2009, Braunerhielm established the Globalization Forum as
A recent trend is that multinational companies to a greater extent also locate R&D in different countries. R&D has often been characterised as more place-specific than production, in the sense that R&D activities have normally been localised to the home countries of the companies and close to the head office (Patel and Pavitt 1991). The globalisation of the R&D activities of multinational companies is a recent phenomenon that has developed at a slower pace than the globalisation of production (Carlsson 2006). Today, the multinational companies (including the Swedish ones) run extensive R&D operations around the world. A survey made by Tillväxtanalys regarding multinational companies in Sweden also show that a majority of companies, almost two thirds, think that the location of the head office is not particularly important for the localisation of other strategic operations such as R&D (Andersson, Dieden & Ejermo, 2012). [23]

The expressions in Q6:15 are often extended, particularly in expert reports, to include notions of so-called global value chains. That is to say, under conditions of globalization the mobility is not automatically a matter of relocating a factory from one region to another, for instance; rather the relocation is built into the structure of the corporations. They are represented as shuffling parts of the production around so that, as an example, the marketing strategies of a particular product may be produced by one subsidiary in country X, while the assembling of the product takes place in country Y, and the research and development of the company is located in country Z.

These very mobile companies that use the world as their playing field are, however, only one side of the articulation concerning business. Indeed, while many of the dominant rationales are directly linked to attracting and maintaining such corporations, they also pose a form of threat since they can relocate and they can choose new paths in their corporate structure.

While the discussion so far has concerned global, large companies, the other end of the spectrum is also very positively represented, although the form is different. Here two things are articulated as important. First, that regions must maintain an environment that is business friendly, full of small start-up companies and easy for the entrepreneurs to maneuver through and, second, that they should focus on agglomerations, or clusters of businesses.

This means that the representations of the social actor the corporation are split into two major categories: On the one hand, the corporation that is a highly mobile giant and, on the other, the small businesses that are not able to compete through size. However, the small businesses are often also linked to knowledge, innovation and entrepreneurship. Whereas the large corporations may have money to establish big research and development

an arena where the work of the council could continue in a similar format – by issuing reports and providing policy material on the impact of globalization in Sweden.
offices that regions must compete for, the small businesses can also build their competitive edge on knowledge and innovation:

(Q6:16) In an ever more competitive situation, the ability to change continuously is required for a company to survive. The businesses in southern Småland cannot respond to increasing global competition with lower salaries and simple production, but only through development and innovation. A good climate for innovation creates conditions for knowledge and entrepreneurship to lead up to new products and services, or new modes of production. Innovations are dependent on a highly functional interplay between those agents who influence the way in which knowledge is created and used in the business sector, in politics, and in research. Apart from the role of physical capital, financial capital, and human capital, the dimension of social capital has become more and more important—a social capital which consists partly of the access of people and businesses to social networks, and partly of the level of trust between these agents. The focus is moved from effective production to the ability to cooperate and the need for a creative and tolerant environment (RDS Södra Småland, 2009:7).

Notice how the articulations of Q6:16 also place the small company at the center of the community. It is represented as a social actor that contributes to the production of social capital and indeed, this makes the small business dependent on cooperation and an environment where partnerships and joint efforts are crucial. From my point of view, this enhances the articulated importance of the businesses as social actors since they are positioned, almost on equal terms as humans, in the networks that produce vital resources for the local community.

When such local environments of companies are represented, they often relate to articulations of clusters as both an expression of good cooperation as well as a means of facilitating an environment where social capital, innovation and entrepreneurship can emerge. The clusters, therefore denote a particular social actor that sometimes is bestowed with the quality to act on behalf of the companies and organizations that are a part of it, but most of the time a cluster designates a format that ties together businesses, universities and other organizations to produce innovation and entrepreneurship within a particularly fruitful domain. It can contain small as well as large companies but the important feature is that it gives a region a focus and expertise that help in the global competition. Ideally it should also be a site where regional leadership is deployed and fostered (cf. Q5:33 and Q5:34). In the national innovation strategy issued by the Swedish Government this is spelled out as in Q6:17 below:

(Q6:17) It is highly desirable that the development of regional innovation environments in Sweden is coupled with a strategic approach to the international development. A special potential for sustainable growth and innovation in the regional economy resides in the connection between different industries and fields.
of knowledge. The creation of meetingplaces, for instance in the form of clusters or networks, is therefore valuable for innovative edge and regional growth. Cooperation in these innovative environments can promote innovation and competitive power, and create conditions for them to become attractive nodes in global knowledge and innovation networks and platforms for cooperation on the regional, national, and international levels. A development of the tourist industry and the cultural and creative sectors can also contribute to more attractive innovation environments. These industries are characterised by strong growth internationally and Sweden has the potential to increase export and value creation in these areas (MIEC, 2014b:48).

Summing up, the representations of the social actor the corporation produce two categories of the actor that are both important and active in the assemblage. The large-scale, transnational corporation is articulated as mobile in its actions and not only with a clear agency, but also with the capacity to act. Indeed, its mobile capacity is represented as so forceful that those regions who do not try to accommodate the needs and the demands of corporations run the risk of not only missing out on potential new establishments, they will also see already established companies move away. As for the small businesses, they are also produced as vital actors in the regions. As part of a cluster, they are especially important as incubators for innovation and entrepreneurship and also as important parts of the cohesion in a community. Therefore, in contrast to, for instance, the region, corporations are very much agentilized in the corpus in ways that produce them as dictating the lead for politics and people to follow.

6.2.4. The Immigrants

The representations of the social actor immigrants are in some ways very similar to that of women. I interpret one strand of representations as focused on forms of empowerment; much as women needed empowerment to realize their potential as innovators and entrepreneurs, so do immigrants (cf. Q5:20). Therefore in this regard, much of the interpretations I made concerning women goes for immigrants too, although the categories are not necessarily produced in similar ways.

In particular, another mode of representing immigrants in the texts concerns the separation, or stratification of the spectrum of immigrants into different social actors. In this regard, as touched upon in the first section of this chapter, one category of immigrants retains the term ‘immigrants’ while another category is articulated as international experts. In the following, I will first focus on how immigrants are nominated as social actors with potentially helpful qualities before I move on to the way that the category is split into two different subcategories. The second of those, the international experts, then provides a kind of introduction to the
next section of the chapter where I introduce the representations of ‘experts’ in broader terms.

In my interpretation, immigrants are represented as important and needed in three ways in the material. First, they can be a potential solution to many problems associated with an aging population, particularly in regions that struggle with population decline and migrating younger people. Second, they are represented as a feature and ingredient of an inclusive, tolerant and attractive environment, which in turn is understood as a melting pot suited for innovation and entrepreneurship. Third, they are also, as mentioned above, represented as a particularly skilled group that already is entrepreneurs or potential innovators such as business leaders, researchers, engineers and students.

The two first ways of representing immigrants as important for regional development are visible in Q6:18 from the RDS of region Kalmar:

(Q6:18) One way to respond to the great demographic challenges of the county is to focus on increased in-migration and labour migration as well as introduction activities for newly arrived inhabitants. The diversity brought to our region by people from other countries is valuable for competence and labour provision, but also for the development of our culture. We will therefore create good conditions for newly arrived inhabitants, regardless of background, to stay in our region, establish themselves on the job market, and take part actively in the development of the community. We can do this for instance by offering high quality schools, good housing, a creative work life, and active participation in club activities (RDS Kalmar, 2012:30). [61]

These positive representations of the immigrants are a striking feature of the material and I think it is important to recognize this generally welcoming attitude. At the same time, the split of the immigrant into two subgroups reconfigures this image somewhat. Consider the articulations of Q6:19 lifted from the final report of the ESPON project TIGER:

(Q6:19) In the context of globalized human flows, one of the major issues for Europe is to attract highly qualified labour (WP11 and 13). This specific migration plays a predominant role in many respects. Demographic trends might result in shortage of qualified labour, at least in some professions. Also, highly skilled labour is of utmost importance in knowledge transfer, notably within major transnational firms’ networks. […] This might reflect the fact that migration to Europe in particular is more often of lower skilled nature and that qualifications are not easily transferred. Overall, Europe still lags behind the US in terms of high-skilled immigration, but performs better than Japan. However, the trend of high-skilled migration to Europe is positive since Europe has displayed stronger growth than the US in both absolute and per capita terms (ESPON, 2013:16). [09]

In the quote the separation of immigrant into two segments is explicit. Indeed, a problem for Europe as a whole is that much of the migration is of ‘lower skill’. What is needed instead are world class researchers,
engineers, business leaders as well as highly skilled exchange students. The latter are experts in the making and therefore important to attract since even if they do not stay they will create lasting relationships and networks with Swedish companies and universities.

Hence, when representing immigrants, there is a rather stark difference between the highly skilled and the lower skilled. It is my interpretation that lower skilled persons are also those who need empowerment, although this does not mean that they will become highly skilled. Rather they are often represented as performing service functions, or indeed being an exotic ingredient in the kind of environment that attracts the highly skilled. Again, we may consider one of the examples that the OECD uses when evaluating region Skåne in its territorial review:

(Q6:20) Governance partnerships between municipalities and local firms could help tap into the existing and potential qualifications of the migrant labour force. An interesting example of a bottom-up partnership between local government and local industry can be found in Malmö. During the spring of 2011, many hotels in Malmö asked the city government for help in finding asylum seekers who could work in the hotel industry in order to better address the needs of increasing numbers of international guests. In the summer of 2011, the City of Malmö started offering a programme of adult education combined with Swedish language education and workplace training for asylum seekers, with the promise that if participants achieved a set of given standards they would then secure a job in a hotel. Only 30 spots were available but the initiative attracted as many as 300 participants, and 23 out of the 30 candidates found jobs within 2 months. Similar projects could be encouraged in the future, including other sectors, such as healthcare, which need professionals able to communicate in foreign languages. The multi-national group IKEA is currently building a new conference centre and a hotel in Malmö that will host training programmes for their employees from all over the world. Combined with targeted training mechanisms, this could be used as a pivotal opportunity to harness the diversity of languages and other professional skills available within the region’s migrant labour force and bolster Skåne’s international brand (OECD, 2012:187).

The stratification of immigrants is clearly spelled out in Q6:19. Notice how the low-skilled immigrants through these kinds of initiatives can be made into the service personnel for the international expertise as they travel around the globe. I will get back to this issue later. However, the class dimension is so overtly articulated here that it is hard to avoid. While it is implicitly present throughout the corpus, it becomes highly visible in representations of immigrants as two different categories. Again, some of them are supposed to produce the kind of expert knowledge that we need for competitiveness while others may work in elderly care, hotels or use their entrepreneurial culture to start restaurants. This is quite different from the kind of immigrants sought after in for instance Q6:5.

So, to sum up, the representations of the social actor the immigrant take two forms, although both rest on a common ground that immigration is
important. In short, immigrants are needed to make regions function in the future. The first kind of representations therefore produces the immigrant as a potential service class that can perform the jobs needed in elderly care and other services that are needed among an aging population. The second kind represents the immigrant as a very highly skilled and competent individual that the regions need in order to be competitive. In between the two categories there are also representations of the immigrant as an exotic feature of an attractive environment, which is needed for the experts of tomorrow to relocate to any given region. I have called this an overt display of class difference that in reality also is an ethnicity issue. While the experts are often represented as being of any possible origin, the low skilled immigrants are implicitly asylum seekers or, indeed they do not even have to be immigrants, but rather second-generation immigrants that live in deprived areas of the cities that are in need of empowerment such as in the example of Q5:20.

6.2.5. The Experts

I have grouped together some articulations of social actors under the term the experts and with this I mean representations of primarily three kinds. First, it relates to the particular expertise that is needed to be attractive in international competition, or in other words the kind of immigrants that I specified above (researchers, students and other highly skilled professionals). Second, there are representations of experts in the making, or in other words the notion that regions must also produce the same kind of expert knowledge that they are trying to attract internationally in their own local setting. In essence, this often means that representations of universities as social actors are a salient theme in the corpus. In relation to the universities, representations of the ‘internal’ researchers and students are then opposed to the external ones that have to be attracted to come from other countries. Finally, the third type of articulations of experts in the material relates to policy expertise such as the OECD, ESPON, NORDREGIO and other social actors that are represented as important for providing ‘evidence based’ policy in regional development.

Hence, we may crudely group those articulations into two groups of which includes the experts as producers and the other the experts as evaluators. Often, there is no clear cut line since, for instance, university research centers can be represented both as a center of knowledge production of outmost importance for innovation and competitiveness and as an unbiased actor that can provide policy expertise.
If we start with the representations of the experts as producers, it is my interpretation that these are ascribed a highly mobile quality and thus bestowed with great capacities of social action. Both the internationally recruited competence and the internal group of students and researchers are often represented as very rational in the sense that they will be looking for environments that best suit their needs and then relocate there. What is more, this capacity of being on the move seems to be constantly present so that researchers and students continuously evaluate their present living environment and consider whether or not it is time to move on to the next region. These mobile qualities of the experts are often implicitly assumed, such as in Q6:21 from the national strategy for regional growth and attraction:

(Q6:21) Sustainable growth in Sweden is not only dependent on the conditions for the business sector. It is also dependent on the environments where people live and work. Access to education, infrastructure, job markets, service, IT, culture, and housing is an important prerequisite for an attractive environment where people and companies can grow and work. Attractiveness is therefore a key requirement for sustainable growth and as such an obvious starting point for local and regional growth efforts. The ability to offer good living and housing environments is essential when creating regions that can attract, keep, and develop not only skills but also businesses and capital (MIEC, 2014a:2). [39]

There is no explicit nomination of the social actor the expert here although, the reasoning concerns measures that must be taken, not only to attract competence, but also to retain it. Through such implicit assumptions the experts, as in students, researchers, business leaders, engineers and other highly skilled professionals, are represented as mobile and in a way very dedicated to their own realization as experts by being ready to relocate to wherever this realization is considered most beneficial for the moment. Indeed, one of the chief problems articulated in relation to this is that this mobility is not recognized enough in policy. In Q6:22 from the Nordic Council of Ministers’ report Global Pressures Nordic Solutions, the importance of the expert as producers is cemented and at the same time articulates the lack of a global perspective in the Nordic:

(Q6:22) Highly skilled employees and world-class research are the bedrock of Nordic competitiveness and a key reason for the high level of R&D intensity in the region. In both areas, the region is in danger of falling behind market needs, not the least because of a lack of global perspective and Nordic integration. If there is one critical issue that the Nordics need to get right, it is this one (NCM, 2010:7). [30]

We may ask then, assuming the mobility of the experts, what it is that they desire in terms of living environment preferences. Some of the most salient
themes in the representation of the experts in this regard are visible in Q6:21 above, such as attractive housing, although the articulations in Q6:23 below expand on this:

(Q6:23) A global living environment makes a city or town seem larger than it really is. A global living environment means that rural areas are connected to the world through good communications and increased digitalisation, which results in a living, attractive, and socially functional countryside. A global living environment is a place where the outside world is an integrated part of the local community. It is characterised by curiosity about other cultures and it is creative and dynamic with an open and tolerant social climate which contributes to diversity. It is essential for a growing region both to keep and to attract new inhabitants. People choose those towns and regions that offer the best balance of an interesting job market, dynamic living environments, attractive housing, community services, and a good environment for children and young people to grow up in (RDS Jönköping, 2013:28).

Often, the tacit assumption is that a global environment is what the experts desire, and this is generally represented as best realized in urban centers. Hence, the important experts are assumed to be driven towards metropolitan areas where the concentration of high-tech companies and innovation incubators is highest. The combined representations of the experts as important, mobile and urban therefore also contribute to a form of elevation of the qualities found in cities at the expense of those found in rural areas. Thus, this feeds into the ways that the attraction chain articulated certain rationales for achieving competitiveness by focusing on precisely the experts (cf. Q5:18 and Q5:19).

Turning then to the other form of representations of the experts, namely the evaluators, we often find the experts equated with quite a narrow set of ‘bodies’. The OECD, ESPON, NORDREGIO and certain university centers are identified as very important in the governance of regional development. In a way therefore, the experts as producers and the experts as evaluators have overlapping functions since some of them actually produce what is represented as unbiased knowledge concerning how the politics of regional development should be shaped and evaluated.

In my interpretation this is not only a superficial statement of some instances where the role of the expert as producer and evaluator is blurred, but rather an indication of how the rationales for evaluation and assessment are formed as well as how they also shape the representations of the experts as producers (i.e. how important they are, who they are and what they should do).

Concerning the representations of the experts as evaluators then, the most prominent feature here is that the assemblage of regional development needs what is often referred to as ‘evidence-based’ policy.
This should ideally be disseminated by unbiased actors with the ability to perform benchmarking and evaluation in ways that can feed policy makers with information so that they can make the right decisions. In Q6:24 below we find what I see as salient themes of the texts:

(Q6:24) A key element in managing the territorial impact of policies is the availability of a sound “evidence base” of key EU territorial structures and processes, trends and methodologies. The need for territorial analyses and impact assessments was identified during the discussion on territorial cohesion and its policy implications which were launched by the European Commission after it had adopted its Green Paper on “Territorial Cohesion” in 2008. The key challenge is to produce targeted analyses for use at key moments in the whole EU policy process.

ESPON plays a crucial role in the development of a sound analytical base, and also in the development and use of methodologies for ex-ante territorial impact assessments of European Commission proposals. The first results of these researches are already available from projects like TIPTAP or EDORA, for example. If the political will is there, these results could be used as a framework for a formal integrated impact assessment procedure. [...] The utilisation and capitalisation of ESPON results could also be developed at national and regional level. The whole ESPON programme should be adapted to the needs of the period after 2013, in agreement with the European Commission, to better serve European policy making related to territorial development and cohesion (EC, 2011:86). [18]

Similar examples could have been made using OECD, NORDREGIO or some university institutes as the central bodies. However, in this regard I think the important point is the articulated ‘sound analytical base’ that stands at the center of the representations concerning all such expert actors. That is to say, they fulfill, as I have already stated, the role of the unbiased evaluator that may provide information on ‘how’ to conduct the governance of regional development.

Less manifested is the way that private experts figure as such evaluators, not the least through the production of the RDS documents. Indeed, those are explicitly formulated with goals that are possible to evaluate and benchmark, and often the RDS contains material produced by consultant firms that specialize on the evaluation of public sector performance. The goals, and the measures of evaluating them, therefore become an important part in the formulation of policy. Consider the articulations from the RDS of Region Värmland:

(Q6:25) The Värmland strategy includes 33 quantifiable objectives. The objectives are so-called impact goals on an overall community level. The various objectives are dependent on changes in economic conditions and what happens in the outside world. The quantifiable objectives constitute an important tool for finding out if we are moving in the right direction. Through continuously monitoring and measuring the development in Värmland, we can assess whether or not we need to reconsider some of the measures as we go along. It can for instance be a question of prioritising certain activities above others. Knowing how Värmland is
developing is also valuable for learning and gaining insight into the kind of efforts which benefit the region (RDS Värmland, 2014:6). [70]

To me, this role of the unbiased expert knowledge helps (re)produce certain forms of truth in relation to the assemblage and therefore in a way also contributes to the naturalization of particular practices and in the end also of the modes of rationale that dominate it. In addition, the power/knowledge that operates in relation to this form of expert articulations is of course also a powerful form of legitimization for the governance that rests upon them. Moreover, it is also an often-used example of processes of de-politicization in the sense that certain matters of knowing and performing are deemed as 'true' since they emanate from experts. Hence, to formulate opinions that go against them would be unreasonable, rendering politics more or less impossible. This is not to say that experts should have no role to play in governance. What I wish to point out is rather how expert knowledge is as performative as the numbers, diagrams, schemas and indices they mobilize as instruments. Hence, the deployment of expert knowledge and the actions represented as vital to the expert as evaluator do not only describe an empirical reality, but also produce that reality. On this note, recall how the leadership chain produces a rationale on the notion that expertise is more needed, and not enough installed in the polity apparatuses (cf. Q5:32 and Q5:35).

To sum up, the social actor, the expert, is represented in two broad ways. The first involves the experts as producers and representations portray a highly skilled or competent worker, or one in-the-becoming, such as students. The second form of representations are made in relation to the expert as evaluator and equates the expert with unbiased evaluation performed by bodies such as OECD, NORDREGIO, ESPON as well as university research centers and private consultant firms. Taken together, the representations of the expert produce a social actor that is of outmost importance not only for the internal production of competitiveness but also for the legitimacy of the techniques deployed and the rationales adopted to achieve it.

6.2.6. The Entrepreneur

Turning to representations of the social actor, the entrepreneur, it should be clear that they take a central position in the corpus. The entrepreneur emerges as a social actor that is linked to, and important in a number of different circumstances. Entrepreneurs are often explicitly nominated in the texts and when this happens they are active and represented as full of
potential. Indeed, in the logic that follows from the rationales that focus on creativity, innovation and entrepreneurship it seems only natural that this social actor takes a prominent position. However, I think there is a quality concerning the representations of the entrepreneur that goes beyond ‘just’ importance. Therefore, in the following I shall focus on how we may understand the social actor, the entrepreneur, as discursively overdetermined and what this means in more detail (van Leeuwen, 2008).

By referring to the entrepreneur as an overdetermined social actor I mean that the representations of it symbolically places it at the center of a diverse set of social practices that thereby become inter-related through the presence of the entrepreneur. Before I spell out my interpretation of this overdetermination more clearly I wish to ground the importance ascribed to the entrepreneurs throughout the corpus in a quote:

(Q6:26) Stimulating what is sometimes assessed an “innovative but not entrepreneurial” labour force in Sweden can have a substantial impact on regional development. Sweden’s overall rates of entrepreneurship (in terms of business births, deaths and growth rates) remain low by international standards. The annual number of start-ups tends to be higher in large metropolitan regions, but the annual growth rates of startups is higher in rural regions and this potential should be exploited. Besides the extensive set of national measures to promote entrepreneurship and business support, almost all Regional Development Programmes (RUPs) include initiatives directed towards entrepreneurship and small business development. Some regions have developed successful private sector led bottom-up initiatives (such as the winter automotive cluster in the north). Further efforts, based on close collaboration between national, regional and municipal actors should not only support business development and facilitate access to finance (especially to regional venture capital funds for early stage high-growth firms), but also focus on improving entrepreneurial awareness and entrepreneurial culture starting from early school years (OECD, 2010:24) [36]

In Q6:26 we can interpret the function of the entrepreneur as important, even though it is not nominated as a social actor. Instead, the practice of entrepreneurship is considered with reference to how important it is, and indeed, how problematic it is for Sweden being an innovative nation with low levels of entrepreneurship. A number of measures taken in both regional and national polities are hailed, but these are not enough. If the regions are really to become entrepreneurial they must take measures to change the social system in a more comprehensive way. Indeed, this means, among other things, that the school system should be made an agent for fostering the children’s entrepreneurial qualities (cf. Q5:15).

So, in short, since entrepreneurship is described in such positive terms in the corpus, the entrepreneur is of course also considered positive and important. The alignment of the social system should be shifted so that Sweden not only produce high levels of innovation, but also have a
population that knows how to make those innovations into commodities or services. I interpret this as articulations of quite a large and significant change in the Swedish system as such, and it is most likely linked to the way the entrepreneur is represented.

I stated before that the representations can be seen as overdetermined, and by this I basically mean that the entrepreneur emerges as a symbolic figure of grace in many different social settings and thereby acquires almost a form of omnipotent status in the governance of regional development. To begin with, the entrepreneur is produced as essential for innovation, or at least innovation seems to be problematic unless it is commodified as in Q6:26 (or as in the articulations of Region Uppsala in Q5:17). However, this is but one social practice that the entrepreneur is prominent in and we can make these diverse settings visible through a series of quotes, beginning with Q6:27 below:

(Q6:27) The different activities of the county council are rich environments for research and development. Apart from creating value in the domain of healthcare and promoting health-related research, there are great opportunities for developing innovations and businesses. At the Örebro University Hospital (USÖ), there is a potential which can be developed further in cooperation with the business sector and the university. The strategy involves supporting commercialisation processes and knowledge-intensive entrepreneurship based at USÖ. Cooperation between USÖ, the university, and existing businesses inside and outside our region will increase. Apart from developing initiatives from inside USÖ, forms for searching actively for commercialisation opportunities are developed (RDS Örebro, 2010:25).

In this case, entrepreneurship emerges as a prominent and important feature of health care. The articulations recognize that the advanced technologies and highly educated personnel in place at a large hospital make it suitable for commercializing services and products, and thus it becomes a site for the entrepreneur to operate in. In a way therefore the entrepreneur becomes a social actor that should inspire the staff at medical facilities, who indeed should also become entrepreneurs.

Similarly, consider the articulations of Q6:28 lifted from the national strategy for regional growth and attraction:

(Q6:28) Inclusionary growth is a challenge for almost every part of Sweden and all Swedish regions. Even regions with low general unemployment numbers can experience problems when trying to include young people and newly arrived women and men in the job market, especially those who lack a completed education at the secondary or upper secondary school levels. The levels of income and employment are lower in certain parts of the major urban regions than the national average. At the same time, it is important to note that there are regions and municipalities that have a more inclusionary growth situation. They excel through a good climate for entrepreneurship and business ventures, a diversified business sector with a number of different industries that employ people at
different levels of skill, a vital civil society, and an open-minded attitude towards new inhabitants (MIEC, 2014a:9). [39]

In this circumstance, even if not directly nominated, the entrepreneur (who presumably must be the actor that performs entrepreneurship) is again represented as a role model. Struggling regions and municipalities should look for entrepreneurs and businesses when trying to create an inclusive system (cf. Q5:28). That is to say, since inclusive growth is promoted as the way of making sure that growth is spread out so that all social groups can benefit from it, the entrepreneur becomes the social actor who can help alleviate potential problems such as unemployment and general low levels of income.

In the EC document *The Territorial State and Perspectives of the European Union*, issued as a background material for the EU2020 program, we find that the entrepreneur is also the savior of the rural territories in a globalized world:

(Q6:29) Local entrepreneurial capacity has been identified as a key aspect for capitalising on territorial potential in rural areas. Furthermore open and inclusive soft networks are positively related to the mobilisation of entrepreneurial capacity and local initiative. Nonetheless, along with diversification local and regional economies should also recognise that they may need to specialise to be competitive (EC, 2011a:57). [18]

Furthermore, as I have already mentioned when analyzing the modes of rationale that I interpret as important in the corpus, the entrepreneur is also a key figure in relation to the environment (cf. Q5:29) where environmental issues of the future will be solved by new inventions driven by the new culture of entrepreneurship. In relation to the school system it is evident in Q6:26 above as well as in Q5:15 and Q5:41. In the latter of those (Q5:41) the entrepreneur is also nominated and represented as an actor that could help change the bureaucratic systems of municipalities, county councils and government agencies. In relation to women and equality, it has also been discussed here how the entrepreneur can be interpreted as a role model, or at least that the practice of entrepreneurship can be related to means of increasing gender equality (cf. Q7:8). Also, in relation to higher education, and the so-called experts, the entrepreneur is represented as a special social actor that needs to have a more prominent role (cf. Q5:17) and the same goes for immigration (cf. Q5:20). In a way therefore, the following quote from the RDS of Södra Småland sums up the representation of the entrepreneur in the material:
The cultural-historical identity, the man from Småland as an innovator, a clever jack-of-all-trades highly capable of adapting, can be defined as the concept of entrepreneurship. An entrepreneur is a determined person who takes initiatives and gets things done – a creative person who moves from ideas to actions. The attributes of Småland, creativity and agency, have been greatly valuable in the past and will be again in relation to our capacity to handle the challenges of the future. The entrepreneur is an innovator with a fundamentally optimistic attitude, an open-minded and curious person. In short, entrepreneurship is about get-up-and-do-it – seeing to it that things happen. The get-up-and-do-it of Småland is needed in many different contexts – obviously in the business sector but also in schools, healthcare, organisations, politics, and culture (RDS Södra Småland, 2009:9).

Taken together this overdetermination of the social actor the entrepreneur helps produce a form of natural legitimacy for the role(s) it is inscribed with. The entrepreneur becomes the professional hero that is never confined to a particular social practice but rather actively turns social practices into new competitive domains. If there is inequality, the entrepreneur will solve it, if there are problems with the environment the entrepreneur will disentangle them and if the governmental agencies need changes the entrepreneur will bring them. In essence therefore, the entrepreneur is represented as a very powerful icon of contemporary regional development. The practices he or she performs are almost ritually inscribed as the future solution of society.

6.3 Producing The Regional (and Global) Actors

In this chapter I have shown my interpretations of some of the most prominent social actors that are represented in the texts. In relation to studies of governmentality this chapter is therefore concerned with the way power/knowledge operates within the assemblage, producing a range of different social actors that each has a role to fill, particularly in relation to the political rationales drawn out in the previous chapter. As explained before, this is not an analysis that tries to point out who has the most power, or who dominates who, but rather the central questions here have been ‘who is conceived of as a social actor in a given circumstance’ as well as ‘how is this representation made’ and ‘how come’?

I have chosen to investigate the representations of social actors and actions in terms of inclusion, exclusion, agentilization and de-agentilization. While these are crucial elements in the construction of social actors, they also provide insight into some minute workings of power. So even though the primary goal has been to illustrate the representation of social actors, the power/knowledge that produces these representations also tell us interesting things about the internal configurations and stratifications of the assemblage at hand.
First, some of the social actors are represented as having very high capacities for action, especially action that drives the re-actions of other social actors. Corporations, the experts and, in a special way, the entrepreneur are examples of social actors that are represented as having a set of qualities that are so important in relation to the modes of rationale that they are able to stipulate demands and dictate their future. When the corporations are represented in the texts they are understood as increasingly mobile, so much in fact, that they are not really tied to any specific spatial site. Through the use of global value chains they have built mobility into the production so that regions must always be wary of the specific parts of the production that may be located in sites that benefit them.

Even though small businesses are not represented as equally mobile, they too are produced as very important. They are positioned in the midst of the social fabric as drivers of innovation, particularly if within a cluster and therefore in relation to other businesses (including large corporations) and public organizations such as universities and agencies.

The production of the social actor, the corporation, in this particular assemblage can be understood in many ways. However, I think that one aspect of it relates to the discussion in chapter five concerning the leadership chain. That is to say, the importance of the corporation is literally intertwined with the region through different forms of public-private partnerships, clusters and innovation systems (Swyngedouw, 2005; Säll, 2012; 2014), helping to produce, as discussed in the previous chapter, a situation that may be characterized as a struggle to uphold consensus forms of decision making and thus keeping antagonistic political issues out of the process. In a wider sense, different strands of research under the general theme of public administration have of course pointed to the changes in administrative systems in relation to the so-called New Public Management (NPM) and a supposed shift from government to governance for a long time (cf. Dunleavy & Hood, 1994; Hood, 1991; 1995; Rhodes, 1994; 1997).

At the same time, and related to the evolution of NPM and governance systems, the importance of the corporation can also be tied to different functions of neoliberal state restructuring (Brenner, 2004; Peck; 2013; Peck & Tickel, 2002) in the sense that the corporations have come to represent a kind of ideal figure for society. This may seem surprising given what Peck (2013:134) has called a near death experience for neoliberalism in Wall Street in 2008, yet, as a range of research has shown (cf. Cohen & Centeno, 2012), in contemporary austerity politics, neoliberalism remains vigilant
and the pinnacles of market economy and business logics continue to permeate most social systems. Moreover, and most relevant to this thesis, neoliberalism in a Foucauldian tradition (Collier, 2012; Dean, 2010; Larner, 2000; 2003; Ong, 2006; 2007) also denotes a particular configuration of political rationalities and governmental technologies in which increasing volumes of social life is being made the object for governing through biopolitics. Thus, even if the recent financial crash had got rid of neoliberalism as an ideology, it would not be surprising to find it fully operational in the mundane and situated practices that make up governing. Therefore, from this position the corporation continues to be a model for politics, administration and development, regardless of possible shifts in, for instance, monetary policy regimes or trade rules.

As for the experts, they are also articulated as mobile and very rational in the sense that they are ascribed innovative and entrepreneurial qualities that they seek to realize in environments that best suit them. In this regard they are represented as primarily seeking qualities that can be found in urban regions and if a particular region cannot provide this they will not choose to stay there. Hence, they are bestowed with the power of mobility and purpose like the corporations and therefore assume a central position among the important social actors. Consequently, the way this social actor is represented feeds the logic of the creative class (Florida, 2005; 2012) as discussed in the previous chapter where some of its elitist grounds were mentioned (cf. Parker, 2008; Peck, 2005).

Furthermore, the experts are also represented as objective evaluators of regional development policy and hence, this mode of representation is directly linked to the power/knowledge that produces rationales and the general frame of governmentality in the assemblage. Possibly, the production of this social actor can also be further illuminated by considering what has been called an increasing function of project politics (Jensen, Johansson & Löfström, 2013; Sjöblom, Löfgren & Godenhjelm, 2013). That is to say, influenced by, for instance, the different funding schemes in the EU where regions increasingly apply for short term projects, the actual form of the polity is shifted and allows for an influx of such experts that assume the function of unbiased knowledge producers who measure and control the outcome of different projects.

The entrepreneurs on the other hand are represented as overdetermined social actors that are able to fit into most of the important social practices that are articulated in the corpus. I interpret this overdetermination as having two important effects. First that it helps link social practices
together under the same basic mode of rationale or in other words that entrepreneurship is legitimized as a register of actions that can be applied to almost any situation to improve it. Second, that this also produces a template for transformation, or in other words that the entrepreneur that appears in many different social settings is not just some alien intruder. Rather s/he represents a people in the making. The doctors can become entrepreneurs, the teachers can become entrepreneurs, the students can become entrepreneurs and kids in the ghettos or the deprived rural industrial towns can also become entrepreneurs.

Indeed, in this regard the representations of entrepreneurs in the corpus is similar to the way the lone gun-slinger is often represented in the widely popular genre of westerns or how heroes are constructed in fairytales (Bettelheim; 2010; Wright, 1977). As the genre of western movies expanded during the 1960s it came to take on new forms and in particular it was usually constructed on a story arc where a town or community faces some form of grave danger. The solution often appears in the form of a lone gunman that arrives in town, faces the threat and solves it by using his special skills. Often, this is accompanied by a form of transition where the community can (only!) become collectively prosperous if they follow the example of the lone hero and assume some of his qualities. Furthermore, the entrepreneur also has more recent symbolic references, such as individual risk taking that signals the need to take care of yourself because you should not count on anyone else to do it (Dahlstedt & Hertzberg, 2012; Dahlstedt & Tesfahuney, 2008; 2010). I will return to this motif of the entrepreneur when discussing the production of global space in the final chapter. For now, it is enough to recognize the represented importance that the social actor enjoys in the texts I have analyzed.

If the corporations, the experts and the entrepreneurs are represented as social actors endowed with a high capacity for performing actions and delimiting their own future, the regions are not represented in the same way. Indeed, I have called the representations of the region re-active and by this I mean that the regions, while presented with capacities for action, must always act in accordance with the desires of the more mobile social actors.

However, while the regions are reactive, they are still more actively represented than the immigrants and the women. As for the immigrants, there is a clear distinction between the highly skilled internationally mobile class of researchers, business leaders and students, on the one hand, and the asylum seekers and ‘other’ forms of immigrants on the other. The latter are often represented as in need of help and special programs for being able to
fit into society, and even in this inclusion the immigrant is represented as either a service class person or a potential entrepreneur, making his or her own fortune. This seems to signal a form of deflection from the kind of responsibility that Swedish citizens expect the state to take, in the direction of more pressure on the citizens to fend for themselves without expecting public help.

Evidently, this too ties into the prevalence of creative class thinking (Florida, 2005; 2012; Parker, 2008; Peck, 2005) but in more general terms, the so-called immigration issue has been a part of European politics for a long time (cf. Hansen, 2000; 2010). Indeed, recent research has also highlighted the European colonial legacy in new ways by paying attention not only to the former colonies but rather by focusing on the remnants and influences of the colonial system in European countries (cf. Hansen & Jonsson, 2011; 2014). Doing so also makes visible how current relations between, for instance, Europe and Africa continue to be influenced by this colonial legacy, particularly in terms of migration. Indeed, one way to interpret the representations of the social actor, the immigrants, here is by recognizing what Hansen and Jonsson (2011:275) have called demographic colonialism. That is to say, the history of European-African regulations concerning migration shows a kind of pattern where European states have been able to use different strategic partnerships to their advantage, not least by putting in place systems that promote or restrict migration flows in accordance with European demographic needs.

Like immigrants, the women are also represented as in need of enhancement, although they are more of an asset in the sense that a more gender equal society is continuously represented as a boost for growth and innovation. Therefore, women are passively represented as in need of enhancement of qualities they have, but do not realize. Yet, when (if?) they realize these abilities, they are able to become part of the innovative, entrepreneurial and creative society that serves as the future goal of society. Indeed, many representations of successful and fully realized entrepreneurial women exist in the corpus and they are not in need of enhancement; rather they are role models for other women who must realize that they can activate their own inner qualities and thus overcome structural injustices.

This way of producing women as potentially good for growth while being kind of needy subjects that require enhancement and empowerment is not new in Swedish regional development (cf. Hudson & Rönnblom, 2007). Rather, this strategy is in part a product of greater schemes aimed at
6.3.1 Relational Space and Global Forms

With the risk of now being repetitive: the overarching empirical purpose of this thesis concerns the recursive production of globalization through the assemblage of regional development in Sweden. Hence, the representations of social actors are not viewed here as ‘merely’ effects of globalization in the governance of Swedish regional development, I also understand them as active production of globalization (and global space). In particular I am interested in how they contribute to global forms (Ong & Collier, 2005) of the assemblage and for this reason I will now expand on how I see the representation of social actors in the assemblage as producing such global forms. I do this by discussing two themes. First, how the representations of importance produce categories of actors that can easily be deployed in any local setting and second, how the active/passive representation further provides the modules for a script that can be applied globally.

Returning then to the importance of the social actors, I have illustrated how six categories of social actors are represented as particularly prominent in the texts. These representations can be understood as global forms of social actors (re)produced in the assemblage, yet with such features that make them possible to detach from this particular assemblage and be applicable to the development of regions all over the world. The representations of them delimit and select a certain variety of social actors as particularly influential while suppressing or backgrounding others, forming the contours of a schema more or less removed from, for instance, political actors.

Crucially therefore, the representations of important social actors in this assemblage produce a set of characters that may perform their actions, reactions and even passiveness just as pertinently in the Brazilian regional development as in the Swedish. In other words, the way that these actors are represented gives them a global character and makes them reliable go-to characters for any form of development. To illustrate the political and
contingent nature of this production, we may think of representations that could have been made important in the assemblage but are not, and at the same time we could think of a regional development that was much less keen on mobilizing such global forms of social actors. So, for a moment, let us consider who is not represented among these important social actors.

I have already mentioned the politicians, but there is also a striking lack of working class representation. Unions, social workers, factories, rural towns or sick people are almost antonymous groups to the social actors that have been produced as important in this assemblage. However, it is possible to imagine a form of regional development that would ascribe a much more prominent role to such actors. This list can of course be expanded. However, my main point is that the particular set that is represented as important here also has the kind of mobile character that makes them suitable for playing the central roles in a script potentially applicable to many different contexts. In short, the social actors nominated throughout the corpus are not a neutral expression of a natural order. The selection could have been different and at the same time, the descriptions of their mobility and capacity to act are important for understanding how they take global forms.

Therefore, if we consider something like the degree of activity or mobility that the representations ascribe to the different social actors, it is apparent that the corporations, the experts and the entrepreneurs are produced in such ways that they are not context-bound. Therefore they fit perfectly into what can be understood as global forms of regional governance, ready to be installed into any future context with an executable script ready to run. The regions, in their re-active way, are also produced in such ways that make them almost necessarily configured along the same kind of track wherever they are. It does not matter if a region is located in Kenya, Peru or Japan, they must all be re-active in ways that make them attract the extremely mobile corporations and experts while fostering entrepreneurs.

Note that while I do speak of global forms, I do not mean that the global forms must take exactly similar expressions in any given context (Ong & Collier, 2005). As for the corporations, experts, entrepreneurs and the regions, they are represented in such ways that they are particularly suited for appearing more or less the same in any setting. In contrast, consider the representations of the women and the immigrants. These two categories can be understood as local variations of passive and developable social actors. In another assemblage they could have been differently
represented, more backgrounded or complemented with other social actors.

So, taken together, I interpret the assemblage as producing a set of social actors that can be understood as contributing to the global forms of regional governance. They are produced as repeatable modules in a script that can be lifted from one setting, inserted into another and then executed. While such processes will likely produce variation, it will also show degrees of stability. Here I have interpreted some of the represented social actors as particularly mobile while others can be understood as more contextually bound.

Indeed, this production of global forms is of course related to the power topologies of the assemblage and I have already alluded to some of the more obvious effects. In the next chapter I will turn to discussing this further as I show how the social actors and political rationalities are also configured and expressed through specific governmental technologies.
This chapter centers on the technological side of governing the Assemblage. Recall how governmental technologies were means of making the rationales of the particular regime operable through a diverse set of tools, instruments and techniques (Dean, 2010; Miller & Rose, 2008). While the governmental technologies are linked to the modes of rationale, this should not be understood as a causal relationship in one direction. Indeed, often techniques of governing have a way of producing a rationale of their own and one might argue that being aware of such effects is an important part of understanding the way that power operates in an assemblage that is being made the object of governing. In addition, they also contribute to the production of social actors, and also often require certain types of social actors to function.

Therefore, in this chapter I examine the technological side of governing Swedish regional development by paying attention to two distinct forms of governmental technologies that also highlight the entangled production of social actors. The first one is the multimodal expressions of the RDS documents where images and stylish layout have become integral to the way that policy is communicated. Second, I also look closer at a (limited) aspect of the way that numbers, and in particular rankings and indices, are being mobilized as a ‘neutral’ way of expressing the performance and development of Swedish regions. I do this by analyzing the so-called Regional Innovation Index produced by Reglab, an organization where Swedish regions and government agencies cooperate regarding a number of issues concerning regional development.

As for the multimodal texts, what I am concerned with here is first, how all Swedish regions now are required to produce the RDS documents and outline their general strategies for development, and how therefore the documents can be conceived of as having a clear technical side. They are both a requirement, a kind of documentation, where the regions showcase their activities for the national government as well as a clear instrument for
joining up actors within a given region and pushing them in a particular direction. Second, I also think that they illustrate an ongoing trend in Swedish politics that may be identified as a shift in the way that it is communicated, at least within ‘regional politics’. Increasingly the government seems to communicate not through parliamentary committees and so-called SOU-documents,51 but rather by producing more glossy pamphlets such as Nationella innovationsstrategin52 or En nationell strategi för regional tillväxt och attraktionskraft 2014-2020.53

In this vein, the RDS documents are often glossed and clearly created with the help of graphical design expertise and thus introduce a way of communicating politics that is not captured fully by ‘only’ analyzing the written texts. In short, there are ways of expressing politics in written text that are not possible to do via the use of, for instance, photographs, and the written text is still the main mode of communication. Yet, the opposite is also true – the use of graphic images expands the discursive register to include modes of articulation that are not possible with written text (Kress & Van Leeuwen, 2006). If combined, which is in fact the most common practice in media and everyday communication today, the text becomes multimodal and interpreting it will require more than, for instance, ‘just’ reading the words in an advertisement campaign. Indeed, one of the most commonly used ways of combining written text and images is to produce a form of interplay between them. So, to use a quite unrelated example, what in written text may be considered a neutral message can become an overtly sexist multimodal one, as is often the case in advertisement campaigns for women’s underwear (Kress & Van Leeuwen, 2006).

Therefore, in this chapter my goal is to analyze what I take to be an important technological instrument in Swedish regional governance, the RDS documents, and in particular I am interested in the technique of using images to enhance or transform the political articulations of traditional written text segments. I do this in the first part of the chapter. However, before I more thoroughly analyse particular images and multimodal expressions, I start with a section that describes all of the RDS documents in terms of their multimodal qualities. I then proceed to some detailed examples that relate to the chains of rationale that I identified in chapter five that also highlights further modalities in the representation of the important social actors as described in chapter six. Hence, I will focus on four different examples of how the chains of rationale are also expressed

51 Statens Offentliga Utredningar [Swedish Government Official Reports].
52 In English: The National Innovation Strategy
53 In English: A National Strategy for Regional Growth and Attraction
through multimodal articulations, and an additional one for the prominent mode of rationale that I have called *creativity, innovation and entrepreneurship*.

When doing so, my analysis builds on, and mobilizes some of the analytical categories introduced by Gunther Kress and Theo van Leeuwen in their seminal work *Reading Images: The Grammar of Visual Design* (2006). This means, then, that the primary examples are chosen here first and foremost to show how the identified modes of rationale are also expressed in multimodal articulations, and often given an enhanced feature. Thus, the focus is more on laying bare the technological aspects of multimodal policy articulations and, with the exception of the first section, my goal is not to produce a general statement on how all multimodal expression of Swedish RDS documents function.

As for the use of numbers and rankings in regional politics, I find this also to be an important expression of certain forms of technologies within the assemblage. My point is not to question the use of numbers, statistics or rankings in politics *per se*; in fact I think that numbers and statistics can be liberating and important. However, I do take an interest in the way that numbers and rankings tend to be interpreted as crystal clear reflections of ‘reality’. I understand numbers, like other forms of text, as something that can actively be used to put forward an argument that in turn can be interpreted in many different ways. What is more, like written text, numbers do not just reflect reality, they are a form of language and thus contribute to the production of what is socially constituted as ‘real’.

Thus, as a separate part with regard to the analysis of RDS documents, I have included a shorter section on how we may interpret the technique of ranking regions with respect to their innovative capacity in this chapter. When doing so I make use of a set of analytical categories primarily extracted from works that deal with the governmentality of numbers in general and indices in particular (Fougner, 2008; Krause Hansen, 2012; Krause Hansen & Mülen-Schulte, 2012; Löwenheim, 2008; Porter T, 2012; Rose, 1991).

7.1 RDS OVERVIEW

In this part of the analysis I have delimited my corpus to a subsection, namely what I so far have identified as RDS documents. All in all, there are 21 such active documents, each corresponding to a specific Swedish region. Recall that the regional structure in Sweden is a little messy so it is not the same kind of political body that produces all of them. Instead the national government has appointed one specific body in each region to be
responsible for regional development politics and therefore this function is sometimes carried out by county council boards, sometimes by so-called regional cooperation councils and in the cases with formally instituted regions, by the regions themselves.\footnote{For contextual information regarding Swedish regional politics, see Chapter 2.}

In any case, we may start this approach by recognizing that the degree of multi modality in the documents varies although most of them can be interpreted as multimodal. In Table 7:1 below I have classified all 21 documents along something like a categorical scale of multimodality. When doing so, I came up with three categories that can both serve to showcase the salience of multimodal representations of regional development politics while also illustrating that even though this is a salient feature, it is not equally distributed among the documents. There is likely a number of reasons for this, but for me this distribution primarily served as a way of selecting certain documents for a more thorough reading than others.

In the first category, \textit{not multimodal}, I have placed documents that only contain a minimal extension of articulations beyond the baseline of written text. These contain written text, numbers and some minimal graphic design such as colored plates for headings or some basic tables or figures. As for those that I have labeled \textit{approaching multimodal}, I have included such documents that use a range of visualizations in the form of diagrams, colored text blocks, tables and drawings.

A key difference in relations to those that I have classified as \textit{multimodal} is the use of images as a salient feature of the articulations. Hence, in my classification, \textit{multimodal} utilizes an extensive amount of photos in their articulations while those \textit{approaching multimodal} do not. Two documents, the RDS from Halland and the RDS from Uppsala, have adopted a form with a great many elaborate sketches and drawings that fill the function of photos and for this reason I classified them as multimodal despite the fact that if my classification system had been followed strictly, they would have been placed in \textit{approaching multimodal}.\footnote{For contextual information regarding Swedish regional politics, see Chapter 2.}
Table 7.1 – The Multimodality of RDS Documents

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<tr>
<th>Not Multimodal</th>
<th>Approaching Multimodal</th>
<th>Multimodal</th>
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<tr>
<td>RDS Dalarna</td>
<td>RDS Gotland</td>
<td>RDS Blekinge</td>
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<tr>
<td>RDS Södra Småland</td>
<td>RDS Stockholm</td>
<td>RDS Gävleborg</td>
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<tr>
<td>RDS Västra Götaland</td>
<td>RDS Västernorrland</td>
<td>RDS Halland*</td>
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<td></td>
<td>RDS Uppsala*</td>
<td>RDS Värmland</td>
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<td>RDS Västerbotten</td>
<td>RDS Västmanland</td>
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Comment: RDS documents from all Swedish regions sorted in three categories according to their degree of multimodality. Not multimodal: Main medium is written text (some coloring for headings etc. may be present). Approaching multimodal: Diagrams and figures are readily present in combination with regular, written text. Some typography for headings etc. may also be present, however, there are very few photos. Multimodal: Diagrams, figures, photos and advanced typography are clearly present in combination with written text. * = Document contains no photos, but a rich set of illustrations which fills the function of photos.

As can be seen, out of the 21 documents I have classified 15 as multimodal and three as approaching multimodal. Hence, a vast majority of the documents contains articulations that go beyond the written text in their representations of social actors, expressed modes of rationale and general views on regional development politics. For this reason I think that it is fully motivated to investigate how such techniques of articulating regional development politics in multimodal forms relate to some of the dominant modes of rationale that I have identified in the previous chapter. Before going into some more detail, however I would like to briefly comment on what we may understand as more general effects of multimodal policy documents such as the RDSs that I have analyzed.

7.1.1. Multimodal policy in RDS documents
A first reflection concerning the multimodal qualities of the RDS documents can be related to how such articulations transform our ways of interpreting them. Standard written text is, as we know, a central feature of communication in most human societies and in most writing systems, this
form of text builds upon a notion of linearity for its interpretation. That is to say, regardless of whether our way of reading and writing starts from left and moves downwards to the right, or the other way around, such writing systems demand a linear approach. Slightly exaggerated, if we wish to get the full message, we generally have to start at the beginning and traverse the middle before we can approach the end of the text (Kress & van Leeuwen, 2006).

In a multimodal text, some of this linearity goes away. It can still, of course, be produced in ways that strive for a linear interpretation, yet often the function is the opposite. We can instead claim that as a text becomes multimodal it activates differentiated compositions that invite the reader to follow multiple directions, almost as a form of interaction. The reader can choose paths in such documents and determine how to move forward in the reading.

In the multimodal RDS documents, there are such interactive elements since we are presented with images, glossed quotations and a general arrangement of written text, photos, diagrams and magnified text segments that does not have to be followed in a linear way. So for instance, we often encounter a larger image with super imposed text, often quotations, that may take up half a page of a document, while the other half has more traditional text mixed with, for instance, color coded words or other forms of more stylized typography.

While the reading might be more non-linear, it is important to recognize that this does not mean that the paths are infinite or random. Rather, I think that just as discourses operate to structure written texts, they are also expressed in multimodal fashions, and in this sense, therefore, we will find expressions of the power/knowledge regimes that are present in society both within other modes of articulation and in the composition of modes into a multimodal text. Indeed, the elements that make up a composition and makes non-linear readings possible are always also a delimitation in such ways that they may actually steer interpretations towards a rather limited set of meanings, as for instance in children’s books where one page may only consist of some pictures that we use to construct stories about. We may assemble them whichever way we want, but the general direction of our stories and interpretations are quite determined if the images are, say, a tree, a cat and a dog (Kress & van Leeuwen, 2006).

As a further example, think of the way you may enter a store or an art exhibition. As you are surrounded with elements of such an exhibition and you encounter things, such as clothing items or statues and paintings, you
can move around freely. However, some of these artifacts or items will have been put in more central places than others; they will have been positioned and portrayed in ways that interpellate you in more demanding ways and together such positioning will convey certain discursive articulations to you as a shopper or a visitor at an art gallery.55

Thus, the combination of elements in a multimodal text is one aspect of how modes of rationale come to be represented, and so is the question of where and how the elements are positioned, but there are more things that matter. The individual elements also contain representations of objects and social actors in ways that contribute to similar articulations expressed as in written text. Therefore, not only composition, but also the representations of what I will call participants (Kress & van Leeuwen, 2006) of the images are important to consider when analyzing the multimodal techniques of expressing regional development. Broadly speaking, with participants we may denote two different kinds, namely represented participants and interactive participants. Notice, that participants do not have to be humans. The former category thus relates to images of things, such as people, animals, houses, cars, factories, schools or government buildings, while the other concerns the relationship between the represented participants and we who interpret them. While it is my position that all images establish a relationship between themselves and whoever interprets them, we may still find it useful to distinguish between the relationships among the represented participants within an image and those produced as interactive relations.

In the RDS documents, two kinds of elements emerge as salient alongside written texts, namely diagrams and photographs. In my interpretation I do not make a conceptual distinction between these two forms since I think that, while expressed differently, they can be approached in similar ways. Both of them communicate one or more objects through the representation of those objects (participants), and while diagrams are often more abstract than photos, this does not necessarily need to be so. Semiotically, they both signal forms of salience, classifications, narratives and interaction in ways that may enhance, or otherwise transform, the message of the written text in relation to them. Indeed, it is of course not a requirement of them to have any relation to

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55 While the examples may suggest a certain form of manipulation of the discourses that are expressed through the disposition of items in, for instance, an exhibition, I do not think this is necessary at all. Rather, my understanding of discourse does not mean that it should primarily be understood as an active intervention by specific actors, but rather as media through which power/knowledge institutes the formations of truth, morals and ‘the real’. Hence, any multimodal composition will display the mark of dominant discursive rationales, regardless of actor intervention.
the written text at all, and they are still semiotically important for understanding the way dominant modes of rationale operate in the assemblage, even if viewed as a separate modality.

In terms of composition, the documents are fairly similar. As I have already mentioned, they often communicate a certain section through text, and then gloss it by evoking images that relate to it. How, this is done varies, of course, but this general way of producing multimodal texts does not only serve to activate non-linear readings. For example, the images can either work as anchors of the texts that follow by, for instance, representing 'the known' or taken for granted of the particular theme, or they may work as an extension, presenting to us ‘the new’ aspects that emerge in the way the theme is articulated. Similarly, they can also be used and positioned in ways that foreground them as the ideal of a given theme, or instead being used as concrete marker for how things ‘really’ are (Kress & van Leeuwen, 2006).

In the RDS documents, images are often placed in the top left corner of a page, which in turn comprises two or more columns with running text. The upper left part is generally the first place any western reader looks as a new page is turned, and the images presented here can be interpreted as the kind of given or known information that we have of the subject at hand. Conversely, images placed to the right (at the end of the reading process for westerners) communicate sites where we may be presented with new information, or suggestions. Some RDS documents also consequently start each page with a banner-like image that is placed in the top half, under which the written text runs (cf. the RDS of Region Västerbotten). In art theory (as applied to the history of art), this top position, both within images and in compositions, are generally recognized as portraying ‘the ideal’ while the bottom represents more concrete reality. While this is not a necessity, in the RDS documents such an interpretation seems plausible as the images often portray idealized versions of the region, whereas the text below them can be more problematizing (Kress & van Leeuwen, 2001; 2006).

In the following sections I will analyze a set of images along these lines (and more), and while I will employ certain analytical categories resting on the works of Kress & van Leeuwen, 2001; 2006), my underlying idea is quite simple: images, and more precisely photographs, are not representations without a code. They are not ‘just’ instances of the real that we can view and treat as objective information. Rather, they are, like
written texts, sites of discursive articulation with remnants of a past that contributes to the way they are mobilized in the present.

7.2 Detailed Examples

I will now turn to analyzing multimodal articulations that relate to the chains of rationale that I identified in the previous chapter. More specifically, this means that I will interpret such articulation in relation to the adaptability chain, the attraction chain, the environment and sustainability chain and the leadership chain. In addition, I will also examine how the central mode of rationale (that is an element in all chains) creativity, innovation and entrepreneurship is articulated in multimodal forms. In sum, what follows are therefore five related but different analyses of multimodal compounds. Related to this are also multimodal articulations of social actors and I will provide comments on this throughout the analysis.

As I have mentioned, my focus is on showcasing how the multimodal articulations can be understood as techniques that enhance, institute or transform the modes of rationale, and at the same time I will pay attention to the ways that they contribute to global forms of the assemblage. This latter part, however, will be revisited in the final section of the chapter as I consider the technological aspects of multimodal documents together with the numbers and rankings.

Throughout the analysis I will italicize the analytical categories that I use to make sense of the multimodal texts, and in essence they all draw on the kind of CDA articulated by Kress & van Leeuwen (2001; 2006). Importantly, I do not interpret the categories and analysis advocated by Kress & van Leeuwen (2001; 2006) as a ‘complete set’ that must be utilized in one specific and all embracing fashion. Instead, the way that I apply their categories is more a result of an iterative process back and forth between my methods, empiric material and theory.

7.2.1. Multimodal Articulations of the Adaptability Chain

The first multimodal articulation I would like to show is from the RDS of Region Sörmland and it relates to the chain of rationale that I have called the adaptability chain. Recall how this chain linked the modes of competitiveness and innovation by way of knowledge. In short, knowledge is represented in this chain as relating to three main functions. First, so called life-long learning of all social actors is hailed as important and, second, the same goes for the general education of social actors, particularly in the early years of pre-school and in the last stages of
university or college training. Third, science and research are represented as something that can work as a creative force for coming up with new inventions.

In relation to this the image in Figure 7.1 is both typical and salient in terms of the corpus at large. We may begin our analysis of it by considering some basic information. First it is a full-page spread that mixes both photography, written text and some visual designs in the form of an orange border. In this case, however, I think that the most important part of its multimodal composition to take into account is the relationship that is invoked between what we see in the image and what is written in text in the lower part. This text reads:

(Q7:1) The potential for innovation through new products, processes, and business concepts must be good. This is a precondition for increased productivity. Therefore, research and development efforts are required both inside and outside the companies that contribute to the growth and renewal of the business sector in Sörmland (RDS Sörmland, 2013). [67]

We also learn, by considering the text written in the orange margin that this composition is part of a specific goal (goal 3) and that it is articulated within the realm of what is here called ‘strategy’. These are the basic compositional features that make up the multimodal text that fills the page, and to me it is clear that most of the interesting articulations of this composite lie within the photograph and its relation to the two written text passages. I will return to these relationships later, but first I think it is important to interpret the photo in some more detail.

The first question to ask is, what participants are represented in this image, and how do they relate to one another. I have already mentioned that one of the basic distinctions that is often made at this stage in art theory and linguistics (Kress & van Leeuwen, 2006) is that between represented participants and interactive participants. First of all, participants are any kind of object in the image (the represented participants) and objects outside the image that are related to it (the interactive participants). Clearly, this image has been produced by social actors and is intended as a form of communication to other social actors and these form an imaginary set of such participants that the image can be said to relate to. I say imaginary because even if we, for example, tried to follow the production of this image there would most likely not be a clear subject that can be pointed to as the single source. Rather, it has been arranged, structured and executed in different stages and by different social actors in ways that make it hard to point to an origin.
Comment: This is a reproduction of page 55 in the RDS of Region Sörmland. Please refer to appendix A and B for more information concerning this document.

Likewise, the intended audience for this image is an abstraction. There is no ‘real’ audience but rather the image produces an audience and a range of interpretations. However, as I have pointed out, this does not mean that we are dealing with a random composite or some direct representation of reality. In this case, I think the represented participants are more salient
than the interactive ones, even though there is (of course) a relationship here. In any case, let’s start by making an inventory of the most salient represented participants in this image. First, there is the female character positioned to the right that takes up almost half of the image. Then there is the microscope that is also very dominant in terms of size and the focus of the image, and then the plant-like green specimens that are positioned along the counter and in particular the ones placed in the woman’s left hand. Last, but not least I would also say that the hands of the woman are salient participants. In particular, the stark contrast of the purple gloves that clearly break with the white, sterile tone of the rest of the picture enhances their presence.

If we stop for a moment here and consider this composition, the image is obviously a depiction of knowledge at work. Indeed, it seems to communicate to us the very epitome of knowledge, namely that of science or scientific expertise. We may note therefore, already at this state, that such a representation of knowledge excludes many ideas of what knowledge is supposed to be, and how it is supposed to be executed. It is my interpretation that this image clearly communicates some of the basic features of the mode of rationale that I called just knowledge in chapter five, and we can understand this just by our first impressions of the image, but I think there is more to this.

If we have established then an interpretation of the important participants of the image, we may also ask what is going on in this representation of those participants. Unlike in spoken or written language, images cannot communicate action by means of verbs, although there has been a long-standing recognition of the so-called vectors as the verbs of images in art theory and multimodal discourse analysis (Kress & van Leeuwen, 2006). We may understand the vectors as strong directions that are present in the image, and in this case I think we may speak of two such directions, or vectors. First, one is realized by the desk that sort of seems to extend out of the picture towards us, and secondly, the one created by a combination of the woman’s left arm of and her gaze into the microscope. The function of this second vector is also what I think is most important, namely that it clearly points to the microscope, relating both the rest of the participants to it as well as creating a suggestion for interactive participants to turn their attention in that direction.

In this case the vectors produce a relationship between the represented participants in a way that turns the microscope into more of a goal than a participant and I think this is important. Think of what this means in terms
of how knowledge is represented. In a way, the scientist realizes her knowledge by pursuing technology and by making technology a part of her knowledge. The plants seem to suggest that her scientific discipline lies in the field of biology. Could not biology have been represented in many other ways? We could have encountered a biologist doing fieldwork in the forest or being represented as doing some deep reading in certain forms of literature. However this is not what is happening here. Instead, the way that we understand that this is a picture of knowledge at work, and of a scientist, is through the *symbolic attributes* that are depicted in relation to her. By the presence of high tech instrument such as the microscope and the general lab environment, the meaning potential of this represented knowledge is steered in a certain direction. I think that this is very much a direction that enhances some of the articulations of the adaptability chain, namely the way that knowledge is produced as an element relating to competitiveness and innovation.

Therefore, I interpret the technological significance of the image to direct the interactive participants’ thoughts to innovation (maybe unconsciously) and the generally positively attributed role that bio-technology may have in advanced capitalist states as they continue to strive for more growth. I think this is strengthened by the way that the other represented participants (the biological specimen and the hands) are also put in a clear relation to the microscope, the general symbol of high technology here. Notice how most of the specimens are out of focus except for the one that is being lifted by the researchers left hand as it approaches the microscope. We know the symbolic meaning of hands in present western culture as instruments for doing work, and indeed it is as if the scientist here, by the use of her clearly marked hands, connects nature and technology through her high knowledge work. Maybe she is just about to realize her knowledge into some form of innovation and thereby becoming an important part of the future for Region Sörmland (consider here for a moment the written text in Q7:1 and how it relates to her realization).

So far I have just alluded to the connection between the represented participants and the interactive ones, and even though I interpret this particular image as more of a representation of participants than an invitation to interaction, it does produce interaction. In fact, because the image does not really demand our interactive attention by being more of a display of knowledge, at the same time it produces us as spectators of this display. When it does so I think it is important to speak of a few more
interpretations of this spectator – display function that is produced. In my take there are primarily two things that stand out.

First, consider the close distance that we are invited to view the participants from. In particular, the meaning of distance in photography and film has been theorized in relation to how much of the frame that is occupied by any given represented participant. In social semiotics this has been translated into concepts of *social distance* and it has become common to talk of distinct steps of scale in this context. This is of course no exact science,\(^{56}\) although I think that we may distinguish (at least) such representations that are made at close personal distance from those that are made of participants depicted as being several meters away. Between these there is naturally also a form of scale of social distance that I think semiotically communicates important aspects, even though these representations of distance vary by culture and the like (Kress & van Leeuwen, 2006).

In this case, we see the researcher at a close distance. This suggests that we are to relate to her, she is close to us, indeed so close that she is our peer, our friend. At the same time this closeness is regulated by the angle. Notice how we see her slightly from below, which makes her as a towering figure. If she should turn and face us, she would look down at us. This is a way of representing social actors that generally are associated with power, and maybe we can interpret it here along the familiar lines of ‘knowledge is power’ (Kress & van Leeuwen, 2006).

So far I have not made any substantial comment about the fact that the scientist is represented as a woman. However I think this is important, and it relates to a fundamental compositional aspect of this multimodal text. As mentioned briefly in the previous section, images, like written texts, are laid out in a certain way when readers encounter them. For a long time in western culture the meaning of ‘top and bottom’ as well as ‘left and right’ have been articulated along some common lines of reasoning. To the left, we generally encounter information that is taken for granted, or something that we are supposed to know already, while to the right we are presented

\(^{56}\) While not exact, they are never the less very fundamental in, for instance, film theory and even more so in film practice. Directors planning film scenes always have to be aware of how the screen portrays distance between represented participants and the imagined viewers. As such therefore the size of the frame is always related to the human body in beginners books on film theory. There is for instance ‘the close shot’ that portrays the head and shoulders, ‘the extreme close shot’ that is anything more zoomed in than so and there is ‘the medium close shot’ showing the represented participant from about waist up. ‘The medium shot’ instead cuts the representation of at the participant’s knees while the medium long shot shows the full figure. In the long shot the human body occupies about half of the frame height, and anything beyond that is recognized as ‘the very long shot’ (Kress & van Leeuwen, 2006:124).
with information that is new to us (Kress & van Leeuwen, 2006). Similarly, in western culture, ever since the Middle Ages and the paintings of churches and reliefs, the bottom part of pictures usually symbolizes the more concrete, real aspects of its configuration, while the upper part expresses the ideal (Kress & van Leeuwen, 2006).

Now, in my understanding this is not necessarily a rule for interpreting all compositions or images, nor do I think that these discursive boundaries are never transgressed or broken, but here it presents us with an interesting final interpretation of the composition. The importance of science and technology we already know and this is represented as ‘given’ in this composition as manifested through the microscope’s left position. What is new, however, is how knowledge is represented through this technological form, and maybe more importantly, that knowledge can be a woman. Indeed, she not only realizes herself as a scientist, she also realizes herself as a useful asset in the quest for growth. At the same time, consider the firmly rooted position of the written text at the bottom of the composition, the ‘real’ part. What does this mean? Maybe we can interpret it like this: the ideal represented in the upper part, where knowledge is combined with technology to (presumably) produce more innovation through a woman scientist, must always be rooted in the reality of productivity increase in capitalist economies. Thus, the production of the woman and science as assets are represented as conditioned upon the realist facts stated in the written text. Indeed, the ‘new’ information that is presented to the right is often also a site of social contestation (Kress & van Leewuen, 2006). So the new information presented here, namely that we should feel close to and identify with a woman exercising the power of knowledge as she is being innovative is presented to us as a suggestion, not as a final truth about the state of things. This suggestion is, as mentioned, grounded in the more realist statements of increased productivity of the economy, and thus justifies our identification, but at the same time it is conditioned on productivity and competitiveness being increased.

Thus, as a final note we may consider this multimodal composition in relation to the discussion in chapter six concerning the social actor women. When doing so, we may think of the composition as expressing a kind of knowledge in action, which further underlines the rationale that was

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57 The importance of this is not lost on the people performing marketing campaigns for multinational corporations. By visiting, for instance, the Japanese and Swedish websites of the company Sony, we encounter a similar range of represented participants, although positioned in almost reversed fashion.
exemplified in, for instance, Q5:30 and the representation of this social actor as potentially important (see the discussion in chapter six).

7.2.2. Multimodal Articulations of the Attraction Chain

When I described the attraction chain in chapter five I said that it produced a link between the mode of competitiveness and the mode of creativity, innovation and entrepreneurship. By positioning them as elements of a chain that also includes the elements image and branding, living environment, immigration and inclusiveness different modes of rationale could be articulated together to produce various aspects of an attractive region. Here I will expand on how this chain can be expressed in multimodal texts by focusing on some of the aspects pertaining to inclusiveness and immigration.

As described in chapter five, the governing of immigration becomes an important rationale because by attracting certain types of internationally available expertise, regions may increase their innovative capacity. In this regard the kind of immigrants that are represented as most desirable are highly skilled researchers, engineers, business leaders or students since they are crucial to a region that is supposed to be innovative and entrepreneurial. Furthermore, immigration is also produced as a salient aspect of the kind of living environment that the highly skilled and internationally mobile social actors desire. Since, among other things, they are understood to require a tolerant and inclusive community, it becomes important for regions also to deal with the more problematic aspects of immigration, namely such things as integration and social exclusion (Florida, 2005; 2012). As a consequence, to be prosperous the regions will have to attract foreign interest, while paying attention to how this in turn also can be used to make the region more attractive by making it a vibrant global community. In addition to this, I spent some time in the previous chapter showing how the social actor the immigrant was represented as two separate groups where one denoted exactly this mobile creative class, while the other could be understood as a potential resource for lower skilled services and as a group that in some cases could also be empowered and turned into entrepreneurs and innovators (cf. Q6:20).
Comment: This is a reproduction of page 24-25 in the RDS of Region Skåne. Please refer to appendix A and B for more information concerning this document.
Here, I will focus on what can be understood as a multimodal representation of this integration problem, and thus be more concerned with the second kind of representation of the social actor *the immigrant*. Figure 7.2 is a two-page spread from the RDS of region Skåne and it signifies the start of a new chapter in the document. Let us begin here, as in the previous section by identifying some of the most central representations of this text. For starters, we have two clearly delimited frames. The left page is entirely in a clear red color, with a striking white text that glows against the background. The text reads:

(Q7:2) An open-minded and tolerant attitude towards different ways of life is required for Skåne to be able to establish itself as a successful region. [65]

The right-hand side has a photo with the title of the chapter superimposed on the upper part of the image (it translates to something like ‘Challenge: The Participation’). It is written in stark, black letters, almost as if painted on the empty white wall that constitutes the background of this photo. The photo in itself is very stripped down in terms of details and represented participants. The theme of the image is also quite clear. It depicts a Muslim woman in prayer in some form of mosque. In terms of represented participants, I think we may interpret her as the only significant one. The carpets on the floor and the hijab that the woman wears could also be interpreted as participants of this image, although they are in this case more of a mix of attributes which symbolically signifies the Islamic religion in general, and maybe also in this context, Islamic immigrants in Sweden in particular.

We may also add that this picture has a very clear central perspective and conveys a sense of depth and distance. Such central perspective images have what we may call a built-in subjective view that forces interactive participants to observe the represented participant from a distinct angle. In contrast to the photo in Figure 7.1, for instance, this image is more interactive. While the one in Figure 7.1 produced a form of interaction through its production of spectators, the image in Figure 7.2 invites us to view what is happening here from a very distinct perspective that has been selected for us. In my interpretation it is clear that this image does not only represent a Muslim woman, but also very clearly engages interactive participants. This is also realized by the *horizontal angle* from which we are invited to look upon the image, a technique often used for producing involvement (Kress & van Leeuwen, 2006).
However, this image contrasts in very distinct ways with the kind of involvement that is produced in images where we are subjected to a clear *gaze* from one of the represented participants. Here I think that it is not insignificant that we can only view the woman from the back with her face turned away. Indeed, one of the more obvious interpretations of this image is probably that of the Islam woman turning away from society, although I will try to draw out what I find to be some more important features of the composition.

Let me then first propose that the image to the right can be understood as an image of Islam, and of immigrated Muslims in general. While there is a represented participant, I think that the room in itself works as a *carrier* of Islamic *possessive attributes* such as the already mentioned carpets and hijab, but also the praying woman who is sitting on her knees. By this I mean that the signer, the Islamic room (or maybe mosque), holds a number of represented features that produce a form of *interactive analytical structure* that the viewers can become involved in.

To me, this analytical structure can further be interpreted as one that represents a *typical* rather than a *particular* image of Islam, and this is mainly realized by the way the woman is represented, both as an attribute of the room and as a sole participant. When I have spoken of modality thus far in this thesis, I have used it to speak of different modes of texts. However, there is another form of modality used in linguistics as a grammatical concept that has been extended through art theory and CDA to the analysis of images. Modality in language conveys a ‘truth value’ of a particular statement so that there is a difference between uttering ‘I may come to your party tonight’ and ‘I will come to your party tonight’ (Halliday, 1985). When speaking of modality in images, Kress & van Leeuwen (2006) have suggested what they call *modality markers*, that is, ways that the image can be produced so as to convey something similar to the linguistic modality function. Hence, color (in terms of saturation, differentiation and modulation), context, depth, illumination and brightness are all examples that can be used to transform the same image into different versions giving it various ‘truth values’.

Of course, this does not mean that there exists a true image, or a true interpretation of the image. However, consider how different discourses may take diverse positions on what counts as ‘real’. So, for example, in science and academia very abstract images such as diagrams or charts are not at all photorealistic depictions of a particular object or process, precisely because in such discourses the abstract and more general are
often understood as truer than a ‘simple’ picture of an object or process. Hence, the way that pictures are modulated gives them distinct features that matter to interactive participants (Kress & van Leeuwen, 2006).

Returning to the image in figure 7.2 then, the depiction here has a very low modality in terms of contextualization. The room is stripped of details and the representation of the woman is such that she really stands out as more or less the only object in the room, which situates her almost in a void. Such a void resembles the way that abstract scientific diagrams or flowcharts lay bare the general features of a given phenomenon and in this case we are witnessing generic Islam. This could be a prayer room for Muslim women in any location of the world but its decontextualized representation produces it as a general image of Islam, not a woman praying in a particular room somewhere in a particular place. As mentioned, it is my interpretation that this feeds into the general meaning of this image as an interactive analytical system that we as viewers are invited to scrutinize. Needless to say, Muslims are possible to represent as individuals, engaged in normal routines that have nothing at all to do with praying in a mosque.

Furthermore, when analyzing the image in Figure 6.1, I spoke of the meaning and salience of social distance that may be articulated in images and films. If the woman in image 6.1 was represented in a way that invited us as her peers, the story of Figure 6.2 is quite the opposite. The woman is far away from us, by the look of it several meters away, which suggests a clear social distance between the represented participant and the interactive ones. In short, if it was not already clear from the representation of other attributes, her distance from us produces her as a stranger, ‘the other’ or someone (something!) that is not part of ‘us’ (Kress & van Leeuwen, 2006).

In addition to the representations of the photo, I also think that the multimodal composition of the entire text is important. Indeed, I think it is this composition that signals the most salient meaning of the text. We have then, three important parts of this composite, the text segment on the left page (Q6:2), the superimposed title of the chapter, and the photo that I have analysed in some detail now. Only by reading the written texts and looking at the photo, do I think that a clear meaning is articulated: Skåne needs to be open and tolerant to be a successful region. However, there is a problem with this as depicted in the photo. Indeed, as the title reads ‘Challenge: The Participation’ we understand that there is a problem with the participation of immigrants in society. However, we may ask who or what the multimodal text articulates as responsible for this situation, and I
think the answer is clearly the woman, who in turn represents the Islamic immigrants. She has turned her back on us, she is engaged with activities that are not part of us and we can see this with our own eyes from the position where we are placed.

In terms of left-right and top-down composition, I think that this interpretation is strengthened. The information to the left is what we know or what is taken for granted. Regions must be open and tolerant if they are to attract the right kind of people to create an innovative living environment that can be successful in the global competition. This presents us with a ‘new’ situation, namely that we must rise to the challenge and integrate the immigrants in a better way. Remember how such ‘new’ information is often a site of social contestation simply because for something to be new, it must either be some form of pure novelty, or more commonly, something that is not yet agreed upon or treated as common knowledge in the present discourses (Kress & van Leeuwen, 2006). Indeed, even some purely novel information (whatever that might be) is likely to be a site of contestation precisely because of its ‘new’ status. Hence, the photo to the right is a new situation that we may interpret to be in the midst of some discursive struggle. Furthermore, the title is positioned in the top part, hovering over the woman, representing the ideal situation of participation, yet the lower part of the image, the concrete part show how ‘things really are’. This reality is not a society that has turned its back on the Muslim immigrants, but rather a situation where the immigrants actively turn their back from society and are not working hard enough to be included. Therefore, if Skåne is to emerge as a prosperous and successful region in the global competition, it is imperative to deploy programs that can influence the immigrants already living there to realize their own participatory capacity.

7.2.3. Multimodal Articulations of the Environment and Sustainability Chain

Throughout the RDS documents the theme of environmental challenges and sustainable regions is very salient. As expressed in chapter five, the mode of rationale that I labeled environment and sustainability connects to many other modes. However, it is also so distinctly articulated that I said it forms its own chain. More specifically, environmental challenges and sustainable living environments are represented not only as threats, but also as great opportunities for coming up with new innovations and increased entrepreneurial qualities. Hence, the mode of rationale becomes an element in a chain that is linked to competitiveness and creativity, innovation.
and entrepreneurship and thus represents a way for regions to be prosperous in the global competition.

At the same time, articulations of sustainability and environmental challenges also emerge in relation to a number of other modes of rationale, yet my interpretation is that innovation, entrepreneurship and competitiveness are forcefully tied to solutions and ways out of dilemmas. In a way the articulations of sustainability work as a foundation for much of the reasoning in the RDS documents and thus, when looking for specific representations, these often appear in flow charts or diagrams that present abstract encodings of how the regions can work to overcome possible challenges.

For this reason I have chosen a multimodal text from the RDS of Region Västerbotten that represents sustainability as part of a diagram. This diagram is situated within a distinct three part composite with a photograph in the form of a banner that runs across the top of the entire page, a column of written text with a title and subtitle placed to the left of the lower part while the diagram itself occupies the lower right part of the page. In addition, the page as a whole functions as the start of a section (or chapter) in the document that outlines general goals and challenges for Region Västerbotten as it tries to become ‘a sustainable attractive region’ (RDS Västerbotten, 2013:8).

In this case I think that what I have said so far about the composition of left-right and top-down segments in multimodal texts (Kress & van Leeuwen, 2006) can function as a brief introduction. We have then the banner on top representing a form of ideal where the mountains and forests seem to signify a healthy environment, suitable for a human community as suggested by the skier to the right. Although this photo can be interpreted in more detail, I would like to leave it at this general understanding for the time being and instead move on to the function of the diagram. First, however, here is the written text segment in clear detail:

(Q7:3) In 2020, Västerbotten will be a region where all parts of the county contribute to a place where more women, men, and businesses want to establish themselves and develop, and where both people and the environment are protected in the long term. The guiding vision for the regional growth efforts of Västerbotten is “A sustainable attractive region is created from the coast to the mountains”

Six strategic objectives establish the direction of regional growth efforts 2014-2020. These sub-strategies allow the county to take advantage of opportunities and respond to challenges which follow upon global trends in order to realise the vision of the county. In relation to the strategies, there are priority areas and measures which indicate what the county must prioritise in terms of regional growth efforts in order to fulfill the objective of the strategies. Some measures are
linked to examples which are meant to provide concrete suggestions for what can be done within the framework of a certain action. These examples should be seen as suggestions for activities, but do not exclude other types of ventures which correspond to the framework of a particular measure. The sub-strategies are followed up by means of indicators that show if there is development towards sustainable growth in the county of Västerbotten (RDS Västerbotten, 2013:8).

As for the diagram I think it is useful to start by returning to the reasoning on modality markers that I briefly mentioned in relation to Figure 7.2. A diagram is, almost intrinsically, an abstraction and an attempt to generalization and (or) classification. At the same time, it may of course be articulated in many different shapes. In short, there is often a distinct difference between the diagrams that appear in scientific journals and those appearing in the tabloid press, to use a schematic example. The latter are often glossy representations that, with the help of visual design, combine the classifications and abstractions of diagrams with the more personal touch of photos and drawings. In the scholarly community though, it seems as if the most basic forms and figures predominate in producing an abstraction and generalization of events or phenomena (Kress & van Leeuwen, 2006).

Based on such reasoning, the diagram in Figure 7.3 can be interpreted as resembling the scholarly ideal more. In essence, its only modality marker beyond lines, squares and circles is its blue coloration of some of the shapes. Therefore we start interpreting this diagram with what it portrays in terms of these basic forms. First, this is a combination of a taxonomy and a flowchart. There are distinct levels in the vertical direction while the three boxes that are shaped as broad arrows at the right end produce three vectors that we may in fact interpret as one. If we ‘just’ read the diagram, it says something like: there are three parallel and concurrent processes of importance for the production of Region Västerbotten as a sustainable and attractive region. First, there are some forms of basic trends depicted as the foundational or ‘real’ bottom part of the diagram that are labeled, ‘Affecting trends’. These are identified as ‘globalization and urbanization’, ‘Climate change’ and ‘Demographic development’ and are represented by blue ellipses. At the top of the diagram, in the ‘ideal’ part, there are similar representations labeled, ‘The goals of Europe’ and these are identified as ‘Smart growth’, ‘Sustainable growth’ and ‘Inclusive growth’. In the middle section there is a process labeled, ‘The county’s strategy’, represented as clearly delimited levels and squares, lined up along a left-right axis.

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58 The county is in this case roughly the same as the region.
This diagram therefore seeks to communicate that the strategies laid out in the RDS document are dependent on one process of higher order politics and one process of something like naturally occurring events that they cannot steer or control. I interpret this as the taxonomy of the diagram. There is a form of classification going on that clearly places some represented participants (in this case the boxes, ellipses and arrows that make up the diagram) as belonging in the same category or process. There is also a sense of hierarchical order, although it seems to run in two directions and basically positions the strategies of the region as subordinate to both the political goals of Europe and the basic ‘natural’ trends. Taken together, these representations combine into an abstract system that visualizes how the production of a sustainable and attractive region ‘hangs together’.

We may ask then what it means to articulate such an abstract system in relation to the chain of rationale. First, I think that the abstraction as such functions as a form of naturalization and sense of detached possibility of political realization. Indeed, it gives the six themes represented as the squares in the middle a position of being squeezed in between the kind of changes going on in the world (globalization, climate change and demographic development) and the higher political goals (smart, sustainable and inclusive growth). This is strengthened by the very representation that uses ellipses and colors for the surrounding changes and goals.

Since the squares and the circles are exceptionally salient forms in abstract diagrams, it makes sense to ask questions about them as forms. Why squares/rectangles and why ellipses/circles? Are they interchangeable? While I do not think that there exists a general law delimiting the meaning of a square and a circle, they have nevertheless traditionally been used for different purposes when they occupy space in a diagram. Squares and rectangles are the realm of technology, order and human construction. Unlike circles, they can be stacked, aligned and positioned together as building blocks, as in, for instance, the planning maps used by city planners as they draw up and represent land use on a map. They can therefore easily be used as modules in interlocking patterns in ways that circles cannot (Kress and van Leeuwen, 2006).

On the other hand, squares and rectangles do not exist as forms in natural structures, but circles do. Hence, the circles can be understood as representing natural or organic objects and processes. So, while the technological squares stand for that which we can tame or control, the
circles usually signify things that are outside of human technical manipulation.

In the case of the diagram of Figure 7.3 therefore, there is a realm of the manipulable human strategies that stand against natural and non-manipulable goals and processes. This then produces a number of things as outside the reach of politics in general and the regional development of Västerbotten in particular. Climate change, globalization, urbanization and demographic development seem to be more of structural constraints than something that is produced within the region. Indeed, in passing we may note how this is a kind of abstract visual representation of globalization (and other phenomena) as the natural force that underpins the chains of rationale as described in chapter five. Therefore the region is left with the task of constructing a strategy that can deal with these constraints rather than focusing on changing the constraints themselves.

Concerning the middle section, or in other words the strategy of the region, it illustrates a schema that resembles a tree structure. We could draw it out so that there would be a top layer stating, ‘From coast to mountains a sustainable, attractive region is created’ under which six branches of integrated themes are positioned. A number of questions can be asked regarding this tree structure that I think emerges as a consequence of using the abstractions that a diagram represents. Since what we are looking at must reasonably be some form of process (or rather processes), the representation is remarkably unclear in how the parts relate to each other. Is this a temporal process, and does it have spatial aspects? The themes are said to be integrated, but in the representation of them they are clearly separated, and visually the aligned boxes resemble more forms of stages that could be read from left to right, or from right to left. In fact, the only represented participants in this diagram that explicitly form vectors or signal direction and process are the labels to the right. For this reason, the process elements of this diagram are, to be honest, confusing.

Now, the intention here is not to critique this particular diagram (there are many like it in most of the RDS documents) but rather that I wish to call attention to how diagrammatic representations do something to the events, objects and subjects that they depict and position. In addition to producing classifications, the abstraction can also often be understood as a form of visual nominalization. This linguistic concept, as mentioned, denotes situations where agency, or doings, is omitted from statements so that they take on more neutral forms. Compare for instance the statements, ‘The police shot and killed two participants of a demonstration’ with ‘Two
participants died at a demonstration’. Kress & van Leeuwen (2006) have argued that diagrams do something similar when processes are turned into systems, with often oblique representations of how specific represented participants relate to each other. Indeed, while arrows are often present, ambiguities still exist, since it is seldom explicitly stated if an arrow signals transfer or transformation (and indeed, it often seems to denote both).

Furthermore, even if this diagram is ‘science-like’ it lacks some of the details that most likely would be required in more formal circumstances, and I interpret the use of it here as a form of legitimization. That is to say, even though it is very hard to understand from the diagram exactly how a sustainable and attractive region will be created, it produces a form of certainty and refers to a form of knowledge highly associated with certainty and ‘truth’, namely that of scientific abstraction. Indeed, as part of a multimodal construction, this becomes even more salient. By invoking a photorealistic image of the ideal at the top of the page, a written text (Q7:3) that broadly states a vision of a prosperous region in the year 2020 at the left (known) part, in combination with a scientific representation of how to achieve the ideal in the bottom (real) part, the composition signals the sound work of expertise rather than politics.

7.2.4. Multimodal Articulations of the Leadership Chain

In chapter five I described the leadership chain as a chain creating links between the four elements of leadership, cooperation, clusters and expertise, evaluation and benchmarking. When those elements are linked together I stated that a chain of rationale emerges where leadership is important for steering cooperation, for making sure that clusters are formed and developed, as well as for bringing in the relevant expertise that can be used together with evaluation and benchmarking of the region to further its development.

Furthermore, my interpretation of the leadership chain was such that it articulated a rather oblique leadership, one with very little notion of who or what the leader was supposed to be. In this section I turn to analyzing a multimodal text, which I interpret as articulating aspects of the leadership chain. This text is drawn from the RDS of Region Östergötland and represents the start of a chapter named ‘Strengthening the integrated capacity for action in Östergötland’. In figure 7.4 the entire page is reproduced and reveals a multimodal composition of one rather dominant photo, a heading containing a graphic image of a handshake, a written introduction and then also a written text with headings including some minor graphical elements.
Figure 7.4 – Multimodal Representations of the Leadership chain

Östergötland are strategic regions in national innovation systems.

FÖRSTÄRKA DEN SAMLADE HANDLINGSFÖRMÅGAN I ÖSTERSGÖTALAND

Kärnan i strategin är att förstärka den samlade handlingsförmågan bland aktörer i regionen för att bättre tillvara regionens utvecklingsförutsättningar. Genom att regionala aktörer och företärender i större utsträckning agerar samordnat utifrån en gemensam agenda uppstår större effekt regionalt, nationellt och internationellt.

En strategi att samlas kring
En plan, en mål, en vision kan vara faktiska tillgångar, menar och möjligheter att utveckla. Här denna förutsättning kan utnyttjas är i hög grad bemöts av den samlade handlingsförmågan bland regionens aktörer. I Östergötland finns en historia av ök modurar som av ledar om sammankoppling. Detta kan kallas från andra regioner viss fördel i att samarbeta mellan offentliga och privata aktörer, liksom att samarbeta på privata aktörer och bland olika offentliga aktörer, ger en born-loaded kraft i utvecklingsprocess. Att stärka unitoral handling utifrån en gemensam agenda är av strategisk betydelse för den regionella utvecklingen.

Lederskap och rollfördelning
En grundläggande förutsättning för en samlad regional handlingsförmåga är att det finns ett tydligt lederkomp med roll mot alla parten, liksom privata som offentliga. En god sammankoppling mellan det politiska lederskapet, stora företärender för den privata sättandet och den hållbara successen, ger möjligheter och fördelning av särskilda ämnen på den nationella arena.

En viktig uppgift för det politiska leder-
skapet och andra regionala aktörer är att i olika sammanhang tillvara regionens intressen i konkurrerande med andra svenska regioner och med regioner i andra länder. Konkurrensen kan handla om att regionen får god tilldelning av t.ex. stora utgifter på infrastruktur eller lägre utbytt och försök som kultur.

Den regionala nivån av Sveriges sammal-
organisation kan dock vara ett utmärkt befri-
föde för aktörer med roll. En tydlig rollför-
delning mellan stat och region, där regionerna ger större handlingstaktik, men arbetsförvärvs och egna regionala initiativ stöttar det specifika re-
gionale förutsättningarna.

En relationsbyggande region
Genom att vara i en öppen och aktiver samarke-
skap genom att i andra regioner som Öst-
ergotland har starka funktionella samband med, som att samarbete, även där på andra regi-
ner, göra det möjligt att nå mindre regionala initiativ stöttar det regionala och lok-
al nivån att nå andra regioner även det internationella nivån. Detta kommer att handla om att de officiella verksamheterna i större utsträckning går in i samarbetsrelationer för att få detta praktiskt utföras.

Fokus på styrelsens råd
Till strategin bör även att Östergötlanden ska hela till nationella utveckling genom att vara nationella och även internationella ledande i sina brancher, liksom att rimligt verk-
yt och utveckling av världsliv är strategisk besy-
sketsväkt för regionen.

Comment: This is a reproduction of page 15 in the RDS of region Östergötland. Please refer to appendix A and B for more information concerning this document.
As in the previous sections, we may start this analysis by reading the image in terms of its represented participants and the relation it seems to produce with interactive participants (Kress & van Leeuwen, 2006). First then, the photograph depicts two main represented participants, the man in the center and the woman to the right. They are depicted as in a meeting room, so there are also the usual items in such circumstances, notebooks, a coffee cup, a computer, a table, some form of whiteboard and chairs. In terms of represented participants, I interpret these objects as pertaining to the room, which becomes a carrier for a range of possessive attributes. In this regard, I think the phone that the man is using is particularly important, and I will get back to its function soon.

In terms of interactivity, I think this photo is much like the one in Figure 7.1. It offers the viewers a depiction that we may evaluate and interact with. So, as a depiction, this photo seems to offer a representation of leadership in action, in the same way that the photo in Figure 7.1 offered a depiction of knowledge in action. The interactive participants are therefore produced as spectators that may react to the represented participants and their possessive attributes in different ways.

Starting by sorting out some of the representations of the image, I interpret the man as the central participant, and indeed I think that we may refer to him as the one enacting the role of leadership. He is in focus and the way he seems to look into the distance, beyond of the picture, also produces a very strong vector, suggesting he is the one producing the action in this image (Kress & van Leeuwen, 2006). The woman, on the other hand, is out of focus and also only partially inside of the frame of the photo. Her hands and arms also form a vector towards the computer as she is using it to write. An initial interpretation is therefore rather simple and straight-forward, namely that the man is initiating some form of action (leadership?) and this is the most important thing happening here. The woman is also engaged in action, but since it is depicted as out of focus and subordinated to the more important function of the man, one plausible interpretation is that she is rather reacting to his actions.

The angle of the photograph can support this interpretation in another way. Note how the picture is shot so that the man is depicted from a frontal angle and the woman from the side (and as pointed out, not in focus). Kress and van Leeuwen (2006) have suggested that such an outline produces interactive participants that primarily relate to the frontal angle depiction, and hence positions the represented participants illustrated from a side angle as less important. Now, this does not mean that all interactive
participants must accept and identify with the image in this way. Nevertheless, the way it has been produced forces all interaction to be made from this particular angle, regardless of whether or not we would rather have wanted to see what the woman is typing, or who else might be sitting around the table.

In relation to this interpretation of the salience of the actors, we may also think about the representation of social distance (Kress and van Leeuwen, 2006). Usually, a closer depiction suggests a closer relationship with interactive participants, and this might first come off as slightly strange given the interpretation so far. Why is the leader produced as being at some distance from the viewers? To me, this signifies the exceptionality of the leader. He is like us, but not one of us in a rather elitist way. That is to say, the way he is represented here, at medium distance from us, produces him as ‘not a stranger,’ but also as someone who is not really our peer. In this image I think that this mostly means that he is above us, doing things that not anyone could do, enacting leadership in ways that produce a competitive region.

So, if the man is the central participant of this image, how may we understand the leadership he is enacting? Here I think that we may first focus on the salience of the way he looks out of the picture and how he is engaged in a telephone conversation. I interpret the phone as a possesive attribute of the modern leader, whose job it is to direct cooperation and networks. Indeed, it may signify how he is at the center of such networks steering cooperation, managing relationships and maintaining an overall vision. This visionary capacity is, I think, expressed in his gaze beyond the frame and into an invisible and unknown sphere that we as interactive participants cannot see (and therefore perhaps cannot comprehend).

Moreover, I think that the multimodal composition further adds to the representation of leadership. In particular, the graphical representation in the top left-hand corner of the page seems important. The symbolic meaning of a handshake is generally understood to be a moment of agreement. Hence, I would say that since this image is also positioned in a place that represents both ‘ideal’ and ‘given’ information (Kress & van Leeuwen, 2006), it may be understood as a goal that we know is desirable. The lower right-hand side of the photo may, as argued, be understood as that which we in reality have to do to achieve our ideal. At the same time, it also suggests a new form of leadership that may actually work better in achieving agreement.
This new leadership is hardly new in terms of who represents the leader, though. The classic attributes are all there in the form of a white, middle aged, married (the ring on the hand holding the phone is very visible) man. Indeed, the gender dimension is further underlined with the representation of the woman and her actions as subordinate to those of the male leader. However, there may be some new elements to this leadership if we interpret the image in relation to what it is not depicted to be.

There could have been an image here of a meeting-room full of people, engaged in discussion, debate and disagreement. In short, a political form of leadership where politics is built into the fabric of what we take to be important for leading regional development, yet it is not. Instead, we encounter a representation of a leader that resembles an individual manager with visions and networks, ready to hammer out differences to produce consensus (again, the handshake) among different social actors that may help the region prosper. This is also suggested by the written text in the left column:

(Q6:4) A fundamental requirement for an integrated regional agency is that there is a clear leadership in place with support from all involved parties, both private and public. Productive cooperation between political leaders and strong representatives for the private and non-profit sectors creates credibility and a capacity for negotiation in a national context. [64]

Therefore, in sum, we may understand the multimodal expressions of the leadership chain as enhancing and furthering the rationale by giving the rather oblique leadership a more concrete expression. In short, it should be enacted in such a way that it produces agreement rather than disagreement and this seems to be best realized if an individual (male) manager with visions and capacity for action can be put in charge.

7.2.5. Multimodal Articulations of Creativity, Innovation and Entrepreneurship

Before I finish this analysis of multimodal articulations in the RDS documents, I want to pay attention to the very prominent mode of rationale that I called creativity, innovation and entrepreneurship. In my conception of the chains of rationale, all chains connected to this mode, thus making it an element that is almost a form of end station for achieving competitiveness and prosperous regions. Representations of the entrepreneur as a hero or savior are salient features throughout the corpus at large (that is to say, not only in the RDS documents) and are realized in multimodal representations as well.
Comment: This is a reproduction an image at page 22 in the RDS of region Blekinge. Please refer to appendix A and B for more information concerning this document.
Here I will make a short description, or illustration, of how entrepreneurs and entrepreneurship may be represented in RDS documents and I intend to focus on one photo rather than a full-page composition unlike my approach in the four previous sections.\textsuperscript{59} The photo in question is from the RDS of region Blekinge and it comes in a banner format, stretching over the full width of one page of the document. It takes up about a third of the page in terms of size and is positioned at the top, serving as a kind of visual heading of a new chapter. It has some multimodal features in the form of a blue rectangular space that contains a written text segment – a quote from what is called the Blekinge Strategy’s business dialogue 2012, which says:

(Q6:5) Give nourishment to young people’s ambitions – introduce them to entrepreneurship already in school. [54]

In terms of \textit{represented participants}, the photo contains only one, namely the man sitting to the left. While there are a number of objects in this room that we could label participants, I think that they are all rather \textit{possessive attributes} for the main \textit{carrier} here, the depicted room that is some form of industry floor. The man is positioned to the left in the image at medium distance, and, given the width of the photo, the composition of it leaves almost a sort of emptiness, or void, on the right-hand side. This is enhanced by the man's posture that is unlike all the images in the previous sections of this chapter.

Previously I have interpreted the images as producing interactive participants as spectators that are \textit{invited} to take part of the representations, but the \textit{gaze} of this man has a different effect. Indeed, instead of offering participation, it can be understood as a \textit{demand} (Kress & van Leeuwen, 2006). He, presumably the man who has created the business that he is represented as leading, has something to say to us and he needs us to listen and therefore demands our attention. In the multimodal composition, it is almost as if what he has to say is written in the blue box (Q7:5). This fits with his older age, as someone who has made it as an entrepreneur and now has a lot to show for it. He is in a position where he can voice his opinion and he seeks more people like him. Indeed, if he is the ‘given’ part of this image by being positioned to the left, maybe the ‘new’ space, the

\textsuperscript{59} The reason for this is not because larger multimodal compositions do not exist in the documents. Rather, as I have made clear, entrepreneurship is most of the time intertwined with a number of other elements and I could have focused more on those aspects in, for instance, Figures 7.1 and 7.3. Here I have chosen a representation that I think is more purely about the figure of the entrepreneur, which I take as useful for both showcasing certain multimodal techniques as well as underlining particular representations of entrepreneurship.
empty right-hand side of the picture, symbolizes that there are not enough young people with the qualities needed to take over this business and run it successfully?

In addition, he is surrounded by a kind of whitened light, making him appear in a different color composition compared to the rest of the picture. This kind of modality marker functions as a way of making him stand out against the more realistically colored background, representing him visually as beyond ordinary reality, almost as an angel or ghost. At the same time, however, his clothing is more of the common man in jeans and a sweater, showcasing him as a self-made man, possibly with a working class background, further supported by the industrial character of the room in which the picture is taken.

Taken together, it is clear that the entrepreneur is represented as a powerful figure. The way his gaze demands attention evokes the role of the entrepreneur as someone that we should listen to. Furthermore, I think that the way he is represented signals that this kind of position is attainable for anyone as long as they are taught (like the kids in school) to be entrepreneurial and work hard to become so. Moreover, the representation of him at some distance away from us with the aura produced by the color effect can be understood as signifying the importance of entrepreneurship in a wider social context, something that we may all strive towards.

Finally, it is hardly lost on anyone that the entrepreneur is represented as a man here. Indeed, in terms of rationalities (Chapter 5) and representations of social actors (Chapter 6) there is a salient theme that produces the entrepreneur with the ‘male’ qualities that women must be taught to develop. Maybe this is a sub theme in this multimodal representation? The elderly, successful man is looking for a future where children are made more entrepreneurial and his importance makes him a role model to those who have yet to become entrepreneurs, including women and immigrants. Following in his footsteps, would make them important, rich (notice the golden glow of the products in his industry) and equal to the white male.

In the next section, I will turn to different technological aspects of the assemblage, as I look closer at the use of a particular index for measuring innovation and innovative capacity among regions. However, since this too is often expressed in multimodal terms in some ways, I will continue this analysis in a different setting. I will then get back to discussing some of the general aspects of what the multimodal analysis tells us in the final section of the chapter where I also discuss how it contributes to global forms.
In this section I turn to the second kind of technology that I intend to analyze, namely the use of indices and rankings in the assemblage of regional development. The practice of producing indices and rankings is vitally present in these circumstances as it is in other forms of governance too. For instance, a United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) report from 2008 show that, at the time, some 178 indices and rankings were actively produced and maintained in relation to global governance and the general performance of states. The report shows that nations are measured and evaluated in a wide range of aspects such as political corruption, gender equality, human rights, competitiveness, innovation, freedom of the press, level of e-governance, economic vulnerability, hunger, level of globalization, degree of happiness, environmental degradation, political terror, technological achievement and quality of life in general. What is more, even though measures and rankings of nations have existed at least since the 1930s, this kind of benchmarking protocol is a relatively new phenomenon. Of the 178 measures and rankings presented by the UNDP over 50 percent were created after the year 2001 and over 80 percent after the year 1991 (Bandura, 2008; Löwenheim, 2008).

While the number of indices measuring regional space are likely to be fewer because of lack of data, the presence of them are still strong, particularly in relation to innovation and entrepreneurship. Prominent political actors such as the EU stand behind the production of a range of regional indices (that measure much more than innovation) by utilizing the Eurostat database that explicitly tries to gather, produce and maintain data at the regional level of EU-member states, and some additional European nations.

Furthermore, the importance of indices is also articulated throughout the corpus that I use in this thesis. Hence, when legitimizing and articulating Sweden’s innovative capacity, it often looks like in the articulations of Q7:6, taken from the national innovation strategy of Sweden.

(Q7:6) Sweden has been proven successful in international comparisons of the innovation climates and competitive powers of different countries. In Innovation Union Scoreboard 2011, Sweden is rated as the leading country among the 27 member states of the EU. In INSEAD’s Global Innovation Index 2011, Sweden is in second place, and in the 2012 World Economic Forum ranking, fourth. […] In Innovation Union Scoreboard 2011, the EU member states are compared in terms of the conditions for innovation. Sweden appears particularly successful in the area of human capital (the number of new doctoral degrees, the proportion of 30-34-year-olds who have completed programmes of higher education, and the number of young people who have completed upper secondary school) and innovation
investments (private and public). Sweden’s outcomes are weaker when it comes to the results of innovation activities, for instance in terms of how much revenue companies get from new or substantially improved products (goods and services), especially for small and mid-sized companies (MIEC, 2014:10). [44]

In this case I have chosen to focus on the topic of innovation since it is articulated as part of a dominant rationale in the assemblage I study. There are a number of available candidates to choose from. However, I have settled for quite a local index that is produced by the Swedish Regions’ cooperation arena Reglab in collaboration with the private consultancy firm Kontigo. As such, their Innovationsindex has been actively developed by representatives of the Swedish regional development agencies to address a general need that they identify in relation to their task:

(Q:7) One of the objectives of regional development policy is to create a basis for more innovations and improvements in the economy which constitute important preconditions for the competitive edge of companies and regions. It is therefore important to develop methods for measuring regional conditions for innovation-driven growth and the innovative potential of an economy. In order to support the regions in this area, Reglab has launched a development project to establish an innovation index – an indicator model for measuring the capacity for economic improvements. The development project builds on the work done to develop a model for a regional innovation index which was introduced by IVA as part of the project Innovation for growth in the autumn of 2010 (Reglab, 2012). [52]

Now, as mentioned before, I am not interested in whether or not this index is accurate or if it is a useful tool for analysts in regional development (although I do think there are reasons for asking questions regarding this). The point here is to analyze the index as a governmental technology, or that is, as an instrument of rule in the assemblage, deployed in conjunction with the different modes of rationale and prominent representations of social actors. Hence, this is not an analysis of the validity and reliability of the index; rather it is one of the power instruments produced by and through the index.

In this sense, the Reglab index is an example that serves to illustrate a more general point concerning the ways that politics is enacted through techniques of measuring, ranking and ordering in advanced liberal societies. Indeed, while it is a limited example of this, I still think that it conveys important aspects of how the assemblage takes on global forms.

Even though this part of the chapter is significantly shorter than the one on multimodal articulation, I have chosen to divide it into two sections. In the first I describe the Reglab index in more detail and in the second I turn to analyzing it by focusing on how it can be understood as a technology of
distance, a technology of communication and a technology of surveillance (Krause Hansen, 2012).

7.3.1. The Reglab Innovationsindex

Reglab’s Innovationsindex was first published in 2012 and has since then been updated once in 2014. It aims to measure the level of innovative capacity and the capacity for economic renewal and adaptation in Swedish regions. When doing so it builds explicitly on a view of innovation as a broad concept as specified in the so-called Oslo-manual where it is understood as:

(Q7:8) An 'innovation' is the implementation of a new or significantly improved product (good or service), or process, a new marketing method, or a new organizational method in business practices, workplace organization or external relations (OECD's Oslo-Manual for Innovation, cited in Reglab, 2012:4). [52]

In addition to the broad definition of innovation, Reglab also articulates the need for theoretical frames in relation to the index construction, and for this reason they support their understanding with references to the theoretical works of, among others, Richard Florida (2010), Michael Porter (1990) and Josef Schumpeter (1942). Taken together this means that the theoretical foundation for the index can be summarized as follows:

(Q7:9) The other main idea concerns the significance of a “hook” to make the model and the indicators comprehensible. What this means is that indicators, in order to be comprehensible, must have a starting point and a main idea. It does not mean that the chosen starting point must be retained at any cost, but rather that it can be used to support development efforts. We think that innovation-driven growth is created in cooperation between on the one hand industrial innovation and marketing skills and on the other a more general set of competences such as entrepreneurship, creativity, openmindedness, and diversity (Reglab, 2012:5). [52]

Together then, the broad definition and the theoretical foundation result in an index built on 15 different indicators grouped along three dimensions and then weighted together to produce the composite index value. The work on these themes and the selection of indicators were also the focus of a series of workshops that engaged representatives of the regions and consultants from Kontigo in methodological discussions, trying to ensure the usefulness of the index by finding reasonable measures of innovation. This was the main part of the work in producing the index:

(Q7:10) The focus for the index work process – and the issue which has been given the most time and generated the most discussion in the three workshops that have been held – is the question about what indicators should be included in an
index of this kind. It is important to emphasise that the indicators are supposed to highlight an existing situation and thus function as a kind of thermometer (Reglab, 2012:7).

The first dimension is a set of indicators grouped under the category called basic requirements\(^{60}\) that aims to measure what is considered to be basic needs for innovation. These are articulated as less flexible and harder to change in the short run and therefore they require more long term planning for any region who wishes to improve in this respect. In sum, the five indicators of this category\(^{61}\) revolves around what is called the openness, tolerance and diversity of people and companies as well as the competence of the work force and the dynamic learning and new ideas.

The second category of indicators is designed to measure renewal capacity\(^{62}\) of the regions. It is also comprised of five indicators relating to what is called abilities for renewal, the environment for change and renewal as well as physical capital.\(^{63}\) Finally, the third category of indicators is called market capacity\(^{64}\) and relates to two themes that are identified as actual capacity for commercialization and international networks of the regional business environment.\(^{65}\)

Together this enables an indexing of all Swedish regions at different times (from 2004 to 2013) on a composite scale where the value 100 represents the average level of innovation among all the regions. Briefly, this means that in 2013 only five regions managed to score above this value as Stockholm and Uppsala in particular skews the average.

Importantly, the index is broken down into the three different dimensions so that it is also possible to examine how the regions perform in more detail, a quality that is emphasized by Reglab. In combination with the interactive internet tools that are reachable from the website of the

\(^{60}\) In Swedish: Grundförutsättning

\(^{61}\) These are: (1) the level of employment among native Swedes in relation to immigrants; (2) the gender dissimilarity of economic branches; (3) the proportion of the population with at least three years of college education; (4) the proportional share of the people employed in the ten largest economic branches in relation to all employment and (5) the proportion of individuals who have changed employer the last three years.

\(^{62}\) In Swedish: Förnyelseförmåga

\(^{63}\) These indicators are: (1) The proportion of newly founded businesses for every 100 existing ones; (2) The proportion of highschool students that partake in the JA-Worldwide [in Swedish: Ung företagsamhet] classes (3) The proportion that agrees to the statement that their company of employment is innovative; (4) The proportion of research funding of universities out of total Regional Gross Domestic Product and (5) The share of private R&D resources in relation to Regional Gross Domestic Product.

\(^{64}\) In Swedish: Marknadsförmåga

\(^{65}\) The indicators here are: (1) the proportion of entrepreneurial individuals in the regional population; (2) The per capita patent and trademark applications; (3) The regional share of total national risk capital investments; (4) The proportion of foreign owned companies out of the total amount of companies in the region and (5) the regional export as proportion of the regional gross domestic product.
index, this facilitates a platform for regions where they can use the index as a learning tool:

(Q7:11) *Innovation index* is an indicator model for the regional capacity for economic improvements which can be used for analysis and learning at the regional level. The index can be used as a basis for strategic discussion with regional policy agents about the way in which conditions for supporting growth in the best way possible can be promoted. The primary purpose is not to compare regions; instead the index is meant to contribute to a focus on ways in which a region can successfully harness its own growth potential. Another objective is to provide in-depth learning about factors behind innovation-driven growth which are possible to impact on local, regional, and national levels. ([http://www.reglab.se](http://www.reglab.se))

While, the explicit goal may of course be for regions to learn, it is nevertheless a form of learning that will be conducted in relation to the rankings that are a necessary internal configuration of the index as such. Indeed, both the 2012 and the 2014 reports, where the index is published, end in an analysis that focus on showing how the regions can be ranked along the three dimensions and the overall score (Reglab, 2012; 2014). At the same time, however, a form of learning tool is articulated and built on, the dimension that was called *basic requirements*, on the one hand and a merging of the two *capacity* dimensions, on the other. This produces a basic two-dimensional matrix reproduced in Figure 7.6 below where the regions are visually portrayed in one of four quadrants.

These quadrants then represent tools for learning so that a region that falls into the top right quadrant enjoys both high levels of basic requirements for innovation and high levels of capacities. Thus, these regions should, according to the analysis of Reglab, maintain their direction and work on strategies for carrying this positive innovation climate into the future. Conversely, regions that fall into the lower left quadrant are those that have low levels of basic requirements and low levels of capacities. They have a difficult task in trying to produce programs and strategies that can change the long-term dimensions of basic requirements while paying attention to such measures that can be taken to improve their capacities.

66 Full site address: [http://www.reglab.se/innovation/?page_id=1425](http://www.reglab.se/innovation/?page_id=1425) accessed 2014-09-21
Comment: The figure originally appears at page 17 in the Document ‘Innovationsindex 2013’. Please refer to appendix A and B for more information concerning this document.

Should a region fall into the upper left part or the lower right part of the diagram, this means that they may concentrate on improving only those aspects in which they are lacking. In relation to this it is also understood that if falling into any of those quadrants a region has a sort of balance problem. Either it is not utilizing its basic requirements enough or it has a capacity that could be even more strengthened if these basic requirements were enhanced. As exemplified by Reglab (2014:18):

(Q7:12) Good basic conditions coupled with a low capacity for marketing and innovation (the upper left quadrant): An interpretation of this position is that the region does not make optimal use of its basic conditions today. It is possible to generate a better outcome from the present conditions if the marketing and innovation capacity is strengthened. Development efforts can focus on measures that support the ability to turn basic conditions into value – for instance measures which strengthen entrepreneurial positions, promote increased R&D investments, or attract venture capital. It is likely that there is a potential here which can be used, since the basic conditions are good. [53]
7.3.2. Index Technologies

Turning now to the understanding of this index in terms of a governmental technology, I think this can be done by first considering some basic features of numbers, rankings and indices as they operate in the public domain and then consider some more precise qualities. Consider therefore, how the dominant mode of rationale that I have called *creativity, innovation and entrepreneurship* through the Reglab index has been made into a calculable object and what the consequences are. First of all I think that we may recognize such a move as one that is a very distinct rendering of an ambiguous form into a concrete governable object. Indeed, it becomes not only concrete, but also easy to communicate, mutate and mobilize in a vast range of different social settings. The innovative performance of regions may now not only be measured, it may be related to, and installed in, wider discussions on for instance education, infrastructure, research and growth.

Importantly, this is a function that arises almost as intrinsic to the process of making a social field the object of governing. In advanced liberal systems it is important to foster political space as a calculable habitat upon which it is possible to perform simple as well as advanced calculus in order to determine its borders and inner functions. Indeed, it has been suggested that in such democratic systems the citizens are produced as subjects that must be calculative and rational, and that democratic power is both *calculated power* and *calculating power* (Rose, 1991).  

In the case of producing an index such as the one analyzed here, one of the most salient features is of course the level of simplification it achieves through abstraction. That is to say, the fifteen indicators used are assembled through a complex process of classification, measuring and calculation in order to arrive at a single unified measure for the innovative capacity of any given Swedish region. In particular, this abstraction backgrounds the classificatory processes and judgments that must be taken to render such a unified measure possible in the first place. In a sense therefore, it also removes some of the politically contestable features of the index as such. It is based on very specific theoretical foundations, and it uses equally specific measures to produce a number that may appear much

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67 Rose (1991:675) states that: *there is a constitutive interrelationship between quantification and democratic government. Democratic power is calculated power, and numbers are intrinsic to the forms of justification that gives legitimacy to political power in democracies. Democratic power is calculating power, and numbers are integral to the technologies that seek to give effect to democracy as a particular set of mechanisms of rule. Democratic power requires citizens who calculate about power, and numeracy and numericized space of public discourse are essential for making up self-controlling democratic citizens.*
less contestable than the individual measures or indicators. Consider for instance indicators 5 and 6:

(Q7:13) 5. The number of individuals who have changed employers in the last three years as part of the day-time population

Mobility is used here to denote the inclination of individuals to change employers. Research shows that the mobility of the workforce (often inside or between clusters) has a positive effect on the dynamics and innovation capacity of the business sector. Our suggestion is that mobility should be measured in terms of the number of job-switchers as defined by SCB. In other words, this is the part of the day-time population which has changed workplaces in the last three years.

6. The proportion of students who have taken part in the educational concept Junior Achievement Worldwide as part of the total number of upper secondary school students

This indicator is included as a measure of attitudes towards business ventures and entrepreneurship in the region. It is considered a prerequisite for being able to introduce an innovation on a market. A register-based study done by the Stockholm School of Economics shows that participants in the activities of Junior Achievement Worldwide engage in entrepreneurial activities later in life to a significantly higher degree than others (Reglab, 2014:10). [53]

Both these indicators are inserted in the index as positive contributions to the resulting composite figure and as such they illustrate how the abstraction neutralizes highly political judgments. As presented here, the index shows the innovative capacity of any Swedish region in one precise number (indeed so precise that decimals are used) and by doing so portrays a neutral measurement of innovative capacity. In addition, as described above, it also suggests ways for regions to deploy resources for improving the index values, thereby achieving higher levels of innovative capacity. In short, to be better at innovation, regions should make sure that its youths partake in the education and courses deployed by Junior Achievement Worldwide 68 to a higher degree and facilitate a system of labor that encourages more loosely hired workers.

 Needless to say, this is hardly a neutral political position. However, numbers such as those distilled by Reglab have a way of presenting themselves as neutral depictions of reality, disclosing things as they ‘really are’, and shifting the focus on their representations away from what they represent. Hence, by measuring and indexing innovative capacity in the regions, innovation not only becomes synonymous with the particular

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68 J-A Worldwide is the world’s largest organization for promoting and teaching entrepreneurship to school children and young adults through a range of different programs that can be implemented as part of the schools curriculum. In the actual indicators used by Reglab this refers to the Swedish organization called Ung Företagsamhet, which is a part of J-A Worldwide.
figures of the index, it also contributes to the positioning of innovation as an important concept in the assemblage as a whole by making it explicitly visible. Taken together we may understand and interpret the production of the index as related to three broad forms of governmental technologies, namely technologies of distance, technologies of communication and technologies of surveillance (Krause Hansen, 2012).

By technologies of distance I mean the way that an index of this kind must always rely on a formula that renders disparate, local and qualitative phenomena in quantitative categories that are possible to read and apply to all Swedish regions in a corresponding manner. Consider also how this creates specific centers of calculation (Rose, 1991) in which the data is collected, transformed and deployed to make the knowledge manifested in the index numbers into mobile constructs that are instantly portable across continents, oceans and indeed planets.

Thus, in principle, the Reglab innovation index could be deployed in any given region in the world and it could be reproduced according to the stable sets of processes and measures on which it is constructed. Crucially, it is also mutable and possible to combine with other figures and indices, making it yet more abstract. Indeed, the Reglab index itself uses other indices as indicators, thereby showcasing the usefulness of these highly abstract figures in the sense of mobility and mutability.

These aspects then also relate to technologies of communication. By this I mean how the figures produced by the index are not really the end point, but rather the starting point for more elaborate functions. Indeed, in this case Reglab explicitly states that the index is produced to help regions learn how to improve innovative capacity, and at the same time this is made possible by a set of communicative tools. In particular, the website resources enable users to produce diagrams and maps in beautiful colors, using a number of factors to investigate aspects of particular regions and their innovative capacity.

Hence, this makes the production of this kind of index an important tool for communicating innovative capacity in different formats. Indeed, quick Google searches also showcase how the Reglab index has been used in a range of power point presentations, reports and meetings as Swedish regions have continued their work on development. It has also been used as an important resource for some of the regions when producing their RDS documents, as in the case of region Blekinge that

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69 Using terms such as ‘reglab Innovationsindex’ ‘regional innovation Sverige (Sweden)’ and similar variations produces these kinds of results.
included an appendix in their RDS with calculations based on the Reglab index. These are then imported into the strategy in a refined format and communicated in multimodal text such as in Figure 7.7 below.

*Comment:* The figure originally appears at page 33 in the RDS of region Blekinge. Please refer to appendix A and B for more information concerning this document.

Concerning *technologies of surveillance* I follow the suggestion made by Hans Krause Hansen (2012) to understand these as first and second order surveillance. First, however, what I generally mean by technologies of surveillance in this case is something in the line of Foucault’s (2004) famous example of *panopticon* in the evolution of modern prisons. In other words, an index like this does not only communicate representations of innovative capacity in any given region, it also makes it possible to constantly monitor it. In a way, the abstract representation of innovative capacity as a single number produces a permanent visibility of this abstraction that is readily accessible (for instance, through the website and its tools) for anyone who wishes to assess regions in terms of innovation.

Importantly, this does not restrict the assessment to a set of external actors, but rather includes the regions themselves. Indeed, as mentioned many times now, an explicit purpose of the index is for it to be a tool in
the hands of the regions, possibly to use in order to assess themselves and improve themselves in regard to the numbers provided. Hence, the kind of surveillance I speak of here is not conditioned on the presence of specific social actors that may want to investigate the innovative capacity of a region, but rather on the possibility that such an investigation may occur at all.

As mentioned, I think that it is also useful to recognize the production of Reglabs Innovationsindex as a surveillance of the first order and as surveillance of the second order. What I said in the above paragraphs can thus be further specified to show two broad categories of technologies of surveillance. We may understand the first order surveillance as the actual gathering of data, the classificatory schemes deployed and the necessary observations that must be made to be able to count, calculate and produce the index in the most basic sense. This then results in a specific figure that measures the innovative capacity of the region, although once this is produced and made into a ranking or rating it is inserted into social relations where it can be used to exercise second order surveillance. For instance, the Reglab index could be used by government agencies to allocate resources and subsidies, it could be made part of private enterprises’ planning procedures when they are looking to expand into new regions and it could be utilized by other political actors such as party’s and lobby organizations to formulate policy initiatives.

Thus, all things considered, the production of indices such as Reglabs Innovationsindex can be understood as a form of governmental technology that makes important contributions to the governance of the assemblage. While my intention here is to illustrate how this specific index operates, at the same time it also sheds light on some instances of power/knowledge at work in the assemblage. In addition, this particular example could easily be expanded to show the deployment of a wide range of measures and indices that are used in these circumstances to help govern regional development, and institute the boundaries of the field.

Before I move on to the final section of this chapter where I recapitulate the functions of the governmental technologies investigated here, I would like to make a final point concerning the multimodal articulations so often associated with indices. Indeed, the Reglab index is no exception and as I said above I think it can be understood as a technology of communication. Hence, the graphic expositions such as the diagram in Figure 7.6 and Figure 7.7 are of course associated with the numerical abstractions of social phenomena. Here I shall be very brief, but
I do think that these articulations are very important for enhancing the 'neutral' representation of knowledge invested in the figures.

Consider then, the way that innovative capacity is represented as multimodal in Figure 7.6. It is, of course, a very typical way of showcasing performance along two axes that constitute a particular space where individual measures are plotted. Here I will just make one main point, namely that such diagrams produce a sense of movement and direction out of what is actually separate and individual points of measure. The installation of the four quadrants helps induce an understanding of linearity for the evolution of regions regarding their innovative capacity. While this may not be the intention, questions of 'where are we at' are transformed into questions of 'where are we going' and thus in this case regions are represented as located on a continuum ranging from less evolved into more evolved ones. The diagram therefore gives any interactive participants a general idea of what direction the less evolved regions will move if only they follow the prescriptions of the index. However, this general idea is not a neutral expression of unbiased knowledge or a representation of 'how things work'. Rather, as Virginia Woolf put it, 'general ideas are always generals ideas' (Kress & van Leeuwen, 2006).

7.4 ENTANGLED TECHNOLOGIES AND THE POWER OF MOBILITY

In this chapter I have illustrated how two governmental techniques operate in the assemblage of Swedish regional development. First, I focused on how the policy articulated in relation to this field can be understood as multimodal texts as they combine photography, graphic design and typography to convey their message. Second, I turned to the way that numbers, in the form of performance indices, are a common feature of regional development (and indeed all forms of governance today) as I analyzed how they can be understood as governmental technologies.

Regarding the multimodal articulations, I explicitly made the analytical examples related to the chains of rationale that I identified in chapter five as well as in relation to the social actors of chapter six. This was done in order to show how the technological aspects of using multimodal communications can enhance, modify or otherwise transform the meaning of a particular message. At the same time, the primary goal was not to focus on such transformations, but rather to showcase how multimodal articulations can be deployed in the assemblage and how this can be understood as expressions of power. Furthermore, an explicit purpose of the chapter is how these multimodal articulations can be understood as
global forms (Ong & Collier, 2005) and thus contributing to the ongoing production of global space (and the phenomenon of globalization).

In terms of the relationship between the multimodal texts that I have used as examples and the chains of rationale that they are linked to I would like to point out that I do not interpret them as particularly deviant from the general message conveyed in chapter five. Hence, using Figure 7.1 as a starting point, I showed how this expresses, and in some ways enhances, the rationale that was dominant in the adaptability chain. In particular, I think that by encountering what I described as knowledge in action, the multimodal articulations showcase further insights as to how knowledge as a mode of rationale operates in the assemblage. Indeed, knowledge was represented here as technological knowledge, performed by scientists in a way that possibly could contribute to innovation and in the end competitiveness. The scientist was depicted as a woman, empowered by scientific knowledge to contribute to competitiveness through her innovative skill, thus showing even more aspects of how the adaptability chain is made and carried out through certain forms of knowledge.

Figure 7.2 also illustrated how multimodal representations of immigration weaved together the notions of openness, tolerance and integration in such ways that it produced the non-integrated immigrant as a problem that must be solved. Indeed, I also interpreted the text as conveying representations of immigrants (and Muslims more precisely) as responsible for this problem and as turning their back on society. Therefore, in relation to chapter five, the multimodal representations of immigrants as a problem shed additional light on that particular part of immigration that is more unwanted. Recall how I in chapter five stated that we may interpret the attraction chain, and the element of immigration, as one in need of particular types of immigrants, namely the internationally mobile class of researchers, business leaders and engineers. Here, the multimodal expression showed the other side of the immigration coin, as articulated by the regions, or in other words that there are some foreign subjects that may constitute part of the problem rather than the solution for future competitiveness. These asylum seekers and poorly integrated people in deprived city areas must therefore be turned into assets, yet in this chapter we have seen a multimodal text that not only produced such immigrants as responsible for their situation, but also represented them as a generic group that is not part of us or our society.

Figure 7.3 was a multimodal composition that also illustrated the fairly common use of diagrams and flowcharts in the RDS documents. In this
case it was related to the way that region Västerbotten strived to become a sustainable and attractive region, and I spent some time showing my interpretations of how a diagram like that expresses particular modality markers. More specifically, I understood it as portraying a form of ideal that is often present in science or academia where the abstraction is often represented as close to ‘truth’ or at least a purer form of knowledge.

Thus, in terms of power, this shows how the act of governing any domain is always closely connected to regimes of truth and knowledge. As power productively flows through the social body, it is nested in the practices of governing specific domains. Not least, as Tania Murray Li (2007:7) has put it, such installments of a governable domain requires both a moment of problematization as well as a moment of ‘rendering technical’. Taken together this means that a domain only becomes an object of rule after it has been made into a problem, which in turn requires technical definitions, instruments and procedures. Therefore, the multimodal articulations in Figure 7.3 (and others) can be treated as a snapshot of the permeable boundaries between policy and expertise, where the latter increasingly is taking on new forms as it influences policy. Not least is expertise to a great extent today constituted in relation to a very mobile class of hybrid consultants. These may be academics in various forms depending on the context where in which they may act as publicly funded professors on one occasion, and at other times they may act in the name of their own, private consultancy firm. Moreover, large consultancy firms are very much involved in shaping politics as well, not least in relation to development issues (cf. Bock, 2014; Jung, Korinek & Straßheim, 2014; Pfister & Horvath, 2014).

As for Figure 7.4, I spoke of representations of a kind of leadership that was embodied by a white man, ready to hammer out differences and steer networks and actors towards cooperation. At the same time I also interpreted the multimodal composition as one that offered the viewers a depiction of leadership in action. This kind of offer was different from the more demand-like articulations of Figure 7.5, which I used as an example of how entrepreneurship could be articulated in multimodal texts. Indeed, the man that represented the self-made entrepreneur in Figure 7.5 fixes his eyes steadily on who ever is viewing the image, producing a situation where the composition demands something from you (like Uncle Sam and other draft pictures). In a way, his demanding gaze could be motivated by the esteemed position he possesses, and I further understood these
representations as a way of producing the figure of the entrepreneur as a role model or hero in need of new disciples to fill his shoes.

Taken together, one major and salient feature of the multimodal articulations is the way they transform the relationship between the text and the reader in comparison with documents containing ‘only’ written text. This is because multimodal texts produce interactive participants in ways that are both more explicit and less linear than written texts. Indeed, the multimodal compositions in the RDS documents often contain written text and then enhance this by glossing it with figures, tables, photos, flowcharts and drawings giving them a more comprehensive interactive capacity.

While I think that the governmental technologies of multimodal compositions mainly enhance or visualize certain rationalities and social actors rather than completely change them, I also would like to mention what I think is a very important addition in terms of governmental power in this regard. Put briefly, as policy becomes multimodal, it transforms how we experience power and the way that the system of rule becomes present in relation to its subjects. Think of the way that a multimodal text, such as those in most of the RDS documents, in a way presents itself as both formal and personal at the same time. Indeed, they produce interactive participants that are invited to scrutinize certain representations of reality and they sometimes also demand attention from the same participants. Furthermore, this message is mixed with representations of scientific-like diagrams and charts while also blending these with graphic design, typography and colorations.

It is thus reasonable to interpret the multimodal articulations as new ways for power and rule to express itself. Indeed, power interpellates us in these texts by producing us as an interactive participant and by representing our peers, our enemies, our dreams, our future and our desires in photos and therefore becomes personal with us. At the same time, it also imposes forms of knowledge upon us that further positions us as an interactive participant of these texts.

In regard to the second form of governmental technologies investigated here, namely the performance indices that circulate in the assemblage in general, the analysis focused on Reglab’s Innovationindex as an example of such indices. By doing so I wanted to widen the analysis of rankings, measures and indices to consider them as language, possible to interpret and as part of the ongoing construction of social reality.
For this reason I first stated some basic themes that we may view as intrinsic to such a view of numbers, namely that they can be used to background certain elements while producing forms of abstraction that are mobile, easily reproducible and ‘neutral’ in their representation of reality. In this sense the example of Reglab’s Innovationsindex is not different in terms of production of innovation as a single measurable figure for all Swedish region. However, I also articulated interpretations of how the index could be understood as producing technologies of distance, technologies of communication and technologies of surveillance.

First, I stated that the way Reglab produces its index necessarily includes ways of bringing disparate quantities into a center of calculation where a number of calculative techniques are processed to enable in a sense the comparison of apples and oranges. This results in a single figure that is possible to deploy in any given social setting, almost instantly, as long as the data are there to be gathered. In this way, it can be understood as a technology of distance (Krause Hansen, 2012) in that it works to overcome distance, both in the concrete geographical sense and in the more theoretical meaning of rendering distant phenomena comparable.

As a technology of communication (Krause Hansen, 2012), I said that the actual production of the index numbers was only the start of a more elaborate communication so that there is a function built into this kind of production that goes beyond the measurement. Indeed, Reglab has provided us with a sort of web driven laboratory where we, through our Internet browsers, can engage with the index in many different manners, letting us produce graphs and colored maps for different regions and points in time. Hence, the communicative and interactive parts of the index are salient and likely also to continue making the numbers important in the assemblage in a wider sense. I also pointed to the fact that the kind of graphs that are often associated with this kind of indices can be read as multimodal texts that help institute a sense of progression and movement along particular paths, even through the index actually represents discrete measurements at separate times.

Finally, I also considered the way that the index could be understood as a technology of surveillance of the first and second order (Krause Hansen, 2012). In short, this meant that the production of Reglab’s index enables a form of constant assessment and surveillance of how well any particular region succeeds in its attempts to be innovative. Importantly, this kind of monitoring is upheld not only by external actors, but also by the regions themselves. Recall how I stated in chapter five that the articulations of
global competition positioned the regions in a new situation where competition is omnipresent and always potentially shifting. This, in a sense, demands that social actors constantly adapt to such a situation, and an important part in adaptability may be to monitor and constantly evolve through more ‘knowledge’ of the contextual factors (cf. Q5:5 and Q5:6). This contributes to a situation where the region's own interest in improving by coming up with the index in the first place, in the end turns into a form of self-control and what Foucault (2008) and governmentality scholars (cf. Dean, 2010; Fejes & Dahlstedt, 2013) recognize as technologies of the self.

In a way, this behavior of the regions is underpinned by what may be understood as a hyper-rationalized approach to development (Lovering, 1999; Säll, 2014). As we know, the last decades of regional development in Europe and beyond have been marked by an ever-growing apparatus of concepts for regions to develop in new ways. Learning regions (Asheim, 1996), regional innovation systems (Cooke, 1992), clusters (Porter, 1990) and, more recently, the so-called smart-specialization are but a few of these. Together they represent this hyper-rational approach where the underlying assumption often seems to be that there exists such a thing as an objectively best policy for developing regions. Since this is so, impressive quantities of resources must be spent on trying to measure, compare and calculate how to close in on this. More generally, these are surely not practices that are limited to regional development, but rather they logically follow the global quest for good governance that seems to abound in today’s politics. Indeed, one of the single most sought for information by policy makers are numbers and indices since these lend themselves well to benchmarking and comparison (Arndt, 2008). More recently the politics of numbers has received increased attention from scholars in relation to many different issues such as higher education, risk, management and standardization (cf. Arndt, 2008; Erkkilä & Piironen, 2009; 2014a; 2014b; Espeland & Stevens, 2008; Higgins & Larner, 2010; Hummel, 2006). While there are several themes running through this recent strand of literature, they generally recognize the performativity of numbers so that they serve as devices of political practice that can be mobilized and utilized to construct knowledge. However, most of these articles and books also underline how the ranking, calculation and benchmarking throughout society do serve the function of masking the inherently political character of policy-making.
In sum, I hold that multimodal expressions in RDS documents and performance indices such as Reglab’s *Innovationsindex* contribute to an extension and enhancement of the modes of rationale identified in the previous chapter, yet they are also examples of distinct governmental technologies that have the ability to produce rationale and exercise power independently. This also means that they are important pillars in the biopolitics of controlling, manipulating and enhancing the populations of the domain in which they are made operational. That is to say, the techniques in this case help reinforce the political rationalities of competitiveness through articulations of, for instance, knowledge, inclusiveness, leadership and entrepreneurship *in action*. This can be understood as one way (among others) to help installing the governance of regional development as important sites of the biopolitics of modern governmental regimes (cf. Painter, 2013). What is more, they are also in this case good examples of how the assemblage may take on global forms and thus also perform in sites outside of regional development in Sweden, and I turn to some of these functions next.

7.4.1. Relational Space and Global Forms

While the analysis in this chapter has focused on the things discussed above, I have made it clear several times that these can be interpreted as effects *within* the assemblage. At the same time though, one of my main points here is also to discuss how the assemblage *reaches out of itself* through its global forms. These forms then can be interpreted as local production of globalization as they help to relationally constitute other spaces outside of the assemblage of regional development in Sweden that I am interested in here (Massey, 2005; Ong & Collier, 2005).

The limited analysis of two forms of governmental technologies conducted here was never intended as a nomological answer to ‘why-questions’, but rather to serve as an approach to ‘how-questions’. That is, the goal here is not to provide a general or total description of all global forms produced as an effect of governmental technologies in the assemblage and neither is the endpoint a thorough answer to why this happens. The goal is, however, to provide a fruitful example of how governmental technologies can take global forms and how this in turn can be made into a platform from which it then is possible to fashion a form of critical explanation, if by the latter we do not mean that to explain necessitates a covering-law model (Glynos & Howarth, 2007; Law, 1994).
So, in relation to the analysis that has been conducted here I think that it is useful to focus on one main way that the technologies here contribute to global forms and then modify that discussion by focusing on some variations within it. Consider therefore first how both the operations made possible by the indices and the multimodal articulations in RDS documents can be understood as enhancing the mobility of the assemblage. Indeed, when speaking of the Innovationsindex, I used the concept technologies of distance to portray how it helped aspects of regional development (the measuring of innovative capacity) to be rendered in a way that in theory can overcome distance both in terms of miles and kilometers as well as in qualitative separation of phenomena. This mobile quality then is enhanced by the governmental technologies and makes it possible for this specific assemblage to be (re)produced in other settings.

Within his ANT framework, Bruno Latour (1987; 2005) has used the concept of an immutable mobile to describe how certain translations occur in networks such as information passing from node to node in the larger system. While I do not deploy an ANT understanding here, I think that it can be useful to conceive of the kind of global form produced by the technologies investigated here as a mutable mobile (Law & Mol, 2001; Porter T, 2012). In the case of immutable mobiles, think of the way a range of technological instruments were deployed during the colonization era as the ships, caravans and carriages transported and collected vast amounts of information and objects from distant places back to the centers of the European regimes. In this way, maps and navigation instruments condensed knowledge in relatively small and mobile constructs that could be brought along for the travels and utilized in any setting, thus realizing their invested knowledge. Such devices can be seen as important for understanding how certain centers of calculation facilitated the exercise of a rather stark control over spaces far away and we may think of the indices and RDS documents along similar lines (Law & Mol, 2001; Porter T, 2012).

By means of multimodal articulations, and indeed through the realization of RDS documents as a way of communicating policy at all, the assemblage of regional development in Sweden takes on a very mobile character that in addition is not immutable, but rather mutable (Law & Mol, 2001). This means that the multimodal elements and the ways they are presented through graphic design and marketing techniques can be distilled and then realized in other spaces where they may be inserted, for instance, in French, Italian or South African regional development.
Naturally, this would result in a form that would be a kind of mutation of the Swedish version as different languages would be used and variegated discursive registers would come into play as the multimodal compositions were produced. However, there would still exist a presence of the technological articulations made in the ‘original’ assemblage.

Furthermore, the production of RDS documents as a technological tool for steering regional development can also be understood as a mutable mobile, invested with formal modes of governmental knowledge that is possible to deploy and transform in many variations while still retaining the character of the original construct. Thus, while immutable mobiles are possible to transport, they may not have the same mutable capacity as the kind of governmental technologies I have investigated here.

As for performance indices in general and the Reglab *Innovationsindex* in particular this mutable mobility is especially potent. It builds upon calculations and techniques that are possible to insert into other forms of computations, and it permits other instruments to use it in a wide range of ways. Hence, as innovation has been produced in this distinct format where it can be communicated as a single descriptive figure, it has also been equipped with the capacity to be mobile and mutable.

Taken together therefore, I would argue that the governmental technologies that I have investigated here extend the global forms of the assemblage through increased mobility. What is more, since these technologies are also linked to modes of rationale, they contribute to a spread of these distinct forms of conducting regional development around the globe. While multimodal documents and performance indices can be produced in some variation, it is likely that we may also encounter the dominant rationales in many settings while expressed differently in each one. This is the function of the global forms (Ong & Collier, 2005), and of course, it would be a mistake to treat the technologies and modes of rationale that operate in the Swedish assemblage as originating from there. Rather they are themselves local variations of the more global forms that transport discourses and power/knowledge from one spatial construct to another.
‘My point is not that everything is bad’, said Foucault famously, ‘but that everything is dangerous’ (1984:343). In this chapter I will provide a discussion along Foucault’s lines when I reflect on the results of the empirical analysis made in this thesis. However, when I do so I will situate them in relation to larger questions of power and rule that may be of importance beyond the assemblage that I have studied.

Thus, in these concluding sections I return to the themes that I have investigated so far, namely how globalization is (re)produced in Swedish regional development and how this reproduction can be understood as recursive with both situated and tangible effects as well as global forms. Moreover, given the particular signature of power that I have deployed in this thesis, I wish to discuss somewhat further how we can understand the political rationalities, governmental technologies and representations of social actors as effects of a productive power, enmeshed with knowledge and claims for truth, directed towards governing the biopolitics of the assemblage.

Before doing so, however, I think it is important to recognize how the ensemble of practices and discourses that makes up the governing of regional development can be thought of as ‘a will to improve’ (Murray Li, 2007). In other words, regional development arises, as often mentioned here, in the midst of private and public expertise that, in the efforts to govern this assemblage, must instate it as a problem that can be improved. According to Tania Murray Li (2007:4f), we may understand ‘the will to improve’ as shared by many parties and interests:

Many parties share in the will to improve. They occupy the position of trustees, a position detained by the claim to know how others should live, to know what is best for them, to know what they need. [...] The objective of trusteeship is not to dominate others - it is to enhance their capacity for action, and to direct it.
I agree with this description and I have no intention to analyze the practice as one ruled by some hidden agenda that aims to achieve one thing, but communicate something else. While I do not like the general logic of current regional development, it is not primarily because I am ideologically opposed to it (even though I am ideologically opposed to it). It is more because of the non-recognition of the dangerous side of government (Foucault, 1984), in the sense that the will to improve and its trustees (re)cast whatever field it sets out to govern in non-political, ‘neutral’ terms:

They [the trustees] desire to make the world better than it is. Their methods are subtle. If they resort to violence, it is in the name of a higher good - the population at large, the survival of species, the stimulation of growth. Often, their schemes operate at a distance. They structure a field of possible actions. They modify processes. They entice and induce. They make certain courses of action easier or more difficult. Many schemes appear not as an external imposition, but as the natural expression of the everyday interactions of individuals and groups. […] Whatever the response, the claim to expertise in optimizing the lives of others is a claim to power, one that merits careful scrutiny (Murray Li, 2007:5).

It is such a scrutiny that I intend to do in this final chapter of the thesis. In other words, I wish to highlight how we may position the results generated here within a larger discursive context, and examine their conditions of emergence. Indeed, I will make the case that rather than speaking of the established concept new regionalism (cf. Keating, 1998), a better way to approach contemporary regional development politics is to recognize its neoliberal side and therefore I shall refer to the assemblage as dominated by neo-regionalism70 a trait significant of what I call an innovation society.

In the following, I first reflect on the benefits and challenges of assemblage thinking in relation to the results that I have produced here. I then revisit the results of each chapter in more detail as I consider them together along three related axes that I denote subsumptions, displacements and enhancements. Briefly, this means that I situate them within a discussion of power concerning how the will to improve is intimately linked to processes that render political issues in non-political terms (Murray Li, 2007). And, in addition, how the ‘will to improve’ also turns into a ‘will to empower’ through its formation of new citizens (Cruikshank, 1999). This discussion concerns the more tangible effects of the particular representation of globalization that predominate within the assemblage and the chains of rationale that it produces.

70 Together with Line Säll, I have pointed to this elsewhere (Säll & Öjehag-Pettersson, 2013). Säll (2014:226) also spells this conceptualization out in some more detail.
Thereafter, I turn to an examination of the global forms of the assemblage in wider terms than what I have done so far, as I situate them within a neoliberal governmental logic (Brown, 2006; Larner, 2000; Ong, 2006; 2007; Peck, 2013). In addition, I also follow Ahiwa Ong’s (2006) and Giorgio Agamben’s (1998) discussion on the exception as a descriptive category for understanding the formation of certain neoliberal spaces such as the neo-regional ones in Sweden. As I do so, I also consider how such spaces can be related to the figure of postpolis to illuminate the kind of regions that are implicit in the global forms (Tesfahuney & Schough, 2009). The chapter and the thesis are concluded by a brief outline of the contours of changes in broader systems of government, which I connect to the emergence of an innovation society.

8.1 ASSEMBLAGE THINKING: BENEFITS, CHALLENGES AND POSITIONS

Before I expand the discussion on the empirical results, I would like briefly to take time to reflect on the benefits and challenges of facilitating the amalgamation of analytical concepts from assemblage thinking and governmentality studies. After all, I have specified the purpose of the thesis as both empirical and theoretical in the sense that I intend to fashion a conceptual grammar that could help, and possibly advance, the way we understand regional development politics.

In several ways, I argue that the analytical approach of articulating assemblage thinking in this thesis has allowed me to grasp, more fully, the variegated registers of power, politics and practice that come into play when regional development is governed. It has allowed me to decenter powerful categories such as the (nation) state and its institutional relationship with regions, municipalities and the EU, while still not declaring such relations unimportant. Indeed, it has allowed me to focus on sites of emergence rather than predetermined territorial units and absolute spaces in which government is enacted. In this way then, I have tried to take seriously the assumptions of space and geography that figure almost intrinsically as a territorial trap in much of political science and international relations (Agnew, 1994). This in turn implies that assemblage thinking also has helped me as I have tried to stay clear of methodological nationalism (Brenner, 2004) when analyzing how regional development is being governed.

To be sure, this has not been only a pleasant experience. Undoubtedly, I have struggled in some respects and maybe most with trying to find methodological directions in existing literature, well aware that the idea of
assemblage thinking in itself is artisanal in nature, allowing for (or even expects) the researcher to assemble her own set of tools and methods. While this is an analytical freedom, it also involves a struggle to fashion the tools, instate the space of inquiry and to maintain a position based on multiplicity rather than homogeneity (Deleuze, & Guattari, 2004; 2009; Ong, 2014).

Moreover, assemblage thinking is not a general way of approaching empirical research in Political Science. Indeed, while there have been advancements towards allowing a more heterogeneous set of methodologically accepted approaches, the dominance of what we may broadly call positivist methodology is still clearly predominant (cf. Brady & Collier, 2010; Glynos & Howarth, 2007). Intertwined with such perceptions are concepts such as validity, reliability, objectivity and intersubjectivity. I have already discussed how I think it is important for social science to go beyond such categories, and maybe most importantly, to recognize the role of the researcher. However, to move beyond established guidelines comes at the price of some uncertainty. Yet, it is a road that I have travelled here and I intend to see it through.

So, briefly put, I have no problem in stating that the research conducted here has been carefully undertaken, thoroughly performed, and indeed also accurately, which does not have to mean true and correct, to paraphrase Jennifer Mason (2007). Furthermore, I also argue that my approach of merging assemblage thinking with a Foucauldian perspective on governing and power has allowed me to recognize my position as a researcher within the problem that I study, rather than detached from it. The sites of emergence from which I have collected texts were generated, selected and delimited by me and these activities forced my to think extensively about my position, not only as a researcher, but also as a privileged straight white man (Haraway, 1988; Harding, 1993).

Indeed, in this regard, I was inspired by what Sandra Harding (1993) has called standpoint epistemology which basically means that in order to produce research, I do not think that a detachment from the subjects and objects that I study is preferable. Rather, I have actually strived for a position that, as far as possible, does not reproduce the dominant social order, both in terms of ‘how to conduct “good” research’, as well as in terms of categories such as class, race and gender (Haraway, 1988). To spell this position out clearly then, I view the society that I study with a healthy deal of skepticism. I consider it to crumble under orders that produce various forms of economic inequalities and systematically position women, people
of color and non-straight people as inferior to the dominant white male figure. Moreover, I also maintain that geopolitical dispositions under global capitalism contribute to unjust distribution and consumption of resources. While this positions me as a non-neutral researcher (there are no others!), I do not at all think that this excuses me from producing research which can be considered in terms of the criteria I articulated in chapter four. That is to say, I hope that I have produced results that are credible, (fairly) original, with some degrees of resonance and hopefully they can be useful. In conclusion then, before I end this thesis I would like to articulate some scattered thoughts based on the results produced here and the position that I have just spelled out.

8.2 Subsumption, Displacement and Enhancement

In the first chapter I stated three thematic research questions to which I then attached sub-questions in order to be more precise. Recall then, that the first set of research questions asked how globalization was rendered a problem for governing regional development and in turn what kind of political rationalities were formulated in relation to this.

I showed how the governance of regional development in Sweden articulates globalization as a phenomenon primarily considered as a result of technological development and economic trade policy. For this reason, it is understood that we now live in a world where flows of finance, capital and ideas travel at the speed of light, more or less unhindered, which makes the governance of Swedish regional development a matter of recognizing the mobility of skilled people and corporations. In relation to this I pointed out that the two main problems arising were articulated as (global) competition and (not enough) global regions.

Regions, whether they want to or not, must under the conditions of globalization recognize that they are part of a global reality where competition is fierce and omnipresent. Thus, regions are not primarily local units of the polity, they must be governed with a logic that takes the global character of their conditions into account. Therefore, a range of political rationales arise in this assemblage that directs attention to competitiveness, and most often this is understood to be a matter of creativity, innovation and entrepreneurship. I then said that different modes of rationale link up to form chains that represent ways of becoming competitive by means of creativity, innovation and entrepreneurship.

The second set of research questions concerned the production of social actors as I asked both how they were produced as well as who
appeared to be particularly important in the material. I showed that the women, the region, the corporation, the immigrants, the experts and the entrepreneur could be identified as important social actors, although with different representations in terms of capacities. In particular, I described the corporation, the experts and the entrepreneurs as agentilized in the sense that they were represented as more active and mobile in relation to other social actors and the general rationales of the assemblage. In contrast, the region appeared as reactive in the sense that it continuously had to cater to certain groups and follow the logics of the assemblage to a high degree. The same was also true of women and immigrants. However, I characterized the representations of them as deagentilized, or in other words they appeared as inactive and in need of empowerment to realize their potentials.

The third set of research questions turned attention to the technological side of governing the assemblage as I exemplified how two prominent technologies operate within it. The first example concerned the multimodal representations of regional development in 21 so-called RDS documents. I showed how the technology functioned as a form of enhancement and further articulation of dominant rationales and representations of social actors.

In the second example I studied how a particular index designed to measure regional innovative capacity was produced and deployed as an instrument of learning in the assemblage. In doing so, I highlighted how such indices can be regarded as imbued with governmental power representing three broad themes of technologies. More precisely I illustrated how the Innovationsindex can be considered a technology of distance, a technology of communication and a technology of surveillance.

I have already situated the main results of each chapter in relation to different strands of research that, for instance, directly addresses women’s role in regional politics or the importance of knowledge in the global economy. What I wish to do now is to conduct a broader discussion concerning the general themes of the results. When doing so I employ a range of Foucauldian inspired works (Brown, 2006; Cruikshank, 1999; Larner, 2000; Murray Li, 2007; Ong, 2006; 2007; Tesfahuney & Schough, 2009) to facilitate a discussion of power, politics and democracy.

I suggest that taken together the results of all three studies may be understood along three interrelated axes. First, as I have shown, I think that we may speak of subsumptions of rationales under the master modes of competitiveness and creativity, innovation and entrepreneurship. Second,
we may designate the ongoing representations of social actors in terms of
rationalities and technologies that simultaneously generate displacements and
enhancements.

Beginning with the subsumptions, I take this to mean two things. First,
how my results throughout all the studies show how notions of innovation,
creativity and entrepreneurship become a sort of master mode of rationale
that structures the assemblage and the interventions made by governing
practices. Indeed, we may have to remind ourselves of the fact that the
basic problem that underpins this is quite a specific articulation of
globalization. In the broad literature of globalization studies there is
certainly no lack of alternative explanations and theorizations (cf. Bisley,
2007; Held & McGrew, 2003; Holton, 2005; Scholte, 2005) that could have
pointed the associated rationalities in very different directions. Second, by
subsumption I also mean to articulate how a salient feature in the assemblage
is the subsumption of politics under the modes of expertise and
supposedly neutral and non-political representations of political issues.

To explore both these intertwined meanings we may start with bringing
the moment of problematization more clearly to the front, in the sense that
‘the will to improve’ (Murray Li, 2007) must start with a basic problem. It
needs something to program, change and steer so that it, according to
certain formations of truth and morale, becomes precisely improved (Dean,
2010). Indeed, this moment is from the beginning ‘intimately linked to the
availability of a solution. They co-emerge within a governmental
assemblage in which certain kinds of diagnoses, prescriptions, and
techniques are available to the expert who is properly trained’ (Murray Li,
2007:7). Thus, the fundamental ‘problem’ of global competition and (not
enough) global regions is produced within a complex of rationalities that is
already there to structure the response.

Moreover, this response consisting of creativity, innovation and
entrepreneurship, must also be instated through a related moment that
Murray Li (2007) calls ‘rendering technical’. This means that it is not
enough to problematize a particular field, such as regional development. It
must also be instated and inscribed precisely as an arena which is possible
to program and develop. When this happens it also serves more clearly to
institute a boundary between the trustees, or in other words the experts,
who are in a position to diagnose and mobilize treatments for the problem
at hand, and the subjects of rule, who are the object of this treatment. To
render a domain technical therefore often entails the representation of a
political domain in non-political terms. Indeed, sometimes it is not only non-political but also outright anti-political:

There is a second dimension to rendering technical [...] Questions that are rendered technical are simultaneously rendered nonpolitical. For the most part, experts tasked with improvement exclude the structure of political-economic relations from their diagnoses and prescriptions. They focus more on the capacities of the poor than on the practices through which one social group impoverishes another. [...] A third dimension to improvement might also be labeled antipolitics: a design of programs as a deliberate measure to contain a challenge to the status quo (Murray Li, 2007:7f).

In the case if this thesis, we must understand how this is not the neutral ‘best ways’ of governing as so much of the pathways, options and directions for governing regional development are subsumed under creativity, innovation and entrepreneurship in the name of competitiveness. Indeed, rendering political questions in technical terms does not make them less political. On the contrary, it only further underlines the deeply political nature they rest upon (Ferguson, 1990; Murray Li, 2007).

When reading and analyzing documents such as those included in this thesis, one really has to constantly remind oneself over and over again to not lose sight of the political nature involved. In numbers, in indices, in photos, in figures, in graphic design and in written texts, hailing innovation and entrepreneurial qualities appear as so self-evident that there seems to be no alternative to this. Indeed, I have noted how the understanding of globalization that is articulated as part of ‘the problem’ of governing modern regional governance is represented in ways that makes it resemble a natural phenomenon, such as a hurricane or tsunami. As a function of this, regions must become global and competitive, and the experts that instate this problem to be governed are already enmeshed in the solutions as they continuously (re)produce the natural character of the problem. As trustees perform SWAT-analyses, deploy programs for fostering innovative capacities in children and produce images and brands of their particular region they also limit the available options for what regional development is, what it can do and what it can become.

To be sure, it is not always necessary to look for the most recent research to be able to provide an illuminating description of such a process. In this regard, consider for a moment Marx and Engels (1978) theory of alienation. In their analysis they start out exploring the philosopher Ludwig Feuerbach and his description of the worship of God as representing a complete anti-thesis of the initial position of God in
human society. According to Feuerbach, God arises as a need in humans to explain the perils of life and is thus a product of humans (Andersson, 1997). Through a series of steps this relationship is recast so that it is not God who is a product of humanity, but rather humanity is a product of God. Marx and Engels (1978) expanded this analysis and applied it to capitalist economy. According to them, the market system also arises as a product of human political interventions. Through steps similar to those that produced God as the object of our worship, the market becomes, not an instrument under our control, but a force under which we much kneel, and indeed pay tribute. This represents an alienation – what was once under our control is now not only out of control, but also in a sense positioned outside the realm of human intervention entirely. I would argue that this is also the way that globalization is reproduced in the assemblage that I have studied. There is no alternative to global competition and therefore we must subsume our rationale and pay tribute to it by becoming more competitive, more innovative, more creative and, maybe most important, more entrepreneurial in our behavior.

Without overstating the inevitable and deterministic character of regional development, I would still like to firmly underline again that this is a political endeavor, even though its content often does not present itself as such. Likewise, there are political effects of its modes of governing, which are not all bad, but remember that ‘everything is dangerous’ (Foucault, 1984:343).

As pointed out, from a perspective of governmentality studies, the subjects of rule do not exist independently of the governmental technologies and political rationalities that rule them (Cruikshank, 1999; Dean, 2010; Miller & Rose, 2008). Indeed, they are produced as subjects and endowed with different capacities and capabilities as well as shifting possibilities within the field that is being made governable. It is along these lines that I would like to discuss the results of the thesis in terms of displacement and enhancement, which arise when the ‘will to improve’ (Murray Li, 2007) also becomes a ‘will to empower’ (Cruikshank, 1999).

To understand what I mean by displacements and enhancements a short discussion of power is in order. Recall how the signature of power that I have articulated here is concerned precisely with governmental power (Foucault, 2001; 2007; 2008), or in other words a power that is directed at the population and the biopolitics of the regime at hand. To recapitulate, as the focus of rule during late modernity became the population, sovereign power had to be reformulated and the governmental apparatus
disconnected from an individual solitary ruler emerged as central. This apparatus operates not only by instating different forms of disciplinary registers, but also through the subjects themselves. In other words, in an assemblage that is directed by political rationalities of creativity, innovation and entrepreneurship, there arises a need for (and indeed, it presupposes) exactly such social actors that express as well as contribute to the production of those rationales (cf. Foucault, 1991; Ong, 2006):

To achieve this purpose requires distinctive means. At the level of population, it is not possible to coerce every individual and regulate their actions in minute detail. Rather, government operates by educing desires and configuring habits, aspirations and beliefs. It sets conditions, “artificially so arranging things so that people, following only their self-interest, will do as they ought” (Murray Li, 2007:5).

While I have spoken about the processes identified by Murray Li (2007) in the quote above as production of social actors so far, Barbara Cruikshank (1999) has conceptualized these as technologies of citizenship. In her concept, we may again note the intrinsic political aspect of this production as she positions it at the heart of democratic governance. It is noteworthy particularly since even practices related to radical activist groups or social workers, for instance, rest upon a ‘will to empower’ that often reproduces the oppression and displacements of such subjects, while struggling to improve the conditions of oppressed people. She identifies the reasons for this in terms similar to Tania Murray Li:

Technologies of citizenship operate according to a political rationality for governing people in ways that promote their autonomy, self-sufficiency, and political engagement; in the classic phrase of early philanthropists, they are intended to “help people to help themselves”. This is a manner of governing that relies not on institutions, organized violence or state power but on securing the voluntary compliance of citizens. I argue, however, that the autonomy, interests, and wills of citizens are shaped as well as enlisted. [...] Democratic citizens, in short, are both the effects and the instruments of liberal governance (Cruikshank, 1999:4).

Thus, when I speak of displacement and enhancement I speak of the production of citizens in the context of regional governance. More precisely, given the moral regimes pushed forward by the political rationalities of the assemblage, there arise particular ethical\textsuperscript{71} behaviors (Ong, 2006) that correspond to these. Simply put, if the highest good in an imagined community (Anderson, 2006) is understood to be

\textsuperscript{71} Ahiwa Ong (2007:21f) uses this term in its ‘ancient Greco-Roman sense of a practice of the self, or normative techniques in self-care for attaining a particular mode of being. An ethical regime can therefore be construed as a style of living, guided by given values for constituting oneself in line with a particular ethical goal’.
competitiveness through creativity, innovation and entrepreneurship, these codes of conduct will also assume a position of ethical behavior, which then often may pass for common sense and remain unquestioned in lived practices of subjects as well as in institutionalized systems, such as education, health care and justice.

Thus, this is the way that some social actors can be understood as displaced in contemporary regional governance. Particularly the immigrants and refugees (who in a very literal sense are also displaced in relation to their home countries), but also in more general terms, the working and service classes that only exist contingent on the needs and desires of the creative class. Their positions are insecure, precarious and volatile and in my analysis they are either articulated as important, yet very inactive (the immigrants) or more or less absent in the analysis (the working class). In a fundamental way, without enhancement effects, these social actors cannot count on living as equally worthy citizens in the innovation society that looms on the horizon.

On the other hand, the ideals of competitiveness through creativity, innovation and entrepreneurship also enhance social actors. Most notably, the entrepreneur as a fundamental figure in society is represented as a hero, a savior and a role model for all people, but also as a token, a blessing and a boon that may be picked up by displaced groups, such as immigrants or the working class. In my analysis this function of enhancement was most visible in relation to women, who continuously were articulated as important, if they realized their innovative capacity and entrepreneurial spirit.

However, I must underline again that we should not understand this productions of social actors as only, or even primarily, a matter of stratification concerning the importance of certain subjects in the ongoing processes of political life. There is more to it than this. The social actors that are being produced are political accomplishments. They are regulated, configured, situated and endowed with capacities in processes that are fully political before they materialize in everyday practice:

The citizen is an effect and an instrument of political power rather than simply a participant in politics. The measure of democracy is not the extent to which citizens participate in politics rather than stand back in fear or apathy. That is to mistake power for what it excludes rather than what it produces. The critical question for democratic theory is how citizens are constituted by politics and power (Cruikshank, 1999:6).

In sum then, the way that I have now described my results in terms of subsumption, displacement and enhancement recognizes very tangible
effects in the actual spaces forming around the assemblage of regional development in Sweden. Not least, these are (in part) situated in the striated formations that are the geographically bounded administrative units in which citizens live their daily lives. Importantly, while citizenship generally is articulated in relation to the nation state, political scientist Tomas Mitander (2013; 2015) has described in detail how it can be understood as a discursive practice, negotiated and formulated in a variety of spatial formations, where the administrative regions are important parts of this. Thus, the technologies of citizenship operating in the governance of regional development are important pieces of a larger puzzle.

So, we may think of subsumption, displacement and enhancement as some of the more tangible effects that arise in the assemblage as it is governed through its rationales, technologies and subjects. At the same time though, I have made an important point that this is a recursive process so that the representations of globalization and the rationales it structures also reach out, as mobile codes that may be inserted in other assemblages. Therefore, I will also discuss these processes in some more detailed given the results of the analyses performed here.

8.3 The Exception and Postpolis

As I now turn to the global forms (Ong & Collier, 2005) of the assemblage, recall how I described them as particularly mobile strata of articulations. As the assemblage is produced in terms of power, it is held together in an unstable formation, a mixture of relations between discourses, practices and social actors unfolding over a series of sites. In the midst of this formation there are certain articulations that have a global character in the sense that they are mobile, mutable and possible to insert and ‘execute’ in other assemblages, thus I have referred to them as global forms (Ong & Collier, 2005).

In this thesis, I have identified the global forms in relation to each of the three cases, and I specified one research question per case directed towards this. Briefly then, I suggested in chapter five that given the naturalized articulations of globalization as competition and a need for global regions, the four chains of rationale that arise in the governance of Swedish regional development can be seen as localized versions of global forms. The assemblage imports a rationale and then (re)produces it by casting it in ways that fit the context in which the sites of manifestation reside. One step further, such chains retain their global character and
articulate themes that may be drawn from the particular formation that I have studied here before being installed into others.

As for the production of social actors, I have identified the particularly mobile representations of entrepreneurs, corporations and experts as global forms that most likely figure as scripts that can be downloaded, installed and executed in local modules of regional development (and other practices as well). When I analyzed the governmental technologies in chapter seven, I concentrated on showcasing how they were made to operate in the assemblage and how they enhanced the rationales and representations of social actors. Thus, the global forms that I identified lie in the particularities of these technologies so that, for example, the use of multimodal texts in policy communication enhances the mobility of the chains of rationale even further. The same goes for the use of numbers and performance indices as ways of formalizing particular aspects of the rationales such as innovation. Indeed, I argued that by reducing this abstract concept into a single figure, it produces a near infinite mobility that further enhances practices of, among others, communication and surveillance.

If we consider these global forms in terms of content, I think they are no different from what has been discussed so far, or in other words, they articulate the primacy of creativity, innovation and entrepreneurship as well as the importance of what in broad terms can be called the creative class (Florida, 2005; 2012). While this may be so, the fact that such modes of rationale and representations of social actors take global forms makes it possible to discuss, in some more detail the spatial formations in which they are articulated as well as the more general horizon against which they reflect and refract. By using Ahiwa Ong’s (2006) ideas of neoliberalism as an exception, I will try to make sense of the spaces that form around the governance of regional development, and I will consider how we may also draw on the figure of *postpolis* (Tesfahuney & Schough, 2009) to further illuminate the discussion.

To begin with, unlike the common references to neoliberalism that have been abundant in social science for at least the last two decades, Ong (2006; 2007) adheres to a Foucauldian tradition where neoliberalism is recognized as particular modes of governing, rather than as an ideology (cf. Brown, 2006; Dean, 2010; Larner, 2000). This tradition pays particular attention to how the neoliberal modes of governing in terms of

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In this tradition, it is not uncommon to speak of *advanced liberalism* instead of neoliberalism to emphasize that what is theorized is primarily a mode of governing, rather than an ideology.
technologies and rationales reconfigure the relationship between the state apparatus and the subjects of rule:

Neoliberalism is often discussed as an economic doctrine with a negative relation to state power, a market ideology that seeks to limit the scope and activity of governing. But neoliberalism can also be conceptualized as a new relationship between government and knowledge through which governing activities are recast as nonpolitical and nonideological problems that need technical solutions. Indeed, neoliberalism considered as a technology of government is a profoundly active way of rationalizing governing and self-governing in order to “optimize.” The spread of neoliberal calculation as a governing technology is thus a historical process that unevenly articulates situated political constellations (Ong, 2006:4).

In her work, Ong (2006) studies how such neoliberal forms of governing are deployed as exceptions, both in the sense of neoliberalism as exceptions from other ideals as well as exceptions from neoliberalism. More precisely she explores, for instance, the special economic zones in China and other Southeast Asian milieus such as Indonesia and Singapore in terms of Agamben’s (1998) notion of exception, yet modifies this by focusing precisely on the interplay between different kinds of exceptions:

In contrast [to Agamben], I conceptualize the exception more broadly, as an extraordinary departure in policy that can be deployed to include as well as to exclude. As conventionally understood, the sovereign exception marks out excludable subjects who are denied protections. But the exception can also be a positive decision to include selected populations and spaces as targets of “calculative choices and value orientation” associated with neoliberal reform. In my formulation we need to explore the hinge between neoliberalism as exception and exception to neoliberalism, the interplay among technologies of governing and of disciplining, of inclusion and exclusion, of giving value or denying value to human conduct (Ong, 2006:5).

In line with this, I suggest two things. First, that we may understand the assemblage of regional development in Sweden as precisely a space of exception where neoliberal technologies are not only let loose but forcefully experimented with. Indeed, in Sweden, some of the frontier programs deployed are presented as ‘living labs’ and ‘large scale demonstrators’ indicating the new and experimental forms of governing that are now in use (Säll, 2015). Together with already established clusters, innovation systems and triple helix initiatives, the spaces that form around Swedish regional governance exemplify a complex, overlapping web of exceptions, from other modes of rule as well as from neoliberalism. More precisely, while rapidly changing, Sweden is often classified as a social-democratic welfare state. However, in terms of governing its regions, it displays

For more detailed discussions on neoliberalism, see, for instance, Jamie Peck (2013) and Wendy Larner (2000).
widespread, and deeply neoliberal traits. At the same time, the public sector and the political apparatus are highly involved in selecting and sheltering specific private interests through partnerships and strategic alliances in order to produce more competitiveness, thus exhibiting clear traits of exceptions from neoliberalism (cf. Säll, 2014). Therefore, I argue that studying regions in Sweden, whether in the form of assemblages of different types of practices and discourses, or more traditionally as institutional arrangements, offers a unique view into contemporary neoliberal restructuring of state apparatuses. In fact, I think the case of Sweden as such is very important since generally, neoliberalism has been studied in milieus where it is somewhat expected, such as England, New Zealand, Australia and the United States of America. While I would also argue that the figure of the assemblage is suitable in order to do away with territorially bound units, I would still claim that the (former) social-democratic Nordic states hold sites of emergence that are interesting in the same way that Ong (2006) has shown Southeast Asia to be.

Second, I also suggest that the global forms that are articulated within this space of exception contribute to the formation of a larger neoliberal horizon, which permeates, more or less all aspects of social reality. In my mind geographers Mekonnen Tesfahuney and Katarina Schough (2009) provide an illuminating description of this horizon as they discuss a general transformation that they see occurring in urban regions.

In their analysis they delineate an ideal typical difference between the urban region in its classic sense, based on understandings of the polis, and the new emerging modalities of the urban region, symbolized as postpolis. The urban region has throughout human history been a complex entanglement of sites in which a great deal of how we think when ordering our societies has been formed. In its classic form, urban space can be described as having circulated around the axiom of oikos, or in other words ‘the household’, which can be understood as an economic model centered on home economy, where people work in order to gather the necessities of a good life for themselves and their family. By contrast postpolis, can be said to be structured around the axiom of chrematistics or the kind of trade and wealth gathering that does not serve the household and is tied to commerce and flows of goods. Tesfahuney and Schough (2009) trace the meaning and interplay of both these concepts via their ancient Greek origins through discussions of present day social science and philosophy and note how there is a fundamental difference between them. Oikos as a guiding principle for organizing an economy focuses on the use value of
different commodities and maintains clear boundaries between the spheres of the household and commerce. *Chrematistics*, in contrast, signals a transgressing mode of economy where the household and commerce imbricate and the focus of all kinds of governing is on exchange values and profit. To summarize, Stahel (2006) have conceptualized the difference between these models of economy as oikos being ‘the art of living and living well’ whereas *chrematistics* is ‘the art of money making’.

Now, as the modern urban regions form in the image of a *postpolis*, Tesfahuney and Schough (2009) argue that *chrematistic* becomes the overarching axiom that guides they way we think about the city, and by extension, society. This means that they identify significant changes in terms of spatial regimes, temporal regimes and control regimes, and thus the urban *postpolis* is recognizable by its fluidity, its instantaneity and its continuous control and surveillance rather than bounded spaces, planned household and disciplinary control which *polis* signifies. Its model figure is not the individual citizen, but rather the consumer, the entrepreneur and the dividual (the codes, the passwords, the strips and the credit card numbers that articulate being in *postpolis*). Whereas *polis* found legitimacy in being instated by God or the people and was ruled through monarchy or democracy, *postpolis* has no external referent for its legitimacy. Its only mode of reference is the logics of *chrematistic* and thus its mode of governance could be said to be *chremocracy*. Furthermore, the difference between the two modes is also visible in the dominant expressions of shape and composition (*gestaltung*). Whereas the architecture of *polis* was monumental, it is spectacular in *postpolis*, and whereas the *agora*, the town hall and the church were central points of interest in *polis*, the stock market (*emporium*) assumes the most central position in *postpolis* (Tesfahuney & Schough, 2009:124).

I argue that the horizon against which the global forms of regional development in Sweden refract and reflect can be understood in line with the figure of *postpolis*. While this is an ideal type image, it captures the central rationales of this assemblage, and moreover, it is also a fitting image for the complex play of inclusion and exclusion that is produced (where displacements and enhancements emerge in conjunction with the dominant mode of creativity, innovation and entrepreneurship).

*Postpolis* is inclusive in the sense that it accepts only the logic of *chrematistic*, and thus anyone can belong, be included and be integrated as long as they pay for it. It may be expensive, but the possibilities for buying licenses, surgeries and styling for ourselves, our homes and our accessories
are endless. Indeed, women, people of color and homosexuals are welcome in *postpolis* as consumers, and the infinite possibilities of measuring everything in monetary terms continuously expand the consumer’s realm of realization – as long as the resources are there to begin with (Tesfahuney & Schough, 2009).

But postpolis is also highly exclusive along the same lines. Those who do not comprehend, or manage to live according to *chrematistic* logics are inexorably excluded. Whereas the political citizen of *polis* is a figure which cannot be reduced to a monetary value, the dividuals of *postpolis* must not only sell their labor, they must also marketize themselves, build their own brands and produce themselves as attractive and desirable. Those who cannot do so become excluded and given that *postpolis* inherits a stratified social order from *polis*, this legacy still lingers in the sense that while disadvantaged social groups may have the possibilities to consume and partake on the same terms, the world is not equal to start with. This unequal quality is also visible in the differentiated spaces and enclaves that make up the urban environment where so called *gated communities* and affluent residential areas are lodged in between ghettos and deprived social communities (Tesfahuney & Schough, 2009).

Again, while the results of the analysis in this thesis cannot be neatly ordered into the figure of *postpolis*, I argue that it provides a sketch for understanding the more abstract transformations within which the governance of Swedish regional development is situated. Indeed, I think that the combination of Ong’s (2006) neoliberalism as exception and Tesfahuney and Schough’s (2009) *postpolis* provides me with enough conceptualizations of the production of spaces (Lefebvre, 1991) associated with Swedish regional development to articulate it in terms of neo-regionalism.

### 8.4 Welcome to the Innovation Society

What are we to make of contemporary regional development in Sweden then? What can the analysis here help us say about the wider society in which it is situated? I have called this thesis *Space Craft* and I think this illustrates the assemblage of regional development in at least two ways. First, as has been described, I think that spaces form around regional development in specific ways, and the modes of governing that are invoked are therefore precisely crafted space – a steered, controlled and oriented production of space. Second, I think that we may also understand it as crafting space in a wider sense. I have spoken about *territorial*
reconfigurations and the way that the assemblage of regional development is instated, as spaces of exception provide insight into the more comprehensive transformations that are in progress, not only in Sweden, but also in Europe and beyond.

Returning to John Law (1994) and the notion of ordering, I think that we are now in a better position to consider what kind of ordering is being instated through the governing of regional development. This ordering, this innovation society, represents spatial reconfigurations as well as reconfigurations at the heart of established modes of governing. Now, when I have spoken of governing or governance I have made it clear that I do not designate only formal, administrative institutions, but rather a heterogeneity where minute interventions as well as grand political schemata all strive towards some form of ordering, and thus can be understood as ‘conduct of conduct’, or simply government (Dean, 2010). However, for a moment, I would now like to speak about government in the more limited, institutionalized sense.

While there have been many recognitions of the neoliberal state (cf. Harvey, 2006), I still think that we need to be wary of the complex overlaps of neoliberalism as exception and exceptions from neoliberalism (Ong, 2006) that designate this state. Rather than exclusively focusing on the ideology of neoliberalism, we should consider how the institutions of government now have a corporate logic installed in their executive branches and in their technological systems. Indeed, in what I would term the innovation society, regional development is not only conducted in accordance with so-called new-regionalism (Keating, 1998), but also in accordance with the more aptly termed neo-regionalism to highlight how it is marked by neoliberalism as exception and conducted against a backdrop where postpolis looms (Ong, 2006; Tesfahuney & Schough, 2009).

In the innovation society, the entrepreneur is the hero and the creative class solution that is needed for any given village, town, city or metropolis to be prosperous. Innovation and entrepreneurship is not, as I have shown here, something restricted to private enterprise only, but something to be made a function of society in general, not least of its public institutions. Schools, social services, health care and public administration in broad terms, the message is, must learn from entrepreneurs and make innovation part of their everyday practice. Indeed, they must become innovative in their institutional arrangement and entrepreneurial in their policy formulation. If we think about this shift in the ordering of society, we may schematically illustrate this in a kind of ideal type formula, which I here
restrict to three models of society so as to illustrate relevant and recent changes in the institutional arrangement of government.

Consider first how social-democratic societies traditionally have centered on a governance system aimed to support every citizen’s entitlement to a good life. More specifically, the system provides social security, pensions, health care, education and other benefits to its subjects. While forms of corporatism may arise, there is a general understanding that entrepreneurship and competition is reserved for the sectors of commerce and finance.

In what we may denote liberal societies, the governance system is of a kind that focuses on helping people to help themselves to lead good lives, by providing basic services, notably education, social services and health care to a point and the primary aim is to secure its citizens’ rights to private property and legal status. Under this system citizens are actively made into competing individuals in many aspects of their existence, and in this race innovation, creativity and entrepreneurship are generally hailed as virtues. Differences among citizens in terms of wealth and influence are accepted and it is generally recognized that all lives will not be equally pleasant. In short, some will have more and others less.

What I have here denoted as innovation society is based on the logics of a liberal society and moves beyond. Here the governance system is one that focuses on helping itself to help itself as the innovative and entrepreneurial ideals are installed in the public administrative apparatuses. This in turn is thought to be ideal for helping its subjects to help themselves. This governance system does not only educate and produce its citizens as innovators and entrepreneurs, but also turns on itself to try to become innovative and entrepreneurial. This means that it tries to (re)produce itself in ways that help it to continuously improve through innovative solutions. Indeed, in the innovation society the civil servants are guided and led by policy entrepreneurs who are thought to produce policy innovation that will help the citizens to help themselves even better.

Importantly, in the innovation society, competition is not only seen as paramount for the citizens but also for the units within the government system. Indeed, this is why it is so important for them to focus on how to help themselves. Nations are thought to compete with nations, regions with regions and cities with cities. Thus the administrative apparatus is molded to focus on this competition. Indeed, as in the corporate world of commerce and in the state of competition among citizens in liberal societies, the innovation society accepts competition as a condition to
which it must submit. Moreover, it also accepts that differences between the units of government may arise so that some prosperous regions are more innovative and entrepreneurial and able to provide better quality of life for their citizens than other (less competitive) regions.

Now, what I think is most interesting here, and what I have tried to sketch is not a good ideal type representation as such of the three examples. Rather, I wanted to express what I take to be some of the important reconfigurations of the government apparatus under conditions of (perceived) omnipresent global competition. Drawing on the governance of regional development, which I have analyzed here, what I illustrated in a few paragraphs above may also be expressed more concisely so as to focus on the shift in the system of government:

1) **The social-democratic society:** The system of government (G) is a system that helps its subjects (S) lead good lives (L).

2) **The liberal society:** The system of government (G) is a system that helps its subjects (S) to help themselves (SH) lead good lives (L).

3) **The innovation society:** The system of government (G) is a system that helps itself to help itself (GH) to help its subjects (S) to help themselves (SH) lead good lives (L).

The point I wish to make with this reductive and formulaic taxonomy is that, the near omnipresent focus on innovation and entrepreneurship in the material that I have studied indicates fundamental changes at the heart of our democratic institutions. We may understand the innovation society as one where the government systems are both receding and expanding at the same time, yet their functions in relation to its subjects appear increasingly abstract.

To be sure there is no shortage of social science studies of innovation and entrepreneurship. However, I would argue that there is not enough focus on what these discourses do to the way we order our societies and our lives in terms of power, politics and democracy. My hope is that this thesis has provided an insight into how the governance of regional development (re)produces globalization as a natural phenomenon and how this in turn feeds an emerging innovation society. I also hope that it has illuminated how this particular form of crafting space is important to study if we wish to further investigate what I have called territorial
reconfigurations under the conditions of globalization. What is more, I have said that this not only entails a territorial reconfiguration, but possibly also signifies changes at the core of democracy that need to be scrutinized further and in greater detail. In particular studies that further explore the way that innovation and entrepreneurship are being rendered important in other segments of society, such as the education system or the health system, are needed, and in my view, also urgent.

***

Remember Billy Pilgrim and the Tralfamadorians? Consider for a moment their very advanced innovative capacity. They can travel in time and they know everything there is to know. They even know, as I mentioned in the beginning, how and why the world ends. Ironically, this happens because of one particularly innovative pilot who decides to use his spacecraft to further experiment with the fabric of the universe that the Tralfamadorians so meticulously had mastered. This was the end of the world. It blew up. Everything is dangerous, not least innovation. And so it goes.
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APPENDIX A: ANALYZED DOCUMENTS

The table below lists all of the documents that have been part of the analyzed corpus. The number column corresponds to a number (1-81) which has been assigned to the individual .pdf-documents as they have been stored and made available in two online repositories (see appendix B). The categories ‘producer’, ‘document title’, ‘year’ and ‘class and type’ provide information for two different purposes. First they can be used to search for, and locate, the documents at various online and offline sources. Second, they also provide an overview and description of the corpus.

‘Producer’, ‘document title’ and ‘year’ are rather self-explanatory, however, ‘class and type’ may need some more clarification. In this category I have classified the documents along two different dimensions. Class can be either ‘public’ or ‘private’ referring to the character of the producer body. So a document from a government agency would be public, whereas one from a private think-tank would be private. Type can be either ‘policy’ or ‘expert’ referring again to the principal function of the producer. Here, a document from for instance the OECD has been classified as expert, while an RDS from a Swedish region has been considered policy. Thus the combined classification is reported in the column ‘class and type’.

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<th>Class and type</th>
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<td>Ansvarskommittén (Swedish Parliamentary committee) [Committee on Public Sector Responsibility]</td>
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APPENDIX B: CONCERNING ONLINE REPOSITORIES

For a number of reasons I think it is important to make not only the end result of the research process (the thesis, the book, the chapter or the article) publically available, but also, so long as it is ethically and technically possible, the material used to produce the end result. Therefore I have chosen to make the following items available:

- All of the analyzed documents in .pdf-format
- The Nvivo file containing all of the major coding of the documents
- A document containing all of the empirical quotes used in the thesis – in their original Swedish formulation

According to Karlstad University rules all doctoral theses must be made available through the Academic Archive On-line (DiVA) portal. This portal also makes it possible to upload attachments to different entries in the register. Thus, I have chosen to upload the files described above to the DiVA portal and my intention is to keep them up to date, changing their formats if future technical developments require me to do so.

Since DiVA is not so well known outside of Sweden I have also chosen to upload my thesis, and the above listed documents, to the online repository Figshare. This is increasingly popular throughout the (international) academic community and across disciplines, and it will hopefully be around for a long time.

The repositories can be accessed through these addresses (may change):

http://www.diva-portal.org

http://figshare.com
Space Craft

In an age often understood as globalized, questions of space and territory are pushed to the forefront of political rule. This thesis explores how contemporary regimes of governing are not only practices of ‘state craft’, but also ‘space craft’ as power operates in relation to perpetual and encompassing notions of global competition among states, regions and subjects.

In the thesis a conceptual grammar based on so called assemblage thinking and governmentality studies is put forward in order to investigate how globalization is articulated as a problem for governing regional development in Sweden. It is shown how this is nested in specific political rationalities and governmental technologies that emerge in attempts to produce competitiveness.

By approaching the governance of regional development as an assemblage, a vibrant junction of discourses, practices and subjects, the thesis shows how political analysis can rid itself from notions of methodological nationalism, or in other words, a reification of the nation-state as the most appropriate scale for the study of social relations. When doing so it also highlights how complex forms of neoliberal rule lies at the heart of regional development, posing challenges for democratic principles and practices throughout the world.