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Ripe for resolution?
How the recent earthquake impacted India-Pakistan relations

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ABSTRACT

The traditional standing in the practice of negotiation which is main concerned with the substance of the proposal for a solution has been somewhat altered by Zartman who do acknowledge the importance of the first idea but adds the dimension of the timing of the efforts for a resolution. Throughout the schools of crisis management and conflict resolution this concept has made its name as the ‘ripeness theory’. The focal point of the theory is termed as the ‘Mutually Hurting Stalemate’ (MHS), a situation where the conflicting parties sense their positions in a hurting impasse.

The concept of a ripe moment does not only centre on the parties’ perception of a MHS but is optimally associated with an impending, past or recently avoided catastrophe. Even though the catastrophe is not necessary to either the definition or the existence of a MHS it provides a deadline or a lesson that pain can be sharply increased in something is not done about it now. This in linked with the idea behind the concept that, when the parties find themselves locked into a conflict from which they cannot escalate to victory and this deadlock is painful to them (although not necessarily in equal degrees or for the same reasons), they seek a way out.

A unique opportunity presented itself when a earthquake struck the areas between India and Pakistan the 8th of October 2005. Did the post-quake scenario present a new opportunity to collaborate on immediate relief activity and long-term build up? Could suspicion be buried with the wreckage? Could the disaster be a push to intensify the peace process?

The aim of this study is to find out if the disaster has made the conflict ripe for resolution or more advanced mediation. The empirical chapters is going down two avenues including the political elites (and their actions) as well as the internal political process which in this study is made up by a) the militancy, and b) editorials from major Pakistani and Indian newspapers.

The results of the study can be summed with that the earthquake has not made the conflict ripe for resolution (as in final resolution) but definitely made it ripe for more advanced mediation. This is based on the numerous important counter building measures carried out by the elites of India and Pakistan and the fact that the Kashmiri people were involved in the process. As for the internal political process the militancy did not show any will of collaborate or changing position in the conflict. The results of the newspaper’s editorials is not entirely positive either although both Pakistan and Indian newspapers had a rather positive outlook towards the increased Indo-Pak cooperation and the prospects for the future.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

First, this study would not have been carried out without the financial aid from the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA) who sponsored the trip within the framework of their Minor Field Study scholarship program.

Whilst in India, the Malaviya Center for Peace Research (MCPR) at Benares Hindu University worked as a ‘base camp’ and it’s director Prof. Priyankar Upadhyaya provided me with information, organized interviews and kindly invited me to a four day long workshop.

In New Delhi I am grateful to the Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies (IPCS) who warmly invited me to interactive talks, book discussions as well as a conference. Further, the Institute for Defense Studies and Analyses (IDSA) proved to be a good source of information and I am grateful to Dr. Asutosh Misra who not only organized interviews but also let me use their extensive library/archive.

Finally, my warmest thoughts go to Dr. Om-ji Prakesh for being a good mentor and a way in to the Indian civil society.

In addition for the professionals I met during my journey I am grateful to all of you that made my journey through India to a memory for life. It might be worth pointing out that some of the most interesting discussions related to my work occurred in the civil society while traveling in the country, all the inputs furthered my knowledge and worked as a counterweight to all official statements and ‘fixed opinions’.

Per Karlsson

Karlstad, May 2006
The idea of this work was given by a visiting Indian scholar and later my supervisor in field, Prof. Priyankar Upadhyaya. Although I was drawn to the very interesting topic, I was not all that convinced in the beginning since I did not know much about the South Asian history or current situation. After some initial reading on the subject, discussions with senior lectures at the university and a personal desire to explore India I was determined to go.

I guess most scholars find obstacles and run into unexpected situations when carrying out studies abroad, especially in developing countries. Running between bed and bathroom became an occasional hobby as the ‘Delhi belly’ ranged from making one visit the bathroom five times a day to transforming one into a vegetable. This was however not unexpected and there were far more serious things taking place.

As for the period in field, I happened to be at close range to the major bomb blasts in Varanasi at March 7 as well as being in New Delhi on the bombings of April 14. These events did not only kill and injure people but also shook my security concerns and delayed the ‘schedule’ for the paper. Further, a much wanted trip to Islamabad to join a conference on my very topic was not due since I was told the visa regime would not grant me a visa in the short time a head I was noticed about the event. Finally the loss of unique (not transcripted) audio interviews through theft not only affected me but three other students since we ‘stored’ the audio data on the same memory stick.
ABBREVIATIONS

AJK  Azad Jammu and Kashmir
BBC  British Broadcasting Corporation
CBI  India’s Central Bureau of Investigation
CBM  Counter-Building Measure
ICG  International Crisis Group
IDSA  Institute of Defense Studies and Analyses
IPCS  Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies
FIA  Pakistan’s Federal Investigation Agency
J&K  Jammu and Kashmir
LoC  Line of Control
MCPR  Malaviya Center for Peace Research
MHS  Mutually Hurting Stalemate
NWFP  Northwest Western Frontier Province
PoK  Pakistan Occupied Kashmir
PM  Prime Minister
SIDA  Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency
UCDP  Uppsala Conflict Data Program
UN  United Nations
WMD  Weapon of Mass Destruction
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1. THE MOUNTAIN TSUNAMI

1.1 INTRODUCING THE RESEARCH PROBLEM

The earthquake has created a unique feeling of togetherness, of an urge to help each other within the people of Kashmir on both sides of the Line of Control and more than that within the people of India and the people of Pakistan. Therefore I sincerely and genuinely believe that this earthquake, that challenge of this earthquake can be converted into an opportunity of a life time which was never available to India and Pakistan to improve their relations. – President General Pervez Musharraf

On the 8th of October 2005, a devastating earthquake struck Pakistan-administered Kashmir and the Northwest Western frontier province (NWFP) of Pakistan. As the nature showed its wrath again, in less than a year from the tsunami in the Indian Ocean – the earthquake has been termed by many as the ‘mountain tsunami’. The destructive quake shredded entire areas and killed more than 80,000 people, made about the same number injured and created a situation with over half a million homeless. About 1500 of the causalities were Indian citizens. Numbers reported recently from United Nations (UN) states that more than 73,000 people died and about 70,000 injured with millions of homeless. The timing of the catastrophe was critical since the harsh winter of the Himalayas was on its way and many people was stranded in remote areas.

The impact of the quake did not remain within Pakistan since parts of India were affected and the hostile Line of Control (LoC) that has divided the region of Kashmir between India and Pakistan since the partition 1947 – was shuddered. A map showing the extent of the earthquake will be at hand as an appendix in the end of the paper.

Did the post-quake scenario present a new opportunity to collaborate on immediate relief activity and long-term build up? Could suspicion be buried with the wreckage? Could the disaster be a push to intensify the peace process? There were as many questions as answers in the post-quake scenario in the following fortnight of tragic incident.

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1 Speech at the Donors Conference, Islamabad, Pakistan, 14 Nov, 2005
2 http://www.earthquake.com.pk/
The relationship between India and Pakistan has not only experienced impasse but has also called for way out of the impasse several times through their complex history. The protracted conflict dates back to 1947, when India and Pakistan secured their independence from Britain.

The strategic and political characteristics that evolved over the years has added new dimensions to the conflict that have been in progress for over half a century. One of the conflicts’ evident shortcomings was the conversion into overt nuclear weapon states, this change in the military-strategic situation can not be exaggerated as for the impact on the South Asian security complex. Except for evolving into a so-called ‘nuclear flashpoint’, the rise of internal violence in the Indian-administered state of Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) and the upswing for Muslim separatist movements has also played a negative role for the ‘peace process’ in the recent years.

Although India and Pakistan experienced close military confrontations in 1948, 1965, 1971, 1986-87 and 2002 there has also been times when the two countries realized the ripe moment. This could be categorized as a step away from impasse and a route for seeking a way out. According to Zeb & Chandran, there have been at least four cases in which India and Pakistan realized that the ripe moment had arrived. These are the Tashkent Agreement 1966, Simla Agreement 1972, Lahore Declaration 1999 and the Agra Summit in 2001.4

The same authors also outline that the two countries experienced problems of imminent catastrophes at least on four occasions – during the Brasstacks crisis of 1986-87, the nuclear crisis in 1990, Kargil war in 1999 and the border confrontation in 2002.5

The devastating earthquake that struck on the morning of 8 October 2005 will make the fifth catastrophe the two countries share. The attention-grabbing regarding this earthquake is the question if this could work as a step away from the impasse and be a route towards a better relationship. This question will be explored as the paper goes on, next section will introduce the discourse this paper tries to navigate through – the ripeness discourse.

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4 Zeb & Chadran, 2005:21
5 Ibid, p 22
1.2.1 The Ripeness Discourse

The statement that conflicts are solvable is not necessarily an idealistic or optimistic position according to Wallensteen who argues that ‘most actors in conflicts will find themselves in need of negotiation at one time or another.’ The traditional standing in the practice of negotiation which is mainly concerned with the substance of the proposal for a solution has been somewhat altered by Zartman who does acknowledge the importance of the first idea but adds the dimension of the timing of the efforts for a resolution. Throughout the schools of crisis management and conflict resolution this concept has made its name as the ‘ripeness theory’.

The theoretical foundation of this paper will employ the ‘ripeness theory’ developed by Zartman. In the basic adaptation, ripeness theory is concerned with the process in which decision-makers turn to negotiation or mediation in major conflicts.

The focal point of the theory is termed as the ‘Mutually Hurting Stalemate’ (MHS), a situation where the conflicting parties sense their positions in a hurting impasse. The MHS is ‘optimally associated with an impending, past or recently avoided catastrophe’ who provides a ‘deadline or a lesson that pain can be sharply increased if something is not done about it now.’ This is linked with the second condition behind the concept, a mutually perceived way out.

Why ripeness theory for the post-quake scenario? Every conflict has its unique features and complex history. Although, the positive spin-off effects seen in earlier conflicts are triggering when facing the Indo-Pak post-quake situation. Examples could be the 1990-92 drought that made the conflict in Mozambique ripe for mediation, the 1999 earthquake in the Marmara region of Turkey that improved relations with Greeks and its traditional rival as well as the recent peace deal generated by the Tsunami between Aceh separatists and the Indonesian government.

As the earthquake occurred for some six months ago, not much research has been published on the correlation between the quake and the process between India and Pakistan. The lack of empirical cases where disasters touches upon tense conflicts is one factor that may affect the number of scholars involved in this problematics. Another reason for the lack of published material was presented to me in several discussions with Indian senior scholars. It is simply the fact that the interstate process between India and Pakistan is moving so fast and taking unexpected turns which results in that your material will be outdated when printed and distributed. At last, an encouraging

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6 Wallensteen, 2002:13
7 Zartman 2000:228
answer was given me from Zartman when asking if the ripeness theory could be applied on the interstate relations after this catastrophe to make any conclusions about possible outcomes (or chances of outcomes) of the disaster. ⁸

1.2.2 OBJECTIVE AND PROBLEM FORMULATIONS

The definition of a catastrophe varies somewhat and is not relevant here, but one thing that all catastrophes share – is tragedies. Although disasters are tragedies they can serve as object of research. This study will hold the recent earthquake in Kashmir as an independent variable while the impact on the ‘peace process’ between India and Pakistan are paid attention.

The purpose of this paper will be to apply Zartman’s ripeness theory on the Indo-Pak post-quake scenario to find out if the disaster has made the conflict ripe for resolution or more advanced mediation.

When carrying out the purpose of the essay, one needs to focus on the certain elements that a ripe moment requires. The prominent features that identifies ripeness are the main elements of: a mutually hurting stalemate; an impending, recently experienced, or recently avoided catastrophe; and an alternative way out. The hurting stalemate should be seen as basically a painful deadlock (in the conflict) while the imminent catastrophe provides a deadline (that pain can be sharply increased if action is not taken now). The mutually perceived way out is seen by Zartman as ‘a negotiated solution is possible’.

This brings us to the questions which this study would like to give an answer to in regard to the recent earthquake:

- Is there a realization of a Mutually Hurting Stalemate by India and Pakistan and does a sense of a way out exist among them?

- If a sense of a way out exists, does it provide any sustainable outcomes?

In addition for trying to give an answer to the questions above, the paper will also pay attention to if the influential elites’ (major newspapers) and the other parties to the conflict (the militants) view the situation differently? This will be done as a compliment to the political elite and bring a dimension of the internal political process into the situation. This dimension is more relevant to the second research question since the first one is concerned with the ripeness theory which puts focus on the political elite.

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⁸ Correspondence via mail in February 2006.
1.2.3 LIMITATIONS

There are several major limitations to this study. At first, the scope of the study did not allow one to further explore the attitudes of the political elite or the internal political process. A more extensive study could not only have explored these areas better but also included other important variables such as how the inflow of international aid affects the situation. One could argue that the chosen areas of political initiatives, CBMs, newspapers editorials and the militancy initiatives are not enough to bring answers in how the independent variable affects the dependent variable. Even tough the findings do not bring the complete picture, arguments can be put forward that they are sufficient enough to make conclusions in regards to theory being used.

Further, it is not easy to determine whether the negotiations in fact are serious or genuine, as mixed motives could trigger the actors to negotiate. Even though attention has been paid to this variable in interviews with scholars; the basic assumption has been that the negotiations should be seen as serious, although there is ‘awareness of false negotiations’.

Along the study, personal knowledge about conflict resolution in general and the Indo-Pak situation in particular has been a limitation. Even though knowledge increased as time passed by it was still a limiting factor as one for example had discussions with senior scholars.

As English is not the mother tongue for either me or the people that discussions occurred with, there was a limitation attached with not only those events but also in transcription of audio material.

1.2.4 INDO-PAK RELATIONS THROUGH HISTORY

Running metres of literature have been published on the complex history of India and Pakistan and therefore some things must be left out when briefly going through their history.

There are many schools of thought when it comes down to explain the Indo-Pak hostilities. Most scholars are to employ many of them combined in trying to bring answers of the roots of hostility. One school employ the idea that hostilities originated from the long period of Muslim rule over India which lasted nearly a thousand years before the arrival of the European colonial powers. The point is that the Muslims were willing to live by governance from foreign powers but were not willing to see a Hindu majority dominating the continent as the colonial power left. This could be linked with the discriminatory treatment the Muslims experienced in the initial period of the British rule when Hindus were favored in different levels of the administration\(^9\). According to same author, the British

\(^9\) Dixit 2002:102
did a conscious decision to exploit the existing divide between Hindus and Muslims according to the policy of ‘divide and rule’.

However, since 1947 India and Pakistan have clashed over the disputed region of Kashmir following the end of the British colonial rule when the areas were partitioned into separated states. This dispute is characterized by incompatibility over the territory even though each state controlled significant portions of the state after the colonial end. According to the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP), there have been five wars between India and Pakistan since their independence from Britain in 1947. Thakur sums things up with ‘official relations between India and Pakistan are based on a permanent state of paranoia and a zero-sum mentality’.  

Except for the straightforward dispute between India and Pakistan over the issue of territory one need to add the recent dispute within Indian Kashmir to get the whole picture of tensions between India and Pakistan. This conflict can be described as an ethnic conflict with two dimensions, one where an ethnic conflict occurs within the state and one between these ethnic groups and the Indian government. The Pakistani author Malik describes the situation by ‘there are two distinct Kashmir problems, but there is a great deal of parallel and overlap between them. Each influences and determines the other’.  

In 2002, only one of the 66 armed conflicts (that between India and Pakistan) were coded as an interstate conflict. In 2003 two of the 59 ongoing armed conflicts were coded as interstate conflicts (the fighting between India and Pakistan and the US-led invasion of Iraq).  

1.2.5 PRIOR TO THE EARTHQUAKE

It would be misleading and unfair to overlook the recent positive developments in Indo-Pak relations that actually occurred prior to the earthquake. It is therefore necessary to break out the current situation from the relations through history and present the essential recent changes in order to make a correct analysis later on.

After the 1999 Kargil war and the attack on the Indian parliament in December 2001 the Indo-Pak relations reached a low point. India by that time, took the decision to cut all communication links and amass troops along the border.  

A positive change was first seen in 2003 when Prime Minister Vajpayee reached out to ease the relationship with Pakistan. Among the CBMs that was carried out, a few major ones is worth

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10 Thakur, 1992:168
11 Malik, 2005
13 Zeb & Chandran 2005:43
mentioning. The first one was the restoration of the High commissioners posts (ambassadors) in April followed by a ceasefire along the Line of Control (LoC) and on the Siachen glacier in November. In January 2004 the transportation links including air, bus and train was back in business. A liberalization of the visa regime was also observed including people of sixty-five years of age to cross the border at Wagah on foot.

The International Crisis Group notes about a year prior to the earthquake that ‘the current easing of tensions provides an opportunity to reassess and revitalize the role of CBMs in normalizing relations’. According to the Department of Peace and Conflict Research at Uppsala University, there were no military engagements recorded in 2005 and therefore the conflict was coded as ‘not active’.

1.2.6 PREVIOUS RESEARCH

As this study is main concerned with the ripeness theory, there will be a short briefing about some researchers and their use of this theory in conflict situations. The study of most interest is the work by Zeb and Chandran titled ‘Indo-Pak conflicts Ripe to Resolve?’. This work was published before the earthquake struck. This is good review of the components of ripeness connected with the India-Pakistan conflict. In the conclusion of the book when ripeness already been established, the authors point out (with reference to Indo-Pak ripeness); ‘that both enjoyed ripe moments and tried to seize them but this did not bring about any permanent settlement of their differences because Indo-Pak ripeness did not contain any political or economic motivations’. They also point to the need of an effective and positive role of the state in both countries that can build trust at the grass-root level.

Bercovitch and Houston deals with ripeness in ‘The Study of International Mediation: Theoretical Issues and Empirical Evidence’. Their ideas do not differ significantly from Zartman as when mediation is most likely to take place. They put forward that this time is when (a) a conflict has gone on for some time, (b) the efforts of the individuals or actors involved have reached an impasse, (c) neither actor is prepared to continue further costs or escalation of the dispute; and (d) both parties welcome some form of mediation and are ready to engage in direct or indirect dialogue.

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14 The new bus service was operated between Srinagar in India and Muzaffarabad in Pakistan-administered Kashmir.
15 ICG Asia Report, No. 79
16 RCSS Policy studies 34, p 46
17 ICG Asia Report, No. 79
18 Uppsala University, Department of Peace and Conflict Research (Conflict Database) at: http://www.pcr.uu.se/database/conflictSummary.php?bcID=199
19 Zeb & Chandran 2005:86.
20 Chapter in Resolving International Conflicts: The Theory and Practice of Mediation (1996), edited by Bercovitch, Jacob
1.2.6 Disposition

Followed by this rather long introductory part, a study design will be presented together with the methodology concerns. Except for operationalizations and definitions this chapter also includes deeper information about the informants/interviews and a brief ethical discussion related to the former. The theory framework will make up the next chapter where Zartmans theory makes up the focal point. Once past the theories, an empirical chapter about the peace process after the earthquake will be at hand. This chapter is going down two avenues where the political polite (their actions) and the internal political process are closer looked at. At the end of the chapter the empirical results will be put in context, this could be seen as a pre-conclusion argumentation. This is naturally followed by the concluding discussion which is ended with some final remarks. At last, references and appendixes will be presented. The interviews will not be published in whole (not even as appendixes) due to their extensive length in most cases, although they can be obtained from the author in either audio or semi-printed format.

2. Study Design and Methodology

2.1 Intro

An anonymous (foreign) researcher told me to put my methodology concerns 'up somewhere' since things would never work out the way you expected anyway. Even though I caught myself being confused quite often - the methodology concerns stayed at the right place. – From the study diary kept during the field work.

The ripeness theory, as shown, is mainly concerned with the elite’s decision making. To my knowledge, it does not really matter if the decisions been chartered in back-channel diplomacy, secret meetings or major conferences - it is the results produced that matters. As a result, one does not gain substantially to design the study around interviews with the political elite since the information you would get most likely have been printed in media already. Therefore, one is better off by verifying the political outcomes by analyzing reports in the media. This method of gathering information is by itself not sufficient since it is easy to miss out on certain events that are poorly covered by media or are only to find in a narrow field of the media. Consequently, there is a need of personal briefing on events and political outcomes. Discussions and interviews with experts will secure this ‘information gap’. The method being used regarding the media is that the paper will make use of the editorials from the quake-day and two month forward to get a proper stance of the newspaper. Editorials are preferred since they are usually expressing opinions rather than just report news statements. Two major newspapers from Pakistan (The Dawn, The nation) and two major from India (The Hindu,
The Tribune) will make up the material. According to Zeb and Chandran, political initiatives were of ‘status deadlocked’ just half a year prior to the earthquake. Assuming that the deadlock was present, this review will explore how the newspapers evaluate and weigh the political initiatives and prospects for the future in the post-quake scenario.

So, the chosen way to gain and secure information will combine text-analysis with interviews. The reason for using text-analysis in this study is two-fold. Firstly, to gather information about the elite’s political initiatives from the regular news. Secondly, to get an opinion about the elite’s political initiatives from the internal political process through editorial’s in the media. The primary goal of the interviews was to fill my ‘knowledge gap’ more than to get an opinion from the internal political process.

2.2.1 DEFINITIONS

The key concepts are mainly found throughout the theoretical chapters and are defined as they appear. A concept used throughout the paper is conflict. The idea of conflict is defined by Wallensteen as a social situation in which a minimum of two actors (parties) strive to acquire at the same moment in time an available set of scarce resources.21

One source of confusion could be derived from the number of names that label Pakistan-administered Kashmir and India-administered Kashmir. It should be clarified that Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK) and Azad Kashmir (Azad meaning free) is referring to Pakistan-administered Kashmir while Indian-occupied Kashmir or Indian held Kashmir is referring to the Indian-administered Kashmir.

2.2.2 OPERATIONALIZATIONS

This discussion will argue around the dilemma of how to measure the effects of the earthquake?

In this post-quake scenario one would rather be part of a ‘research team’ that could cover as many aspects, as deep as possible. But since this study is carried out by one person in a very limited time, the concepts being operationalized will reflect that.

The effects on the political elite will be operationalized as any direct or indirect effects of the earthquake on the political initiatives and counter-building measures in the post-quake scenario with regard to the Indo-Pak peace process.

21 Wallensteen 2002:16
The effects on the internal political process will be operationalized as (a) the views and attitudes expressed in the editorials and (b) the behavior of the militancy in the post-quake scenario with regard to the Indo-Pak process.

2.2.3 INTERVIEWS AND INFORMANTS

The purpose of the interviews was to receive a profound understanding of the very complex situation that this study tries to navigate through. The form of the interviews had to be semi-structured since academics could drift away on various related topics (based on personal experience). Since the inputs of the participants were not to be measured or used for any standardization, a very open and interesting discussion did occur in all cases. The interviews (the recorded material) lasted between thirty-five to sixty minutes. All interviews were (except for the group discussion) with senior academic researchers with great knowledge about conflict resolution or the Indo-Pak situation. As one might notice, all participants were men (except for the group discussion where the group was equal in gender). The gender issue has not been paid attention to since it should be irrelevant for this study. Although planning for potential informants was made before the field study was carried out, one had to be very flexible during the field-time and ‘catch the moment’ as it arrived. As the most interesting people to meet are the ones that usually stay most busy, major efforts had to be undertaken to see a few of the informants.

At Malaviya Center for Peace Research, interviews and several discussions related to this paper was made with its director and founder, Prof Priyankar Upadhyaya. Time and a group of distinguished students were appointed to me as I lead an hour-long discussion about the effects of the earthquake. At the center, I also participated in a four-day long workshop titled; ‘crafting peace through citizen diplomacy’, led by John Davies which is Co-Director, Partners in Conflict and Partners in Peacebuilding Projects and Adjunct Professor, Department of Government & Politics at University of Maryland. He also had an hour-long discussion related to the aftermath of the earthquake with me. In New Delhi contact had been undertaken with the private Institute of Conflict and Peace Studies even before arriving in India. Except for taking part in a conference, book discussions and interactive talks that partly could be linked with the study, Co-director Dr. Suba Chandran had a discussion related to this paper with me.

The premier think tank of strategic and security studies in India, Institute of Defence Studies and Analysis offered interesting discussions with Dr. Ashutosh Mishra and Dr. Ashok K Behuria. Several others of the faculty offered inputs and material related to the paper. Contact and visits was also
undertaken to the Swedish Embassy in New Delhi but as time run out no formal interview could be carried out with the people of interest there.

2.2.4 Ethical reflections

Even though this paper is not ‘empirically founded’ in interviews or long-term relationships with people in the field, there is however need to point out some of the ethical considerations taken. At all occasions in the field were I could be perceived as being in the ‘academic role’ and the respondent in a participating role a few things were made clear. These were; the purpose of the study, what the final product would be and the right to receive the results and conclusion of the study. At times when a recording device would be helpful, not only was the question asked if that would be tolerated but information was given that the audio recording could be switched off any time during the interview on request.

In the group discussion at MCPR where I was ‘appointed’ a group of students I made it understandable that there was an option to decline participation after stating the purpose of the study. As the recording device was not an option during the group discussion, there was an opportunity of submitting the thoughts in writing voluntarily. As for the relationship between me and the participants I am positive the benefits worked two-ways since most interactions were genuinely interesting and I showed gratitude for the information being given. To enforce the positive interactions, attention were paid to dressing in a culturally respectful manner when needed and careful attention paid to local customs.

3. Theoretical Framework

The theoretical approach is going down two avenues making use of Zartmans ripeness theory and Buzans theory dealing with security complexes. These will set the theoretical framework for the paper. Before introducing Zartmans ripeness theory, one must identify the regional security complex theory that constitutes the Indo-Pak situation. Thus, the initial theoretical approach will be carried out based on Buzans work (1991, 1998) and its contribution on the subject of regional security complexes.

In Buzanian security terms, ‘region’ is defined in People, states and fear as a ‘distinct and significant subsystem of security relations that exists among a set of states whose fate is that they have been
locked into geographical proximity with each other’.\textsuperscript{22} In \textit{Security: a new framework for analysis} one find that a security complex is defined as “a set of states whose major security perceptions and concerns are so interlinked that their national security problems cannot reasonably be analyzed or resolved apart from one another”\textsuperscript{23}

The reason for giving a distinct identity to regional subsystems is that two intermediate levels of analyses between system and state are established, more precisely ‘the subsystems themselves and pattern of relations among them’.\textsuperscript{24}

When Buzan define regional security, he argues that the primary building block that must be supplementary to power relations ‘is the pattern of amity and enmity’.\textsuperscript{25} By amity Buzan mean ‘relationships ranging from genuine friendship to expectations of protection or support’ and by enmity ‘relationships set by suspicion and fear’.\textsuperscript{26} Upon the base of these definitions, the regional security subsystems can be seen ‘in terms of patterns of amity and enmity that are substantially confined within some particular geographic area’.\textsuperscript{27}

When it comes down to identifying individual security complexes is all about ‘making judgements about the relative strengths of security interdependencies among different countries’.\textsuperscript{28} As shown in the empirical chapters later on, the regional security complex of concern in this study will be traced quite easily.

In evaluating and identifying changes in the patterns of regional security, one must see the subsystems as ‘with their own structures and patterns of interaction’.\textsuperscript{29} However, in a discussion concerned with change, Buzan states that ‘one faces the core theoretical problem of distinguishing what is significant from what is not’.\textsuperscript{30} To identify changes in the patterns of regional security and distinguish what is significant from what is not ‘one can use the idea of essential structure as a standard by which to measure significant change in a security complex’. In defining essential structure in a security complex, Buzan makes use of two key components that follows: (a) patterns of amity and enmity and (b) the distribution of power among the principal states.\textsuperscript{31}

\textsuperscript{22} Buzan 1991
\textsuperscript{23} Buzan et al. 1998:198
\textsuperscript{24} Ibid p 188
\textsuperscript{25} Ibid
\textsuperscript{26} Ibid p 188-189
\textsuperscript{27} Ibid p 190
\textsuperscript{28} Ibid p 192
\textsuperscript{29} Ibid p 209
\textsuperscript{30} Ibid
\textsuperscript{31} Ibid p 211
The idea behind this theoretical approach is that it allows one to analyze the regional security in static as well as dynamic terms. Buzan puts it as ‘if security complexes possess structures, then one can look for outcomes resulting from either structural effects or processes of structural change’.

In the security complex, the (b) distribution of power ‘shapes the possibilities of alignment’ while the (a) patterns of amity and enmity ‘shape the whole character of relations within in the region.’

This is summed up in *Security: a new framework for analysis* with ‘the formative dynamics and structure of a security complex are generated by the states within the complex – by their security perceptions of, and interactions with, each other’. As the foundation and the dynamics of a regional security complex are laid out, the next phase will deal with the concept of ‘ripeness’ and how to connect it with a security complex.

The theory and concept of ‘ripeness’ constructed by Zartman presents that there is a specific moment that is particularly favorable for a change in the tense relations in favor of a positive development that preferably is carried out as a negotiation process.

Before exploring the approach of ripeness, one must clarify that this is one of two approaches to the study and practice of negotiation. The other and longest standing in the discourse is promoting that the key to a successful resolution of conflict ‘lies in the substance of the proposals for a solution.’

Although the substance of the proposals for a solution is by definition important, this study will focus on the timing of efforts for resolution.

Zartman states that ‘ripeness theory is intended to explain why, and therefore when, parties to a conflict are susceptible to their own or others’ efforts to turn the conflict toward resolution through negotiation’. The theory reveal not only that the ripe moment concept centers on the parties’ perception of a *Mutually Hurting Stalemate* (MHS) but also that it is ‘optimally associated with an impending, past or recently avoided catastrophe’. Zartman describes the idea behind the concept: ‘..when the parties find themselves locked into a conflict from which they cannot escalate to victory and this deadlock is painful for both of them; ..they seek a way out.’ The reason why a catastrophe is one of the components in this theory is due to its providing of a ‘deadline or a lesson indicating that pain can be sharply increased if something is not done about it now’ In making the theory more

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32 Buzan et al. 1998:213  
33 Buzan et al. 1998:198  
34 Zartman, 2000:225
Following the discussion it comes to the perception of a way out, a necessary element for a ripe moment that is 'less complex and controversial'. In the perception of a way out, the 'parties do not have to be able to identify a specific solution, only sense that a negotiated solution is possible for the searching and that the other party shares that sense and willingness to search too.' In lack of the sense of a way out 'the push associated with the MHS would leave the parties with nowhere to go'. The definitional proposition by Zartman where he combines these elements follows as:

'If the parties to a conflict (a) perceive themselves to be in a hurting stalemate and (b) perceive the possibility of a negotiated solution (a way out), the conflict is ripe for resolution (i.e., for negotiations toward resolution begin).'

Logically, the greater the objective evidence of for example a disaster, the larger the subjective perception of a stalemate and its pain is likely to be. In identifying, the perception by both parties of a way out appears to be less difficult to map out than the subjective perception of a stalemate and its pain. Zartman notes that 'leaders often indicate whether they do or do not feel that a deal can be made with the other side'. This takes us to the next proposal which states,

'If the parties’ subjective expressions of pain, impasse, and inability to bear the costs of further escalation, related to objective evidence of stalemate, data on numbers and nature of casualties ad material costs, and/or other such indicators of an MHS can be found, along with expressions of a sense of a way out, ripeness exists.'

The objective elements of ripeness are defined by Pruitt as ‘circumstances under which a well-informed, dispassionate, and rational decision maker would conclude the negotiation is appropriate.’ But Zartman and many others, point to the fact that decision makers are often not very rational. Recent additions to the ripeness theory has been carried out to specify ‘(a) impediments to

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35 Zartman 2000:228
36 Illustration from Ripeness: The Hurting Stalemate and Beyond, p 230
37 Zartman 2000:228
38 Zartman 2000:228ff
39 Zartman 2000:231ff
recognizing or acting on objective elements of ripeness and (b) conditions that remove those impediments, thereby allowing a return to rationality’. Zartman addresses this problematique by pointing out that as costs mount, the impediments (called ‘resistant reactions’) tend to rise, making it more difficult to recognize a ripe moment in severe conflicts than moderate ones.

There are many solutions for overcoming impediments and allowing progress. The one of interest is the ‘recent or impending catastrophe’ as Zartman describes it. Many other researchers chose to call this phenomena the shock theory and Pruitt states that some authors ‘postulate that there will be a return to rationality when a sudden striking event – a ‘shock’ – jolts the mind and stimulates rethinking’.

4. The Peace Process after the Earthquake

4.1 Realization of a MHS and Indications of Ripeness

‘This [the earthquake] definitely boosted up ‘Brotherhood’ of both the countries’.42

When presenting indications of ripeness one must understand that ripeness only is a condition, it is not self-fulfilling or self-implementing. As Zartman puts it: ‘it must be seized’, either by the parties directly or through the influence of a mediator. Since the earthquake could provide the lesson signifying that pain can be harshly enlarged if something is not done about it at this time; it will work as a useful extension of the notion of a MHS. This takes us to one of Zartman’s definitional proposals that says ‘if the parties to a conflict perceive themselves to be in a hurting stalemate and perceive the possibility of a negotiated solution (a way out), the conflict is ripe for resolution (i.e., for negotiations toward resolution[s] to begin)’.43

In the following part all counter-building measures with significance that been carried out is to be presented. The counter-building measure that was most emphasized by the media as well as for professionals was the opening of five crossing points along the LoC.

Although this CBM is a great step towards a more normalized relationship it was carried out far too late to really make a difference for the original thought of ease the delivery of relief goods and

40 Pruitt 2005
41 Pruitt 2005
42 Group interview, student at MCPR, March 2006
43 Zartman 2000:228ff
reunification of divided families. The International Crisis Group notes that ‘India imposed constraints to prevent the misuse of the facility by jihadis, while Pakistan was as reluctant to open its side of the LoC to Indian humanitarian workers’. Further, the locations for the crossing points along the LoC was far from idealistic and the de facto number of people that crossed was low due to the visa regimes and the certain times crossings were allowed. On the other hand, Chandran notes that the interaction of the two Kashmiri societies is a positive thing on the societal level. Although this CBM is linked with major limitations, one must acknowledge the fact that this was the first time the Kashmiris were allowed to walk across the heavily militarized frontier in nearly sixty years.

The bus service that was mentioned as a CBM earlier in highlighting of the steps of normalization prior to the quake is worth mentioning even here. The bus service had just been operating from April 2005 when the quake shut down the route due to road damages. The bus service reopened in February 2006 and is sometimes referred to as the ‘peace caravan’ between the two Kashmiri capitals. Although only 816 people rode the bus last year and the present situation is bogged down in bureaucratic minutiae and security worries, the service is however still functioning. As this accord is viewed as a long-term arrangement between the two countries, it is worth to see as a major input to the normalization process.

Additional openings of road-rail links have also been taking place this year. The Lahore-Amritsar bus service was started in January followed by the night bus service from the border areas of Ferozepur and Fazilka to Ludhiana-Chandigarh in Punjab, which had been suspended during the days of militancy. The recent improvement of inter-state communications was seen in late March when PM Manmohan Singh flagged off the bus service between Amritsar-Nankana Sahib. As for railroad, India and Pakistan resumed a train service across the Thar desert in February that had been suspended 40 years since the second war between the two countries. Except for road-rail links, one much wanted improvement on air-links has been taken in early March when both sides agreed to allow private airlines to operate on routes as well as increased travel destinations and flights between the countries.

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44 ICG Policy Briefing, Asia Briefing N°46, 15 March 2006
45 Interview with Dr. Suba Chandran, IPCS, New Delhi
46 “Bus service has only brought disappointment to Kashmiris”, The Dawn, 8 April 2006
50 “Pakistan and India resume train service after 40 years”, Reuters, February 18, at: http://www.swissinfo.org/eng/swissinfo.html?siteSect=143&sid=6481738&cKey=1140258922000
Another CBM carried out after the quake was restoration of telephone links between Indian and Pakistani-controlled Kashmir that was cut fifteen years ago after militants took up arms against India. The restoration included centers in Jammu, Srinagar, Tangdar and Uri where telephone was offered free of charge. This service was complemented with a 24-hour line where people could call from their homes through an operator. BBC News also reported this move as being ‘widely welcomed by Kashmiris’. 52

In late March, a CBM was carried out to fight organized crime in the disputed region. Indian and Pakistan agreed to jointly fight human trafficking, counterfeit currency trade and illegal immigration. This was the first meeting in seventeen years between India’s Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) and Pakistan’s Federal Investigation Agency (FIA). Apart from the agreed procedures the two agencies ‘will also explore possible avenues of professional training and share experience in various fields of criminal investigation’. 53

After nearly sixty years of aloofness, India and Pakistan agreed in early May to develop trade and commerce between the divided regions of J&K. The trade and commerce are expected to start with commercial trucks between Srinagar-Muzaffarabad in the first half of July 2006. 54 At the time of writing, the specific goods of commerce and the amount of the trade has not yet been presented.

There has also been CBMs linked to the military after the quake, in early 2006 the Indian government has ordered a ‘redeployment’ of about 5000 troops in J&K to West Bengal following an ‘improvement’ in the situation. The defense minister of India argued that ‘the decrease in violence helped us take the decision’. 55

An additional CBM linked to the military was also carried out in early 2006. This counter building measure were an exchange between the government of Pakistan and India with their respective nuclear installations and facilities in accordance with Article II of the agreement on Prohibition of

51 “Pakistan and India agree to expand air service agreement”, Daily Times Site Edition, 8 March, at: http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/print.asp?page=2006\03\08\story_8-3-2006_pg7_6
attacks against nuclear installations and facilities between Pakistan and India the 31st December in 1998’. 56

4.2 THE INTERNAL POLITICAL PROCESS

Pruitt notes that many scholars have a persistent criticism of the ripeness theory since it lacks an internal political dimension. He states that the theory ‘is almost entirely focused on leader decision making’, which according to him ‘is a useful way station’. 57 In order to improve this, suggestions are made that ‘the theory needs to incorporate the internal political processes that influence – and often override or substitute for – leader decision making’. The incorporation of the internal political process as a dimension in this paper will go down two avenues.

Firstly, a summary will be presented on four major newspapers from India and Pakistan in trying to get a ‘feel’ of the opinion that could influence the decision making or reflect the people’s thoughts. Second, attention will be paid to militancy and counter-militancy initiatives in the internal political processes. These results will be put in context and analyzed in the next chapter, before one makes any conclusions.

4.2.1 THE INTERNAL POLITICAL PROCESS: NEWSPAPERS

The Dawn, the most positive of the Pakistani newspapers notes if trust is maintained, not only will tensions be eased but an understanding will be promoted that would enable a de-escalation on the emphasis on defence and security. This is further seen as a hopefully permanent trend that would ultimately lead to a peaceful resolution between the parties. As for the CBMs, ‘the speed and the scope of them have left a large number of Pakistanis confused and unsure of the real direction and sustainability of the current Indo-Pak process’. The CBM according to the editorial, ‘are measures both easy to adopt and even easier to sell to the general public’ but ‘can not be a substitute for purposeful negotiation’. As for the future a view is ‘considering that the peace dialogue with India is proceeding satisfactorily one can be optimistic about a normalization of relations with New Delhi’.

57 Pruitt 2005
The Nation notes that ‘as a rule, missfortunes wrought by nature ought to create good feelings even among adversaries’. It also notes that these good will gestures [CBMs and relief response] hopefully will continue once attention shifts to the serious political dialogue again.

This is about the only positive things that comes from the paper’s editorial in two month span. The CBMs like improved transit facilities or demilitarization of Kashmir will according to the paper ‘be of little use as long as the core issue remains unresolved.’ The editorial further notes that the ‘so-called CBMs are mostly to the greater benefit of India’. The prospects for the future are dark since ‘the failure to make a breakthrough is the result of the Indian obduracy reflected in its rejection of any suggestion Pakistan makes’. Another editorial notes that ‘in this scenario, there is no need for Pakistan to rush into searching for any solution that comes it way. It is only by sticking to our principled stand of a plebiscite, which has international legitimacy, that we can press our case’.

The Hindu notes that ‘it [the earthquake] certainly can give an impetus to dispute resolution’. Regarding the interaction along the LoC (even only for a short term), ‘it will represent significant movement towards the acceptance of the proposal for soft borders between India and Pakistan. This proposal is a compromise between Pakistan’s refusal to make the LoC the permanent international boundary and India’s rejection of any change in territorial status quo’. It further notes that the tragedy ‘has opened up the possibility of bringing two countries closer on an emotive issue, one that will strike an immediate chord with the peoples.

A warning finger is raised for the jihadi outfits and ‘there have been growing calls for a more aggressive line on Pakistan’. One editorial argue that ‘despite the growing vigour of the India-Pakistan dialogue, the Islamist jihad had continued apace. Few in India, however, understand the full scale and intensity of the Lashkar’s operations – or the hatred that drives them’.

The Tribune notes that ‘both countries seem to be inclined to shed the baggage of hate and mistrust. This time around, the beginning has the people’s support on both sides. The chances of its derailment are, therefore, remote. Encouraged by these CBMs, leaders of India and Pakistan are poised for bolder initiatives to restore normalcy in the region. As for the CBMs, ‘pakistanis mindset is yet to change’ since the country ‘has not been as forthcoming as it ought to be; ..it suspects every Indian move even if meant for purely humanitarian purposes’. In regarding prospects for the future, it could look better since one editorial states ‘it [Pakistan] has allowed most terrorist leaders to consolidate their support base by doing relief work in the earthquake-hit areas. Now they may find it easier to get fresh recruits for their destructive activities’.
4.2.2 THE INTERNAL POLITICAL PROCESS: MILITANCY

In covering the post-quake scenario with political initiatives, even with inputs by influencing opinions from major newspapers in the internal political process one lacks a dimension. This is the dimension of the major non-state actor in the process, the militancy and their initiatives.

The regional implications from the internal political processes in the following fortnight of the quake started with an upswing in terrorist activity in Jammu and Kashmir (J&K). The casualties reached 44 including the J&K education minister, these attacks were attributed by Indian authority to Lashkar-e-Tayyaba and other Pakistan-based jihahi groups. In crossover attempts from Pakistan-administered Kashmir, Indian forces claimed to have killed 46 militants.  

The increased mishmash of violence that was taken place after the quake reached new heights when the bombings in Delhi killed 62 people on the 29 of October 2005. Even though this event strained the relationship between Delhi and Muzaffarabad and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh told Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf that he expected Pakistan to ‘honour its promise to end cross-border terrorism’.  

A journalist made the conclusion that the improved Indo-Pak relations seen after the quake do not have any meaning for the militants. Except for being a troublesome element for both governments in the post-quake scenario, there is an argumentation that the jihadi groups wanted to dismiss the impression that the earthquake damaged their organizational capacity. The open jihadi presence in NWFP and Kashmir in the relief work forced Musharraf to react to Indian and western pressure and stated; ‘we have warned them that if we see any single activity of their involvement in anything other than welfare, we are not only going to ban them but we are going to get them out of that place’. The official view on the jihadi outfits could be categorized as somewhat schizophrenic since the jihad relief activity was described in censorious terms at the same time as Musharraf did nothing about them and the Interior minister even said that ‘they [the jihadis] are the lifeline of our rescue and relief work in Azad Kashmir right now’.

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58 The damaged facilities included The Jaish’s at Bagh, Hizbul Mujahidin’s at Jangal-Mahal, Harkatul Mujahidin’s at Balkot and Batrasi and Al Badr’s at Oghi. ICG Policy Briefing, Asia Briefing No46, 15 March 2006
59 “India sees foreign link to attack”, BBC News Online, at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/4393532.stm
61 ICG Policy Briefing, Asia Briefing No46, 15 March 2006
Security sources of Pakistan have identified at least seventeen banned outfits involved in the relief work in the quake-affected areas. They were present in NWFP and Azad Jammu and Kashmir (AJK) and some openly displayed banners and titles of their organization.\(^{64}\)

The fact that the military in Pakistan controlled the distribution channels of international aid caused International Crisis Group (ICG) to raise concerns over the preferential access that gave “both Islamist parties and banned jihadi groups opportunities to win local support in the immediate aftermath and weeks following the earthquake”.\(^{65}\)

“The quake has strengthened jehad” is one of the headings in the short article I was handed by Alok Bansal, research fellow at IDSA, New Delhi. The author argues that mainly two organizations of interest have won accolades for their participation in relief efforts. One is Muttahida Quami Movement, apparently a reincarnation of the Lashkar e Tayiba in a new name. The other organization, JuD, may play an even more ominous role in the relief operations. The author notes the irony that this organization which has been in the forefront of exporting terror in J&K and the rest of India has also been at the forefront in providing succor to the affected population in both NWFP and PoK.\(^{66}\)

### 4.3 Analysis of Empirical Data

#### 4.3.1 The Political Elite

As one goes back to Buzan, there is an important theoretical discussion about identifying changes in the patterns of regional security. As shown in the theory chapters, one has to face the core theoretical problem of distinguishing what is significant from what is not. In doing so, one can look for the essential structures that the security complexes possesses. The two components Buzan puts up are (a) patterns of amity and enmity and (b) distribution of power among the principal states. As the distribution of power not has changed noteworthy\(^{67}\) (both states still have WMD operational), the interesting thing is the pattern of amity and enmity, which also could be understood with the ripeness theory. Even though there was a positive trend in the development of Indo-Pak relations before the quake most of the informants describe the event in terms of that the earthquake ‘gave a push to the peace

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\(^{64}\) “17 banned outfits active in quake relief work”, The Nation, 23 October 2005.

\(^{65}\) ICG Policy Briefing, Asia Briefing N°46, 15 March 2006

\(^{66}\) “How the quake changed Pakistan”. The full article can be found at <http://in.rediff.com/news/2005/dec/09guest.htm>

\(^{67}\) Pakistan postponed the purchase of expectedly more than 50 fighter aircraft due to the earthquake. Full article ‘Pakistan postpones F-16 purchases’ from BBC News at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/4405818.stm
process’. So, in the patterns of amity and enmity, there is little argumentation in opposition to the view that developments has gone towards amity since the earthquake.

The positive developments seen in the post-quake scenario is also the basic reasoning underlying the MHS based in cost-benefit analysis, when parties find themselves on a pain-producing path they prepare to look for alternatives that is more advantageous. The pain-producing path could be seen in terms of the areas where the CBMs were carried out. How would the Kashmiri people, the people of India and Pakistan and the international community react if affected families could not reunite, communicate or get proper aid? As it takes ‘two to conflict’, there was also need for India and Pakistan to mutually find a way out from the pain-producing path that the earthquake created. This mutual way out from the pain-producing path is seen a sense of a way out in the ripeness theory.

The sense of a way out, as discussed, is supposedly less complex than a MHS but still perceptual. Zartman reveals the sense of a way out by stating that ‘the parties do not have to be able to identify a specific solution, only sense that a negotiated solution is possible for the searching and that the other party shares that sense and the willingness to search too.’ Nevertheless, I would argue that the sense of a way out is more complex than the MHS in this situation since the earthquake reinforced a distinct MHS and the sense of a way out is very blurred and difficult to chart. Apparently, there is a sense of a way out from catastrophe and its aftermath, but is there a sense of a way out from the other several areas of conflict between India and Pakistan? If the sense of a way out is related to the core issue(s) of the conflict one runs into problems evaluating the Indo-Pak situation. The common idea is that the parties express contrary views on the core issue, while Pakistan sees the status of J&K as the basis of difference; India argues that cross-border terrorism is the main conflict.

If one holds the view that the sense of a way is only related to the core issue, one must dismiss the present developments as some minor ‘side track’ diplomacy. However, there is support in Zartman’s ripeness theory that the sense of a way covers a more broaden view. He argues that parties resolve their conflicts only when they are ready to do so and at that point, ‘they grab on to proposals that usually have been in the air for a long time and only now appear attractive’. As indications of sense of a way out, Zartman use the leaders as they ‘often indicate whether they do or do not feel that a deal can be made with the other side’ (particularly when there is a change in that judgment). In the case of India and Pakistan after the quake, as shown, proposals of magnitude that have been in the air for

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68 From the interview with Dr. Suba Chandran. Dr. Ashok K Behuria used the phrase: ‘The earthquake has fasten the [peace] process.’ Both interviews were made in New Delhi, April 2006.

69 Zartman 2000:231
a long time have been carried out and the leaders have repeatedly indicated that deals can be made with the other side by implementing various CBMs.

### 4.3.2 The Internal Political Process

Not surprisingly, the editorial material is pervaded by an essentially ‘blame spirit’ which could be summed up in that India do not show any flexibility on the Kashmir dispute while Pakistan is accounted for the continuing terrorism. There is however enough published material to break out other opinions that occur between the lines. This would be 1) the increased Indo-Pak cooperation. This refers to the de facto increased collaboration between India and Pakistan after the earthquake. 2) Role of the CBMs. This will reflect the editorial’s view on the CBMs and their impact upon the peace process between India and Pakistan. 3) Prospects for improvements. This should be seen in light of Zartman’s ‘sense of a way out’.

In order to categorize each newspaper standing, an analysis of the editorial material has been done. The ‘+’ indicates a rather positive attitude to the issue while a ‘-‘ indicates a rather negative attitude towards the issue. In cases where the overall impression is positive or negative but there are a number of conflicting impressions that must be taken in account it is demonstrated by parenthesis that the opinion is somewhat divided but leans toward the first mark.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Issue (1-3)</th>
<th>Dawn (Pak)</th>
<th>Nation (Pak)</th>
<th>Hindu (Indian)</th>
<th>Tribune (Indian)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Increased Indo-Pak Cooperation</td>
<td>+ (-)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Impact of the CBMs</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+ (-)</td>
<td>- (+)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prospects for improvements</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>- (+)</td>
<td>+ (-)</td>
<td>+ (-)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Figure 1.2 Table of issues and ranking of the newspapers.**

Let us convert the results in the figure 1.2 to a scale (Fig. 1.3) were the ‘+’ and the ‘-‘ is operationalized as +1 respectively -1 and (+) respectively (-) is +0,5 and -0,5. This would lead to a result that the Pakistani newspapers combined measure -2 on a -6 to +6 scale where the Indian newspapers end up with +3. This express the total positive attitude towards the issues listed in the table.

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*30 Thirty-four editorials have been picked from the four newspapers in the period of 8 October to 8 December. These are presented in the references.*
As for the militancy, it is not possible to review any knowledge gained in charts as has been done with newspapers. There is however fairly easy to put the information in analysis and outline the most essential parts. Firstly, the militancy activities seen after the quake, did not break down the normalization process that was in place. I would argue that this is the central comprehension since peace processes or small steps in a new direction are sometimes followed by violence as it was in this case.

### 5. CONCLUDING DISCUSSION

Even though the earthquake struck close to the heart of one of the major territorial conflicts between India and Pakistan – mediation is still a voluntary process. Conflict resolution does not arrive per automatic; mediation has to be constructive, effective and the actors must be committed if any sustainable results are to be produced. But as argued, sometimes the timing is more important than the substance of the proposal to achieve what is sought for. What is sought for could be a thorny question since Pakistan and India, as shown, view the basis of the conflict differently and consequently seeks for different resolutions. Irrespective of the perceptual viewed core issue, one must give credit to improvements that is not directly linked to the core issue. If all actions not related to the viewed core issue are to be dismissed as meaningless side effects, it is difficult to see the point of paying attention to conflict resolution in the case of India-Pakistan.

Ripeness theory in its basic appearance, as shown, terms ripeness as a necessary pre-condition to negotiations; it does not however predict the outcomes of the negotiations. Therefore, the research questions must be answered in order since one is concerned with the stage up to ripeness and one is
concerned with the outcomes of the negotiations. The research questions will be restated and discussed in regard to the empirical material and the purpose of the essay.

The purpose of this study has been to apply Zartman’s ripeness theory on post-quake scenario to find out if the disaster has made the conflict ripe for resolution or more advanced mediation. To initially feed all curious minds, the respond in general to the purpose of this study would be that; the earthquake has not made the conflict ripe for resolution (as in final resolution) but definitely made it ripe for more advanced mediation. This overall statement is based on the coming discussion on the research questions in regard to the ripeness theory and the empirical material.

The first research question is concerned with the realization of a MHS by India and Pakistan and if there exists a sense of a way out among them. I would argue that as a result of the disaster and the impending MHS where pain would increase, the parties had no where to go than to sense a way out. The MHS seen in the post-quake scenario forced a sense of a way out due to magnitude and geographic location of the disaster. ‘It can’t go on like this’ is a catchy metaphor borrowed from Zartman’s theory that explain the situation rather good after the quake. Even tough this particular term was not used by the political elite of neither side; they did recognize the MHS and sensed a way out. This recognition of the objective evidence of stalemate in concert with the perception of a way out makes up the ripe moment. So, as ripeness has been established, where does it take us? Following the reasoning in the ripeness theory, one must conclude that time is ripe for India and Pakistan to negotiate toward resolutions. This brings us to the second research question which is concerned with if the ripeness stimulated the political elite to bring about any outcomes of negotiations.

It is rather uncomplicated (however important) to point out what the political elites accomplished in terms of outcomes in the post-quake scenario. It is by far more problematical to evaluate the impact of these outcomes. As shown earlier, one can make it easy and point towards the amity-enmity scale used by Buzan and make the overall conclusion that the Indo-Pak relationship has gone towards amity. However it is not possible for the paper to make any conclusions by how far, since standardized data has not been compiled. One source of information this paper employ to bring partial answer to this question, is to include parts of the internal political process. As shown, this way goes down two avenues by including both newspapers and the militancy activity. Starting with the Pakistani newspapers combined, one makes the conclusion that they are negative toward the CBMs carried out after the quake. The increased Indo-Pak cooperation does not qualify to the positive side either. As for prospects for improvements, they employ a slightly positive outlook. The Indian newspapers put least fate on the CBMs of all issues, and end up with a result that is neither positive
nor negative. As for the increased Indo-Pak cooperation, they have a very positive attitude. And finally, the prospects for improvements are measured as slightly more positive than the Pakistani newspapers. Before one make any conclusions by large of this information, the second avenue in the internal political process will be reviewed. Straightforward, the militancy and counter militancy operations continued its ‘normal procedures’ in the aftermath of the quake. There was not much more to it except for the raised concerns about the increased jihadi influence, as shown earlier.

Could one draw any conclusion from the internal political process? I would argue that these inputs from the internal political process could illustrate two things. Firstly, that the militancy needs to be engaged in the mediation process rather than just be condemned. As shown, the militancy did not reach a MHS along with the other parties; they did not sense a way out from the stalemate together with the other parties as they continued on their beaten track. The reason to include them is because they make up the major irritant to the ongoing peace process, an upswing in terror activity could put the process back to status quo or even worsen it.

The newspapers’ stated opinions could not be generalized to the respective populations, they could however be seen as an authority with influence in the internal political process. Even if they not bring about ‘the voice of the people’ in the editorials, I would argue that one can get a good understanding of the current political climate in the respective country. As the rhetoric is by far distanced from the political elite who employ more ‘fixed opinions’, one gain a lot by studying what is been told in the editorials. To conclude, the internal political process viewed through the newspapers editorials, is an irritant to the peace process and in some cases not ripe to the outcomes of the political elite. CBMs is the major tool used by the political elite to bring about outcomes and Pakistani internal process finds these negative or meaningless while Indians find these neither positive nor negative. The internal political climate in both states are however more positive towards the increased Indo-Pak cooperation and prospects for improvements.

Why did I state that the conflict is ripe for more advanced mediation as these irritants seem to be exploiting the ripe condition that came about after the quake? There are a few good reasons for why the conflict is ripe not only for continued mediation, but also more advanced mediation. First, the Kashmiri people were involved in the process (the openings along LoC and the bus between the two Kashmiri capitals). As the bus continuous to run, the foundation of an interaction process between the two people is at hand and could be expanded. As interaction should be seen like something important to bridge differences, suspicion and build trust; attention must be given to the several
other increased travel options created outside Kashmir after the quake too. As shown earlier, this included increased bus-linkage, re-opening of rail-road services and improvement of air-links. The trade agreement could play an important role for the regional economic growth in J&K since the region has been deprived of border commerce. This could also be a first step towards another area of mutual collaboration if the process is not bogged down by respective government.

The historical context of the dispute between India and Pakistan has a strong influence on all parties of the conflict and consequently on the likely outcome, therefore I would argue that further interaction on all levels must be taken to change the pattern. As this is ongoing, one can not refrain from being somewhat optimistic about the future.
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6.1 Published Sources

6.1.1 Literature


6.1.2 Articles


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7. APPENDIXES

7. Appendix 1a Northern Pakistan earthquake of 8 October 2005

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7. Appendix 1b the Kashmir Region